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"The materialist sociologist, taking the definite social relation; 
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SUMMARY
The thesis investigates the formation of a unified class identity 
among a highly sectionalised labour force, the shipbuilding workers of 
Clydeside. One episode is examined in detail, the work-in at Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders during 1971-72, which was a protracted campaign for 
the 'right to work’ by a. workforce whose jobs were jeopardised by the 
sudden banlcruptcy of the company.
The successive phases of the work-in are reconstructed through 
documents and records of the time including transcribed tape-recordings 
of the workers’ discussions and meetings. An attempts is made to show 
the detailed unfolding of the workers’ strategy end tactics in response 
to the internal and external pressures upon them to abandon or modify 
their objective of preserving both their own employment and the shipyards 
as functioning entities. It is suggested that the success of the 
workers in securing their objectives was contingent upon the ability 
of the shop stewards leading the campaign to forge and maintain a 
cohesive solidarity among the workforce, despite divisive sectional 
undercurrents. The work-in itself, although largely symbolic in nature, 
is shown to be the focus for national and international working-class 
solidarity and, in addition, to command the support of other sections 
of the population not normally identified with workers’ struggles. It 
is argued furthermore, that in posing certain fundamental questions 
about the future direction of the Scottish economy, this campaign for 
the right to work provided the initial focus for a broader anti-monopoly 
alliance to begin to talce shape as well as the context for demands for 
Scottish devolution. It is maintained that as a result the Conservative 
Government reversed their decision to reduce the scale of shipbuilding 
on the Upper Clyde and embarked upon a fundamental change in industrial 
policy which became known as the U-turn of the Heath administration.
(x.)
The UCS campaign is pinpointed within a period of rising working 
class militancy in the early 19?0's and it is suggested that it itself 
made a significant contribution to generating organised worker 
resistance elsewhere, not only to redundancy tlrreats, but to the 
broader social and industrial policies of the government. The wider 
Implications of the UCS campaign are examined therefore in terms of 
what is identified as a watershed phase in the development of post-war 
British capitalism. These and subsequent developments have raised 
several fundamental questions about the contribution of trade union 
struggles to political change and strategies for Socialism in 
contemporary Britain, The final part of the thesis examines these 
issues on the basis of the UCS study. It is argued that trade union 
struggle can be seen as the site of regeneration for a working class 
culture preserving within it historical memories of class experiences 
of resistance to exploitation. A Leninist redefinition of working class 
culture is offered which identifies its core,in an ideology of democracy 
and socialism deriving from the application of principles of solidarity, 
collectivism and struggle. Working class culture while based on trade 
union struggles is not necessarily therefore limited to purely wage 
militancy. Rather, it is a collective class inlieritance based on 
resistance to exploitation which is capable of providing an essential 
springboard to more revolutionary challenges. As such the thesis 
attempts to reinstate the central importance of the struggles of the 
organised working-class as the leading force in the general movement for 
social change.
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CHRONOLOGY
1971
12 June Rumours and press report of impending liquidation of UCS, 
Shop Stewards discuss tactic of work-in.
14 June Parliamentary announcement by John Davies that no further
government financial assistance to be given to UCS, STÏÏC 
and Tony Benn declare support for work-in,
15 Ju]ie Adjournment debate in Commons on UCS lasts seven. hou3?s«
Mass lobby of UCS workers leaves by special train for
London, Benn cites 'Ridley letters* as evidence of a
'plot against UCS*„ John Davies announces appointment of 
group of 'Wise Men* to produce reconstruction plan for the 
Upper Clyde.
21 June Mass mobilisation meeting of shop stewards at the Rosevale,
25 June First large public demonstration on UCS in Glasgow.
29 July Report of 'Wise Men* published recommending closure of
Clydebank and Scotstoun and reduction of labour force from 
8,500 to 2,500.
50 July Work-in begins at Clydebank yard.
2 August Second UCS parliamentary debate.
5 August Davies and Gordon Campbell visit Clydeside to discuss the
crisis,
4 August Harold Wilson visits the yards and appears to pledge 
support for the workers.
(x x ix )
10 August Second mass mobilisation meeting of shop stewards at
the Rosevale, this time on an all-Scottish basis and 
supported by trade union officials,
16 Augu.st STUC Special Congress on unemployment, Vic Feather
and Dan McCarvey come to Clydeside to give backing of 
official labour movement,
18 August Second large public demonstration on DCS in Glasgow
Shop stewards begin to travel throughout the countx'y 
seeking support from other workers,
19 August Archie Kelly decides to bid for the UCS consortium.
26 August Government reaffirms its plan to proceed with Govan-
Linthouse complex,
51 August Feather, McGarvey and Jack Service meet with Davies and
initiate a 'dialogue'.
1 September STUC Committee of Inquiry into proposed run-down of UCS 
begins to talce evidence.
6 September UCS shop stewards modify their demand for the preservation
of UCS intact to willingness to consider cumulative 
proposals concerning the four yards,
10 September Heath visits Glasgow but says nothing publically on UCS.
Behind the scenes discussions Inld with Stenhouse on the
formation of an embryo board for Govan and Linthouse,
(xxx)
17 September SIB report w i t  ten prior to liquidation, forecasting 
that UCS should shortly become profitable.
21 September Composition of the new board of Govan Shipbuilders
leaked to press,
22 September Connells demand that Scotstoun be included in any future
reconstruction of the yards. Stenhouse and Gilchrist 
met at the gates of Linthouse by UCS shop stewards and 
told to conduct their business elsewhere in future.
28 September UCS shop stewards malce token occupation of boardroom.
29 September UCS stewards meet McGarvey end Stenhouse in Glasgow hotel
for exploratory discussions, Stenhouse agrees to consider 
Scotstoun but not Clydebank for the new consortium,
50 September Stenhouse now agrees to consider all four yards.
5 October Davies tells McGauvey and Service that he will not provide
finance for Clydebank's inclusion and a.miounces to the 
press that time is running out.
6 October Shipowners with suspended orders at UCS deny putting
pressure on the government. UCS workers accuse Davies 
of ’blackmail’,
10 October McGarvey declares a ’compromise’ over Clydebank after 
discussions between the trade unions and the Irish 
Shipping Coy,over the placing of orders and threatens 
to call on the boilermakers membership to endorse his 
position.
(x x x i)
11 October UCS shop stewards repudiate McGarvey*s statement
publically and demand the release of new orders as a 
precondition to talks with government,
12 October ’Victoria Street' document signed between government
and CSEU finally initiating discussions on Govan • 
Shipbuilders, promisinga feasibility study for Scotstoun,
26 October UCS shop stewards concerned about the falling off in 
labour movement support publish explanation of the 
'Victoria Street' document in the Morning Star.
28 October First potential cracks in the unity of the campaign
appear with Scotstoun senior manag'ement, Govan caulkers 
and plumbers beginning to create problems.
1 November Mobilisation Scottish shop stewa,rds meeting on UCS at 
the Rosevale shows significant decline in numbers.
Public campaign loses some momentum.
5 November Stewards issue 'ultimatum' to government backed by threat 
to withhold launch and delivery of vessels in each ■ 
of the yards if resolution of the UCS crisis not quickly 
forthcoming,
16 November UCS shop stewards at a meeting with McGarvey, Service, 
the Irish Shipping Company and the liquidator agree to 
'guarantee' the delivery of the Irish orders and accept 
that none of these vessels be built in the Clydebank 
yard in return for a promise from the liquidator to place 
a resuscitated order there. Recriminations from Clydebank 
workers- over this.
(x x x ii)
28 December Davies meets stewards in Glasgow and warns them that 
formal discussions must begin with Govan Shipbuilders. 
The stewa,rds reiterate the position of no negotiation 
without a solution for Scotstoun and Clydebanlc, 
Feasibility study for Scotstoun increasingly unlikely 
to appear before new year. US interest in Clydebank 
also uncertain. Death of Stenhouse leaves Govan 
Shipbuilders without a chairman. The year ends on an 
inconclusive note.
1972
4 January Work-in resumes after holidays. Lord Strathalmond 
appointed new chairman of Govan Shipbuilders.
7 January McGarvey and Service leave for a week in the US to
explore possibility of Breaksea taking over Clydebank, 
Talks with Breaksea prove inconclusive but Marathon 
expresses interest in the yard.
20 January McGarvey comes to Glasgow for a 'showdown* with the
UCS stewards regarding immediate recognition of Govan 
Shipbuilders but all sections of the shop stewards 
remain united including the boilermakers.
21 January Six week 'holding position’ of no redundancies agreed 
to until further discussions held on Clydebank and 
Scotstoun.
( x x x i i i )
24 Jaaiuai'y
27 January
31 January
14 February
28 February
March
5 April
Shop stewards divide on the issue of whether to proceed 
to immediate confrontation by withliolding vessels at 
Govan, Scotstoun and Clydebank.
Stewards decide to allow launch of the New Westminster 
City in order to avoid crisis atmosphere during the 
Marathon negotiations. Marathon promises an early start 
to its operation. Problems among the women and lower 
paid workers in support for the 5Cp levy.
Mass meeting endorses stewards' decision but workers 
raise fears of a 'no-strike' agreement with Marathon 
and cessation of sectional bargaining.
Shop stewards receive assurances on Clydebank and 
Scotstoun and agree to begin ..omial talks with Govan 
Shipbuilders. Scottish Assembly convenes in Edinburgh,
Government accepts the Hill Samuel Report and ajxnounces 
£35 million to be made available to the new Govan Ship­
builders which will include Scotstoun with a total 
labour force of 4»3GO. Marathon begins to attempt to 
extract maximum favourable terms before further 
committing themselves to Clydebank,
Liquidator goes to US to try to speed up negotiations 
with Marathon,
Shop stewards suspend participation in talks with Govan 
Shipbuilders until government reaches firm agreement 
with Marathon. Marathon resubmits its bid to take 
advantage of new budgetary measures.
(xxx iv )
7 April Reid appeals to workers to retain unity during the last
phases of the campaign and warns against 'snatching 
defeat from the jaws of victory',
10 April Clyde Confederation officials sign Govan Shipbuilders
employment charter,
17 April Government confirms new orders for Scotstoun,
1 May Financial terms finally agreed between government and
Marathon, Mana-thon promises to provide over 2,000 jobs 
at Clydebank,
1 June Clydebank workers given prospect of redundancy money.
Work-in to receive holiday pay after some internal 
disagreement. Workers in each yard begin to back their 
own narrower interests,
30 June Government agrees to place interim orders at Govan in
anticipation of Govan Shipbuilders starting to trade in 
early September,
10 July 50p levy suspended until after holiday period and Govan
workers told that there will be no redundancy pay for them.
4 August All unions sign the Marathon agreement except the boiler-
makers whose traditional differential is threatened.
7 August McGarvey holds discussions with boilermakers in Glasgow
and is persuaded that the Marathon deal must be accepted. 
Ag]?eement signed within minutes of deadline.
(xxxv)
16 August Recriminations and divisions open up over Clydebank
workers' agreement to accept 10p bonus to complete 
vessels for the liquidator. This is construed as 
'run-dom* money by Govan workers who also fear they 
will be asked to accept retrained GlydebanJc men,
17 August Govan boilermakers demand re-employment of their work-in
members and retrospective payment before signing the 
Govan Shipbuilders agreement. Shop stewards attempt to 
ensure entire work-in re-employed,
24 August Other imions postpone signing the Govan agreement to 
preserve unity,
29 August Govan Shipbuilders offer to re-employ all boilermakers,
51 August Boilermakers go against advice of stewsards and local 
officials and reject Govan agreement by 20 votes,
1 September Boilermakers again reject agreement, this time by 200 
votes. The other unions go ahead with signing the 
agreement, Strathalmond gives boilermakers until 5 
September to sign otherwise will postpone operation. 
Boilermakers refuse to allow sheet-iron workers to be 
retrained as caulkers,
5 September Co-ordinating Committee denounces boilermakers for their 
sectionalism,
5 September Govan. Shipbuilders postpone starting date for a week. 
Boilermakers national official James Murray arrives 
in Glasgow for talks with Strathalmond and argues for 
separate negotiating rights for his members.
(xxxv i)
6 September Murra^y claims to teve won an immediate £2 interim
award for all skilled grades so boilermakers vote to
accept Govan agreement, Strathalmond immediately denies 
the offer.
16 September Joint union pay claim submitted at Govan Sliipbuilders 
ends sectional negotiations.
21 September Majority of Govan Shipbuilders boilermal-cers boycott
Clydebanlc meeting to discuss re-imposing the 50p lovy 
to assist redundant Clydebank workers duning the 
transition to Marathon. Leading shop stewards resign.
2 October Confederation officials call a joint meeting of Govan
Shipbuilders finishing trades to reverse the decision 
on the levy for Clydebank. Airlie and other leading 
stewards reinstated,
4 October Marathon and liquidator agree to minimise redundancies 
during changeover.
10 October Work-in ends after final mass meeting proclaims victory.
Introduction
On July 8th 1971 ÿ Norman A, Sloan, the director of the employers* 
federation in the shipbuilding industry, the Shipbui.lders and Repairers 
National Association, drafted a letter headed 'Personal and Private* 
to the minister responsible for that industry, Sir John Davies. The 
letter begins *My dear John* and is clearly a communication between 
two members of the establishment on familiar terms between whom 
confidences may be exchanged. The date, early July 1971; is significant 
for it was a mere three weeks since the government, by refusing to 
provide further financial aid to the company, had allowed the great 
shipbuilding consortium on the Upper Reaches of the River Clyde, Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd,, to go into liquidation with the threatened 
loss of thousands of shipyard workers* jobs It was also exactly 
three weeks prior to the workforce of that company after massive 
demonstration, lobbies and protest, embarking upon a new and historic 
form of resistance in defence of their 'right to work*, what was to 
become known as the UCS 'work-in*, The text of this letter, coming 
mid-way in this crucial six week span, makes interesting reading.
Here Norman Sloan speaks on behalf of his fellow shipbuilders regarding 
any moves to rescue UCS,
"Since the appointment of a provisional liquidator my members 
have sensed in their yards a realisation by their employees 
that Government will not continuously underwrite failure and 
that everybody must be prepared to earn their living. Ship­
builders consider that this is a very healtly sign and feel 
you should be advised of it.
We realise that you are presently being subjected to extreme 
militant pressure to preserve UCS in its entirety. I have been 
asked to express to you the view that this pressure is largely 
confined to the Glasgow az'ea and does not represent widespread 
public opinion in the country, I have also been asked to 
express the hope that the Government will not alter its original 
basic position as a result of militant pressure." (1)
Over the course of this six week period the Government had indeed 
been subjected to 'militant pressure*. However, no doubt bearing 
in mind the more discreet pressure from Norman Sloan and his members, 
it had decided,after due consideration, not to 'alter its original 
basic position*, UCS was to be allowed to go dovm all hands on board.
In other circumstances the shipbuilding employers had stridently 
demanded and received huge government subventions to help prop up 
ailing parts of the industry. It was not, however, the behind-the- 
scenes influence that could be exerted by one group of employers 
which was the decisive factor in shaping the decision of the then 
Conservative administration of Edward Heath to remain undeflected 
from its chosen course. Rather it was a deeper declared ideological 
commitment to allow the inexorable logic of the 'laws of the market* 
to work out regardless of the social and human consequences for the 
lives of thousands of workers and their families. This was the issue 
which the collapse of UCS posed so starkly - people or profits - the 
placing of economic priorities before social ones.
Yet^  within a matter of a few months these priorities had been 
massively, if temporarily, rearranged by the action of the Clydeside 
workers and the response which their struggle evoked in the entire 
British working-class movement and beyond, as the Conservative 
government gracefully executed its historic *U-tum*. The 'militant 
pressure* of which Norman Sloan had written by no means remained'confined 
to the Glasgow area* but became generalised across the whole country 
supported by an increasing 'widespread public opinion*, UCS became 
the first successful point in a conflagration that was eventually to 
engulf the Heath government as the working class moved into action 
to resist government policies across an entire range of industrial and
social issues. At the historical level tliis thesis sets out to 
record a key episode, the UCS work-in, during a period of rising 
class conflict, a period moreover that has been of major significance 
in shaping the current contours of the relations between capital and 
labour in the 1980's.
The core of the thesis is therefore an historical narrative 
which portrays the changing tempo and developing phases of the 
protracted struggle of the workers on the Clyde over a period of 
some sixteen months, from the summer of 1971 to the autumn of the 
following year, around the issue of the right to work. There are in 
fact remarkably few accounts in contemporary industrial sociology 
which actually examine the detailed unfolding of the strategy and 
tactics of the class war as it is fought out in open confrontation, (2) 
In attempting to reconstruct the workers' struggle^ recordings made 
during these months of major mass meetings and of the deliberations 
of the UCS shop stewards themselves, have provided an Invaluable 
resource supplemented by the more usual documentary and Interview- 
based data. They have in a certain sense enabled the writer to act 
as a kind of retrospective participant observer with priviledged 
access to an inner chamber of the class. The changing sequence of 
events is viewed through the eyes of the workers at UCS and is spoken 
through their voices. In this respect this thesis should be seen as 
standing in the tradition of and essentially complementary to those 
sociological and political studies which have sou^t to recreate the 
experiential immediacy and complexity of working-class life under 
capitalism, (3)
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In saying tM.s it should be made clear that what is at stake is 
not simply a convenient or fortuitous stylistic device. The need 
for a close-grained historical reconstitution of the central moments 
of the workers’ struggle has a compelling theoretical priority which 
addresses itself to a more general disturbing lack of concrete • 
specification in contemporary theory-malcing. As Nichols and Beyion 
have appositely remarked,
"so much of what passes for 'theory* (even Marxist theory) 
fails to connect with the lives that people lead, whereas 
most descriptive social surveys too often fail to grasp 
the 8tincture of social relations and the sense which people 
make of them. It is almost as if another way of ^nriting 
has to be developed; something which 'tells it like it is* 
even though in any simple sense this is not possible; 
something which is theoretically informed yet free from 
theoretical pretentiousness, and which destroys the gap 
between the abstract and the concrete," (4)
The discipline of connectiveness, the demand that analytic 
categories do not assume pre-eminent refinement for their omi salce, 
or at least for the sake of a presumed and complicit audience, is 
not, however, an excuse for a 'retreat into naturalism*. Theorisation 
and not merely reportage of social and historical 'realities* remains 
the primary responsibility of progressive social science and the most 
valuable recent studies have attempted to fulfil,1 that obligation. 
However, all unnecessary barriers to accessibility by those who are 
in a fundamental sense the makers of history must be removed by 
those who seek to rescue and return that history to the class, a 
task which has both a political and an intellectual dimension, (5)
VAiat is presented in this thesis then is not a 'neutral* account 
nor indeed, axe its central theoretical preoccupations 'impartial* 
with respect to the outcomes or uses to which this work may be put.
It is an intervention in a wider debate about the nature of working-class
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consciousness and the varied social responses to the structural 
inequalities of capitalism, a debate which too often has lacked any 
substantial empirical basis in the lives of ordinarjr people and their 
struggles. (6)
The problem may be phrased in historical terms. Marx predicted 
that with the development of capitalism there would be a greater 
homogenisation of the working class, the levelling out of differences 
in the forms of conditions of wage labour, as workers become 
increasingly mere appendages to the machine. Whatever the longer- 
term tendencies working tlirough the capitalist mode of production, 
it is evident that there are a number of 'intervening* factors which 
complicate this picture. Among the more cogent critics of Braverman's 
'de-skilling® thesis, for example, have been those such as Eiger who 
have commented upon "the specific, differentiated forms assumed by 
socialised labour today." (Y) Stuart Hall has likewise noted that 
capital produces.
"both the massification and the * simplification* of labour, 
as one of its tendencies; but also, equally "necessarily®, 
the internal divisions between skilled and the unskilled, 
the distribution of skills into different branches of 
production, as 'Modem Industry* seizes on them and transforms 
them xmevenly. (8)
The problem in short,as Hall observes is
"how the production of two, opposite tendencies in capital’s 
contradictory development decisively intervenes between 
any simple notion of the 'inevitable cohesion of the proletariat* 
and its actual realisation under the new conditions of capital's 
historic organisation," (9)
Of particular relevance here, especially in view of the subject 
matter of the present study, are the detailed investigations carried 
out by Brown, Brannen, Cousins and Samphier among shipyard workers in
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the North-East during the late 1960's. In a series of articles the 
Durham group of sociologists have challenged the characterisation by 
David Lockwood among others of shipyard workers (along with miners 
and dockers) as archetypal 'traditional proletarians* imbued with 
class consciousness and inhabiting a solidaristic socially homogeneous 
geographical community, (10) Rather, the Durham group point to 
multiple sources of division among the labour force which preclude 
the automatic ascription of any cohesive working class consciousness 
to such workers. In particular, it is argued, occupational divisions 
have produced a sectionally highly differentiated pattern of group 
affiliations only partially 'modified* by any ties of friendship, 
kinship or residence. (11) It should be clear that Lockwood's 
stereotype of shipyard workers with their 'dichotomous or two-value 
power model* or 'image* of society has to be seen as counterpointing 
the stereotyped 'privatised* workers of the 'new working class* 
motivated in the main by a strictly 'instrumental* or 'pecuniary 
model* of society. (12) In this respect the work of the Durham group 
is a useful corrective to rather vulgar oversimplifications which 
until recently had threatened to assume the stature of standard 
sociological orthodoxy. What these writers have done is to raise the 
general question of the contradictory dynamics of c3-ass solidarity 
and sectional fragmentation in the working class which this thesis 
examines through an historical case study.
The interplay and opposition of unifying and distancing forces 
within the working class is an issue which lies at the centre of any 
analysis of working class culture and its ai’ticulation with and 
against the dominant cultural formation. It is raised in a visible 
and draimatic way by the unfolding events on the Upper Clyde. Thus 
while there have been several published accounts of these events,
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at least two of which have purportedly told 'the workers' story*, 
none with the exception of the preliminary work of Hay and McLauchlan 
have done more than provide a gloss on the retarding influence of 
sectional identities on the development and maintenance of class 
consciousness among the workers. (13) Yet unless this retarding 
influence is understood then the full significance of just what was 
achieved at UCS in terms of a unified class solidarity cannot be 
properly comprehended. It is also otherwise impossible to specify 
the particular contribution of the work-in to the development of wider 
working class culture.
Bearing in mii.\d the earlier strictures concerning the need to 
concretise theory, chapter one begins therefore by attempting to 
uncover the historical roots of both seotionaliam and solidarity 
among the labour force in the Clydeside eliipbuilding industry. The 
following chapters,two through to eleven, detail the successive phases 
of the work-in campaign and in particular, elaborate the internal and 
external pressures which the workers* leadership faced in attempting 
to preserve unity in the course of a lengthy and difficult campaign. 
Chapter twelve then draws together some of the wider implications of 
this struggle in terms of the significance of UCS for the fight 
against redundancies in the early 70*8 by workers elsewhere. The 
role of the Communist Party in the events at UCS and as a complement 
to this the subsequent political and union career of one of the leading 
workers* spokesmen is then examined. The impact of UCS on the question 
of national self-determination in Scottish politics is also discussed 
along with the more general question of the Conservative government's 
U-turn on regional and industrial policy. Finally some comments 
and observations are offered on the developments since UCS at the
Clydebank yard and at the nationalised Govan Shipbuilders yard.
Chapter thirteen attempts to return to the question of sectionalism 
and solidarity, in terms of the broader debate which has been opened 
up around the work of Eric Hobsbawm on the obstacles facing the 
further progress of the British working class towards any realisable 
goal of a, socialist society. This work is of seminal importance 
since it has provoked many commentators to speculate upon the political 
lessons which may be dram from the militant struggles of the early 
1970*8. The UCS work-in was of course central to those struggles 
and in many pertinent ways the present challenges and possibilities 
facing the working class spring directly from this watershed period 
of development. With few exceptions, however, most have drawn 
rather pessimistic conclusions about the limitations of the achieve­
ments of this period of militancy and indeed, of trade union militancy 
in general. By contrast, it is argued here that on the basis of a 
closer analysis of the UCS struggle and its surrounding circumstances 
there are reasonable grounds for at least a cautious optimism; that 
UCS revealed real possibilities for more radical change initiated 
by the organised working class in alliance with other groups and 
social strata.
Finally, to return to the central underlying theme of this 
thesis, it is argued that the notion of working class culture as the 
expression of an historical class experience of struggle and 
resistance to social inequality should be delimited and distinguished 
from the rather eclectic uses to which the term is currently put.
An attempt is made to relocate the notion of working class culture 
within a more classical Leninist purview. This emphasises its
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embryonic character developing tiirough class struggle into a 
coherent social identity based upon an oppositional ideology of 
socialism and democracy which can at critical moments displace 
even deeply rooted sectional attitudes and perspectives.
10,
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Chapter One 
THE ROOTS OF SECTIONALISM AND SOLIDARITY,
(i) The Evolution of the Shipbuilding Labour Force,
/•
Several ^n?iters have commented upon the * craft-like® nature of 
much of the labour force in the shipbuilding industry. (l) How it 
came to assume this craft character is of some importance and is 
worthwhile recapitulating here briefly. (2) The early craft societies 
were mutual benefit and insurance bodies with links going back to 
the medieval handicraft guilds. Until the nineteenth century the 
building of sailing vessels of wood and sail had been the work of 
a handful of handicraft artisans such as shipwrights, riggers, 
joiners and carpenters assisted by unskilled labourers. Of these 
it was the shipwrights who were known as the primary trade of 
'shipbuilders'. However, in the nineteenth century the division 
of labour changed with a rapid proliferation of new trades 
required by the introduction of metal and steel hulls and steam 
engines and with increases in the size and complexity of the 
vessels themselves. This division of labour, however, did not 
come about initially through the subdivision of the traditional 
shipbuilding trade. Indeed, for a long time the ship^ -frights 
whose traditional tools were the adze and the mallet refused 
to work with the new materials coming into the industry. (3)
The result was that the employers began to recruit labour’ from 
elsewhere to fulfill the new needs which had arisen. By the time 
the shipwrights realised that their position might be threatened 
by these developments their position of dominance was irretrievably 
lost and the new metal trades had established a permanent position 
for themselves with their own forms of craft protection and apprentice­
ship organisation, an important factor in sha.ping the future pattern
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of trade unionism in the industry. Pollard and Robertson comment 
regarding the impact of the technological clianges on the shipvrrights 
which eroded their central role.
"They were restricted to drawing the lines of hulls, shaping 
the frames, and launching the vessels as well as performing 
heavy timber vmrk on board. They also supplied molds for 
the components, plates, and bars, which iron workers then 
shaped and assembled." (4 )
Eventually the work of the shipwrights and the related trades 
that subsequently evolved.from them, accounted for less than a 
tenth of the work on iron and steel vessels. This narrowness in 
outlook, is one peouliairity of the craft mentality which can be 
dangerously disabling for the group of workers concerned and features 
in a variety of manifestations throughout this account.
For the early builders of the new types of vessel it meant 
that the skills they required needed to be borrowed from other 
industries. Since each vessel was 'custom-built* and the industry 
was not susceptible to mass production techniques this meant that 
there was an influx of new labour into the industry comprising 
tradesmen who "could retain their identities as skilled workers even 
though they were employed as wage labourers in large concerns," (5) 
V/here there were not already in existence the skilled groups required 
for the new methods of construction they were, according to Pollard 
and Robertson, created by the promotion of semi-skilled or unskilled 
labourers.
"The iron workers, frequently promoted from unskilled labourers, 
developed into such separate trades as platers, angle-iron 
smiths, riveters, drillers and their necessary holders-up and 
assistants; the engineering trades developed independently, 
yet on a parallel line, into fitters, turners and drillers; 
other metal trades, including foundr^anen, brass and copper 
workers, and finishers found employment in the yards; in the
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larger centers the shipvn?ights split early into riggers, mast 
and block makers, and caulkers; and finally improved construction 
and amenities brought painters, cabinet-makers electricians, 
and plumbers into the shipyards." (6)
The proliferation of trades in shipbuilding therefore proceeded by a 
process of "accretion". As a result of the complex assembly nature 
of the industry requiring the input of a whole range of skills in 
the construction of hulls and the subsequent fitting out of vessels, 
the industry assumed the character which it has retained to this day 
of a high ratio of skilled workers compared to other branches of 
engineering and mass production, with perhaps as many as two-thirds 
of the workforce being classified as skilled craft workers. (7)
If the original shipbuilding craftsmen were unable to retain 
control over the materials with which they worked they were a,t least 
able to attempt to secure control over the one vital feature in the 
preservation of craft status, the supply of competitive labour, 
Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer observe,
"A craft relies upon control over entrj’- into a trade through 
apprenticeship, and upon reserving certain jobs for apprenticed 
craftsmen. Thus their pay and conditions of work are protected 
and improved through control over the supply of labour for 
certain jobs," ( 8)
Tills control was by the system of seven year apprenticeship in which 
not merely the skills of the trade were transmitted, often albeit in 
a rather haphazard manner, but also a profound sense of occupational 
identity. Eldridge has remarked upon the sociological implications 
of this pattern of recruitment to the craft group in shipbuilding,
"It is traditionally the y q t j  nature of a craft to demand entry 
to the trade through apprenticeship. In this way the mystery of 
the craft is passed on from generation to generation. Tricks of 
the trade, standards of worlcmanship, pride in one's work, are the
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marks of such a sociological inheritance involved in the transmission 
of skills. This mode of recruitment makes for a clear social 
definition of group membership and a homogeneous group composition,’’(9)
Among some craft groups such as the boilermakers elaborate admission 
rituals symbolically underlined the special and closed nature of 
the group. (10) Nevertheless the boilermakers and indeed the shipv/rights 
took the additional precaution, should socialisation techniques prove 
to be inadequate, of signing up apprentices as half members until 
they qualified as journeymen, in order to prevent then being used as 
strike breakers.( 11 )
Exclusivity in terms of competence to perform certain 
tasks has been a primary element in the formation of craft identities. 
Traditions play an important part in preserving the knowledge and 
patterns of behaviour which comprise this special competence.
However, as'Flanders points out, such traditions are not simply 
accepted because they have been sanctified by the passage of time.
Their role as "sheet anchor of the group's goals and values" derives 
from the fact that "they embody for the group the lessons of its 
corporate social experience" to be transmitted, often by vmrd of 
mouth, from generation to generation, ( 12) What might be described 
as the cultural legacy of the craft is identified by Eldridge as 
a feature in ensuring the persistance of a socially cohesive group 
identity which contains an important'moral* dimension, (1?) Such 
a, moral or ideological imderpinning to the particular 'personality® 
of a group or trade is revealed in the advancement of exclusive 
claims to certain types of work as their particular 'birthright® to 
be preserved at all costs. This sense of a moral element is clearly 
shoim in the Webbs' discussion of nineteenth century shipbuilding 
workers demands to preserve their 'right to a trade*. ( I4)
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" *We are fighting this battle®, declared the United Pattern­
makers* Association in 1889, 'on the principle that every trade 
shall have the right to earn its bread without the interference 
of outsiders; a principle jealously guarded by every skilled 
trade...and one which we are fully determined shall likewise 
apply to us*. 'It is our duty *, declared the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers, * to exercise the same care and watchfulness 
over that in which we have a vested interest as the physician 
who holds a diploma or the author who is protected by a copy­
right*. 'The machine*, says their Tyne District Delegate in 
1697 *no doubt is part of the employer's invested capital, but 
so is the joume;>TDan*s skilled labor*. The associated Ship- 
m'ights* Society expressly stated in 1893* with reference to a 
new dispute on the Clyde, that 'while we do not object to any 
firms dividing their works into departments, or sub-letting 
portions of the vessels they are building still we do most 
respectfully and emphatically contend that no employers should, 
in suiting their convenience, give away another man's means of 
living, any more than that no workman would be al.lowed or 
justified to go into an employer's office and take his money 
from his safe and give it to another*. 'The sacredness of 
property*, vrrites the Liverpool delegate of the Engineers in 
1897; *is surely applicable to labor, which is as much our 
property as the lathes are the property of the employer*." (15)
The historical tenacity with which demarcation disputesbetween rival 
trades have been fought in the industry derives in part from this 
ideological overlay to craft social identities resulting in a highly 
sectional mentality* It should be understood however, that sectionalism 
as a factor governing inter-trade relations has its real basis in 
the general conditions of insecurity which have historically marked 
the shipyard workers* lives. While it became possible to attempt to 
exert control over the recruitment and training of labour in the 
craft, it was less possible to control the impact of teclinological 
claange in the industry.
Each trade could distinguish itself from the other by the types 
of materials and^  although increasingly less so, the character of the 
tools with which it worked. So long as technical improvements fell 
within the province of a particular trade there were few problems. 
Difficulties arose when it became arguable that certain kinds of
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work were the legitimate property of more than one trade or a 
certain kind of tool could enable more than one trade to claim 
that work as their own. An example, the roots of which go back to 
the days of changeover from wood and sail, is the continuing 
demarcation problems between the shipvrrights and the platers which 
were only really tackled when the two trades came together in 
the Boilermakers* Society in the early 1960*s. (l6) Earlier 
demarcation problems about who should work with what materials under 
which circumstances were in fact compounded by the introduction of 
préfabrication and welding into the industry.
Welding has probably been the most significant technical 
development in shipbuilding in the twentieth century. (17) Its 
first application was outside shipbuilding and it came into the 
industry originally in ship repairing. The first all-welded vessel 
of any size was built by Cammell Laird in I92O but not until the 
1930*8 did it become more widely adopted. Parkinson in hiü discussion 
of welding comments on the employers* initial reluctance to introduce 
the new teclinique,
"In the main the reason for the slow acceptance of welded ships 
was of a technical nature. The early welds tended to be brittle, 
and shipowners doubted (and with considerable justification) 
whether welded connections cou.ld stand up to the full strains 
they would be subjected to in large ships," (I6)
Lloyd's Register also doubted the reliability of welded ships which 
only really became acceptable with the introduction of the coated 
electrode making possible a more reliable weld. It was the conditions 
of wartime production, specifically the desire to save weight in the 
construction of warships which led to a wider introduction of welding, 
particularly in the United States, in the construction of Liberty and
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Victory shipsl^^îliveting still remained but its role was quickly 
reduced in the construction of new vessels to that of 'crack- 
a r r e s t e r s * l i n e  of rivets would be placed on the hull soif the 
welded structure cracked due to faulty construction stresses, the 
cracks would run to the rivet holes and allow the strain to be 
relieved there. Special steels less susceptible to brittle 
fracture began to be utilized in parts of the vessel most liable to 
strain and'it is possible that without such improvements there may 
have been a tendency to revert to riveted ships in the post-war 
period. Be that as it may, Parkinson suggests that with vreight 
reduction and resistence reduction due to the smooth hull of a 
welded ship costs of construction could be reduced by ten pei 
cent or more, (21)
Welding brought important changes in other shipyard producLion 
methods. In particular, it facilitated indoor working and the 
consequent préfabrication of units under cover rather than their 
assembly on the berth. The actual process of welding is more easily 
carried out under shelter and it became possible to turn large 
sections in welding bays with the use of cranes to ensure that 
difficult welds could be performed in a dovmhand position. This 
also made for grealer accuracy of welds and facilitated constant 
checks on the quality of the work done. Building under cover, in 
turn, gave rise to a complete change in the layout of the berths, 
cranes,Milding and storage areas needed as well as in managerial 
organisation and working practices, although in the generally 
cramped physical location of the British shipyards, limitations 
were imposed upon the reorganisation process which meant that ship­
builders were not able to take as much advantage of these changes
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as in certain other countries, (22) So far as the platers and the 
shipwrights were concerned, bitter disputes arose between them as 
to who should be responsible for * jhiring* the pre-assembled units 
on the vessel. As it happened-both trades felt severely threatened 
by the new developments,
Finlay Hart, then a leading wartime Clydeside steward vividly 
described some of the changes in working practices which the rapid 
expansion of welding at this time led to.
"All trades are affected by the extension of the welding 
process. Some gaJ.n, others lose. For example, blacksmiths 
who did all their welding on the fire, are now finding much 
of their work being done by electric welding. That means a 
loss of work to them. On the other hand the ship plumbers 
who substituted welded flanges on pipes for rivetted flanges 
before the last war are now making up all kinds of fittings 
such as chests and valves etc,, which were previously made 
of cast iron, thereby taking work away from the moulders.
That in turn affects patternmakers, so we can see how large 
scale introduction of welding brings about many changes in 
the industry.
The most apparent changes, however, are seen in the way 
welding and the new profile burning machines affect platers, 
riveters,', caulkers and drillers. Both processes permit a 
much simpler construction and thereby eliminate a great deal 
of the work of these trades. There are many examples of 
where with the introduction of welding and préfabrication it 
has meant a displacement of platers. This situation has been 
causing a certain amoung of alarm among platers, while riveters 
and caulkers, too are concerned about their future," (23)
Wh.en welding was first introduced by the employers in the mid­
thirties they proposed to create a, new class of workers to be kno;m 
as 'ship welders® which was strongly opposed by the trade unions who 
felt that the new machines should be operated by the members of the 
union whose work was displaced. Fearing that the•employers * proposal 
was a way of undercutting wages the boilermakers thereafter organised 
the welders as a result of an agjz-’eement between the unions in 1934* (24) 
Welders became a trade within the Boilermakers® Society and there
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was an agreement on interchangeability between them and platers, 
caulkers, riveters etc,, when redundancy ocoui’red in one trade and 
there was a shortage of labour in another. However, the increase 
in the amount of welding and a growing tendency to redundancy in 
other sections led to welding becoming largely 'diluted' . 'Time- 
served* welders became increasingly craft-conscious as they sav/ 
their conditions being threatened,especially by the large numbers of 
welders who had been trained during the war. (25)
"They look on themselves as the orphans who will have to make 
room for other members in the Society without a possibility 
of the position ever being reversed." (26)
It can be seen from this that sectional attitudes within a union 
also have their roots in conditions of insecurity. In fact, the 
welders quickly supplanted the platers as the highest wage earners 
in the yards being paid on a piece-work basis. Once at the top of 
the earnings league they did everything in their power to retain 
that position. Platers engaged on the assembly of large sections 
were prevented from ma king simple taclc-vrelds which hold steel 
members in position before they are finally welded together even 
though they had the required skills to do so. Demarcation rules 
were enforced to retain the welders*monopoly because as Parkinson 
pointed out.
"if ever tack welding becomes a generally accepted accomplishment 
of other trades, the essentially semi-skilled nature of most 
welding operations would be exposed and the carefully guarded 
monopoly of the welders broken down." (27)
To some extent, it will be shown, this in fact eventually occurred 
on the Upper Clyde, Alexander and Joiklns similarly point out the 
basically simple nature of tack welding in particular,a job quite
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within the competence of other steel trades but often resulting in 
delays while workers waited for a service welder to appear. The 
authors note,
"However, the shop stewards were always anxious to protect any 
encroachment on 'their* trades and did the utmost to preserve 
the mystique.of the craft from interlopers," (28)
It should be remembered, however, that while many aspects of welding
are not of a highly specialised natur’e there are certain forms of
welding that are highly skilled. Indeed, high technical standards
are enforced by such bodies as Lloyds and the A.dmiralty who provide
classification trade teats of welders'skills. According to information
given by Alexander and Jenlcins, only twenty per cent of welders in
Fairfields were able to achieve Admiralty standards first time, (29)
By implication then, although they may be loathe to admit it to
other trades in the yards, clearly there are welders and 'welders',
although open disputes between members of the same trade are rare.
Doubtless also the same is true of the variability in the skills
of other trades. Although therefore, the ideological component of
sectional identity may be important in bolstering their claims to
continuing superiority over other trades,it is important to recognise
that these claims are based on a certain reality, A welder may
continually have to 'prove* his skills by submitting to tests each
time he goes for a job and more than, a few mistakes subsequently will 
result in his dismissal.
Nevertheless the fact remains that most demarcation boundaries
between trades are fixed not by some objective impartial standard 
but by custom and practice which varies from yard to yard. It is 
the "ai’tificiality" in many instances of these bomidarjies which 
makes changes in working practices consequent upon technical develop­
ments so contentious. (30) The fact that the workers themselves
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know that these boundaries are to a degree "conventional* in no 
way lessens their significance. Indeed, precisely because they 
are liable to be contested they may be defended all the more 
fiercely. Most commonly disputes have occurred within groups of 
trades where there is some overlap in skills, that is, among the 
workers concerned with the construction of the hull or azaong the 
fitting out and finishing trades, the main exceptions being disputes 
between boilermakers and fitters. (31) Thus Roberts observes,
"The most extensive overlaps occur between metal shipvrrights 
and platers, over erecting and fairing plates and sections; 
between wood shipwrights and joiners, over wooden outfit work; 
and between plumbers and fitters over pipework," (32)
This may be described as horizontal inter-trade sectionalism.
However, although demarcation disputes have been seen by the employers 
as a major cause of the industry's problems, in reality, although 
they have at times been a cause of production delays their harmfulness 
has been much exaggerated, Roberts, for example, calculates that 
demarcation has increased wage costs between five and twenty per 
cent, probably adding only about two per cent to the total cost of 
a ship, still well below the competition price edge of foreign 
producers. (33) It %ms not so much the threat of 'deskilling* 
and the substitution of semi-skilled workers for * craftsmen*, which 
has been the main result of technical change, although more recently 
there have been tendencies in this direction, as the frequent 
reallocations of work between established trades. This has created 
one important basis of sectionalism and it has conditioned the 
attitudes of the workforce right up to the period with which we 
are mainly concerned, (34)
A further source of sectionalism among shipbuilding workforces 
has been the general insecurity of employment caused by the nature
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of the production cycle, resulting in an uneven pattern of demand 
for the skills of different trades. Here a broad division, which 
is reflected in how the workers see themselves, can be drawn between 
the metal trades and the finishing trades. In the early phases of 
construction there is a high demand for the services of the steel 
working trades in the construction of the hull, arduous and sometimes 
dangerous work that is very often carried out under inclement conditions 
in the open air. Following the completion of the hull and the 
launch of the vessel the finishing trades fit out the vessel with 
the necessary cabin accommodation and electrical work. Often also 
the engines and steering gear are only installed at this stage, 
work that involves the engineering trades. Thus while some groups 
of workers find themselves being paid off others are being taken 
on. (55)
Even with several ships being built by a firm the managerial 
problems in ensuring continuity of demand for all groups of the 
workforce by synchronising the construction stages are considerable.
The normal practice was for workers to be dismissed when their 
services were no longer required, a dismissal which could be carried 
out at one hour's notice. Contractual guarantees of employment were 
regarded as unthinkable to the yard owners until the mid-1960's 
when the Confederation and the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation 
signed an agreement in I965 guaranteeing a full week's employment 
to workers with 4 creeks or more service, or payment of its hourly 
equivalent. This was hardly job security but it was an improvement 
on the previous situation in the industry.
The reputation of shipbuilding as an industry of 'feast and 
famine' comes precisely from the need felt by workers to secure as
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much work as possible including overtime, when demand for their 
services is greatest in order to boost wages. Indeed, higher levels 
of overtime have been worked in shipbuilding than is general through­
out the rest of industry. As regards overall earnings levels,
it has been the metal trades who have traditionally 'led the wages 
fight' in the industry. The readiness of the boilermakers 'to do 
battle* on this question, with the welders very often leading the 
fray, derives from the dominant position they first assumed in the 
heyday of piecework when they established a lead over other groups.
Since then they have fought to maintain that lead over the rest of 
the workforce, at least up until the events at UGS, even in the face 
of changes in teclmique and in payment systems, (36)
The reluctance of the boilermakers to embark on joint negotiations
along with other groups of skilled trades derives from their conviction
that their relative position would thereby deteriorate, a belief not
without some foundation. This has led to the classic 'leap-frog'
pattern of wage claims where one group by disturbing relativities
with a successful claim, triggers off defensive action in the form of
a, counter-claim.by another group in order to maintain pre-existing
differentials. Action by the whole workforce of a yard in concert
is an extremely uncommon event with sectionalism again determining
the pattern of wage bargaining, in addition to determining demarcation
conflicts. (37) Nearly two-thirds of the stoppages were on wages
issues and the majority of these were unofficial, although generally
of short duration, being more in the nature of a display of strength
to impress on management their felt sense of grievance according to the 
CIR report. (38)
Perhaps, not surprisingly a feeling of separateness has grow 
up between broad groups of trades wi’th the boilermakers remaining
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generally aloof in terms of agreements and wage bargaining. The 
metal trades who generally comprise over a third of the workforce 
in fact tend to regard their work in the construction of hulls as 
more 'basic* and therefore of greater worth to the industry than 
the contribution of other groups, justifying their higher earnings. 
Here the 'moral* or ideological aspect of sectional identities can 
be seen once again. In terms of the division of labour, strictly 
speaking, all the trades are more or less equally interdependent, 
however, the numerical dominance of the metal trades and the claim 
to possess the most important skills has reinforced the individual 
sectionalism of the particular trades, setting them apart as a group 
from the other groups of trades.
In part there has been an historical foundation for this attitude 
of exclusiveness in terms of the different labour market opportunities 
for the metal working trades as against say the outfit trades. Many 
of the boilermakers' skills are in fact highly specialised to the 
shipbuilding industry making it hard, and in the case of the ship­
wrights virtually impossible, to find alternative employment outside 
the industry. This is particularly so where shipbuilding dominates 
the local labour markets as the major employer of labour. Workers 
in the outfit trades, on the other hand, such as painters, joiners, 
electricians and plumbers have alternative employment opportunities 
in the construction industry and traditionally there has been a great 
deal of movement between these industries. Although therefore the 
metal working trades may have certain opportunities in engineering 
and elsewhere, these are by no means comparable to the finishing 
trades as studies of labour markets on both the Upper Clyde and the 
North-East have shoi-m, (39) Thus the boilermakers regard themselves 
as 'committed* to the industry in a way quite unlike the other trades.
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If anything, the series of amalgamations among the metal trades 
in the early 1960’s which was to produce the Amalgamated Society 
reinforced a broader sectional cohesion. In I96I the United Society 
of Boilermakers, Shipbuilders and Structural Workers joined with the 
Associated Blacksmith, Forge and Smithy Workers and in 19&3 they 
were joined by the Ship Constructors, and Shipwrights Association,
Together these formed the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers,
Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers covering virtually 
all the metal workers in shipbuilding. (40) Paradoxically, the 
purpose of these amalgamations was to minimise sectional disputes 
which were most numerous among the metal trades, especially between 
the platers and ship^vrights, (4I) On the other hand it should be 
noted that major trade groups such as the platers and welders still 
retain advisory committees at Clyde district level to deal with particular 
problems facingiWr trade. While it is true that the amalgamations 
laid the basis for reducing, although not eliminating, demarcation 
disputes between the metal trades it is arguable that in creating 
the basis for common action on behalf of the metal trades as a group, 
they heightened the boilermakers* sense of separateness. Now nearly 
all the metal workers were organised in the one union which easily 
dominated the others in the industry.
Parallel ænalgamations among the finishing trades were also taking 
place which brought together the plumbers and electricians to form the 
EETPU in I968, and the painters and woodworkers to foinn UCATT in early 
197c, (42) It is interesting to note that one factor to emerge with 
growing importance, was the increasing unwillingness of the finishing 
trades to accept the boilermakers® self-proclaimed superiority at 
least so far as wages issues were concerned. In this regard the 
developments at Fairfields and subsequently at UCS, assumed considerable
significance as will be shown below. It can be argued that the boilermaker
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sectionalism has to some extent provoked a counter-sectionalism among 
the finishing trades, who in coming together in broader groupings of 
trades as a result of amalgamations, also began to feel their own 
strength in a new way by challenging the boilermalcers * right to claim 
a differential. This kind of sectionalism may be described as horizontal 
inter-union sectionalism to distinguish it from the inter-trade sectionalism 
described previously. Increasingly the former has begun to supplant 
the latter as the amalgamation process between trades has moved from 
the formal level as in the case of the Boilermakers Society in I965 
towards integration in terras of day-to-day union organisation at the 
workplace and local district level by 1969. Indicative of this is the 
steady fall in the number of demarcation disputes during the 1960's to 
around 7 per cent of total stoppages during 1969-70 compared with 
3 per cent for the rest of industry. (43)
While the majority of workers are organised in craft groups, there 
is still one third of the manual workforce who are semi or unskilled 
workers. The lines of union organisation are less well defined here 
than among the skilled trades with the Transport and General Workers 
Union or, as is usually the case on Clydeside, the General and Municipal 
Workers Union organising these workers. This is yet another line of 
sectional division in the labour force in which the semi-skilled men 
such as tradesmen's helpers and those in ancillary jobs such as cranemen, 
drivers, stagers and redleaders, are excluded from the craft unions.
The boundary between the skilled and the semi-skilled men is particularly 
closely guarded. Only under the most exceptional circumstances does a 
semi-skilled or unskilled man have the opportunity to cross the frontier 
of craft control. More commonly as in the case of the boilermakers, 
with the exception of the blacksmith's strikers, very few non-tradesmen 
are recruited to the craft unions, although in I968 the boilermakers' 
rules were amended to make provision for this. (44) However, at 
branch level there is resistance to recruiting helpers. As such,
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unlike the ancillary workers groups such as cranemen who possess 
a certain bargaining power and potential autonomy as a result of 
their 'strategic* position in the organisation of production, the 
-Craftsmen's helpers or mates are, in the words of the CIR Report,
"in an overtly subordinate position." (45)
In the nineteenth century the subordinate position of the non­
time served men was ensured by the squad or gang system of contract 
work whereby the skilled workers on piece-rates hired their unskilled 
workers to whom they paid day wages* Parkinson suggests the ways 
in which the squad craftsmen could exercise their authority over 
their helpers,
"One of the oldest systems of piece-work adopted in the 
industry was simply to subcontract a particular part of the 
construction of a ship to a squad leader. Part of the shell 
painting, framing or riveting, in typical examples, were put 
out at a price agreed by the management with the squad leader 
as a result of hard bargaining. Both sides to the agreement 
was knowledgeable as to what was a reasonable price in the 
circumstances. At the end of each week the squad leader would 
draw to account and he would pay his helpers, generally in 
the local pub, what he considered to be due to them for their 
efforts of the preceding week. In this way the earnings of 
the squad reflected its efficiency and the payments to workers, 
if they were fortunate in their leader, something of their merits."(46)
In these circumstances the helpers means of recourse where they felt 
an injustice had been perpetrated by the squad men would have been 
fairly circumscribed placing the helpers as a group in a somewhat 
inviduous position.
During the first World War the spread of 'lieu rates' in place 
of piece-work began to undermine the importance of the squad. Lieu 
rates were introduced to boost the earnings of the skilled men who 
were placed in a supervisory role over the dilutees. With their 
earnings in danger of being overtaken by the high piece-work earnings
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of the dilutees the Government conceded a wage supplement to the 
tradesmen. Indeed, during this period faced with the common threat 
to their status as craftsmen by the introduction of dilutee labour 
in the shipbuilding and munitions industries on the Clyde, the so- 
called 'vigilance committees* of shop stewards agreed to bury their 
sectional differences in a common fight against encroachment by 
dilutee unskilled workers. The fear that concessions made to the 
employers on demarcation issues in wartime would not be restored 
post-war underlay at least some struggles on Clydeside although the 
Clyde Workers* Committee fought hard to inject a wider class perspective 
into these struggles as is argued below. The fact that with a few 
weeks training tie dilutees were d)le to perform many of the skilled 
men's tasks must have been dangerously disruptive to their claims for 
differential rewards by revealing the 'notional* rather than 'real* gap 
between much of the work of the skilled and the unskilled men, (47)
Under these circumstances demarcation practices become crucial for 
they are in the words of Flanders, "more like a sea wall which stands 
between the inhabitants of the island and total flood," (48)
After the second world war, particularly with the rapid decline 
of riveting, the squad system of piece-work tended to become increasingly 
rare although it lingered on among the metal trades especially 
among the platers. Robertson in his 1954 study of a Clyde yard 
notes that platers' earnings, even when not organised on a squad 
basis, still had a deduction for their helpers, the rest of whose 
w&ges were made up by the company. This deduction was recognised 
by the Inland Revenue for tax purposes. (49) Some indications of the 
generally improving position of the tradesmen's helpers can be gained 
from the tendency of the wages of the unskilled to increase relatively
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to the skilled from around 50 per cent at the beginning of the 
century to about 80 per cent in 1950» (50) However, by and large, 
the "sea wall" between the skilled and the less skilled has remained 
unbreached. This di.vision has produced what may best be described 
as vertical Inter-union sectionalism. •
The sources of the three main kinds of sectionalism which have 
been examined, horizontal inter-trade, horizontal inter-union and 
vertical inter-union sectionalism all have a long historical 
tradition in the industry and play an important part in shaping 
the workforce's current motives and attitudes. It is part of 
their historical legacy, as Geddes points out, a legacy which 
included overall rates of unemployment of between 30 and 40 per 
cent among shipbuilding workers in the inter-war period.
"The past is very much alive in the minds of the workers 
in the industry and coupled with general lack of confidence 
in the future of the industry it has bred a deep feeling 
of insecurity which is at the root of most of the 
demarcation disputes which are commonly known as 'restrictive' 
but which the workers regard and describe as 'protective'," (5I)
The ability of the workforce to sustain 'protective* practices 
was due in no small measure to a factor which has ensured a remarkably 
high degree of autonomy for the skilled work goups in shipbuilding. 
This is the ability of these work groups to retain substantial control 
over the pace and organisation of actual work tasks. Some indication 
of this has already been suggested in the previous discussion of the 
pattern of strikes and counter-strikes in defence of demarcation lines 
and relativities, actions often by small groups independent of their 
fellow union members and by the independent bargaining tradition which
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existed in the old squad system. Although the latter no longer 
exists and the former is much diminished, the actual nature of the 
production process, involving numerous small groups involved in 
specific tasks of work, perhaps scattered over a wide area in a 
complex assembly process, often enables sufficient insulation from 
direct managerial and supervisory control for the continuance of 
this tradition of independence at work group level.
"Many of the tasks performed in the construction of a ship 
give the work group a high degree of discretion over the manner 
in which they are carried out. The craftsmen and their helpers 
or mates, sometimes working in gangs, have sufficient knowledge 
and discretion to be able to allocate to a considerable extent 
the work among themselves and to control the speed of work and 
the co-ordinating with those who precede and follow them.
Because the work lends itself to self-supervision the traditions 
of the industry protect the autonomy of the work group," (52)
This autonomy has had its most extreme manifestation among the 
welders who in the past have collectively dk ermined their ovm weekly 
wages' ceiling in relation to their production output. (55) By 
contrast there have been few independent groups of semi-skilled 
operatives except the redleaders who paint the ship with red lead 
to prevent rust and the stagers who provide access scaffolding. (54) 
Those working on the berths in hull construction or in the cabins 
and engine rooms are often more able to escape the kind of closer 
supervision of their activity which workers in the assembly shops 
must accept. Independence in terms of control over the pace of work 
is thus facilitated by the level of visibility of the different 
occupations, with those less under the direct eye of the management 
or foremen having greater autonomy.
The Durham group suggest that one consequence of the difficulty 
of close managerial control of work has been the proliferation of 
social contacts between workers resulting in "sociable groupings that
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retain identities over time and become an important work 
satisfaction in their own right." (55) The immediate work group 
as a social group is important especially in view of the long hours 
of overtime which have been worked but also groups of younger apprentices 
and tradesmen would form 'card schools' or discussion groups during 
tea-breaks or hold-ups in the production process. While it is 
perhaps somewhat exaggerated to describe this as a "work-based 
culture of play" it is probably the case that the selective freedom 
of workers to make and sustain social contacts with each other was 
felt to be in part an assertion of their independence. This
independence has had a certain 'stylistic* element, a blend of 
verbal provocation and daring which derives in part from the ever­
present risks that much of the work involves. The Durham group 
characterises a "style of conduct" which has its Clydeside equivalent,(56)
"The possession of a wide range of knowledge and the ability to 
handle well the style of conversation with its emphasis on quick 
wit, quick verbal reactions and rapid changes of tack, carry a 
social reward. To be regarded as a 'character' or a 'patter 
merchant' with a witty, caustic and self-mocking style and a wide 
variety of interests and stories is to have a welcome, and an 
acknowledgement, in all parts of the yard and often outside it 
as well." (57)
Another traditional source of division among shipyard labour 
forces which historically often served to reinforce sectionalism is 
religious sectarianism and Freemasonry, Melling notes for the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century,
"In areas such as Clydeside, the sectional consciousness of the 
craftsmen was interwoven with the sectarian attitudes of the 
Freemasons as foremen assumed important responsibilities in 
Orange Halls and Masonic Lodges," (58)
The important role of foremen in reinforcing the sectarian mentality 
of their squads derived from their position in the hiring and firing 
of labour, a position which no longer pertained in the post-1945 
period but which did result in the boilermakers, at least, having
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"Certain departments obtained the reputation for employing 
or favouring men with a particular attribute; one workshop 
became Icnovm as 'Vatican City* because of the number of 
Catholics working there." (59)
It is claimed that Freemasonry in particular emerged as a factor 
in hiring and firing during their period of participant observation 
in the yard. (60) V/Hile, if anything sectarian attitudes run much 
deeper on Clydeside, it is difficult to be precise about the 
influence of such factors. McShane writing of the period before the 
first World War notes concerning Clydeside,
"There was a strong Orange group in the shipyard areas. Many 
of the skilled boilermakers of the shipyards had originally 
come from Belfast in'the 1860*a; not only the platers and 
riveters were 03?angemen but often their labourers, and there 
were twenty-three shipyards on the Bower Clyde alone. The 
Glasgow shipyards had strong linlcs with the Belfast ones - 
in Rarland and Wolff's in Glasgow no Catholic was ever 
employed." (61)
According to McShane Freemasonry was more of an influence among the 
skilled engineers. (62) Both Orange ism and Freemasonry with their 
'loyalist' convictions were fertile sources of Toryism among the 
working class. However, by the early 1960's with younger men coming 
into the yards untinged by the vicious sectarian gang feuding of 
the days of high pre-war unemployment on Clydeside, attitudes had 
begun to mellow to some extent. Certainly the recruitment of 
apprentices, crucial in retaining the sectarian hue of particular 
trades, was by the 1950*8 no longer on the basis of 'which school 
you went to*, Glasgow's school system still being divided along 
religious lines. What was more important was that the person who 
'spoke for* the apprenticeship applicart had the reputation of being 
a good tradesman, Morevoer, the big expansion in demand for labour 
in early post-war years itself broke down the major barriers in the 
pattern of sectarian recruitment oi:‘ apprentices.
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At the high point of the TJCS struggle any such lingering 
tendencies were submerged by wider working-class unity and indeed 
the Co-ordinating Committee leadership even used the troubles in 
Northern Ireland as an example to the workers of the dreadful, 
consequences of disunity in their ranks. To have done this, the 
shop stewards must have been fairly confident that there was no 
real danger of the UCS workers splitting along sectarian lines.
The fact, however, that Reid was a Communist and a 'Catholic' 
would not have escaped the notice of the more 'bitter' Orangemen, 
although their ability to use this, to damaging effect was largely 
circumscribed.
The final divisive influence on the labour force which should 
be mentioned has been that based on the geographical location of 
the yards. While studies of labour turnover have shown that long­
term employment with a particular firm was very much the exception, 
workers would often return to the same yard several times in the 
course of a working life-time, (65) There was little evidence 
that they did so because they identified vexy strongly with a 
particul.ar firm. Rather it appeared that once locked into circulation 
within a particular local labour market based on a group of geographically 
close yards they would often tend to remain there moving from one 
yard to the other as work became available or, as more attractive 
rates were offered. On Clydeside there have in fact been two such 
local labour markets so far as shipbuilding is concerned. One is 
on the Upper Reaches based on the yards in Glasgow and Clydebank and, 
the other is at 'the tail of the barüc' based on the Greenock and 
Port Glasgow firms of Scotts and I,ith,gows. Historicadly there has 
been little interchange of workers between the two as the travelling 
time involved has been prohibitive. More importantly with wide
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alternative employment opportunities for skilled labour on the Upper 
Clyde the workers there have tended to be the wage leaders for the 
whole river. This has meant a diffuse but nevertheless tangible 
rivalry between the two areas. On the part of the ovmers of Scotts 
and Lithgows this rivalry became outright hostility when first 
Fairfields was, rescued from bankruptcy and later when the Upper Clyde 
yards were merged under the Geddes proposals and in their turn had 
to be rescued from total financial collapse. Paradoxically the 
strongest manifestation of geographical divisions appeared within 
the Upper Clyde itself during the UCS campaign rather than between 
areas, although in the backwash of the Upper Clyde struggle 
unfortunate differences were to appear between workers on the Upper 
Clyde and workers in the North-east over the "Polish orders* situation 
which is further discussed in chapter 12,
In terms of the formation of social identities directly based 
on the labour process itself, religious and geographical divisions, 
are not strictly speaking forms of sectionalism, although there may 
have been an element of trade specific religious sectarianism in the 
past. Moreover, the general insecurity facing the working class is a 
common feature underlying all forms of internal division and 
differentiation within the labour force. What is of concern here 
is the specific forms of its expression within one particular labour 
force, the workers in the shipbuilding industry who have, for the 
reasons outlined, experienced that insecurity in a particularly sharp 
and protracted way.
An understanding of the development of sectionalism requires 
an examination of the position of workers within the relations of 
production and their responsesto the experience of exploitation. 
Sectionalism can be defined as an attempt by a section of the labour 
force, whether at the level of the work group or trade union, to erect
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around itself a protective barrier based upon the defence of existing 
working practices and/or the attempt to maintain differential wage 
rates. This ’protective barrier* is often ideologically buttressed 
with specific ’moral’ claims to certain relative positions within 
the hierarchy of status, particularly although not necessarily, 
where such claims can be based upon a legacy of skills, real or 
notional, and a degree of control over apprenticeship. Such relative 
positions may be defended by workers both from the attacks of 
employers and from the encroachments of other groups of workers.
The objective bases of sectionalism, therefore, lie in the conditions 
created by the uneven impact of technical change on the differentiated 
pattern of occupational skills, in the lack of sustained employment 
opportunities arising from the uneven tempo of the production cycle 
with its selective demands for various categories of labour, and in 
the post-war period as a whole, in the experience of continuous and 
long-term structural decline producing a substantial overall shrinkage 
of the labour force which echoes the historical memories of the 
inter-war years. These conditions have tended to undercut the 
emergence of more unified forms of struggle among shipyard workers.
Sectionalism may be viewed as the mediation of these overlaid 
contingent threats, real or perceived, to occupa'jional status and 
security which have produced typically fragmented responses, 
especially at work group level where there is a strong sense of 
’autonomy’ among certain occupational groups. Moreover, it should 
be borne in mind that in shipbuilding the trade union structure has 
corresponded to trade boundaries thus reinforcing tendencies to 
sectionalism at the work group level and replicating these àt the 
level of the official trade union movement, while, as has been
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pointed out, the impact of trade union amalgamations has been 
equivocal. Thus, although the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions, both nationally and through its district 
committees, attempts to provide a forum for discussion and negotiation 
on matters of pay and conditions common to the industry as a whole, 
it too is circumscribed by the legacy of sectionalism and cannot 
trespass on any of the prerogatives of individual unions. Hyman 
provides a useful summary statement of the problems which sectionalism 
presents in terms of building unity in the working class.
"V/hile class opposition forms the basis of work relations in 
capitalist society, this is overlaid ana often concealed by 
the immense variety of specific work contexts and distinctive 
group interests. Hence men and women normally identify them­
selves first and foremost as members of a specific occupational 
groupg employees of a given firm, or workers in a particular 
industry. It is within such limited milieux that spontaneous 
collective organisation typically develops. And just as 
Individuals are often most conscious of the narrow area of 
interests and loyalties lying closest to hand (and hence 
commonly of what divides them from other workers rather than 
of what unites them), so the policies and priorities of unions 
often reflect narrow sectional concerns rather than broader 
class solidarity.” (64).
As such, in surmounting sectionalism, one of the major barriers 
to the development of broader collective action is removed permitting 
a new kind of class conscious social identity to emerge. The core 
of this identity is the defence of the common collective interests, 
not just of a particular group or union, but of the class as a 
whole united in its opposition to capitalism. A further discussion 
of this question is presented in the concluding chapter. In the 
following section liistorical examples of the breakdown of sectionalism 
among the Clydeside working class are discussed, before examining 
the significance of the UCS work-in.
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(ii) The Clyde Shop Stewards Movement.
Tims far the forces of division and their complex historical 
roots have been discussed. Here the forces making for unity and 
their historical derivation are examined. Of first importance in 
the UCS struggle was the leading role of the shipyard shop stewards 
in mobilising the workforce and in initiating the wider campaign of 
solidarity and mass action, For the workers of UCS there was an 
historical precedent and a magnificent one at that, Tliis was in 
the struggles oh the Clyde more than fifty years before which had 
given birth to the shop stewards movement in its modem form.
At the outbreak of war in I914 there existed a body which,
under the name of the Allied Trades Committee, brought together the 
trade union officials on the Clyde. William Gallaoher, who was a 
member of this committee before assuming a leading role in creating 
the unofficial movement, recalls the sectional attitude of the 
Allied Trades Committee to non-craft representatives such as John 
McKenzie of the General Labourers Union,
"Despite the fact that he was one of the oldest trade union 
officials in Glasgow, his position on the Committee was anything 
but happy. He was a labourer representing labourers, and craft 
prejudice was still very much alive amongst the others. This 
brought me close association with him. He was like a Jew on a 
committee of half-concealed anti-Semites, with a revolutionary 
as his natural ally." (65)
The trade union officials were to become increasingly isolated from 
their membership as they showed themselves more and more conciliatory 
towards government attempts to impose harsh dilution measures in the 
munitions industries. Until then tlie shop stewards, where they 
existed had been mainly ’pence-card’ collectors of dues for union 
membership. They now began to assume the role of defenders of basic 
trade union rights. During ICbg-IC battles developed over the right
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of stewards to gain access to dilutees, to unionise them, to resist 
speed-up of work processes^^^^he mere skeleton of a workshop movement 
which had existed before the war now had flesh and blood put on it 
by the attacks on workers* standards made by the big employers such 
as Weirs of Cathcart, Barr and Strouds, Browns, Fairfields, Albion 
and Meeohams aided and abetted by the Dilution Commissioners.
The February 19*15 strike provoked by Kirkwoods* dismissal from 
Beardmore’s Parkhead Forge resulted in the Labour-Withholding Committee, 
a body representing most of the major workshops on the Clyde which 
eventually became the famous Clyde Workers* Committee with Gallaoher 
as chairman and J.M, Messer as secretary. The subsequent failure 
of the officials to ensure action to secure the release of three 
imprisoned Fairfields shipv/rights resulted in the discrediting of 
the Allied Trades Committee, and their failure to take an anti-war 
position shifted the centre of gravity of the organised workers to 
the shop stewards* organisation. With John MacLean ceaselessly 
agitating against the war and educating hundreds of working class 
agitators in basic Marxism, a movement of militant class conscious 
resistance to the government came into being based on a shop floor 
power which has been well described by Gallaoher and others. (67)
With MacLean, in the words of Gallaoher, "like a tornado sweeping 
along the Clyde", sectional identities began to collapse. As 
Gallaoher says,
"in all the principal factories, workshop committees representing 
all departments and all workers were now functioning." (68)
Nan Milton quotes MacDougall who was MacLean* s right hand man
writing in the Vanguard of October 1915 as claiming that the real
leadership now existed in the factories with the shop stewards, and
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"that the exceptional circumstances at present existing are 
producing something very like the beginning of a real industrial 
movement. The need for solidarity is breaking down the old 
craft jealousies, the spread of socialism is showing to workers 
their essential unity as a class, in spite of all differences 
of occupation," (69)
This movement towards working class unity received a clear expression 
in the Manifesto of the Clyde Workers* Committee,
"Fellow workers, the Trade Unions as such catering for sectional 
trades only and thus dividing the workers, are hopelessly 
inadequate to deal with the thoroughly organized employing 
class which blocks the way towards the workers' emancipation.
Only by organizing as a class regardless of Craft, Creed, or 
Sex, can we as workers ever hope to successfully combat and 
overcome the Employing Class.
We must therefore change the tactics we have 'clung to so 
closely in the past, and organize now at the point of production 
right inside the Workshop, Mine, and Factory, on a class basis, 
simply because we are workers out to emancipate ourselves - 
and not as formerly, because we are engineers, joiners, and 
shipwrights, etc., out to defend our craft against members of 
our ovm class, even though they were forced to encroach in 
order to make a living.
We must throw out the craft spirit, and accept the true spirit 
of brotherhood, stand shoulder to shoulder with our fellow 
workers, knowing that 'United As Workers We Stand, Divided As 
Craftsmen We Fall*," (7*05
Despite imprisonment, deportation of its leaders and the 
persecution of MacLean, the Clyde Workers * Committee survived and 
indeed won major victories in preventing dilution being imposed wholly on 
the employers* terms and in preventing wholesale military conscription, 
as well as assisting in the defeat of the landlords and factors* 
attempted extortion of higher rents from the workers, the latter 
fight being organised by Mrs Barbour and the women of Govan and 
Partick, (7I) As the support of the Clyde Workers* Committee 
for the rent struggles suggests they were far from being narrowly 
'economistic* but had widened out their perspective to embrace a
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general defense of working class living standards, a defense which 
itself could only be successfully mounted on the basis of a 
political opposition to the war conducted by a Government and 
employing class who had attempted to characterise the workers as a 
hostile and unpatriotic force. The fact that the Clyde Workers* 
Committee was able to lead the workers into action at all, in the 
face of such a sustained propaganda barrage, indicates the degree 
to which they had been successful in educating the workforce as to 
the real causes of their problems. As Darner has suggested,
"the rent strike was located in a mass movement which transcended, 
albeit briefly, the typical splits of skill, sex and religion 
in the working class." (72 )
Although certain advances were made during this period, at least 
in terms of workshop organisation, it was not until the second world 
war that the shop stewards committees finally found their place in 
the structure of the labour movement. As in the first war there was 
some development in the work of shop stewards and shop stewards 
committees sprung up covering whole yards but not as yet officially 
recognised by the Confederation, From April 1941 official *\^itley* 
type yard committees involving shop stewards and management had been 
set up under the Essential Works Order to discuss absenteeism, 
discipline and welfare. However, from 1942 onwards the shop stewards 
began to assert their own independent power as they became increasingly 
involved in production questions resulting from the problems raised 
by préfabrication and demarcation. These unofficial committees 
dealt with the problems of pay and conditions arising from the 
technical changes, especially in the boilermaker trades, as welders 
replaced riveters. Also a fight was made for a fall-back wage instead
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of piecework and for retraining facilities for displaced craftsmen, (?3) 
By 1943» with a large number of demarcation strikes taking place the 
unofficial movement decided to appoint its own full-time secretary 
to deal with these, financed by membership subscription, (74)
This initiative was part of the general drive for production which 
unlike I914-I8, the organised shop stewards movement, now committed 
tâ the ant5.-&scist struggle, supported wholeheartedly.
Indeed by the summer of 1943 the Confederation, recognising 
the valuable role of the shop stewards in 'filling a gap* in the 
structure of the official movement, signed a deal with the employers 
giving the Joint Production Committees the power to advise on 
production questions. (?5) The shop stewards on the Joint Production 
Committees had argued from 1941 the relaxation of 'demarcation 
"so that the whole shop is working like a collective team", (?6) 
However, despite agreement on widening the scope of the Joint 
Production Committees it was clear that there was considerable 
employer resistance to extending their deliberations to cover 
production questions. While the shop stewards called for a drive 
"to secure the utmost production for victory" employers like Pair- 
fields held out against the committees fearing them turning into 
"little Soviets". (77) In September 1943 at a meeting of the Clyde 
Yard Committee conveners it was reported that in only 12 out of the 
22 yards represented was co-operation by the management satisfactory 
and among those mentioned where it was lacking, in addition to 
Fairfields, were John Browns and Stephens. (VS) Given the attempted 
hamstringing of the Joint Production Committees, the worker-appointed 
shop stewards committees therefore had a particularly important role 
to play throughout the war and in 1947 as a result of this * second
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shop stewards' movement', the Confederation officially recognised 
the shop stewards committees overcoming its previous suspicion of 
such unofficial committees.
Recently there has been some questioning of just how 'red* the 
Clydeside shop stewards movement has been. The movement during the 
first war certainly appears to have exceeded the later struggles in 
the extent and depth of radicalism. It is perhaps significant that 
the Government was careful from early on in 194*1 to create structures 
that would provide an arena of involvement for shop floor repres­
entatives rather than attempting, as previously, to exclude the 
shop stewards as a dangerous and subversive element. Moreover, 
the Beveridge proposals for post-war reconstruction promising 
'full employment in a free society* did much to head off the resurgence 
of a more all-embracing attack on the institutions of capitalism 
which had so manifestly failed during the years of the Depression,
It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the level of 
political understanding which did exist. In the major munitions 
factories, the production of arms for the Soviet Union and the 
campaign for the opening of the Second Front, represented an 
expression of the kind of vigorous internationalism which had 
characterised the shop stewards movement during the first world war.
The difference was, that instead of expressing this feeling through 
a policy of *ca canny* or extended go-slow, with the survival of 
the Soviet ally now at stake the workers fought to maximise production 
levels. In both instances a shop stewards movement came into being 
which albeit temporarily, could surmount the inheritance of 
sectionalism and provide the workers with a unified class-conscious 
leadership. The next time this was to occur was when the very
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survival of the industry on the Upper Clyde seemed threatened.
Before discussing this, however, the more recent development of 
the labour force and the shop stewards organisation on the Clyde 
must be outlined.
(iii) The Fairfields Experiment.
From the 1950*s onwards, once the early boom in replacement 
vessels had subsided, there began the steady erosion of jobs and 
closure of Clydeside yards, as British shipbuilding lost more and 
more of its market to foreign competitors. (79) Then in I965 the 
Fairfield shipbuilding company at Govan went bankrupt calling in a 
receiver. Tvra and a half thousand jobs were at risk. For the 
Labour Government still fairly new to office, only having been 
elected the previous year, and with a series of interventionist 
plans to accelerate economic performance, the Fairfields crisis 
occurred at a time at which their faith in technocratic solutions 
to Britain's economic problems was at its greatest. Doubtless also 
the overwhelmingly Labour-voting character of the political 
constituency of Clydeside was a factor which influenced the decision 
to rescue the yard. Certainly the working class had great expectations 
for the new government after the previous long period of Tory rule.
The Labour Government had already appointed a commission of inquiry 
into the shipbuilding industry under Sir Re ay Geddes charged with 
presenting proposals for restructuring the industry in a more 
economically efficient manner. (80) The Fairfields crisis 
thus occurred at a particularly politically awkward moment as regards 
the future of the industry on Clydeside. It was nevertheless seen 
by certain of the more enthusiastic reformists, at the newly-created 
Department of Economic Affairs under George Bro^ vn, as offering an 
unparalleled opportunity to try out their theories of bringing together
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capital and labour in a new harmonious relationship. A revised 
Fairfield's operation was to become a test-bed for such ideas, 
whereby formerly 'backward' industries could be made to become 
internationally competitive through the application of advanced 
management techniques, industrial relations personnel and economic 
planning on a large scale.
George Brown in his memoirs describes the thinking which lay 
behind the 'Fairfields experiment' as it became known,
"It was an experiment in a new form of capitalism, part-unions, 
part-employers, part-Government, part-private shareholders.
It was, of course hated by all the other shipyards, who saw 
’the prospect of Fairfields earnings going up to their detriment 
as cherished traditional practices were changed. But we saw 
it as a wonderful proving ground for new industrial relations 
in shipbuilding."(81)
It is this latter aspect of industrial relations which is the current 
concern. The wider evaluation of what was achieved by the Fairfield's 
experiment and the details of its history have been adequately 
provided by Alexander and Jenkins upon which the following also 
draws heavily, (82)
Briefly, under the crusading leadership of Iain Stewart who 
was appointed chairman of the revived Fairfields after the bankruptcy 
of the previous company an attempt was made to introduce,
"a 'new look* industrial relations based upon security of 
earnings and a considerable extension of retraining 
facilities." (83)
In other words, in exchange for a much greater degree of job security 
and a general upgrading of working conditions It was hoped that the 
unions would make major concessions on demarcation questions including 
a 'no-strike' pledge. In the immediate circumstances of the
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threatened closure of Fairfields, with so many jobs at risk, it 
was felt that this was an ideal opportunity to make changes in 
working practices which would have industry-wide ramifications.
It was also the opportunity for enlightened management to conduct 
a more 'humane' approach to the welfare of their workers. So 
strong was the opposition of the other Clyde shipbuilders, however, 
that'Fairfields remained outside the local and national employers' 
association which was to characterise the Fairfields experiment 
as.
"based on a utopian philosophy which paid no direct regard to 
the prevailing labour practices in our Industry." (84)
The primitiveness of working conditions under the old ov/ners 
was certainly a feature which had soured relations between management 
and workers. Basic changing facilities and sanitary conditions 
were deplorable, A very interesting participant observation study 
of a Clydeside yard in the late 1940's describes some of the rigours 
with which the workers were faced in addition to the naturally 
demanding conditions of work, many of which must have seemed petty 
and spiteful. (85) If a worker was even a minute late for the 
7.30am start he would be 'locked out' and lose pay till 1pm, There 
were no breaks until lunch. The time office for checking in and out 
was fifteen minutes from the gate and this was not taken into account 
in determining hours worked. Any dispute over pay, which was handed 
out in a bundle of notes wrapped around the coins, had to be taken 
up with the wages office which was twelve miles . away on the other 
side of the river. The description of toilet facilities is worth 
quoting.
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"Lavatories consist of drainage pipes of wide diameter with 
holes cut in the top at regular intervals, reminiscent of what 
the troops experienced in India during the war. They are not 
private. Partitions are provided on one side consisting of 
sacking suspended from ropes. Instead of improving ^ the. 
facilities, industrial relations are so had that the management 
contents itself with employing a paid 'lavatory policeman'.
His sole duty' is to clock employees on and off as they enter 
and leave and to make sure that they do not delay undulyÎ" (86)
A favourite prank related by one old shipyard worker was to 'float* 
a bundle of burning newspapers into the next compartment. If the 
altitude of the old owners to their workers was anything to go by 
it wan no wonder that the whole concept of the Fairfields experiment 
was anathema to them,
Nevertheless the important thing about Fairfields was not such 
concessions as putting up coat-hooks for workers* jackets welcome 
as these no doubt were, but the degree of involvement of the unions 
and the workforce in the affairs of the company. Most dramatic 
was the series of mass meetings with the workforce addressed by 
Iain Stewart in the Lyceum cinema in Govan held at 7.50am at which 
the workers pledged to support the new venture. Leading right-wing 
trade unionists such as William Carron of the engineers and Sir Jack 
Scamp of the giant Courtaulds were also appointed directors of 
Fairfields. They were seen as having a special expertise to offer 
in discussions on working practices, redundancies and wage differentials,(87. 
These two unions together with the electricians, the clerical workers 
union and the woodworkers union also provided finance for the company 
either in the form of direct investment, or as in the case of the 
electricians, a long-term loan. The significant exception was the 
boilermakers whose role in the history of Fairfields w&s critical, 
since if fundamental changes were tc' be introduced it would have to 
be with their assent and co-operaticn.
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Not only were trade unionists involved on the board but the 
shop stewards conveners were present during the meetings of the 
executive committee of the management. The conveners, among whom 
Jimmy Airlie was the engineers representative, could participate 
in discussions but were not allowed to vote. Morever, through the 
concept of 'briefing group' an attempt was made to ensure that 
communications were sustained with all levels of the company.
However, it was in the question of the procedure agreement that 
Fairfields represented a significant departure. Since the company 
was outside the local employers association and its national 
equivalent it had to negotiate a separate agreement with the 
unions. The machinery for consultation and arbitration was known 
as the Central Joint Council and the Scottish Conference, the 
operation of which has been described by Alexander and Jenlcins. (88) 
Significantly in June I966 the boilermakers signed this procedure 
agreement along with the other unions abandoning their 'lone-wolf' 
approach. .However, within six months they had become disenchanted 
with it and thereafter never allowed a claim to reach Scottish 
Conference level. Early in 19^7 they relinquished secretaryship of 
the Joint Council and their attendance became increasingly sporadic.
One of the major achievements of the Joint Council was, however, to 
solve a strike by boilermaker apprentices which did so much to dent 
the no-strike image of the company. It was perhaps characteristic 
of Stewart's idealist approach tint such store was placed in the 
'no-strike' pledge. Tîie problem lay not so much with the mechanics 
of the procedure agreement itself as with the difficulties raised in 
trying to tackle the thorny question of working practices, specifically 
the introduction of flexibility and interchangeability agreements.
This, issue went to the very core of shipyard sectionalism.
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The slogan of Fairfields' management was 'nothing for nothing*, 
that is, effectively a wages moratorium with any increases being 
obtained solely on the basis of increases in productivity. Such 
increases were of course dependent upon changes in working practices 
the prime target for which were the boilermakers, the industrial 
wage leaders. From the employers* point of view it would be highly 
advantageous if the workforce coulu be persuaded to loosen demarcation 
boundaries and accept interchangeability for workers who would be 
trained in a broader range of skills, (89) The CIR report describes 
flexibility and interchangeability as follows;
"flexibility means, in the narrowest sense, carrying out work 
outside the normal work boundaries of the trade in order to 
further the job, using such necessary tools as the individual 
is capable of using, and in the broadest sense it means carrying 
out work, across a wider spectrum of skills than has traditionally 
been the case, as for example would be involved in a member of 
the ASB carrying out work normally the preserve of another trade 
within the same union. Interchangeability involves a man 
changing to another trade, on either a long term or short term 
basis, as opposed to exercising other skills for short periods 
as involved in flexibility," (90)
It should not be thought that the trade union movement was 
entirely hostile to changes in working practices. The Confederation 
had decided to take part in such agreements from I962 while the 
boilermakers were increasingly favourable towards some form of 
productivity bargaining during this period. Indeed the Confederation 
had been conducting negotiations at yard and district level on 
relaxation of working practices, what became known as ROW, since 
1964. Moreover as a result of amalgamation with the ship^Trights 
they were in a strong position vis-a-vis job control, Eldridge 
has suggested this as a key factor mailing it possible for the union 
to respond to pressures for labour flexibility and interchangeability 
at yard and river level of negotiations. (91) In 19^5 Lithgows* and
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Scotts* agreements had already been accepted for interchangeability 
among welders, platers, caulkers, burners and riveters while tack- 
welders became superfluous and were retrained in the metal trades.(92) 
Moves in a similar direction also were afoot on the Upper Reaches 
but had failed to materialise when the old Fairfields company 
collapsed in 19&5 and negotiations were suspended.
In this respect what was finally agreed at Fairfields between 
the boilermakers and the management was virtually unprecedented, 
at least on paper, in terms of the metal working trades in an area 
of traditionally strongly enforced demarcation practices. The 
agreement of June I966 with the boilermakers permitted flexibility 
for the first time among trades covered by the union on the Upper 
Clyde. The Fairfields agreement was subsequently quickly adopted, 
with minor emmendments by the Clyde Shipbuilders Association and 
the ASB throughout the Upper Reaches, (93) Roberts describes the 
broad outline of the agreement,
"The Upper Reaches* Agreement is the most comprehensive and 
extensive in coverage of any of the agreements yet signed; 
so far as the metal trades are concerned it meets most, if 
hot all of the traditional criticisms. Platers and shipwrights 
are to be integrated on work both in the shops and on the berth; 
ca>ulkers and burners are to be ihteggrated into one trade of 
caulker/burners ; afl trades will carry out the service opérations 
needed to progress their own jobs such as tack welding, burning, 
cutting or tapping, drilling, lining off, fairing, making 
brackets, etc; all trades will be interchangeable - in times 
of redundancy men will revert to their own trades and the 
customary ratio of shipwrights to platers will be maintained 
in each yard; and appropriate arrangements are to be made for 
any retraining required and for adjusting the rates of pay of 
transferred men." (94)
The main emphasis of the agreement was the need for adjacent 
trades to be able to 'progress own work *. (95) To allay fears of 
redundancy the boilermakers were guaranteed eighteen months employment,
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They were also offered an increase of over 12d in return for 
agreeing to work study and promises of productivity increases, 
which management reckoned to be worth about 12.5 per cent. (96)
This became known as 'buying the book*, that is, a payment to 
secure the abandonment of existing practices. It cost the 
Fairfields management approximately £30 per head to do this,
£25,000 in total. The metal trades received an average of 10 per 
cent on their wage rates, a fact which quickly provoked a hostile 
reaction from other sections of the workforce.
Tile first aspect of the agreement to cause annoyance was that 
it was paid retrospectively from the date of the commencement of 
negotiations. Besides increasing the differential between the 
boilermakers and the rest of the workforce, insult was added to 
injury by the information that some men who had since left the 
yards would also receive retrospective payments. Moreover, the 
GMVd)' which represented the lower paid workers and had, unlike 
the boilermakers, invested a sum in the yard remarkably close to 
that now being given to the boilermakers, felt that their money 
was now being used "to line the pockets of the ASB", (9?) The 
failure of the management to 'stand up' to the boilermakers, a 
feeling on the part of other workers that management were "favouring 
the opinion of, or succumbing to the threats of the ASB", resulted 
in a walk out by the cranemen who spearheaded a GMV/Ü counter-claim 
and in all, about sixteen claims for wage increases were made on 
the grounds of 'preservation of differentials' or 'parity* within 
■days of the agreement being aii;pied. Alexander and Jenicins claim 
that the "ASH negotiations provided a stimulant for productivity 
bargaining in the company" among other trades. (98) Certainly this 
did occur in the form of an ROkT agreement among the finishing
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trades although its economic significance was less than the fact 
that it sealed the undying hostility of the finishing trades 
towards the boilermaicers and their utter determination to topple 
them from their position at the first opportunity. The precondition 
for this was unity among the finishing trades themselves which was 
achieved during Fairfields, The chance finally to tame the boiler­
makers came in the wake of the UCS collapse and its reconstruction 
in Govan Shipbuilders and Marathon when the boilermaicers were 
forced to accept parity despite attempted rearguard action,
While no attempt can be made here to evaluate the success or 
otherwise of the Fairfields experiment which also involved an 
attempt to rationalise the wages structure, aptly described by 
Stewart as a 'dog's dinner', together with certain long overdue 
reforms in apprentice training and reduction in its length from 
5 to 4 years, nevertheless, it is clear that the results of ROVfiP 
were somewhat less than hoped for. The agreement related mainly to 
the more efficient utilization of labour through flexibility and 
did not cover other important areas such as overtime working, 
production standards or manning arrangements, (99) Another 
Important area where the Fairfields experiment signally failed to 
change working practices was in the unsuccessful attempt to introduce 
double-shift working. This was rejected by the men as likely to cause 
a serious disruption of their established pattern of social life.
In their joint paper on Fairfields industrial relations Alexander 
and Jenlcins comment, with regard to the RObU? agreement.
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"The wealcness of the Agi:eement with the Amalgamated Society 
was its very specific nature, that is, what could be done 
was very tightly defined. Limitations by restriction tend to 
breed further restrictions, ubiquitous phrase that was
the linch-pin of this Agreement 'to progress ovm work* was 
to cause particular problems of implementation. For a man of 
one craft to 'progress his own work’ it was necessary that 
no specialist service trade be readily available. Therefore 
foremen were soon complaining, for example, 'that the welders 
were refusing to allow other trades to weld for any length of
time'," (100)
Elsewhere on the Clyde the introduction of ROV/P was also not 
without its problems. At Connell's Scotstoun yard the welders led 
by Sam Barr, later to be one of the UCS leadership struck, fearing 
that the employers would exploit the agreement because of what were 
seen as 'loop holes' in it and indeed stayed out in defiance ©f 
their national officials. In particular the welders felt that the 
employers would attack their wages by using other sections to tack 
weld their own jobs at a lower rate than previously paid to welders 
and that their members would become^surplus to requirements, (101)
The Fairfields management had to form special service squads of 
welders. Thus whatever may have been agreed at union-company level, 
clearly at work group level, there was continuing resistance to 
flexible working arrangements, despite the fact that senior stewards 
had been included in the negotiations with management and in 
explaining the measures to the workforce,
A further factor which diminished the expected benefits of the 
ROW? agreement in addition to workgroup resistance was what 
Alexander and Jenkins describe as the 'demoralisation' of the foremen 
at Fairfields. The majority of the foremen were recruited within 
the industry from the ranks of skilled craftsmen. Few had received 
any kind of formal training for the position and once promoted to
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the rank of foremen such men had tended to remain with the firm.
The changes which the new Fairfields management were introducing 
sharply revealed the social marginality of the foremen's position 
in the yard. To begin with, with the management devoting a major 
part of their efforts to arriving at an agreement with the shop 
stewards from the metal trades, the foremen felt both neglected 
and their position of authority, based on their ties to the manage­
ment, somewhat undermined. Communications between management and 
men of a direct nature without the intercession of the foremen were 
now taking place extensively. Moreover, given their recruitment 
to their present position, often based simply on favouritism, many 
had neither the inclination nor the expertise to handle the new and 
specific technical demands made by the introduction of work study 
te clinique 8 and job evalua/fcion, despite a limited training period 
of one week which they were given. For men whose ultimate weapons 
were those of intimidation through dismissal threats and whose 
relations with their former workmates were never easy to now relate 
to the workforce through the parapheraiia of job cards and stop 
watches, was asking for a much greater readjustment than management 
realised. As a result the lack, of enthusiasm of work groups to ROWP 
was mirrored for rather different reasons by the foremen and was 
a serious handicap, undermining the effectiveness of the agreement. (102)
One important result of the innovations introduced by Stewart 
then, arising from the problems with the ROWP agreement, was the 
enhanced role of the shop stewards and in particular of the conveners 
in the affairs of the shipyard. Indeed, the shop stewards also were 
given a weeks training at the electrician's trade union college at 
Esher to familiarise them with work study techniques. In order to
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secure the smoothest possible introduction of the changes entailed 
in yard practice the convener of the shop stewards was to become 
employed to explain and assist the implementation of tie *-new 
measures on a full-time basis. The yard convener was not, however, 
a particularly powerful figure in the shipbuilding industry. In 
Fairfields such a position did not in fact exist and it is symptomatic 
of the ill-feeling that the boilermakers had created that when a 
convener was to be appointed, a bitter row broke out over this 
question. The boilermakers did not want a yard convener but if 
one W3.S to be elected it would have to be a boilermaker. The ASB 
had .under 30 per cent of the shop stewards' votes at the meeting 
to decide this issue although their membership was well over a 
third of the labour force. They refused to accept the majority 
decision causing the meeting to be abandoned. Tl'ie shop stewards 
committee was also dissolved for a period as the other stewards 
felt that they could not allow ASB representation in these circumstances. 
Eventually the non-ASB stewards ' fonsied their own yard committee 
with 9, convener who, like the boilermakers' convener, became full-time. 
Although it created horizontal inter-union sectionalism these 
events and Stewart's whole philosophy of involvement did result 
in a more developed shop stewards organisation even it if was 
somewhat aectionally fractured. Alexander and Jenlcins, in the 
circumstances, give a fairly moderate appraisal of the boilermakers' 
role,
"The ASB jealously guarded their prerogatives and allowed their 
fear of losing a long established and predominant position in 
the yard to cloud the realities of the situation," (I03)
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In terms of what was achieved in changes in working practices then 
the boilermakers conceded 'narrow* rather than 'broad* flexibility. 
That is, following the CIR Report's distinction, it was conceded 
that work could be carried out beyond normal work boundaries in 
order to further the job but not to the extent that the preserves 
of particular, trades within the union were normally open to other 
trades on any more continuing basis. It was to be over a decade 
later before thi.s latter was conceded. What happened at Fairfields 
provides the essential background for many of the issues that were 
later to emerge during the history of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders,
'When the Geddes Committee reported it recommended the principle 
of a regrouping' of yards on a geographical basis in order to produce 
larger, integrated and more efficient economic units. On the Clyde 
this eventually resulted, after lengthy discussions, in a merger of 
the lower Clyde Yards of Scott and Lithgow into one unit and on the 
upper reaches the creation of a new consortium bringing together 
Yarrows, the naval shipbuilders, and the only yard currently 
profitable, John Brovms of Clydebank, Stephens yard at Linthouse, 
Connells of Scotstoun and Fairfields at Govan. Tlie merger of the 
latter group into Upper Clyde Shipbuilders took place in 19&7 under 
the watchful eye of a working party of the newly created Shipbuilding 
Industry Board led by Anthony Hopper who was subsequently appointed 
the chairman of the new company. The stormy history of the company 
between I968 and 1971 and its successive financial crises have been 
documented elsewhere. (IO4) The question of who was to blame for 
the eventual failure of the consortium is a matter still firmly 
embedded in political controversy and is not of immediate 
concern here. More important to note in terms of what was eventually
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to transpire, is that many of the underlying defensive sectional 
responses which had manifested themselves during the Fairfields 
period continued with the formation of the new company. In 
particular the division between the boilermakers and the rest of 
the workforce carried over into UCS,
(iv) Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and the Problem of Redundancy.
Perhaps the most striking example of divisive sectionalism 
can be seen in the question of the UCS procedure agreement. Since 
1926 a national procedure agreement for the industry had existed 
which neither the boilermakers nor the engineers had signed although 
they did follow it on many occasions. Then in I967 the Boilermakers' 
Society signed a national procedure agreement for the first time.
Wlien the new company was formed it wished to negotiate outside the 
national agreements jointly with all the unions. The Boilermakers' 
Society which had only recently adopted an industry agreement refused 
to accept this proposal. As a result a two-tier system existed 
at UCS. (105) The CIR report commented on the inevitable consequences 
of this arrangement.
"While it is possible to over-emphasise the differences 
between the UCS procedure agreements and the industry 
agreement it is nevertheless the case that the ASB's 
insistence on entirely separate negotiations drew the 
company and the unions into the creation of two systems 
which have inevitably played upon each other." (106)
On the other hand, when the company was faced with a second major 
financial crisis in the summer of 19^9 the boilermakers offered to 
accept a reduction in bonuses and postpone aai imminent wage demand. 
Any attempt to characterise the Boilermakers' Society as the 
'villains of the piece* or indeed as responsible for the ultimate 
collapse of UCS would be grossly unfair. Indeed, if there is any
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truth in the c?iarge that the trade unions at UCS used the company's 
desire to standardise wage rates between workers of the same 
occupation throughout the group, as an excuse for *jacking-up' 
wages, then all sections were implicated. However, in the case of 
the boilermakers this was done to preserve their differential 
while for the finishing trades it was seen as part of the process 
of eliminating that traditional differential. The full-time 
officer of the sheet-metal workers, one of the finishing trades 
unions, is on record in discussions on wage standardisation with 
the UCS management, as having,
"stressed the view that serious conflict would arise if more 
favourable terms than had been offered to the fitting-out 
trades were conceded to the steelworkers." (IO7)
Other senior trade union officials including influential members 
of the Clyde district of the Confederation argued in a similar 
vein. (IO8) Clearly the memory of Fairfieldsrankled deep.
On the other hand, when the company, facing a series of 
financial crises, was on the verge of liquidation, all sections of 
the shop stewards accepted the inevitability of the sacrifices 
demanded by the government if the firm was to receive yet further 
aid. Of the 12,000 workers employed in the consortium, 3s5CO were 
made redundant between I969 and 1971* (109) It is interesting to 
note, that in contrast to later responses to redundancy, the 
Fairfields crisis and later the UCS labour force rundown produced 
a fairly low key resistance from the shop stewards. Indeed, 
throughout Clydeside during the late 1960's the reaction to the 
creeping’ aocele rution of redundancies in engineering and shipbuilding 
was still fairly muted. However, beneath the surface real resentment
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and bitterness was also beginning to build up, particularly among 
those parts of the labour movement whose adherence and loyality 
to the increasingly right-wing policies of the Labour Government 
was less than slavish. (110)
As far as Clydeside was concerned, the issue of redundancies 
was becoming an increasingly urgent cne,' In the Clydebank area, 
for example, where the burgh council had set up a special committee 
on unemployment since I967, there had been redundancies first at 
Babcock and Wilcox at Balmuir and at John Brown Foster Wheeler 
both major engineering establishments, Tony Benn as Minister of 
Technology received several anxious delegations comprising shop 
stewards, local trade union Officials and representatives of the 
local trades council as well as Clydebank and Renfrew councils 
concerning these firms. (III) The Babcock and Wilcox closure 
was particularly resented as the workforce had already made 
substantial concessions towards productivity bargaining and 
abandoning restrictive practices. There were also redundancies 
at UCS Clydebank, at Manlove Tull is engineering works and at 
Singers. In all of these, with the exception of Singers where 
Gavin Laird was convener, Communist shop stewards began to develop 
wider campaigns involving the trades council, local full-time 
officials, the town councils and local authorities, members of 
parliament and even representatives of the local clergy. In the 
attempt to broaden out the base of these campaigns to involve the 
local communities within which the threatened enterprises were 
located, they provided direct forerunners of the later events on 
the Upper Clyde.
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In the Glasgow area in general, there wa.a a similar pattern 
of contractions and closures in heavy engineering and shipbuilding, 
Ar.ong these the more prominent engineering concerns involved were 
Tollcross Foundry, Davy Ashmore, North British Locomotive Company, 
Nobsl-IOI, Pilkington Fihroglass and in shipbuilding there were 
closures at 3:arclay Cnrle at Whiteinch, the Earland and Wolff yards 
at Govan and Partick and at Hendersons yard. Between I96I and 1971 
net employment in Glasgow fell by 70»000 of which 61,000 jobs were 
in manufacturing'. Over half of these job losses were in engineering 
and shipbuilding as table 2 shows. (II2) Throughout the 1960*5 
male unemployment rose from 4'a per cent to nearly 8 per cent, (II3) 
Growing frustration over rising unemplo^giient in this period was the 
key to later developments. Then in Aueust 1970 an important 
engineering establishment in Glasgow, Sterne & Co, formerly the 
Crown Iron Works shut down with 450 redundancies. The closure was 
a shock to the workforce and just a few; days before the company, 
part of Prestcold had received the Cueens Award to Industry for 
exports. Wlien the closure v/as announced there was an immediate 
stoppage of work and. a demonstration. The Sterne’s stewards 
proposed that the engineering v/orkers’ District Coimnittee organise 
a token stoppage against closures and unemplo^nr.ent in Glasgow and 
endo^'so the call for a Clydeside shop stewards meeting on th--' issme. 
On September 18th the Sterne* s workers gave notice of strike action, 
endo.rscd by the engineers' hxecutive Council, the first ti-r.-^ such 
a df'cision had been taken regarding action against a closure in 
Scotland, A srecial shop stewards ineetinv convened in earl y October 
V'commeiid-':'! a day token stonn.as-'e throurhout the whole of Clas-vo’^ 's 
engineering indu st.? y and in I’psponse to this tlie engineers' Glasgow
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District Committee 8,greed on November 11th as the date for the 
stoppage. The Clyde Confederation in turn decided to support the 
day of action throughout the west of Scotland and subsenuently 
between 40,000 and ^0,000 workers supported the stoppage despite 
a powerful press campaign in opposition and employer pressure.
The Sterne workers’ o\m campaign, however, collapsed after a three 
da,y strike. Then in March 1971 there was a strike in the Scott- 
McQuay factory in Millington, oi-med by the Sterne Group, It was 
once again a strike against closure and the transfer of work to 
England but was also unsuccessful however. Erom these experiences 
a number of lessons were learnt. One local Communist shop steward 
observed just two months before DCS collapsed,
"The n'-’xt issue in this particular struggle, whichever factory 
or shipyard concerned, may sustain longer action, win consolidated 
action, especially in a 'combine', drawing on the strength 
of the whole labour and trade union movement, and succeed in. 
defeating the monopolist boardroom decisions." (II4)
Although the Sterne wnrkers’ ov/n action was not successful they 
had broken new ground in involving the official movement in concerted 
activity against the problem of closures and unemployment in endorsing 
the action proposed by the workers. This wars in contrast to what 
had come to be regarded as the normal role of the official trade 
unions, namely, negotiating the best possible deal with the management 
for those made redundant without challenging the policies which 
created these redundancies. This had come to be called 'accepting 
blood mon^y' or 'selling jobs'. There was a. discernable hardening" 
of attitudes on this nuestion and e realisation that previous forms 
of aoti.on, in particular strikes, not necessarily the most
e.f.f active means of resisting re dune hue:' es. Thus in the ueriod
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leading up to the final TJCS crisis tnere was a growing awareness 
on the shop floor and to some extent also at the official levels 
of the labour movement that some new form of tactic or struggle 
would need to be devised. Vhen in June 1971 UCo went into 
liquidation with, the tJireatened loss of many thousands of jobs on 
the Upper Reaches, it was clear that the time had arrived when a 
stand had to be made. It appeared that there would be no Fair.fields- 
type rescue by the new Conservative Government, The only options; 
open to the workers were to resist or succumb to the destruction 
of their livelihoods and the latter option was simply no longe.r 
acceptable.
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Chapter Two 
THE LIQUIDATION CRISIS
VTien John Davies, the Minister of Trade and Industry stood 
up at question time in the House of Commons on the afternoon of 
Monday 1Ath of June, to announce the Government's intention not 
to save the Upper Clyde yards from bankruptcy, he could hardly 
have guessed that his words would generate a tidal wave of class 
anger unprecedented in scale since the 1926 General Strike.
"The Government have decided, therefore, that nobody's 
interest will be served by making the injection of funds 
into the company as it now stands." (l)
Such was the furore from the Labour benches which greeted Davies* 
words that he was forced to repeat himself three times before 
being allowed to complete his statement.
The twelve shop stewards who sat in the Visitors Gallery 
of the CoiîHîîons listening griml.y to their livelihoods being 
pronounced upon, must have cast a caustic eye on the scene of 
near jublication with which Davies* words were received in the 
Tory back-benches.
That morning, prior to the Commons statement, four of 
their number had met Sir.John Eden, one of the Minister’s 
deputies. V/ith the senior representatives of the STUC led by 
its chairman, Ray Macdonald they had flo^ vn to London in a last- 
ditch attempt to gain a stay of execution. But the axe had 
fallen nonetheless and with it the jobs of thousands were at 
risk. The blade had been honed several months previously when 
John Davies had informed Parliament in March that no more public
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money would be made available to TJCS in line with the Government's 
clearly enunciated policy towards 'lame ducks'* TVhat the stewards 
were witnessing now was a simple coup de grace. It might well 
have been the pathetic denouement of yet another fruitless 
trade union delegation to London with yet another series of 
redundancies confirmed despite all pleas for mercy. But the 
row that was brewing in Parliament was nothing to what was 
shaping up outside.
On Clydeside, even as John Davies spoke a new element was 
emerging. Peelings of shock and anger were hardening in a new 
mood of resistance. There was a growing conviction that a stand 
must be made here, that if they could do this to the Clydeside 
workers what could they not do to the rest of the British working 
class.
The news of the impending liquidation of UCS had been made 
public almost by accident the previous Saturday morning. For 
several days rumours had been circulating that UCS was in 
difficulty. Indeed on Friday, Anthony Hopper, the chairman, had 
told the trade unions that he had asked the Government for between 
£5 and £6 million to meet the cash crisis which the company faced. 
In the event of Government assistance not being forthcoming over 
the weekend he would have no alternative but to advise the Board 
of UCS to petition for a provisional liquidator on the following 
Monday. Hepper in fact had warned Davies on the previous Wednes­
day that he could delay informing the unions no later than Thurs­
day so serious was the situation and, would have to petition for 
the appointment of a provisional liquidator that same week,
Davies, however, had asked the UCS management to Stay; their hand
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for a few days to give the Government 'time to consider the 
position* and had assured Hepper that the Government would cover 
the wages hills at least for that week* (2) In consequence, 
early on Friday evening an anxious UCS Board sat at the UCS 
headquarters in Linthouse assessing the situation. The same 
evening at 5 o'clock, Ian Imrie, the industrial correspondent 
of the Glasgow Herald phoned UCS to check whether information 
which had reached his ears regarding the request for £6 million aid 
was correcte At the other end of the line, much to Imrie's 
surprise was none other than Hepper in the midst of high level 
conversations hy telephone with Government ministers in London. 
Hepper confirmed that the company was indeed in desperate 
straights. Saturday morning's edition of the Glasgow Herald 
spelled out the full implications of the impending collapse, 
both in terms of job losses of workers in UCS and in related 
businesses and shops who were suppliers of the firm. In words 
that would have been prophetic were it not for their obviousness 
the leader writer warned the Government,
"The economic and social cost - never mind the 
political cost - of allowing UCS to go to the 
wall could be vastly greater than £6 million."(3)
For the government of the day it was a political horoscope they 
would have done well to heed.
Later on that day Hepper contacted Davies again to say that 
unless the £6 million was immediately forthcoming even the following 
week's wages could not be paid. The next day, Sunday, the two 
men met in Davies' Cheshire constituency in Knutsford at the 
local Conservative Party offices for a final discussion. It 
was clear from what Hepper had said that time was rapidly running
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out for UCS and the Government would have to make up its mind 
one way or the other whether or not it would render immediate 
assistance to UCS. Davies went to Chequers on Sunday evening 
to confer with Prime Minister Heath who now called a full 
cabinet meeting for the following morning. By then it was 
certain UCS would have to go.
While the Government laid its plans that weekend, on 
Clydeside, the workers laid theirs. The same Saturday morning 
as the story broke, leading stewards from each yard met in the 
AUEW hall in West Regent Street and issued the call for a full 
meeting of 8.11 UCS shop stewards at the Trade Union Centra in 
Carlton Place for the following day. In the event over 200 
stewards, mostly contacted by word of mouth, met on Sunday after­
noon, The stewards had already begun to lay plans for the 
conduct of a mass campaign of resistance, the central demands 
of which were crystallised in the slogans put forward that day, 
and practically every day thereafter, at every mass meeting, 
press conference and demonstration for the next sixteen months,
'Not a man down the road - the right to work not a yard will 
close',
By all accounts it was an exceptionally stormy meeting but 
a crucial one in determining the future direction of the campaign 
that was to be mounted, for it was at this meeting that the novel 
idea of a 'work-in'was first put forv/ard to the UCS shop stewards. 
None of the senior shop stewards who were later to assume prominent 
positions in the leadership of the struggle would claim the sole 
authorship of the tactic of working-in« It emerged as the result 
of collective discussions precisely because it corresponded to
the actual needs of the moment. Its rationale was simple. The problem 
was one of how to prevent the redundancies and closures taking place. 
Obviously a strike would hardly be an appropriate way of ensuring the 
yards stayed open as going concerns, A sit-in was perhaps a more feasible 
alternative but here again there would be problems of finance in maintaining 
large numbers of workers over any length of time. Moreover, an occupation 
was clearly illegal and there was no guarantee that the mass of UCS workers 
would support this form of action, far less the general public who might 
otherwise be expected to sympathise with their plight. A work-in on the 
other hand would present the workers' case in a visibly dramatised way for 
all the world to see. Here were men it coul.d be argued who had been made 
unemployed as a direct result of Government action but who refused to 
surrender their jobs. They would continue tc turn up for work as they had 
previously done, thereby demonstrating their willingness and availability 
for work even though officially they were no longer employed. It was a 
neat reversal of the stereotype portrayed in the media of strike-happy 
workers. Instead of ceasing production to make their case the UCS workers 
were intending to continue producing. The onus for any production loss 
in this instance therefore, lay not with the workers. How far this was a 
clever piece of public relations or a genuine vehicle for the expression 
of heightened class consciousness is a question that can only be answered 
by examining not just the inception but the whole subsequent course of 
events concerning the work-in. As such theorising on this question will 
be suspended until the final chapters after the reconstruction of the 
complete history of this struggle.
At the meeting in the Trade Union Centre, Sam Barr acted as
the spokesman for the Co-ordinating Committee of UCS shop stewards
and outlined the details of the proposal to "occupy the yards" to
the workforce. They would control all movements of men and
materials into and out of the yards. Redundant workers were to
report to their conveners and then rekurn to their usual jobs
and continue working normally. The workers would set up their 
owi time-keepers, and their o\m clerical administration to pay
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members of the work-in. The yards would be occupied on a 
twenty-four hour basis and if necessary, food would be brought 
to the yard by the men's relatives. A treasurer would be 
appointed to handle finance sent in from appeals and donations 
and shop stewards would be sent all over the country to ask for 
aide A special committee would be set up to prepare publicity 
materials to project the v/orkers' cause including also a press 
liason officer* The four yard conveners would henceforth be 
subordinate to a Co-ordinating Committee and would carry out its 
decisions* The decisions of the Co-ordinating Committee would 
themselves be presented to mass meetings of shop stewards for 
endorsement followed by mass meetings of the entire workforce.
All workers would be levied 5Op per head every week to finance 
shop stewards delegations to other industrial centres and to 
provide 'hardship money' for those on the work-in. (4)
When Barr sat down there was consternation among the 
stewards equal to the incredulous exclamations with which they 
had punctuated his speech. (5)
The concept of 'working-in* although not the actual term 
was however not wholly without precedent in the trade union 
movement. (6) This however was to be the first time that the 
practicalities of the idea were to be tested out* As Barr had 
indicated the organisational mechanics of the work-in had already 
been formulated in some detail* (7) The next step was to convince 
the mass of UCS workers that this was a credible tactic of 
struggle, and indeed at mass meetings in the four yards the 
following day the plan of the stewards was given overv/helming
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support by the workforce. Nevertheless, the sheer novelty of the
proposals for most of them should not be underestimated as one of
the senior stewards, Gerry Ross,.the Clydebank boilermakers* convener 
emphasised,
"Many of the stewards could not grasp the significance 
of the work-in, including even we among the leader­
ship, Icnowing we were making a decision of this nature, 
and we'd no position in the past where we could draw 
comparisons with such a situation. We did not under­
stand. .maybe Reid and Airlie did, wha.t the actual decision 
really meant, what complications we'd be confronted with, 
and how gigantic a step was necessary to malce a success 
come out of it." (g )
It was to be several weeks before the ideas which had been 
tentatively formulated that weekend were first put to the test.
But a certain political and tactical estimation had been arrived 
at, which was to determine the overall lines of what was to be a 
unique form of struggle. The job now for the UCS shop stewards was 
to educate the broad labour and trade union movement to see the 
importance of this fight and also to mobilise the wider practical 
and political support which would be necessary if it was to be 
successful. The STUC representatives had been present at the shop 
stewards' initial, meeting in the TU Centre and had already pledged 
their support. At that Sunday meeting arrangements were made for 
shop stewards to accompany an STUC delegation to London the 
following day which was to meet Sir John Eden, prior to hearing Davies' 
Commons announcement. A meeting of all Upper Clyde workers was 
to be held in Clydebank Town Hall later in the evening by which 
time the Government's decision would be known and the workers' 
representatives could return from London to give a first hand 
account of the day's events and the Government's decision on UCS.
At lunchtime on Monday Hepper had received the final message 
from Jolui Davies that his request for assistance for UCS had been
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refused* The news of the liquidation of UCS was embargoed until 
3*30 pm by which time Davies had completed his brief announcement 
to the Commons* (9) With the cheers of the back-bench Tory M P's 
still ringing in their ears the UCS delegation duly departed by 
'plane for Glasgow to attend a mass meeting with the workers in 
the Clydebank Town Hall that evening* They were accompanied by 
several members of the Scottish Labour Group of HP's and by 
Tony Benn, the Shadow Minister for Trade and Industry* After 
Willie Hutchison, a senior Scottish AUEW official, who as 
Chairman of the trade union side of the UCS Joint Council was part 
of the General Council's delegation, had given his sombre account 
of the day's events, Benn stood up to speak. He had come to 
identify himself wholeheartedly with what the Clyde workers were 
proposing to do.
"Your decision not to evacuate the yards is absolutely 
justified in the circumstances," (10)
Thus a major political figure in the Labour Party gave his support 
to the stand that was being made. This, in itself was a tremendous 
boost for the morale of the workers* Pew had doubts about the 
sincerity of Benn's motives for being there. He was welcome, 
doubly so, since it was clear that Benn was prepared to associate 
himself with militant leadership and direct action in defence of 
threatened jobs. The implications of this political declaration 
however did not escape certain of his shadow cabinet colleagues 
who ensured that he was 'roasted' for what he had done* It should 
be remembered that as Minister of Technology under the previous 
Labour* Government, Benn had been responsible for shipbuilding* 
Indeed, as he himself admitted publirally to the UCS workers, in 
part, the problems of the UCS were due to the failure of the
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administration, under which he had served to nationalise the 
shipbuilding yards in 1966 when instead the Geddes plan had 
been adopted. (11)
Now the Provost of Clydebaiik; Bob Fleming spoke, exactly 
capturing the feelings of the local people whose survival as 
a community was now at risk. In a memorable phrase he commented 
bitterly that,
"the Government were trying to do to Clydebank what 
the Germans had failed to do during the Second World 
War*" (12)
With John Brown's as the major employer of labour in the town 
it was obvious what the consequences of the closure would be, 
Clydebank Toi-m Council therefore would stand by the UCS workers 
and as an immediate gesture had agreed to underwrite from the 
Common Good Fund the £1,250 cost of hiring a special train to 
take hundreds of workers to lobby the Prime Minister in London 
the following day* (I3) But it was Jimmy Reid speaking as a, 
local councillor as well as a Clydebank Yard shop steward,-.who 
perhaps best summed up the mood of the moment when he said with 
what was to become characteristic eloquence,
"The Upper Clyde is being sacrificed on the altar 
of sheer political dogma. We refuse to accept 
that somebody sitting in Whitehall is going to 
kill our industry," (I4 )
And if necessary they would all go dovm to Whitehall and tell 
them so to their faces.
From the official trade union movement too came immediate 
public support for the stand of the UCS workers. The General
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Council of the STUC convened a special meeting on the morning 
following the liquidation announcement to discuss its implications* 
After hearing the first hand report of what Eden and Davies had 
said they issued a major press statement roundly condemning the 
Government decision as being.
"motivated by, firstly, the unreasonable hatred of 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, and, secondly the out­
dated and totally irrelevant philosophy expressed in 
Mr, John Davies’ lame duck speech." (I5)
The statement went on to argue that the economic repercussions 
of this decision on the level of unemployment, which was 
already in excess of 9 per cent of the male population in the 
Glasgow area, were unacceptable. The Upper Clyde should be 
nationalised declared the STUC. Moreover, so far as the work-in 
itself was concerned,
"The General Council expresses support for the 
decisions taken by the Upper Clyde shipyard 
workers to occupy the yards to ensure that the 
yards remain open and in production. They also 
support the other measures taken by the Upper 
Clyde workers to draw public attention to their 
case for continuation of the Group's operation 
and the consequences which follow from that 
decision for the working people of the Upper 
Clyde area. The Upper Clyde workers have un­
doubtedly shown far more responsibility in this 
matter than our present Government," (-JG )
James Milne, the Assistant General Secretary of the STUC quoted 
after the meeting, summed up'the STUC's view.
"The chips are down, . Unless a determined stand 
is made nov7 are going to have the unemployed 
in Scotland of the same kind we had in the 1930's." (17)
Willie Hutchinson claimed that the ground was laid by Government 
for the liquidation of UCS with the separation of Yarrows from
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the rest of the consortium in February* The plot to kill off 
UCS it was said had been hatched many months previously, a 
charge that was to be echoed in Parliament by Tony Benn,
Bruce Millan and others during several heated debates on UCS.
By late Tuesday evening with the lobby of UCS workers to 
London about to depart, something of an impromptu mass rally 
had gathered on the platform at Central Station where the UCS 
special night train to London was standing. Bob Fleming was 
there to see them off along with members of the STUC General 
Council* Aboard, besides several hundred UCS workers from all 
four yards, were workers from the Yarrow's Yard and from BSC, 
from such key factories as Rolls Royce, Babcock and Wilcox and 
Singers* They knew that what happened to UCS workers today 
could equally well happen to them tomorrow and they had all 
shared the bitterness of previous redundancies* In the case of 
the steelworkers from BSC Clydebridge works the liquidation had 
already resulted in a cut-back in shifts worked by one third.
Throughout that day following the liquidation announcement 
the clamour of outrage had grown from all sections of the Scottish 
edmmunity* Any doubts that Edward Heath had that the 459 Clyde- 
eiders travelling to London were merely a, local protest group 
must have been dispelled by the time the train drew out. Rarely 
can the message reaching a politician’s ears have been so clear 
and unequivocal* A group of leading churchmen, including the 
Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and 
the Roman Catholic Cardinal had sent a telegram to Heath warning 
that the dissolution of the UCS*
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"without the existence of alternative industry, 
would he so damaging to the economy of Scotland, 
and in an area of already severe unemployment, 
would have such social and human consequences 
as to he totally unacceptable in a responsible 
society," (l s)
As Jimmy Airlie who was to become one of the leadership of the 
UCS struggle along with Sammy Barr and Jimmy Reid, recalled,
"We were asking Heath to meet a delegation. The 
word we got back just prior to boarding the train, 
this would have been nearly eleven o •clock at 
Central Station, was that Heath was not going to 
meet us ■” we could see some*.,! think it was the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Campbell, And I 
can always remember the television crews there, 
and the interviewer says to me, 'Mr* Airlie, the 
word is that the Prime Minister's not going to 
meet you, what's your reaction to that?' And 
that'was at the time of the Ford dispute, when 
Henry Ford came over to meet the Prime Minister,
Well I said 'Surely if the Prime Minister of this
country can meet an American millionaire, he can
meet representatives of the Scottish working peopled," ( 19)
As the train finally drew away from Glasgow, at Westminster 
weary Tory HP's were filing through.the division lobbies at the 
end of the adjournment debate on UCS which had lasted nearly 
seven hours. Perhaps it was the knowledge that hundreds of 
Clydeside workers, the human factors in the equation of profit 
and loss, were physically about to 'invade* the City of London, 
which had given the cut and thmst of parliamentary discussion 
a more than usually sharp edge. It was the first and possibly 
the most important of several Common's debates on UCS, While 
it is true that it was outside parliament that the decisive 
actions were being taken, it was precisely because of UCS that 
the whole economic strategy of the Conservatives was being 
vigorously challenged by the Opposition in a way that for the
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first time severely shook the Government’s confidence. The 
collapse of the Vehicle and General, the Rolls Royce affair, 
a]-l these were parliamentary storms which they had been able 
to ride out with ease. Now John Davies and his colleagues were 
subjected to a sustained battering by Labour MP’s which left 
them politically very bruised indeed, ( 20)
With Denn leading the attack, the Conservatives were 
accused of deliberately engineering a liquidity crisis in DCS 
by the witMiolding of Treasury shipbuilding credit guarantees 
to the banks who financed the shipowners* orders, from October 
1970 until February 1971, thereby severely undermining business 
confidence in the firm. This decision was taken on the recommendation 
of the Shipbuilding Industry Board’s appointee on the DCS board 
A.I. Mackenzie, based on an assessment as to the likelihood of 
the company being able to complete its ’contractual obligations’.
The implications were clear to all. What added weight to the 
charge of conspiracy was that the UCS management were not themselves 
informed that the credit guarantees had been suspended, a fact 
which had only subsequently come to light as a result of telephone 
inquiries to the Department of Trade and Industryj, after first having 
been alerted by their customers that all was not well.
In fact, as Benn argued citing the TICS management's figures, 
the company had been malcing substantial strides forward despite 
its initial difficulties. There had been an 87 per cent increase 
in productivity in steel throughput in the previous twelve months, 
.while the current order book was worth £90 million with a possible 
further £100' million worth of orders for 20 standard bulk carriers 
in the pipeline. This increase in productivity had been achieved
88.
with a 16 per cent reduction in the steelwork labour force and a 25 
per cent reduction in the labour force overall in the previous fifteen 
months. The deliveries of ships had increased from 5 Ih I968, 7 ih 
1969 to 12 in 1979 with a programme for 1971 of 18 deliveries. (21)
The charge was laid that it was for political rather than purely 
economic reasons that UCS was being killed off, as part of a pre­
conceived strategy worked out while the Tories were in opposition, 
clearly spelled out in what became Icnown as the notorious 'Ridley 
letters'. These letters typed on House of Commons notepaper were 
authored by Nicholas Ridley the then Undersecretary at the Department 
of Trade and Industry with responsibility for shipbuilding. They 
had been sent as unofficial briefs to Sir Keith Joseph, then Shadow 
spokesman on Trade and Industry and later to become Minister of 
Social Security in the Heath Government, to Gordon Campbell Heath's 
advisor on Scottish affairs and to the extreme right-wing Conservative 
MP for East Renfrewshire, Miss Betty Harvie Anderson. The letters 
were written in December, I969 before the Conservatives had come into 
office and had first come to light in an article in The Guardian in 
May 1970» They were Ridley's summary of conclusions he had drav/n as 
a result of a visit to UCS and discussions with Sir Eric Yarrow of 
Yarrow Shipbuilders as well as members of the Scott Lithgov; group on 
the lower Clyde. From these Benn read out the most damning quote 
which was thereafter to be throi^m in the Government's face as 
conclusive evidence of a squalid plot against UCS.
"We could put in a Government 'butcher' to cut up UCS and to 
sell (cheaply) to the lower Clyde, and others the assets of 
UCS to minimise iipheaval and dislocation, I arn having further 
views on the practicability of such an operation, which I will 
report,
(d) After liquidation or reconstruction as above, we should 
sell the Government holding in UCS even for a pittance." (22)
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Whether or not subsequent Government policy had been directly 
based on Ridley's ideas for shipbuilding on the Clyde as it 
seemed to many at the time? is arguable « Clearly? however? 
the kite that Ridley had flown was now finding a generally 
favourable wind*
Benn also attempted to rebut the charge which had been 
levelled at him by Davies in the Commons the previous day, that 
in December I969 as Minister of Technology, Benn had himself 
stated his refusal to provide UCS with any further public funds* 
Davies had quoted Benn as saying in 19&9,
"After giving the most careful consideration to these 
proposals, the Government have regretfully concluded 
that, having regard to the need to contain Government 
expenditure, there is not sufficient priority to justify 
the investment of further public funds in the enterprise 
in the face of the many competing demands on national 
resources*" (25)
In the light of this Davies had accused Benn of hypocrisy in 
urging aid to UCS now, but he had obviously not checked his 
quotes personally. One of his advisers had made an appalling 
gaffe, for what Benn had said in December 1969 referred not to 
UCS, but to the Beagle Aircraft Company, Davies was forced to 
make a humiliating apology, (24)
By comparison with Benn's onslaught, Davies and his fellow 
Conservatives seemed as lame as the ducks of their ill-starred 
metaphor. It was argued that the UCS consortium had already 
soaked up over £20 million of public money but despite repeated 
claims by the management that they were on the verge of profitability 
UCS had been unable to give firm assurances as to when this 
profitability would be reached, even if the Government acceded to
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their request for £6 million aid* Davies furthermore denied all 
prior knowledge that the company was in such dire financial 
straights that even the following week's wages could not he paid 
until Hepper had so informed him the previous week, a mere forty- 
eight hours before the time when wages were due. There was 
nothing in the company's financial forecasts up to that point 
said Davies? to indicate the seriousness of the position DCS 
was in* These and the Opposition's arguments were to be raked 
over again and again by both sides. Was tlie company in fact 
now clear of the old loss-making orders taken on at fixed prices?
Had trade union demarcation disputes and higher labo'ur costs 
irretrievably undermined the profits of the firm? Had it been 
the real intention of the Government to kill dff DOS the previous 
February, after hiving off Yarrows from the origi.nal consortium, 
only to be foiled at the last moment by the sudden collapse of 
Rolls Royce thab month? There was enough ammunition here to keep 
MP's blasting away at each other for as long as their endurance 
would permit.
The one piece of substantive information to emerge out of 
the fracas was the announcement by Davies of the names of three 
of the persons to serve on an appointed 'committee of experts' 
which Davies had intimated would be set up to examine the affairs 
of the company over the following two months and to draw up 
recommendations for the Government 'to help in the orderly re­
organisation and reconstruction' of the company. ( 25) These 'experts' 
were Alexander McDonald, Chairman of Distillers Company Limited 
and of the National and Commercial Banking Group, Sir Alexander Glen, 
of Shipping Industrial Holdings Limited, the Lenox Steamship Company
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and Clarkson? the main shiphrokers for Scott Lithgow on the lower 
Clyde, and David Macdonald of Hill Samuel, the merchant hanlcers.
On Clydeside they were to become known as the 'three plastic Macs'. 
Later a fourth name was to be added, that of Lord *Alf’ Robens, 
the former chairman of the National Coal Board who was later to 
make a celebrated public defection from the Labour Party. 
Collectively, they were dubbed 'the Four Wise Men', and were to 
achieve a notoriety among Clydesiders, equal to that which Robens 
already had acquired for himself among miners as the Government's 
hatchet-man in the rundown of the British coalfields.
At 6am on Wednesday morning the UCS train drew into Euston 
Station, They had come south through the night and,in the early 
hours of dawn when the train stopped briefly at Carlisle, a 
deputation from the local trades council was waiting at the 
station to wish them luck. At the other end of their journey,
Tony Benn greeted their arrival at Euston. Their venue that 
morning was the Methodist Central Hall near the House of Commons 
where the demonstrators held a mass rally and were briefed on 
the day's plan. They were warned, although it was hardly necessary, 
that they were ambassadors for their country and as such should 
behave accordingly. The demonstration joined by 40 Labour HP's 
then marched off to Downing Street, or rather 'ambled', as demon­
strators were not permitted to march within a mile of Westminster 
when Parliament was sitting. Led by a pipe band playing a little 
predictably perhaps, "Scotland the Brave" they were accompanied by 
6'7" Sergeant Howard Booth of the Metropolitan Police Force. At 
Downing Street Provost Fleming, along with shop stewards Reid, 
Airlie, Barr, Dickie, Cook and Mclnnes spent an hour inside No. 10
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with Heath and a further half hour with Gordon Campbell at the 
Scottish Office.
By all accounts, their reception by Heath was cordial if 
slightly uncomprehending. After all, it was a rare thing for a 
Conservative Prime Minister to come face to face with a shop 
stewards' delegation. As Jimmy Reid recalled, Edward Heath, a 
connoisseur of fine malt whiskies had offered the men a drink 
from a heavily laden sideboard. The men refused, they settled 
instead for a cup of tea. It was a small but symbolically 
significant act which perhaps seemed petulant to Heath, but 
was in fact an assertion by the men that they were in deadly 
earnest. Equally petulant, must have seemed the continual 
sarcastic references by his political enemies to his hobby,sailing, 
which Heath was subsequently to endure. To many it seemed that 
the Prime Minister, who was captain of the British team in the 
Admiral's Cup yacht races, was more preoccupied that summer with 
beating the Americans than with the problems of Upper Clyde Ship­
builders. The meeting that day, however, was not without its 
humorous moments. Willie Mclnnes, the Linthouse Convener, reknown 
for his quips, said to Heath as they were leaving, 'Can I go home 
and tell Martha and the weans they'll get their Pair Holidays?* 
Someone translated for Heath and he got the joke. (26)
It epitomised the huge void in understanding between a Tory 
Prime Minister and an ordinary worker. For the stewards it was 
clear that the outcome of the meeting had left Heath unmoved and 
equally so, those Scottish Tory MP's like Tam Galbraith, who the 
workers later tried unsuccessfully to lobby at the Commons, For 
the moment at least the Tories' face was set firmly against UCS.
As Reid remarked of Heath and Campbell to the waiting media men.
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"How can a Government in the 1970's try and take 
economic discussions in the abstract? Its pre- 
Keynes, as I said to your colleagues there* Its 
prehistoric* And it belongs to the 19th century 
and I think despite their suavity? how suave and 
well mannered and how well modulated their voice 
I think we're dealing with a bunch of political 
cavemen* " (27)
But it was Gerry Ross who that day coined the expression which 
exactly captured the fierce mood of resistance among the workers*
"They will have to get the troops out of Bogside 
and into Clydeside to get us out of the yard." (28)
The stewards were going home to mobilise a campaign of political 
and industrial support the like of which had not been seen before. 
For the time being,as far as UCS shop stewards were concerned,the 
delegation and pleadings to Government Ministers and MP's were 
over. It was time to get back to Clydeside and arrange a show 
of strength, not just from the shipyards but from the whole working 
class of Scotland* Within seven days they managed to do just that 
and on a wholly unprecedented scale. The battle for Upper Clyde 
was gathering momentum*
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n-ffi DON'T ONLY BUILD BOATS....WE BUILD MEN'
For those in Government the degree of cohesion and 
organisation in the working class movement, appearing almost 
overnight as it seemed, must have been somewhat baffling and 
disconcerting. It was clear that there was a failure to perceive 
the potential strength of the feelings which the liquidation 
announcement had generated. A vigorous surge of anger was taking 
place at the shop floor level. From their headquarters in 
Upper Clyde the stewards issued a call for a mass meeting of all 
Clydeside shop stewards for the following Monday with the intention 
of gaining support for a large demonstration in Glasgow on the 
following Wednesday afternoon.
On the six o'clock news on Thursday evening, Alistair Cajnpbell 
from the BBC interviewed Airlie,
Campbell "Do you think the stoppage will achieve anything?"
Airlie "This will be the first stage of the unleashing of
forces that will either change this Government's 
mind or bring this Government do\m."
Campbell "Do you thinlc all workers will stop on Wednesday
afternoon then?"
Airlie "We are putting this to all shop stewards in the
west of Scotland initially, and if the shop 
stewards endorse it, then we are confident we 
will have toted stoppage in the west of Scotland, 
Incidentally, we are also asking shop keepers to 
close for two hours also on that day." (1)
That day and the next were ones of ferment in and around 
Glasgow. Literally scores of workers' meetings endorsed the 
sending of their delegates to the coming Monday's meeting of 
west of Scotland stewards. Clydebank clergymen agreed to hold 
special services of prayer in their churches that weekend and
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ran off protest petitions to distribute among their congregations* 
Local shopkeepers in Clydebank whose praperity depended upon a 
population employed in an industry that was thriving began placing 
collecting cans and stickers declaring support for UCS in their 
shops* It was not just a trade union struggle but embraced the 
whole community as well* In Glasgow? the Tory Lord Provost 
Donald Liddle chaired a ninety minute crisis meeting of the 
various local authority representatives, local MP's and members 
of the STUC* They were unanimous in demanding that shipbuilding 
on Upper Clyde must be maintained* In the UCS yards the workers 
held mass meetings to hear their shop stewards' reports* By 
Friday it was clear that all Clydeside was rallying behind the 
campaign to save UCS*
On Glasgow's busy Dumbarton Road? in the west end of the 
city? a, mile down, the road from the Scotstoun yard? stands Partick's 
famous bingo hall? the Rosevale* It was in the auditorium of this 
somewhat incongruous building? with its backdrop of giant illuminated 
bingo cards, that plans were laid for an industrial stoppage and 
demonstration on the following Wednesday that was to be the first 
stage in the campaign of public protest. Those who were there that 
day still vividly recall the electrifying atmosphere as trade union 
officials? workers' representatives and shop stewards representing 
tens of thousands of Clydeside men and women poured into the hall*
One after the other the leading shop stewards from major enterprises 
came to the microphone and pledged their support for UCS:
George MacCormaok from Rolls Royce? John Carty from Chrysler?
Duncan Waddell from Scott Lithgow's? Alex Arman from Yarrow's*
Shop stewards had come from Durrough's? from Weir's of Cathoart?
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from John Brown Engineering Company? from Goodyear, from BR work­
shops, from Will's Tobacco factory, from Olivetti, from Anderson 
Mavor, from Babcock and Wilcox and from a hundred other key 
factories in and around the west of Scotland* (2) In all, 
over eight hundred stewards had responded to the UCS call* The 
first of the Co-ordinating Committee publicity sub-committee's 
leaflets which was distributed among the delegates hammered out 
the message*
"The position of the ITCS workers is clear ~ “V/E ARE 
GOING TO EIGHT* But then it is not just our fight alone*
One in nine males are already unemployed in the west 
of Scotland, and as shipbuilding is so interwoven with 
the economy of Scotland, the loss of this Industry on 
Clydeside would have repercussions that would be wide­
spread and shattering*
We believe that this is the crunch in the fight against 
unemployment, redundancies and closures*
To lose this? and this is unthinkable, we are heading 
for the circumstances of the "30's"*
To win, would be to reverse the trend for all the workers 
and the community as a whole.
We ask for, and confidently expect, the support of ALL 
Scots? men and women*
We appeal to all our Brothers and Sisters in the Trade 
Union movement for HELP*
We appeal to all business people and Shopkeepers for HELP.
We appeal to all the Clergy of all denominations for HELP*
We appeal to everyone for HELP.
HELPING us is HELPING yourself*
Let the voice of the Scottish people be heard.
No more closures - no more redundancies - no more
unemployed. DEMAND THE RIGHT TO WORK!" (5)
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The speech that day which brought the normally hard-bitten 
Clydeside shop stewards to their feet cheering as they had 
never done before was delivered by Jimy Reid, acting as spokes­
man for the Co-ordinating Committee* It was an example of 
working class oratory the like of which had not been heard since 
the days of Willie Gallagher and John Maclean and established in 
the minds of those present that here was a shop steward leader 
of outstanding capabilities* It was this speech in which Reid 
made what was to become a classic and concise formulation of 
working-class pride in their identity and resistance to injustice.
"We don't only build boats on the Clyde, we build 
men who have guts and intelligence and who will 
take some moving," ( 4 )
The applause was thunderous, the mood euphoric* These were 
words which captured the imagination and moved men's emotions. 
Jimmy Airlie, not by nature a demonstrative man, gripped 
Jimmy Reid's arm with excitement, saying "By God Jimmy, I thinlc 
we're going to win this one." (5 ) What was more if it ever 
came to resisting a forcible ejection from the yards the UCS 
men knew they could count on the physical support of thousands 
of others* The immediate need however was going to be financial 
help. The shop stewards had launched a fighting fund in order 
to build up reserves for the time, in the very near future, when 
the provisional liquidator would start to lay off men and the 
Co-ordinating Committee would have to assume the responsibility 
for their maintenance. Would those present follow the head of 
the Yarrowfe work-foree who had already pledged themselves to a 
3Op weekly levy from each of their 2,000 members? The UCS 
workers need not have worried, for by the end of that week the
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(6)
UCS fighting fimd had received over £6,000, It was a truly
fantastic response and yet this was just the first trickle in what 
was to become a flood of contributions in the weeks and months 
that lay ahead.
While the unofficial movement gathered its strength, the 
official movement was equally busy although its role at this stage 
was somewhat different. The General Council of the STUC continued 
to put their views to the Government, only now with added force.
\diile the shop stewards were meeting in the Rosevale, the STUC had 
again gone to London for talks with Heath, Davies and Campbell at 
Downing Street to impress upon them the arguments for keeping the 
yards in operation. They stressed both the high level of male 
unemployment in Glasgow which exceeded that in most other areas, 
the improvements that had been made in increasing output at UCS with 
a reduced labour force and the ability of Upper Clyde to attract 
profitable orders for their specialised range of standardised vessels. 
But it had all been said before. The' meeting lasted two hours but 
the delegation received very little by way of encouragement. (7)
It was becoming clear that some entirely new kind of initiative 
would be necessary. At the meeting to report back on these 
discussions next day in Congress House at which the leading UCS shop 
stewards were also present,it was agreed that the STUC should convene 
a Special Congress in August specifically to discuss the whole question 
of unemployment in Scotland, This was to be the first recall Congress 
in the history of the STUC and w^ as itself to be an important stage in 
the launching of a general public campaign on UCS in the context of 
the deteriorating employment situation in Scotland as a whole,(S) The 
role that the STUC was to adopt therefore, was that of broadening the 
UCS issue into a general attack on Government policy.
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For the moment? however? the main site of action had shifted 
to the streets of Glasgow. The sun was actually warm that 
Wednesday afternoon of June 23rd? a rare thing in Glasgow? even 
rarer for it to shine on the day of a workers* demonstration* 
There was an atmosphere of tremendous excitement in George Square 
as the marchers assembled* So packed with people and banners 
was the square that in addition to the assembly point in North 
Frederick Street? the police had to close off Cochrane Street 
on the other side of the square as well* And still the people 
kept pouring in. Three special train loads came from Clydebank 
and another from the Rolls Royce factory in Hillington, The 
entire Clydebank Town Council was there and in Clydebank itself 
the town was almost deserted. The shutters on the shops in the 
Main Street were down and posted on them were notices under the 
Maltese Cross symbol of UCS which read,
"This shop is closed in sympathy with Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders fight to stay alive," (9)
As the columns of marchers spilled out of George Square heading 
down Renfield Street towards Glasgow Green the hand painted 
posters and placards formed a kind of moving telegraphic back­
cloth flashing messages, sometimes indignant, sometimes ironic 
and always politically barbed,
'Give them an inch and they will talce a UCS Yard* -
'UCS today U tomorrow' - 'QM, QE1, QB'2, and now dole Q,' -
'If we are lame ducks, the Tories are dead ducks* -
'Hands off UCS' - Don't Sell Us Down the Clyde* -
'Ships not Yachts Heath* - 'Jobs not dole' -
'Turn the heat on Heath* - 'No ceturn to the Hungry Thirties'
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'Unemployment Corrodes Scotland* - 'Tell Capt* Heath 
there's a force 10 coming from the Clyde' «° 'Nationalise 
not paralyse' - 'We shall not he Moved*. (10)
Female workers from Singers in Clydebank and from the Beatties 
biscuit factory were there in their working overalls* Even the 
usually non-militant Glasgow dockers had turned out for the 
occasion.
It is estimated that something in excess of 150,000 
stopped work that afternoon and anything up to a third of that 
number turned out for the demonstration, (ll) Certainly it was 
the biggest demonstration since the war and even the 'old-timers' 
said they had seen nothing like it before. The onlookers who 
were standing ten deep on the pavements burst into applause as 
the march passed and, in turn? were applauded by the demonstrators. 
Led by Tony Benn? his arms linked to the shop stewards on either 
side, the demonstrators marched twelve abreast and at one stage 
spanned the entire width of Union Street bringing much of the 
city centre to a halt. The police estimated it took an hour for 
the demonstration to pass and by the time the head of the march 
had reached Glasgow Green they were still leaving George Square. 
Nine buses taking 400 retired UCS boilermakers on their annual 
outing to Largs that day had cut short their trip and returned to 
Glasgow Green just in time to hear the speeches. It was an 
occasion nobody wanted to miss* (l2)
At Glasgow Green, Benn read out from the wording of the 
Bill he had presented to the Commons the previous day for the 
nationalisation of UCS, with the concept of workers' control
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written into its terms* It was a Private Member's Bill with 
little chance of success but it represented a pledge to the 
labour movement that the next Labour Government would 
nationalise the industry, (I5)
The Bill entitled Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (Public 
Ownership) was supported by the nucleus of the Scottish Labour 
MP's who had entered the lists in the previous week's UCS 
debate? namely Willie Ross, Dickson Mahon, Willie Hannan?
Bruce Millan, Hugh McCartney, Willie Small, John Rankin,
Dick Buchanan, Prank McElhone, John Robertson and Dick Douglas,
The speeches at Glasgow Green and the metaphors were 
fiery with indignation, Reid expressing once again the gut 
feelings of the workers.
"We are not going to be led like lambs to the 
slaughter.«.This is the breaking point for Scottish 
workers - all the pent up anger and frustration of 
creeping paralysis of small redundancies which add 
up to mass unemplo^nment,,«We are witnessing an 
eruption here today...An eruption not of lava.,, 
but of labour. Unless Heath takes heed, this 
eruption will engulf him and sweep him into political 
oblivion," (I4)
They heard Airlie say that the workers in the shipbuilding 
industry would not stand for any contraction in the existing 
labour force or closures. They heard Jimmy Murray, Scottish
executive officer of the powerful boilermalcers' union plead with 
the men to trust in the officials of the movement. For his 
trouble Murray got a heckling from the crowd, not because they 
were against the officials as such but because it was obvious 
to all, that if no redundancies were to be negotiated this time, 
then the struggle would need to be fought in a different way.
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Danny McGarvey, the leader of the boilermakers* union and the 
national trade union leader who was later to figure most 
prominently in the UCS events was at the annual conference of 
the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions at 
Torquay that day® For the time being, at least? McGarvey had 
chosen to stand back from direct identification with the UCS 
workers* action. In a relationship that was never easy? the 
tensions between the full time national officials and the 
local stewards were to become a continuing feature which 
added new complexities as the saga unfolded. For the moment, 
however, the central dynamism of organisation, and activity 
remained with the UCS workers themselves and the massive turn*™ 
cut at the demonstration was proof? if proof were needed, that 
they were a formidable force.
For the shop stewards the problem confronting them was 
how to follow their public demonstration with new forms of 
action that would keep up the pressure on the Government and 
keep the issue alive in people's minds, particularly during the 
approaching holiday period when the yards would be closed for 
several weeks. To maintain their fighting spirit the stewards 
agreed themselves to take to the streets with petition forms 
which tteir publicity sub-committee had circulated to every major 
factory in Britain* The petition? pledging support foiè the main 
resolution passed at the Glasgow Green demonstration demanded,
"that the Government make available the resources 
necessary to retain all units of UCS with no 
redundancy or contraction*" (15)
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111 Paisley, Renfrew, Greenock, Clydebanlc and Glasgow alone on two 
successive Saturdays, nearly a hundred thousand signatures were 
collected. (16)
In Glasgow's George Square where the stewards went ahead and 
set up petition stalls despite an initial but quickly rescinded 
ban by the Parks Department, seven thousand people signed in the 
space of a few hours, including a number who had been taking part 
in the Orange Walk. (17) A point that was to be proved over and 
over again even from the very outset, was that the scope of this 
struggle transcended the legacy of sectarianism in the west of 
Scotland. Indeed, the only sour note struck that day was when 
Provost Liddle, approached to sign by a group of stewards as he 
was crossing George Square from the City Chambers, refused to 
place his name on the form. For a Tory Lord Provost this was 
perhaps going a little too far. The petition was eventually 
handed over by a deputation of Clydebanlc Tovai Councillors to 
Gordon Campbell in Edinburgh at the Scottish Office, It was 
presented by shop stewards Ian Mackay and Jolin McKee who had 
been deputised by Clydebank and District Trades Council and was, 
as the saying goes, "dul.y acknowleged", (l8)
It remained, to be seen what impact, if any, Wednesday's 
huge demonstration would have on the Government. Certainly the 
widespread anxiety concerning the future of the industry was 
underlined once again by a deputation from Glasgow Corporation 
led by Provost Liddle, John Mains and Walter Wober respectively 
which met Heath, Campbell and Davies in London the same afternoon 
as the demonstrators had marched to Glasgow Green, It was a
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'bi-partisan* approach in which Mains represented the Labour group 
with 3, clear remit from a prior meeting of the local authorities 
concerned to impress on the Government that the jobs and the yards 
should be maintained. Like so many others before him, however,
Liddle left London 'disappointed*. (I9) The Government were not 
prepared to budge until they had received the Report and recommendations 
of their committee of experts, the Pour Vise Men,
Through the. latter part of June and the month of July the 
Advisory Group of experts had pursued their investigations. A few 
days after the June demonstration they paid a visit to Glasgow to 
meet leaders of the local authorities, union officials and the shop 
stewards. As Airlie commented acidly,
"Robens and the others are here to pursue their art of 
surgery. Ve intend to see that they are struck off the 
praoticloners list. If the Government wants to have a 
go then we are prepared to provide the opposition, 
Wednesday's great demonstration was only the first round 
and the workers are fresh and ready for the rest of the
fight." (20)
In view of this perhaps Robens felt it would be more tactful to 
absent himself from the committee on this occasion. On July l6th 
they returned briefly to Glasgow to meet Willie Ross, Bruce Millan, 
the STUC economic committee and the liquidator at Linthouse.
Jimmy Jack, general secretary of the STUC told the TV news reporters 
after meeting the committee,
"I thin].c that they have very much in mind the social 
consequences of the closure of UCS Limited." (21)
Willie Ross, shadow Secretary of State for Scotland also felt 
satisfied that the committee wanted,
"to be able to maximise employment on the Clyde, and that whatever 
they recommend to the Government will have that in mind." (22)
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Bruce Millan another leading Scottish Labour MP felt that,
"they have an understanding of the human and social 
consequences for Clydeside*" (23)
Indeed? the committee seemed anxious to reassure and consult with 
everyone? except surprisingly? Tony Benn,who had been the 
Minister responsible for overseeing UCS in the first place.
The STUC had been told by the Advisory Group that its 
recommendations to the Government would be ready within a week*
John Davies had? however, been kept well informed of their 
progress throughout and indeed? only the day before? two of the Comm­
ittee Glen and McDonald, had given the Government an interim 
report, (24) During this period of awaiting the Committee’s final 
report? while hoping for the best, plans were nevertheless laid 
to prepare for the worst. At the STUC members of the General 
Council? Willie Hannan and Norman Buchan from the Scottish Labour 
group of MP’8? full-time Confederation officials and the shop 
stewards met to try and assess the situation and ensure unity 
among all the parties in the campaign. Any suggestion that the 
resolve of the workers or their representatives might have been 
slackening was effectively countered by the reaffirmation by the 
STUC of its earlier decision to back any action by the UCS workers 
with all necessary practical support* At the same time? in Clyde­
bank the shop stewards announced that they had drawn up plans to 
maintain vital supplies to the yards in order to continue with 
production if necessary during the work-in, (25)
At the beginning of July? two weeks earlier than the 
traditional Glasgow Holidays, the Clydebank yard had shut down
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for the annual Clydebank holiday. The Co-ordinating Committee 
which had prepared contingency plans for the holiday period, detailed 
twenty stewards to remain behind in the yards in readiness for any 
eventuality, especially should the Government attempt to close o œ  
or two of the yards and sack the men while they were still on 
holiday, thus forestalling any workers' action. In mid-Jul.y, the 
same day that the STUC economic committee had met the Advisory Group, 
the Govan and Scotstoun Yards shut for the Glasgow Pair Fortnight 
leaving all four yards virtually empty for the following ten days.
In retrospect it is possible to argue that had the Government 
published the Advisory Group's .Report on the expected date which 
in fact would have fallen within this period, it would have provided 
an obvious propaganda gift to the workers who would argue that this 
was further proof of Government duplicity. It may have been this 
rather than as suggested by one commentator, that the Cabinet 
estimated the local police forces in the area to be unable to maintain 
public order without the help of the army, at that time heavily 
occupied in Northern Ireland, which accounted for the further 
week's delay in publishing the report.(26)
By Monday July 26th the Clydebank workers had returned from 
their holidays. The Co-ordinating Committee requested al.l shop 
stewards to report to the yards on Thursday, More than a hundred 
shop stewards from all the yards held an emergency meeting at 
Clydebanlc and it was agreed that a telegram be dispatched to 
Heath demanding a meeting with the Government before the Advisory 
Group's Report was finally issued. The stewards had been promised 
further consultations with the Committee before they completed their
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deliberationso With publication of the Report now imminent they 
were furious when this meeting had failed to materialise after 
a day of fruitless efforts trying to contact the Advisory 
Group* Meanwhile the STUC economic committee had again been 
in London pleading with Davies and Campbell» On Wednesday the  ^
Raport was considered at a two-hour Cabinet meeting. Rumours 
in the press that it recommended the closure of the former 
John Brown's Yard at Clydebank were growing, (27)
Once again half a dozen stewards flew to London, On 
Tuesday evening they sat in on the debate on Scottish unemploy­
ment which naturally enough was overwhelmingly concerned with 
the employment implications of the UCS crisis. They must have 
seethed with anger as they heard Jock Bruce-Gardyne? the 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Gordon Campbell intervene 
with the ugly accusation that while other yards were 'crying 
out' for labour? there were elements among the trade unions on 
the Upper Clyde who had warned UCS men thinking of applying for 
jobs with Yarrows or with Lower Clyde that they did so 'at risk 
to their families', (28) It was a dirty little smear? described 
by Benn As " filthy tittle tattle" designed somehow to weaken the 
fight for the jobs, (29) If this was the level to which responsible 
Conservative politicians were prepared to sink? as Norman Buchan 
commented later in the debate? the Government "have made the class 
struggle respectable", (30) As Buchan's son,journalist Alistair Buchan, 
points out in his book on UCS? it was a debate that few Scottish 
Tory MP's had even bothered to turn up to attend, (31)
On Wednesday the stewards met Davies at the Commons and 
were warned that they would be wrong to think that the total UCS
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workforce could be re-employed in any reorganisation of ship­
building on the Clyde. Wliat proportion of that total the 
Government felt could be re-employed was revealed on Thursday 
July 29th when Davies announced to the Commons at Question 
Time the principal findings of the Advisory Group published in 
a White Paper. Upper Clyde Shipbuilders,Davies said, echoing 
the main findings of the Report,wap doomed from the start as 
the result of the faulty concept of structure? the inherited 
losses of the company and its inadequate management. Moreover 
for the size of the company, the existing order book was held 
to be "dangerously thin." (32) Davies went on to outline four 
conditions for the reorganisation of the company. First? that 
the order book be concentrated at Govan and Linthouse, second, 
that ship production be standardised, third, that the management 
be "radically reformed" and fourth, that"much more productive 
and realistic working agreements" be negotiated. (35) On this 
last point the Advisory Group had attacked the UCS management 
because it had "not exercised sufficient control of costs, 
particularly wages" and recommended as an essential contribution 
to increasing productivity that the unions, "accept certain 
changes in working practices including in due course a change to 
a 2-shift daily working," (34) On this basis said Davies, provided 
these conditions were met, new capital should be forthcoming, for 
a reorganised two-yard operation"particularly from Scottish 
sources" but the Government would also be willing to provide 
some of the initial capital. (35) It was not made clear from 
whom or how much Scottish capital would be forthcoming or for 
that matter, what kind of financial commitment the Government 
were prepared to make. What was clear, however, was that the
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Government accepted the Report's recommendations tlia,t in effect 
Clydebank and Scotstoun be sold off by the liquidator and production 
to be concentrated at the Govan-Linthouse complex. Moreover, no 
matter how Davies tried to dress it up, the fact was that whether 
or not 1,000 men could find work elsewhere on the Clyde at Yarrow's 
or Scott Lithgow as the Advisory Group suggested, the future labour 
force envisaged for the reconstructed company was a mere 2,500 
as against the 8,500 workers currently employed with the men being 
paid off by the liquidator as the work in hand wan completed. (56)
By any standards it was a savage blow, two yards to shut and 
6,000 jobs gone in shipbuilding with a possible further 15,000 
jobs in related industries. Davies had not been kidding when he 
had warned the shop stewards the day before about possible redundancies, 
The uproar which this created in Parliament has been compared to 
that at the Suez debate in 1956. (37) It was a good dress rehearsal 
for yet another full scale debate on UCS fixed for the following 
Monday afternoon at which the Opposition conducted a further onslaught 
on Government policy and the whole sorry affair was gone over once 
again, (38)
The television news that night showed Reid and Airlie standing 
outside the House of Commons in the pouring rain surrounded by 
reporters.
Interviewer: "Are you going to take over the shipyards?
Reid: "Look, we are going back tomorrow for meetings
of the shop stewards and there will be meetings 
of the workers. And this bunch of political 
hatchetmen that are masquerading as a Government 
they can take anti-human and uncivilised decisions 
of this natu3?e, are going to be confronted with a
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fight that, quite frankly, I don*t think 
any amateur yachtsman has got the imagination 
to conceive ofo He is going to have that 
fighto Its slaughter for the Clydeside,"
"Are you prepared to negotiate at all?"
"Ah, what terms? Ihere are only one terms,,
We are passed it/**o"
"/We are passed negotiations."
"Are you going to recommend a strike or a 
takeover when you get back?"
"We are going to recommend the implementation 
of our previous decision. If there’s any 
contraction or redundancies in this industry 
we will work-in, not occupy the yard because 
that’s the word the press has been using.
We are not a foreign power, we were born in 
that area and we will work-in. The right to 
work, its our birthright and we won’t give 
it up for any hatchetraen as my colleague has 
said".
"If they try to get you out?"
"They can try and get us out, but as my 
colleague has said, we not only build ships 
we build men." (59)
Back at Clydebank where Gerry Ross was waiting, he gave vent 
to his feelings when the news was ’phoned through that Clydebank 
was to close down,
"Over our dead bodies, this is our first reaction.
To accept a situation like that would be better to 
take us to the slaughter house, each and every one 
of us, because there is nowhere else for us to go." (40)
Sara Gilmore, theEETPHconvener at Govan backed Ross up,
"Ro they’re not on. Ro, we took the decision that, 
the workers took a decision that we would fight any 
contractions and there’s Well adl they’ve done
is give us more backbone. They’re not on. That’s ray 
initied reaction." (4I )
Local minister, Rev. Lawson with his arm round Gilmore added,
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"all sections of this community, irrespective of political 
or religious background will be unified in saying that the 
Government has made a tremendous error in seeking to close 
the Jolrm Broims. " (42)
The local reaction among Clydebank people was both one of anger and 
of deep shock. The Glasgow Herald described Clydebank
"like a to\m in mourning,,,,Groups discussed the decision 
in hushed tones, creating the atmosphere normally found at 
the scene of a disaster." (43)
If there was an historical parallel, it was in the closure of 
Palmer’s Shipyard at Jarrow more than thirty years before, Ellen 
Wilkinson in her book, The Town that was Murdered described this 
in words that were entirely apposite to Clydebank and the closure 
of John BrovTn's yard.
"Class antagonism cuts as deeply to the roots of capitalist 
society as ever it did. Men are regarded as mere instruments 
of production, their labour a commodity to be brought and sold. 
In capitalist society vast changes can be made which sweep 
away the livelihood of a whole town overnight, in the interest 
of some powerful group, who need take no account of the social 
consequence of their decisions. These are the facts at the 
base of the modern labour movement."(44)
Like the town of Jarrow, industry and community were closely wedded 
together in Clydebank and like the working people of Jarrow, the 
people of Clydebank and indeed of Govan, Scotstoun and the rest of 
Glasgow were going to make their anger felt.
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Chapter four 
'UPPER CLYDE SHIPYARD WORKERS UNLIMITED»
If there were any among whom there was a raood of despair induced 
by the Government's plans Reid’s defiant announcement to the nation’s 
press next morning at Clydebank should have given them new heart.
"As far as the workers here are concerned, you can now call 
it ’Upper Clyde Shipbuilding Workers’ Unlimited’," (1)
The shop stewards had requested the liquidator to allow the entry 
of the press and the television crews v/ho had been waiting outside 
the gate to cover a forthcoming mass meeting to decide on action 
in the light of the Advisory Group’s Report and the visit due that 
day of Tony Denn. The liquidator had refused his permission and 
when this was reported back to the Co-ordinating Committee,
Gerry Ross along with the GMWU convener John McGonnagall were 
dispatched to inform the gateman Alex Stewant, that the shop stewards 
were taking over his responsibilities and were now in charge. The 
harrier went up and the newsmen walked in. It was not a particularly 
dramatic moment. There was no violence, nor even the tl-ireat of it. 
The police who had been warned that the ’takeover’ would happen 
sometime that day had promised not to interfere. To the assembled 
workers Reid announced that the work-in would now begin.
"The world is witnessing the first of a new tactic on behalf 
of workers. We’re not going on strike. We’re not even 
having a sit-in strike. We’re taking over the yards because 
VJ0 refuse to accept that faceless men, or any group of men 
in V/hitc'hall or anyone else can bake decisions that devastate 
our livelihoods with impunity. They’re not on,/..
The joint shop stewards are utterly unanimous and we’re 
gonnae fight this, and we’re monnaie fight with a determination 
that Britain hasn't seen from any section of the working- 
class in this century, let alone since 1915 and we ’ 11 do it.’,.,. 
The oreSB are here asid we want to tell them that we wore
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seriousy we weren’t bluffing, and we’re taking the first 
step todaya The shop stewards representing the workers 
are in control of this yard* Nobody and nothing will 
come in and nothing will go out without our permission*
The security officers have been told that and they accept 
it* The gateman is there* We’ll take the decisions with 
your endorsement, that determines what comes in or out of 
this yard* And in addition to that, we have as you know, 
the co-operation of all sections of the workforce*
And we want to make this public announcement here today* 
There’s been talk in the press of redundancies at Connells* 
This liquidation can do what he wants, but we are not 
accepting redundancies, and the Connells workers or anybody 
else involved, will be reporting to work a,s they should 
have been, that is, a week next Monday* And if necessary^ 
we’ll line up in South Street and we’ll identify ourselves 
with them and we will march into this yard, because brothers, 
I want to make this point*
Everybody talks about rights*
There’s a basic elementary right involved here - that’s 
our right to work* We’re not strikers* We are responsible 
people and we will conduct ourselves within the dignity 
and discipline that we have all the time expressed over 
the last few weeks* And there will be no hooliganism*
There will be no vandalism* There will be no bevying, 
because the world is watching us, and its our responsibility 
to conduct ourselves responsibly and with dignity and with 
maturity***" (2)
Not to be outdone, Berm also underscored the historic 
character of the hour*
"V/hen the history of the labour movement is recorded, 
this moment will be seen as significant* The power 
of the workers that v^ as negative has become positive*
The power is not going to be snuffed out* This is 
the birth pangs of a new concept of industry." (5)
For Benn, this new concept was of course that of workers’ control
which had been at the centre of his bill for the nationalisation
of UCS the previous week* Perhaps Benn was reading something
into the situation which did not exist* If so, his was a, relatively
modest piece of wishful thinking when compared to that of the various ’ultrc
left’ groupings who saw in ÜCS the possibility of instantly
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rekindling the spark of revolution on, Clydeside* As 
Alistair Buchan commented wryly,
"After the takeover, a larger selection of Socialist 
and Marxist newspapers were sold at the gates each 
lunchtime than W.H, Smith has ever refused to 
distribute*" (4)
For the workers at UCS, whatever longer-term implications 
their action might prove to lave, the immediate problems facing 
them were of a far more mundane character than a direct assault 
on capitalist state power particularly not, as will be argued, 
through the tactic of workers* control, either in its Bennite 
or more overtly Trotskyite garbs*
The work-in commenced at Clydebank, appropriate as it 
may have been, primarily because the workers from the other yards 
had not yet returned from their annual holidays* It was equally 
fortuitous that the liquidator’s refusal to allow in the press 
and TV crews presented the opportunity to directly countermand 
his instructions thereby enabling the workers to demonstrate that 
they were ’taking charge’* It was, however, largely a symbolic 
gesture inasmuch as until the first worker was made redundant the 
actual process of working-in could not commence* Moreover, although 
surveillance of the gates by the shop stewards was necessary to 
keep out unauthorised personnel and to prevent any attempt to 
remove plant and machinery, the real assets of UCS lay on the 
berths * If it ever came to the crunch they could if necessary 
stop the boats being launched. The Clyde tugmen had'been approached 
and had given their assurance that no vessel would be removed from 
any of the UCS yards other than at the say so of the Co-ordinating 
Committee. Control, in the sense of the ability to halt delivery
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of the product to its owners certainly did exist in theory at 
least and indeed was to prove a potential bargaining counter 
during subsequent stages of the campaign* It was however a 
weapon of last resort. The immediate requirement was to find 
intermediate weapons that would stem the inevitable flow of 
redundancies as the existing orders in the yards neared completion 
and the liquidator began to lay off more and more men. Every 
batch of redundant workers would place further strains on the 
shop stewards’ organisational and financial resources. The real 
significance of the work-in would be in coping with these problems*
As if to highlight this very issue, in his first announcement 
now as the official, no longer provisional liquidator, Gourtney-Smith 
indicated that he expected to lay off 4OO men in August and 1,400 
in total by the end of September* Scotstoun, he said would close 
at the end of the year and Clydebank, the following March* Ang:cy 
stewards informed him that if he entered the yard he did so ’at 
his peril’ and that henceforth he should conduct his affair else­
where* (5) As Jimmy Reid had said in his speech, Scotstoun 
workers whose yard was aimed} without work would require support 
virtually immediately*
So far as any notion of workers’ control which involved 
the workforce taking day-to-day decisions about the operations of 
management was concerned,there was no question of the UCS workers 
seeking to extend their say over the organisation and planning of 
production in any continuing way* It was argued from the very 
first day of the v/ork-in, that the authority of the managerial 
staff would be respected by the workforce although as Reid had
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pointed out, this was essentially conditional on such authority 
not undermining the chief aims of the work-in*
"The existing managerial people who are with us will 
continue to function in this capacity and their 
instructions, decisions will he adhered to as long 
as they are consistent with the general strategy, and 
work out with the total labour force in terms of our 
continuing work-in." (6)
Middle and even senior levels of management already had declared 
themselves sympathetic to the aims of the work-in. After all, 
if the yards closed their jobs went too. One of the first 
group of employees who would be declared redundant was precisely 
on the staff side, in the marketing and forward planning' depart­
ments. This provoked the stewards to claim that if‘necessary, 
they would send their own marketing people abroad to secure new 
orders«
In fact, the closest the workers ever came to contemplating
organising day-to-day production though in the event the situation
never materialised, was in the tentative contingency plans which
were made to ensure continuity of work and also the necessary
supplies of material and power. Across at Linthouse in the steel
préfabrication sheds, work was unden-fay on the units for the keel
of a new ship, the 121, which had originally been intended to be
laid at Scotstoun, but was now to be redirected by the liquidator
to Govan, The stewards consulted the tug-men and it was agreed
that if the liquidator did not reconsider his position then, if
necessary, they would have, the units floated over on barges to
Scotstoun where the workers would lay the keel themselves. At
one stage they even conducted preparatory work at Scotstoun in
(7)
anticipation of this. The press speculated on a ‘hijacking’ while
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the stewards naturally enough remained silent.(8) In the event 
the liquidator was finally to accede to the workers’ demands.
There were, at that time, enough materials in the yard to maintain 
production for at least another month, however, the stewards 
suggested that if these supplies ran out, then they might even 
consider asking the workers in other firms to send in materials 
to the yards. (9) They had already received definite assurances 
from electricity workers and GPO workers that power and telephone 
communications would not he cut off* While there were rumours 
that the telephones to the Convener's o'ffices might he disconnected, 
there was never really any question of the Government attempting 
to shut the yards overnight which might have brought about the 
situation where the workers had to decide whether or not to 
continue the total production process on their own behalf. Only 
under these conditions would it have made any real sense for the 
workers themselves to assume permanent responsibility for all the 
functions within the enterprise.
The workers for their part realised the managerial staff 
were essential to any continuation of shipbuilding in the 
future,(10) If anything it was not so much that the workers 
began to see themselves as managers, but rather that the managers 
began to see themselves as workers. As one UCS manager put it,
"From the management, down to the foreman, down to 
the chargehand, we are workers, A lot of men who 
are on tools seem to think we are in a grade above 
them which we are not* We’re still employees.
Anybody who is getting a wage is still an employee." (1I)
One of the first major acts of the Co-ordinating Committee 
after the commencement of the work-in was to incorporate
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representatives of middle and senior management onto the Co-ordinating 
Committee thus ensuring their continuing co-operation and assistance. 
Despite press comment about the emergence of ’workers* soviets’ the 
situation as far as management were concerned was not even a question 
of divided loyalties. (12)
"We will still carry on our job as normal. If we see 
anybody hanlcy-pankying about, we will still chase them 
up. That’s our job. As long as we are getting wages 
we’ll work. And if it comes to a fight we’ll fight 
along with the rest of them." (I3)
In itself, the scale of the shift in attitudes which had occurred 
should not be underestimated. The hierarchical division between 
management and workforce was perhaps more rigid in ohe harsh 
environment of shipbuilding than anywhere else in British industry. 
Certainly memories of bowler-hatted foremen barking orders at 
the workers were not so distant as to leave uncoloured present- 
day relations between management and men. Thus for management 
representatives to sit down at a workers* Co-ordinating Committee 
to discuss the workers* struggle on a day-by-day basis and give 
finance and information to assist the campaign was one of the 
more unique features of the work-in. Needless to say in the 
yard itself, the attitudes and the manner of approach of management 
to men altered correspondingly as the stature of the shop stewards* 
leadership grew. Tliis is not to say that problems did not arise, 
but where they did, they were solved on the basis that any minor 
problem would be resolved by consultation with the stewards. If 
necessary, Ken Douglas the managing director of TJCS as the most 
senior member of management would intervene to resolve any difficulties 
created by managerial staff. Unquestionably Douglas* own relatively 
sympathetic attitude to the workforce also influenced those beneath
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him to regard the workers' actions in a positive light, Douglas 
himself who was the son of a shipyard worker^ was early to go on 
record as praising the "discipline" of the workers and the work-in 
as "an acceptable and understandable expression of their legitimate 
grievances." (14) .
Morale among the workers themselves was so high that the 
steel trades in Clydebank actually achieved record bonuses during 
the first week of the work-in. There was an. improvement in time­
keeping, rates of absenteeism were halved and general morale 
improved as the workers * conviction in what they were doing grew. (I5) 
It was in thé sense, that somehow they had become the proprietors 
and custodians of the future of their industry in the face of 
desertion and betrayal by the powers that b^ that the notion of 
control had any relevance for the mass of the UCS workers. In 
Connelly’s Bar across the road from Clydebank yard where the baz*man 
set up the pints of ’heavy* beer in rows along the bar counter in 
plenty of time for the lunch hour rush coming in the door, there 
was none of the usual lingering after the publican had rung the 
warning bell a few minutes before the men were due back at work.
The bar cleared itself as the workers hurried back to the yard. (I6)
It could be argued that UCS provided a fleeting glimpse of that 
kind of voluntary self-discipline that workers impose on themselves 
in socialist society when they are aware that the outcome of events 
is in their own hands. It was an immediate reflection of the fact 
that the workers began to feel that in some respects the yards 
were ’theirs* in a way that they had never been before.
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A further issue that had to he confronted immediately 
the work-in began was of course the political character of 
its leadership, specifically the fact that Reid, Airlie 
and Barr and several others were members of the Communist 
Party, This issue raised itself in a number of ways. To 
begin with, it could be said that the Communist Pgrty commanded 
a fair degree of influence among the industrial workers of the 
west of Scotland and to be kno^wn as a Communist did not 
necessary carry with it the automatic stigma which it might
(17)
have in certain other areas. Indeed, if anything the reverse 
was the case, in that Communist Party shop stewards and trade 
union officials were widely regarded by the workers as the most 
able and consistent fighters for the workers’ cause.
Nevertheless the public character of the UCS campaign and the 
need to gain the widest possible support could raise certain 
difficulties for the leadership. Undoubtedly the support of 
senior and middle management added a certain ’respectability' 
to the work-in. Further ’respectability’ was provided by the 
clergy of both denominations who were affiliated to a Christian 
Action Group in support of UCS and had a standing invitation 
to attend the Co-ordinating Committee, So far as gaining the 
support of the official movement for Co-ordinating Committee 
activities was concerned, the prominence of Communists was not 
in itself a major problem at least at a Scottish level, although 
at a national level, as will be related, things were perhaps 
slightly different. In any event, the STUC had been further to 
the left than the British TUG for well over a decade and included 
among its number an assistant general secretary who was a Party 
member as well as several Communists who were General Council
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members. Among the local Clyde district officials of thé 
Confederation of Shipbuilding Engineering Unions, which 
brought together the key figures in the largest unions in the 
west of Scotland, sympathy with the workers' fight was also 
strong and in no way inhibited by the Communist Party links 
of the leading shop stewards. In fact several of the leading 
figures in the Confederation either were currently or had 
previously been Communist Party members. While the sheer breadth 
and scope of activity that the Co-ordinating Committee was 
starting to undertake in terms of calling for stoppages, 
solidarity and so on did to some extent tresspass on the 
sovereignity of individual union executives this did not create 
the major difficulties it might h ave, It was necessary, however, 
to make sure that the range of political opinion on the Co­
ordinating Committee was nevertheless sufficiently broad, 
including Labour Party supporters, Scottish Nationalists and 
those of no party that it would not be possible for the smear 
of a 'Communist plot' to have any credibility. In the absence 
of any Tory Party shop stewards, a rare species on Clydeside 
but one which would not necessary have been unwelcome, the only 
other points of view which were not represented on the Co-ordinating 
Committee were those of the various far left and Trotskyite 
frin^ organisations. The 'ultra-left' were not wleoome under 
any circumstanceSo There were perhaps four or five workers with 
any ultra-left affiliations in the yards and with twice as many 
different groupings clustering outside the yard gates handing out 
their broadsheets* But although small in number their potential 
for dis^niptive activity was by no means negligible, a question 
which is taken up again in a later chapter*
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The most important problem of all which immediately 
presented itself was that of finance for the work-in* The 
very real prospect existed that if the liquidator went ahead 
with his planned redundancies then the fighting fund would 
require a considerable amount of money to support the men 
working-in. On behalf of the Co-ordinating Committee Airlie 
issued the following appeal through the media,
"The only way we can be beaten is we can be starved 
into submission* We're saying its the responsibility 
of the labour movement to see that this does not 
happen because its not only our fight, its the fight 
of every man and woman in this country - the fight 
for tWright to work*"(is)
The response to the call for support was as dramatic as 
Airlie*s appeal* In the course of the first ten days of the 
work-in messages of support and cash flowed in from all over 
the British Isles and from workers in Canada, Holland, France, 
Australia and New Zealand*(19) Indeed, by the time the second 
big UCS demonstration was held in August there wa,s so much 
money coming into the fund that the shop stewards bad to employ 
a firm of accountants to do the bookkeeping and in the end the 
Burgh Chamberlain of Clydebank Town Council was called upon*
A selection of reported donations and messages of support 
from the press for ea,rly August gives some idea of the scope of 
solidarity which the UCS received* The National Union of Mine- 
workers was the first major union to contribute to the fighting 
fund with a donation of £1,000 while the print union NATSOPA 
promised £500<=(20) Arnold Wesker promised the proceeds of one of 
the two hand-corrected drafts of his play 'The Old Ones'*
Portsmouth district committee of the AUEW sent an immediate £50,, (21)
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Peter Hall and Lindsay Anderson from the world of the theatre 
and cinema sent messages of support while from John Lennon 
and Yoko Ono came a hunch of red roses and good luck wishes 
to be followed by a cheque for £1,000.(22) In Glasgow a, meeting 
of Communist Party industrial workers collected £71 for UOS« 
Manchester district committee of the ATIEW called on its 
executive for a one-day national strike* Tower Hamlets branch 
of M L G O  gave £100* Trades Councils in Basildon and Ealing 
sent messages of support. So also did Chelmsford and Croydon 
AHEW district committees* (2$) ASTt4S sent £100 from its Scottish 
district and £200 from central funds, HOC at Harlow, Essex 
sent £ 3 0 .( 2 4 ) At-Cammel Laird's in Birkenhead the shipbuilding 
workers agreed to pay a weekly levy as did those at Hall Russell’s 
in Aberdeen*(2 5 ) At the invitation of Butch shipyard workers 
who formed their o\m solidarity committee with UCS, a shop 
steward was sent over to Amsterdam to address the workers and 
returned with £600, (2 6 ) Prom the shipyard workers of the Soviet 
Union came £2,700 and eventually over £7,000* A public collection 
in East Kilbride raised £128, while Pressed Steel toolroom 
workers in Birmingham sent £50 and London Overseas telephonists 
sent an initial £20* (2 7 ) The Yorkshire area council of the IHJPI 
voted to send £100 while Park Royal Vehicles in London sent £60, 
Southall district committee of the AUEW and Universal Tools, 
Hounslow sent £10* The works committee at Austin sent £20$ (28) 
On August 6th, the total that had been received since the 23rd 
June when the fund opened was £13,000 of which campaign expenses 
including mass delegations to London had so far cost £5,000*
By the end of August the total income had lept to £46,353, aii 
increase of £53pGGO in three weeks*(2 9 ) Roddy McKenzie, the
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fighting fund treasurer, who along with fellow stewards 
Willie Robertson and Ban O'Donnell made up the membership of 
the finance sub-committee, recalled some of the contributions 
from housewives, pensioners and even young children with genuine 
tears of gratitude,( 30) Nationally the AUEW decided to pay 
its members strike pay if they were made redundant and opted 
to join the work-in, a lead that was later to be followed by 
some of the other major UCS unions* This wa,s an important 
decision as it would help to alleviate some of the burden of 
finance which the Co-ordinating Committee would be faced with*
In the yards themselves where the Govan, Linthouse and 
Scotstoun divisions had now returned from their holidays, mass 
meetings of workers called in all four divisions voted unanimously 
to proceed with the work-in and to make a voluntary levy of 5Cp 
per worker for the duration of the struggle. (3I) In what would 
be described as 'fighting speech' to the men at Govan Airlie attacked 
the Report of the 'Four Wise Men'* .He put the issue on the 
line for them*
"*,ethe decision now rests with you and (there's) 
only one decision where you can maintain your 
self-respect. We are not going to grovel to any 
Tory butcher* We are going to fight, we have no 
alternative, the key and basic fight - the Right 
to Work." (32)
Wlaile the wholehearted enthusiasm of the men themselves w^ as a 
vital factor in terms of the requirements for unity it was clear 
that the bulk of the finance would need to continue to come from 
the labour movement as a whole* In this respect, the meeting 
which the Co-ordinating Committee had called of all Scottish 
shop stew^ards for August 10th assumed crucial importance*
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Political and financial support now on a wholly new scale was 
requiredo The liquidator had made it clear that the first 
lay-offs would not be long in coming#
Perhaps the central political paradox of the whole UCS 
stmggle was the continuing failure of the Government and 
its Whitehall advisors to take seriously the enormous scale of the 
mass response which their plans for the Upper Clyde had 
provoked. The Prime Minister busy with his yachting pursuits, 
had not even been present in the Commons when John Davies 
made the announcement that the recommendations of the Advisory 
Group were to be adopted# The Conservatives had had ample 
warning . of likely reaction yet either through stubbornness 
complacency ora peculiar failure of political intelligence 
they seemed to be prepared to press on regardless# The 
August 2nd debate which followed the publication of the White 
Paper on July 30ih, while it did not stop the Government in 
its tracks, revealed that the Conservatives had a new concern 
for their image# It appeared that the intensity of the public 
outcry over their plans for UCS had caught the Government by 
surprise# Davies emphasised this time how 'distressed' he was 
to think that anyone should imagine that he lacked sympathy 
with the plight of the workers# (33) It was a significant 
change of tone# 'Humanity' and 'concern', if not quite remorse, 
were the order of the day although as always^the sting in the 
tail remained.
"I understand the emotions of dismay and shock which 
have obviously taken place - I am sure that they are 
making a fatal mistake#" (34)
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This last comment was a reference to the work-in but it became 
clear as the debafe unfolded as if the real mistake had been 
that of the Government# The best the Government cou].d do.was to 
try and place, as before, as much of the blame as they could 
on Beniio They had tried that during the first UCS debate 
in June without notable success and they did not do much better 
this time* In defence of the Report, described as "an objective 
and practical assessment of the situation", Davies assured its 
critics that the background material which justified its severe 
recommendations although not published, nevertheless existed 
"in extensio"* (35)lbe demands to publish this material, or to 
appoint a S elect Committee, were renewed by the Opposition*
Yet perhaps the most politically embarrasing speech came not 
from the Labour benches but from within the Government's ovm 
ranks# Teddy Taylor (Cathcart), who with Tam Galbraith (Billhead), 
was the only other Tory MP in the Glasgow area, had newly 
resigned from the front benches in opposition to the Government's 
Common Market policy# In his constituency there were several 
hundred shipyard workers living mainly in the large working- 
class peripheral housing estate of Castlemilk# Taylor's support, 
much of it working-class, as well as his o\m experience as an 
industrial relations officer in the shipyards tempered his other­
wise right-wing views with a degree of realism# It was unfair, 
he said, to blame Benn entirely for the failure of Upper Clyde 
as some of his colleagues were attempting to do# Nor was it fair 
to blame the situation on the workers#
"I have seen the men who work there, and the report we 
have received proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that 
even if every man in the Upper Clyde W8,s an industrial 
angel###the yards, in their present situation could not 
have paid#" (36)
131
The figures provided in the Report of the Advisory Group 
showed that the burden of losses inlierited from its constituent 
companies amounted to about £12 million, in addition to which 
a further £9 million loss ensued from orders taken on in the 
early days of the new UCS group back in I968* Moreover, as 
regards the unions, said Taylor, many of the old demarcation 
problems had been overcome. In fact, so far as trade union 
organisation was concerned old divisions between platers, caulkers, 
welders, drillers and shipwrights no longer resulted in strikes, (3?) 
It could not be described as anything other than a conciliatory 
speech by ■ one Tory MP whose ear was closer to the ground 
than most. Taylor was clearly uneasy about what the Government 
were doing although his espousal of the UCS cause was not so 
vigorous as to inhibit a plea for naval orders for Yarrows',
"from whichever country they might come", meaning presumably 
frigates for the South African Navy. (38)
Davies' announcement during the debate that he and Campbell 
were going to visit Glasgow the next day, came as no surprise.
The previous night they had been with Heath at Chequers. The 
Opposition had already made capital out of the fact that no 
senior Government minister had been to Clydeside. Just how few 
friends the Government had on Clydeside became immediately 
apparent to Davies and Campbell on their arrival. Armed body­
guards accompanied Davies and tight security surrounded 
the visit. However, it was politically, rather 'than physically 
that Davies must have felt most threatened by what awaited him 
in Glasgow. The rather meagre protest group which had been there 
to greet his airport arrival belied what was to come, Provost 
Diddle who hosted this visit in the City Chambers had assembled
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a broad cross-section of the Scottish community to meet the 
Ministers, There was Hamish Grant of the GBI in Scotland,
Robin MacLellan of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, TJCS 
creditors, local authority representatives from Clydebanlc and 
Glasgow, as well as James Jack and Ray MacDonald of the STUC,
Joe Black and Jimmy Ramsay from the Confederation, and Dickie 
and Barr from the condemned yards, plus Reid who was attending 
as a Clydebank councillor. But it was not the presence of 
trade unionists which Davies must have found so disconcerting 
as the fact that even the Government's usual allies seemed in 
a state of disarray.
The previous day Provost Diddle had presided over an 
emergency meeting of the Corporation in which the Conservatives, 
who in Glasgow, at that time dignified themselves with the title 
of 'Progressives', had split among themselves during the debate.
The Labour group had moved a resolution demanding that the four 
yards be kept open with the full labour force retained, and called 
for a public enquiry into the circumstances of the liquidation, 
and nationalisation of UK shipyards. Bailie Wober, a right-winger 
had moved an aramendment which laid the blame for the problem at 
the door of the Labour Government and Tony Benn and called for 
an early start to the construction of a steel and deep sea 
complex on the Clyde Coast, implying by this that the Government's 
policy for Upper Clyde's rundown was correct. A section of the 
more moderate Tories including Provost Diddle supported an 
arnmendment which called for the retention of the maximum employ­
ment in UCS and called for a public enquiry into these circumstances 
surrounding UCS but left out the Labour group's proposal to
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nationalise the industry* 57 voted for the motion and twelve 
each for the two amraendrnents* (39) If Davies was looking for 
support he would not find it from this quarter*
Davies and Campbell had come to listen to what people 
had to say but they could not have much enjoyed what they 
heard* They heard Jasper Macmichael of the P-A Management 
Consultants who with Plepper was a member of the SIB working 
party which set up TJCS in I967? put fonward the idea of a 
separate company for Scotstoun and ClydebanJc which with Government 
backing would enable a phased rundown of the workforce, at the 
rate of 600 men every six months over a 5 year period, during 
which time the men could be retrained* They heard Reid and 
Joe Black argue the productivity record of the yards and the 
potential orders for multipurpose bulk carriers built on the 
Clyde* They heard the Lord Provost express his surprise that 
the proposed cut-backs were so serious and drastic* According 
to Joe Black in a letter to Prank Chappie, of the electricians 
union,
"At this meeting, Davies had nothing to add to his 
statement made in Parliament and was subjected to 
a barrage of criticisms from all sections of the 
audience, in fact his only supporter wa,s Gordon Campbell*" (40)
Just before four o ’clock when it was obvious that the 
discussions were drawing to an end and would produce little 
that was concrete, Joe Black stood up and led a walkout of the 
trade union side* It was a dramatic thing to do but it certainly 
was not ’staged’ as some observers hade suggested* (4I) Prom the 
wo rice r 8 ’ point of view the whole day's talks had been little more than an 
attempt at a public relations exercis? on behalf of the Government
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or, as Reid succinctly put it, "wafflë' #(42) Davies and Campbell 
did give some slight indication that they were prepared to 
’reconsider the position** Each side held a press conference 
to put forward its point of view*(43) As the two sides moved 
through the corridors of the City Chambers Davies and Reid 
again came face to face* Alistair Buchan described what 
happened rext*
"As Davies walked past he pushed out a hand to Jimmy 
Reid* As Reid explained to the stewards meeting the 
next day, when someone comes towards you with his 
hand out your instinctive reaction is to put yours 
out* The steward caught himself in time and placed 
his hand on the Minister's shoulder instead, and sa,id 
*I cannot shake hands with you, I cannot possibly shake 
hands with you'* Davies said something about shaking 
hands as friends, but Reid persisted; 'You are no 
friend of mine, I cannot possibly shake hands with 
you' *
By now everyone was watching and listening and 
flashlights were sparking off all around# Davies, 
trying to recoup the situation, saids *I would 
like to shake hands with you not as a friend, but 
as one fighting for a common cause*. An annoyed Reid 
snapped back; 'Don't you laiow that shipbuilding on 
the Upper Reaches of the Clyde is the best in the 
world? Let's try to keep it that way'*
Davies had one final try* *I have found interest 
in what you have been saying today* We must work in 
a concerted effort to see the future clearly* * But 
as they moved away, Davies said; 'I just don't under­
stand you* and Reid left with the same words, 'and I 
don't understand you'"*(44)
As before with Heath and Willie Mclnnes the void between the 
UCS workers and the Government was symbolically captured and 
personalised in this brief exchange* Davies left Glasgow a 
shaken man*
While Davies had been in the City Chambers, down at Clyde- 
bank the workers were hosting visitors of a vastly different
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political complexion who had come to identify themselves with the 
workers' action. From the Scottish National Party there was its chairman, 
Billy Wolfe and from the Communist Party of Great Britain,
Alex Murray and John Gollan, Scottish Secretary and.General 
Secretary of the party, respectively. The next day it was the 
turn of Harold Wilson, leader of the Opposition to do the grand 
tour. His last visit to Clydebank had been in the 1950*8 accompanying 
Bovin in an election campaign rally. It was a complete reversal of 
Wilson's earlier suspicious attitude towards the work-in. In the 
course of a few hours in Glasgow, Wilson met the stewards, had a 
meeting with the STHC, talked to Ken Douglas, Bob Fleming and Diddle,
On his arrival at the yard flanked by two police outriders, Wilson's 
car was halted by the shop steward at the gate. As the car window 
was wound dovm a slightly bewildered head poked out. Jack MoClement 
the steward who stepped forward said, "Can I see your credentials 
please? I know who you are but I still have to see your credentials 
pal". The car was allowed through but the police outriders were 
turned back by Reid and Airlie who told them that Dîr. Wilson "doesn't 
need any protection in here". As the outriders turned around Wilson 
cast a nervous glance over his shoulder. (45) After a brief tour of 
the Clydebank yard escorted by the stewards and cheered by the 
workers he was taken to the packed canteen and given a mug of tea.
There standing on a bench he made his personal declaration.
"On behalf of the British Labour movement I am here to 
assert the right of the shipbuilding workers of Upper 
Clyde of their right to work." (46)
As Opposition spokesman, Wilson naturally had a plan to save 
the yards upon which he later elaborated. Effectively it meant the 
Government would nationalise the yards for a limited period
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and place ’spec* orders with the yards to take up slack and ease 
cash flow problems. It was not the sort of thing which would 
recommend itself to a Tory Government bent on eliminating lame 
; ducks. As regards the actual work-in Wilson made, plan that he supported 
any action the workers took to maintain their right to work provided 
it was ’within the law’. (47) As Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal 
Opposition, there was hardly anything else he could have said and 
the fact that he had come to Clydeside at all was a boost to the 
workers* morale and implied that the struggle conducted by the 
stewards had. both legitimacy and the backing of the Labour Party,
The key thing now was to destroy the arguments that had been 
put forward by the Pour Wise Men and create the political conditions 
for a major re-think in Government policy. To some extent it would 
be mass action which would most effectively alter the climate of 
discussion but it was necessary also to dislodge the barriers the 
Government had put up to reconsidering the arguments of the Advisory 
Group Report, The previous parliamentary debate on August 2nd had 
laid the groundwork for this. Within a couple of days of Davies’ 
visit to Glasgow the stewards effectively undermined the Report’s 
claim that the UCS order book was ’thin’. Through members of the 
management the stewards had been given access to information about 
orders which it was claimed were on the point of b’eing lodged with 
UCS for product carriers and ’Clyde’ class ships. With the liquid­
ation these orders, worth about £120 million had been lost, Further­
more, again the stewards charged that the Government load made up its 
mind to dismember the UCS even before it came to power, referring to 
the ’Ridley Report’ which the stewards said they would publish in full 
at the appropriate time. Even more damning was the charge that 
the chief cause of the collapse was the cash-flow crisis exacerbated 
by the withholding of credits for tie period between October 1970
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and February 1971 which resulted in £64 million of overdue debts 
which the company could not meet* (48)
At the same time a number of articles began to appear in the
press which further undermined the credibility of the Advisory
Group's Report* Jasper MacMichael in a long article in the
Glasgow Herald explaining the proposals he had put to Davies and
Campbell during their City Chambers Conference, commented that the
Report was 'disappointing in its lack of vision'. The working
capital requirements of UCS had not been realistically assessed
when the group was formed and the extent of losses on inherited
contracts was not foreseen* As a result the expected investment 
to improve production facilities did not take place* MacMichael
argued that by implication it now made little sense to spend the
£50 million which would be required simply to keep men on the
dole* (49)
That week, The Guardian carried a long article entitled 'UCS 
was bled to death' by one of the paper's correspondents, Mark 
Arnold-Foster* Referring to the withholding of credits which had 
deprived the company of 80 per cent of its revenues, he said,
"the possibility that Mr. Davies' Department did not know what 
would happen is remote." (50) The paper listed six meetings between 
Davies cind Macken&ie, the SIB representative between October and 
February. In fact UCS had been forced to find between £5 and £6 
million from other sources to keep going. By the time the Govern™ 
ment finally released the credits, UCS had been 'bled to death'*
The demands for the Government to publish the .extensivè background 
material on which the Advisory Group's Report was supposedly based 
were now being made not just by the Opposition but from quarters
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which were usually firm Government supporters* It is a moot 
point however, even with the general outcry, whether or not at 
this stage the Government were prepared to reconsider their 
approach*
These and related issues were raised by Reid, Barr, Cook 
and Mclnnes at a meeting with Eden in London at the Department of 
Trade and Industry on August 9th* The stewards wanted to know 
whether the Government would examine Harold Wilson's proposals for 
UCS; whether they would delay the issue of redundancy notices to 
allow these and other proposals to be examined; whether the 
Government would lift its ban on further orders for ships and 
allow the UCS marketing department to seek new orders; how much 
private capitaJ. was pledged to keep Govan going and how much the 
Government were prepared to putip; whether John Davies* pledge 
after his visit to Glasgow to 'think again' was being fulfilled 
and, of course, whether the Government would publish the working 
papers of the Advisory Group* (51) During the ensuing discussion 
Reid put forward the shop stewards' own proposals for a new company, 
wholly or partially publically o^med, to be based on the present 
units for a four or five year period which the workers would 
guarantee to make a success* Eden however, did not think this 
proposal sufficiently interesting to accede to the stewards' request 
that he 'phone Heath aboard his yacht Morning Cloud and put their 
offer directly to him. The outcome was as inconclusive as the 
City Chambers Conference a few days before. The virtues of 
negotiation were clearly wearing rather thin for the stewards.
As Reid commented, parodying Gordon Campbell's Churchillian rhetoric 
at their City Chambers meeting,
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"Having jaw-jawed, we're going to fight fight* Our 
powder is still dry*" (52)
The following day the 'troops? assembled*
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LEFT UNITY AND THE BROAD ALLIANCE
If the first Rosevale meeting of snop stewards in June was 
'indicative of the fighting potential among Glydesiders, the second 
meeting on August 10th had representatives from almost eve]?y section 
of the whole Scottish working class and some from the North of 
England too. There were as many as twelve hundred shop stewards 
present to pledge the support of the workers they represented for 
Airlie's appeal for a weekly levy for financial assistance* Among 
the speakers representatives of the official labour and trtide union 
movement were as numerous as shop stewards. Jimmy Morrell, organiser 
of the General and Municipal Workers, Jimmy Ramsay of the Clyde boiler- 
malcers, Joe Black, Chairman of the Clyde district of the Confederation, 
Gavin Laird, convener of Singers, Janey Buchan of the Glasgow 
Labour Party, Dave Bolton, Scottish Vice-Chairman of the NUM,
Joe McCafferty, the Scottish Officer of the transport workers,
Harry McLevy, Convener from the Dundee shipyards of Robb Caledon,
John McCartney from Hall Russell's yard of Aberdeen.
The enthusiasm which Reid's speech that day generated was 
another tribute to his outstanding ability as a speaker. It 
rivalled and indeed surpassed in eloquence his speech on the 
previous similar occasion in the Rosevale. The applause w-as 
deafening as Reid was given a standing ovation. Here was a man who 
could put into words what workers were feeling and thinking. Yet 
it was the issues to which the workers were responding not simply 
the oratory, impressive though this was. Reid issued the call,
On the part of the working people of Bizi tain to put 
an. end to policies and practices whereby decisions can 
be taken by a group of men cither in Government or in a
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board room that can decimate communities and cast 
thousands of workers on to the dole queue and blight 
the future of the younger generation and force social 
upheaval and people leaving their communities in search 
of a future*
Now for too long we have tolerated such policies and 
such practices, for too long they've been getting away 
with it and at last a section of the workers have rejected 
and repudiated such social, economic and political theories 
and have been reasserted the dignity of workingmen to 
establish that they've got rights, and they've got 
commitments and privileges and principles and they are 
going to utilise their ability and capacity to resist 
these measures to fight and to unite around them their 
brothers and sisters. So that in winning this victory and 
that’s what we should be speaking about today, it is not 
a narrow victory for the UCS workers, but a, victory for 
the British working people that can reverse the whole 
trend that’s been so obvious in our country for the last 
years and indeed, create a situation where no more can 
such decisions be taken. Because I waiit to say thisî 
The policies of the Government in relation to the UCS 
indicate a mentality towards shipbuilding which means that 
shipbuilding is expendable in the whole of Britain and 
we're an island and a maritime nation* But so also does 
this mentality apply to other industries and it raises the 
question of there being people in this Government wHo 
represent financial interests, whose sole concern is 
maximising their profits and if this can be done by 
investments abroad or by chewing gum plantations in 
Timbuctoo they're not interested.in the devastation that 
their policies will wrought in terms of the economic 
structure of Britain and the social malaise and desert 
that these policies will create*" (applause)* )
Referring how to the Report of the 'Four Wise Men' which Reid 
derisively held up before his audience.
"In the first instance its a broadsheet; that's not a Wliite 
Paper! This is supposed to be the result of a, most 
exhaustive examination by experts of the situation of ship­
building on the Upper Reaches of the Clyde# I can tell 
you, my twelve year old daughter could have bettered it, 
as a result of three or four visits to the Yards on the 
Upper Reaches* There’s no analysis, there's no substantiation, 
there's contentions# And it seems to us that in point of 
fact this is not a \'/hite Paper its a dollop of whitewash that 
was constructed in order to justify the preconceived 
position of this Government relative to the UCS because it 
takes a summation of statistics by and large from the 
inception of the UCS, They met for five weeks - five weeks, 
and incidentally they were not in constant session they 
probably had about a dozen meetings* A dozen meetings to 
examine a sibuation of such complexity* They brought on
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Lord RoLens in the last week We never saw Lord Rohens®
He was brought on for a bit of window dressing as an 
ex-Labour minister that might give an aura, of labour 
movement respectability to the findings of this committee* 
We've said before of course, Lord Robens is finished in 
the labour movement as a result of his associations with 
this committee, because it was a hatchet job*" (applause) (2 )
Now Reid poured scorn on the supposed impartiality of the Advisory 
Group of which Davies had previously tried to persuade them*
"He has told us in Glasgow that he didn't want shipbuilding 
experts on the committee because they would have to be, 
almost by definition, competitors of the UCS who had a 
vested interest in ending in the UCS. But he says, 'I can 
assure you they had access to shipbuilding experts', who 
presumably were competitors of the UCS, who had a vested 
interest in destroying the UCS, (laughter and applause)*.*
If they were giving evidence I would rather they had've 
been on the*..on the front line in public glare rather 
than surrepticiously giving evidence through the back 
door. Competitors they may be with an interest as I've 
said in the destruction of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.
What does it amount to? Nobody will argue that if you 
take the statistics of the UCS from its inception, that 
these statistics aren't damning. They are damning. But 
there is no trade unionist will defend the record of the 
UCS of about 1 9 8 8  to halfway through I9 8 9  for reasons 
which Joe touched upon, the money was squandered, compensation 
given to previous owners, too many of them, too many of 
these previous owners who had brought shipbuilding and the 
Upper Reaches of the Clyde to the sorry state they were in, 
as a result of their neglect, were represented on that Board 
and I'm saying this to you quite bluntly. The record of 
the shipbuilding families of the Clyde, that's the owners, 
is such, as they shouldn't be allowed to manage a bingo hall, 
let alone an industry fighting for its community..."
(cheers and applause).
"We are continuing with this fight, and you have an opportunity 
of registering an historical, monumental victory in this 
fight. And do you know why you've got that opportunity?
Because you've got a workforce, that, I'm tellihg you this, 
that I ’m absolutely proud and privileged to be a member of 
in the Upper Reaches of this river. We are going to fight, 
and we can win this one, but we're realists, we know we 
cannot win it without your support. We cannot win it un­
less its understood and recognised that this is the crunch 
fight for Scotland and for the trade union movement in Britain 
in the fight against deadly economic policies that treat 
us basically as rubbish."
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"We are asking here today at this conference, - help us#
Now this is not the begging bowl. We are reasonable and 
rational men but I think we've proven in the last few 
weeks, we've got guts* This is not the begging bowl#
In asking for your help we're asking you to help your­
selves, and in asking for your solidarity we're asking 
you to reverse the trend in British society, whereby' ' 
workers will assert their basic inalienable right, the 
right to work. We are asking that you respond to our 
call not only for financial assistance, but at some 
stage in the relative near future, to demonstrate 
beyond all shadow of doubt where you stand, you and your 
workers stand and you and your organisations stand, by 
giving the most visible, physical demonstration that on 
this issue, the workers of Britain recognise its a trial, 
its a test case, that if its won can galvanise the whole 
progressive working class movement in Britain that 
contains men of goodwill and, can take this country on a 
new course, where the people matter, where the people 
come first, where elementary rights and decencies take 
a higher priority than the economic dogma and greed of a 
tiny section of the community#" (3) (Applause and cheers)#
The shop stewards left the Rosevale meeting determined to go back 
to their workplaces and fight for the largest possible turnout at 
the public demonstration which the meeting had called for the 
following week# ' ,
At the official level also the STUC was marshalling the 
support of the organised trade union movement on the wider basis 
that the IJCS situation epitomised the general crisis of unemployment 
facing the Scottish economy as a whole# In mid-August a Special 
Congress of the STUC was held in the Partick Burgh Halls in Glasgow 
and was attended by over four hundred delegates, James Jack in his 
opening statement pointed out that a recall Congress had not taken 
place before, even during the long and hungry 'thirties' when un­
employment had never fallen below 18 per cent. (4) The figure of 
I34f512 unemployed for July 1971 could be compared to the summer of 
1 9 8 0  when the total was a mere 55fGOO. Factories which had either 
closed or were cutting back involved important plants in chemicals, 
engineering, and electronics like ICI, Babcock and Wilcox, Plessey,
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BSC, Mavor & Coulson, Davy & United, Satohv;ell Controls and AEÏ 
not to mention closures in the paper and textile industries which 
in the previous two or three years alone had lost 1 9 , 0 0 0  jobs*
It was clear moreover that unemployment wa,s no longer confined 
simply to the contraction of traditional industries. Unemployment 
said Jack, in language somewhat more forthright than usual,
"was a persistent, painful reminder of the built-in 
economic and social injustices and conflicts of this 
country," (5 )
Naturally in this context BCS was very much to the fore in the 
speakers' remarks that day* The mood of the trade union leader­
ship in Scotland was as angry and determined as that of the rank 
and file representatives*
In a break with protocol Jimmy Reid was allowed to address 
the Special Congress on behalf of the UCS Shop Stewards Co-ordinating 
Committee even though strictly speaking he was representing an 
‘unofficial* body. According to one observer Reid was again ®cheered 
to the rafters" in a speech which raised the theme of what was he 
called a ‘working-class Charter of Rights’,
"at the heart of which was the right to work,,,,if the 
Government couldn't guarantee that right, or the social 
order could not give that right, then, change the 
Government or modify the order," (6 )
The Special Congress adopted proposals based on the General 
Council's eight point plan to ease the high level of unemployment,(7 ) 
Among the measures proposed were an expansion of the economy 
through public spending, strengthening of regional incentives and 
employment premiums and the establishment of a special economic 
planning authority for the West Central Scotland area modelled 
along the lines of the Highlands and Islands Development Board*
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Specific projects which the STUC had been campaigning for included 
the building of a new major petro-chemical development and the 
construction of a deep sea terminal and steel complex at Hunterston. 
An immediate Government commitment to proceed with the EB211 engine 
for Rolls Royce which would secure jobs at the Hillington plant 
and of course, a reversal of the Government's decision on UCS was 
also called for.
Present at the Special Congress were leading national officials 
of the Confederation, including Frank Briggs its president, Jack 
Service its general secretary and Danny MoGarvey as chairman of 
the Confederation's powerful Shipbuilding Negotiation Committee,
They were in Glasgow not only for the Congress but also to attend 
a key meeting the following day of the BTUC's Economic Committee 
being held for the first time in its history in Scotland, In 
addition they all wanted to be present for the second UCS mass 
demonstration on the day after that. Leading the BTUC Economic 
Committee delegation was Vic Feather, the TUG General Secretary, who 
had come to Clydeside to put for\^rard the idea of a planning agency, 
the Clydeside Development Authority (CDA) to the Special Congress 
thus establishing his authorship of a major trade union initiative 
to solve the long-term problems of the West of Scotland.
Neither Feather nor McGarvey had been to the Clyde since the 
UCS crisis broke but it was clear that the time had come for the 
trade union national leadership to identify themselves publically 
with the UCS cause and, more importantly, to be seen to have some­
thing worthwhile to say on the matter. Previously MoGarvey and 
Feather's involvement had been somewhat peripheral, to the events. 
Clearly what was now happening was too big for leaders of their
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stature to allow themselves to be relegated to the sidelines.
So far as MoGarvey's public role was concerned he had done nothing 
since moving the resolution on UCS at the Confederation Annual 
Conference in June although he had presented the C M  scheme, 
presumably with Feather's blessing, to the Confederation at York 
a few days before and was closely identified with Feather's approach 
to IJCSo As Feather said to the Special Congress, in suitably 
measured tones, UCS was not only a problem for Clydeside, Scotland 
and shipbuilding, but "a matter of concern" for the whole of 
Britain* (s)
"We have kept in touch with the situation during the 
whole period. Now the combined weight of the movement 
must be exerted, trying practical, positive and honest 
proposals to save the jobs of men, the livelihoods of 
families and the future of shipbuilding." (5 )
As regards the actual work-in Feather’s position was somewhat 
more equivocal supporting it mainly as ’’a means of drawing attention'' 
to the crisis. (IO)
In fact, the idea of a Clydeside Development Authority 
paralleled the STUC's own call for a special economic planning 
agency for West Central Scotland* The remit of the CDA in which 
trade union participation was seen as 'essential to achieve the 
confidence of workpeople' would be to prepare a development plan 
for the whole area. The finance for the CDA would come from interest 
free loans from the Exchequer but the authority would also be able 
to raise private loan capital on the market. The CDA would "take 
over all the assets and liabilities" of UCS and seek new orders to 
stabilise employment levels. If after examining the situation it 
was thought appropriate that some of the labour force be redeployed 
then the CDA would ensure that there was sufficient public and
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private investment to provide "alternative employment and 
facilities for such retraining as necessary," (11)
Certainly the CDA proposal could be seen as an attempt by 
Feather to perform a great public act of 'industrial statesmanship' 
which would also assert to authority of the TUC to a degree, over 
the STUC, perhaps also over the political intervention of Tony Benn 
in the campaign and certainly to establish the leading position of 
the TUC vis a vis the shop stewards. As it was, elements of the 
CDA plan could be construed as at variance with the stewards' 
demand that there be no contraction or redundancies, since it 
envisaged the possibility at least, of a reduction in the ship­
building labour force which perhaps explains its rather lukewarm 
reception by the shop stewards, (12) On the positive side, however, 
the meeting of the Economic Committee secured official TUC backing 
for the UCS campaign in the immediate sense, by issuing a call to 
the national executive level of the trade unions to assist the 
UCS workers in their fight. This resulted in more unions agreeing 
to pay their members at UCS strike benefit as well as several 
large lump sum donations to the fighting fund. More generally, 
from the point of view of breadth of support for the campaign, 
the identification of the TUC with UCS as a cause meant that the 
left and right within the trade unions and again, within the labour 
movement were now united to an unprecedent extent. This was 
clearly manifested on the UCS demonstration next day where marching 
together arms linked were Feather and MoGarvey, alongside Hugh 
Scanlon, the general secretary of the engineering union and from 
the Labour Party, Willie Ross in the same lineup as Tony Benn.
If the degree of unity was remarkable the scale of the 
demonstration was equally so. Once again the sun shone, but this 
time up to 80,000 workers took to the streets, and as many as
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200,000 stopped work in sympathy* (1 3 ) The atmosphere was almost 
like that of a carnival with George Square a mass of movement, 
sparkle and gaiety, as the brightly coloured union banners of each 
contingent were unfurled in a sea of placards and posters#
Everyone wanted to carry a message for the Tories# The women 
workers sang the 'protest songs' of Clydeside; 'If you hate 
Edward Heath clap your hands' and 'John Brown's shipyard is Rising 
from the Grave'* They altered the words of 'Daddy's taking us to 
the zoo tomorrow', a children's song popularised by folk singer 
Julie Felix to 'Teddy's talcin' us to the Buroo tomorrow’# The 
chant went up "What do we wqnt?" Back came the roar "Heath out!", 
over and over again# If they could have, they would have blasted 
the Tories out of office by the power of their lungs alone# Some­
how the marshalls organised the hundreds of different groups of 
workers and the head of the march set off while the thousands 
crowding George Square burst out in spontaneous applause# Arthur 
Milligan of the Morning Star captured that occasion, probably 
Scotland's largest ever industrial and political demonstration#
"Nothing like it has been seen before# Here were miners, 
engineers, draughtsmen, postal workers, clerical workers, 
kids from the Socialist Fellowship, tobacco workers, 
transport workers, boilermakers, railwaymen and students - 
all marching as one#"(l 4 )
In a certain respect Vic Feather had been correct when he 
said at the Special STUC Congress that UCS was not simply a Clyde­
side or a purely Scottish issue# The demonstration proved that 
beyond a shadow of a doubt. They had come not just from all over 
Scotland but from south of the border too# There were workers with 
their bamiers from London airport and Gad wick, from Wolverhampton, 
Derby, Blackpool, Barrow, Solihull, Tyneside, Dagenham, Coventry, 
Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool#
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A le x  Murray speaîcing as Scottish District Secretary of the 
Communist Party at Glasgow Green paid tribute to the UCS workers#
"By your fight, you have forged a new unity of the 
working class to a degree and at a level never before 
known in any previous struggle# And also because your 
unity and courage and the quality of your leadership 
have brought a great new sense of pride to our movement, 
pride in the fact that you are members of our movement, 
of our class*
The British working class stands just a little bit taller, 
a little bit straighten today, the product of your struggle 
and your leadership and I know you'll understand when I 
say that we are especially proud of the part that members 
of our Party are playing alongside their fellow shop 
stewards in that leadership, and in the service they are 
giving to the UCS workers and to the Scottish people#
This struggle of the UCS workers has many lessons for the 
working class, including that the fight against unemploy­
ment cannot be conducted in the abstract, or by words 
alone, however reasoned# It is the action of the UCS 
workers that has been the catalyst, that has galvanised 
millions of people to united action in their support*
Their action, their struggle, has become the focal point 
of the common struggle of millions of workers throughout 
Britain." (I5 )
It was, as many agreed, one of the best speeches that day in a list 
of speakers that included William Wolfe of the Scottish National 
Party, Jimmy Airlie, Vic Feather, Danny MeGarvey, Tony Benn,
Willie Ross, Hugh Scanlon, James Jack and of course, Jimmy Reid*
The wider implications of the struggle were taken up by Reid in 3, 
fierce assertion of the central role of working class leadership 
in the struggle for a better society#
"The workers in Britain are getting off their knees, 
getting on their feet and asserting their dignity, 
asserting their abilities, asserting in a determined 
and disciplined way that they will have a say in the 
decision making of this country*.»,
No-one has the right to destroy the aspiration of the 
young men or the security of the old men, no-one has 
the right to demand what people leave their countries 
if they want work* We started off fighting for our 
jobs and in a matter of days we knew we were fighting 
for Scotland and for the British working class movement*
The real power of this country has been forged today
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in Clydeside and will be forged now in the pits, the 
factories, the shipyards, and the offices. Once that 
force is given proper leadership, is disciplined and 
determined, there is no force in Britain, or indeed 
in this world, that can stand against it*" (16)
The only dark patch in that otherwise cloudless day, if the 
press reports of Provost Piddle bemoaning the loss of production- 
caused by the stoppage are ignored, was the announcement by the 
liquidator that 174 workers were to be declared redundant on 
Friday* The following Monday morning therefore, would be the 
first real test of the workers solidarity because for all the 
speeches and demonstrations and for all the plans that had been 
laid, unless the redundant workers themselves were convinced that 
the cause was. sufficiently worthwhile actually to participate in 
the work-in, then it would quickly come to nothing*
Of the first batch of redundancies about two thirds were 
manual workers and one third were staff# Out of all these only 
8 workers were "volunteers", that is, they accepted redundancy 
money from the liquidator and left# The rest were compulsorily' 
redundant and joined the work-in# They were to receive their 
average after-tax weekly earnings based on forty hours work which 
amounted to somewhere between £20 and £25 plus their national 
insurance stamps contribution* Each worker's card was stamped as 
'self-employed'# The money came from the fighting fund and was 
paid out each week by clerks who had themselves been made redundant 
and joined the work-in# By the end of August, 599 had been declared 
redundant of whom 277 were working-in# Of the total redundancies 
that month 215 were hourly paid of whom 155 returned to join the 
work-in and 184 staff, of whom 142 returned# (17) Thus overall, the 
initial turnout for the work-in was somewhere near seventy per cent
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indicating a fairly high level of support among the yard workers* 
About 62 per cent of the manual workers and about 77 per cent of 
the staff who had been made redundant returned* One possible 
explanation of the relative imbalance of the proportions between 
the staff and manual categories is that manual workers perhaps 
felt they had less to lose than staff in that the experience of 
redundancy and job change would be relatively more frequent among 
this group* This would be particularly true of finishing trade 
workers who frequently moved back and forth between shipbuilding 
and construction work. Even the metal-working trades however, 
though less mobile than the finishing trades would be resigned to 
periods of unemployment or job change due to the cyclical nature 
of employment in the industry# (ie) Staff on the other hand would 
stand to loose a number of fringe benefits, pension rights and so 
on, even presuming that they could find employment outwith ship­
building in which their 'skills' would be of some use.
Be that as it may, in the day-to-day organisational terms the 
handling of the work-in employees was no simple matter. The original 
plan had been for the men to report to their foremen and assume 
their old jobs. The problem was however that if the work-in 
continued for ..any substantial length of time and those on the work- 
in continued to produce as before, then every day that passed 
would provide the liquidator with a vessel that was more nearly 
completed* The objective of the work-in was to focus on the willing­
ness of the workers to work in the yards and forestall layoffs 
rather than assist in creating the conditions for even more of 
their number to be sacked* In order therefore, not to provide 
the liquidator with free labour financed, as it were, by the 
workers' fighting fund this meant that work-in members could only 
assist at the most in maintaining norma], output levels by sharing
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work with their mates still in employment. In addition, there was 
the problem that in the event of any industrial injury, and many of 
the jobs in shipbuilding involve some element of risk, then questions 
would arise as to compensa,tion liability. Redundant workers there­
fore had to be put on jobs which did not carry any serious degree 
of risk thus excluding virtually all the work-in from work aboard 
the actual vessels. In the purely practical sense then the work-in 
as an effective concept was circumscribed in its application by 
these objective difficulties. (19) Despite such limitations, in 
terms of its role as a rallying point for the workers there is no 
doubt that it was a powerful unifying force for all those in the yards, 
For all workers still employed in the yards by the liquidator it 
involved a regular weekly contribution towards maintaining their 
unemployed comrades for about a year and a continuing ban on overtime 
working. For those who were members of the work-in and had to turn, 
up daily at the yards, it involved foregoing the chance of a job 
elsewhere for the period they were on the work-in. It was a 
continuing test of the workers* voluntary self-discipline which on 
the whole they passed with credit. At every stage it provided a 
guage of the solidarity of the workforce. The workers were united 
to the extent that members of the work-in continued to turn up and 
their fellow workers continued to support them financially and 
morally.
Even if the men actually on the work-in could not be physically 
linked with the rest of the UCS workforce in terms of the day-to-day 
jobs, the Co-ordinating Committee ensured through its publicity sub­
committee that the futiu:e of the work-in was continually linked at 
least in the workers * minds with their own fate. From September 
tlirough to April, periodic bulletins were issued by the Co-ordinating
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Committee which gave the entire workforce an up-to-date picture of 
the overall, position of the campaign in the form of reports, articles 
and the incisive cartoons of Bohhy Starret from Yarrows* In all, 
a dozen such bulletins were prod.uced and distributed among the 
workforce* (20) In this way the views of the leadership of the workers 
were transmitted through an additional and 'authoritative* channel 
besides simple word-of-mouth statements from the platform at mass 
meetings and departmental meetings and discussions. Although it 
is difficult to guage with accuracy the relative importance of all 
the different ways in whldi- attempts were made to sustain internal 
unity within the yards it was probably due in no small measure to 
such initiatives from the Co-ordinating Committee that they were as 
successful as they were* Certainly the keen realisation of the need 
to combat possible distortions from the mass media throughout the 
campaign prompted the Co-ordinating Committee to seek every channel 
and every possible opportunity to communicate with the workers#
As a demonstration of the UCS workers’ determination to resist 
Government policy the political significance of the work-in had 
massive reverberations in terms of the ability of the Clyde workers 
to mobilise support up and down the country# Throughout the August 
and into September, the stewards had gradually intensified their public 
campaign# UCS stewards addressed the workforces in factories and 
installations the entire length of the country during this period#
In England and Wales they visited London, Barrow, Nottingham,
Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Coventry, Cardiff, Sv;ansea, 
Merthyr, Dagenham, Slough, Oxford, Carlisle and many other places besides,
A list of speakers was issued by the Co-ordinating Committee of 
those who were prepared to accept invitations to address any meeting 
of workers# Among those who travelled around the country were
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Davie Cooper, James Kirkpatrick, Bob Reid, Gerry Ross, Sarn Gilmore, 
Bob McCann, Willie Holt, Dick McLean, Alex Bill, Jim Clonghley 
Dick McCrossan, Willie Clydesdale, Hugh Shaw, Ian Kenny, Tommy Friel, 
Franlc McGowan, Stan MoHee, Jolm McIntosh, Tommy Murdoch, Jimmy Reid, 
Jolm McMillan, Jimmy Airlie and Sam Barr. They comprised what was 
within a remarkably short space of time, a developing "team of mass 
orators" prepared to go any where at a moments notice, ( 2 1  ) The job 
of organising what became practically a professional travel agency 
was given to the sub-committee led by Jimmy Kirkpatrick, a draughts­
man ' 8 representative on the Co-ordinating Committee, Up to fifty 
requests for speakers were dealt with every week and at the height 
of the campaign as many as seventy a week. Usually the stewards 
were sent in groups of two to four so that the less experienced 
could learn from the more experienced speakers, each supplied with 
speakers notes and a list of local contacts among the conveners of 
the work forces in the key local factories. (22) Their job was to 
explain the demands of the UCS workers to the general public and the 
labour movement and to win. financial support.
In this, as reports of donations promised and received were 
to show, they were remarkably successful, UCS had become a national 
issue, even inspiration, for the active organised British working 
class and the visits by shop stewards to the major industrial centres 
of the country were probably instrumental in helping to raise the 
whole combatative spirit of the class, not only in resisting 
redundancies and factory closures, but also in the subsequent 
series of battles over Tory Government policy on a number of fronts. 
Early in August the steel workers from the River Don works faced 
with savage redundancies came north to consult the UCS stewards as 
to how they had organised the work-in, (2 5 )lliey were the first of many
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groups of workers to whom the UCS workers gave moral and financial 
support in their struggles for the right to work. Some measure of 
the degree to which TJCS had become a symbol of the fight against 
the Heath Government can also be guaged by the fact that in different 
areas of the country local action committees uniting left militants 
in the unions, the Co-operative Societies, the Labour and Communist 
parties sprang up, in pla.ces as far apart as Ayrshire, South Wale.s, 
Doncaster, Wellingborough and Hammersmith. These action committees 
were specifically intended to mobilise support for UCS while 
campaigning on the general issue of imemplojunent and encapsulated 
the developing left-unity which was emerging on a nation-wide scale 
at the base of the labour movement.
In Ayrshire at an initial meeting called to discuss UCS at 
the Glacier Metal Social Club in Kirlmarnock over 4 OO shop stewards 
turned up, a response which a local steward described as 'staggering*.
It was decided to set up the Ayrshire Workers Co-ordinating Committee 
which was a county solidarity committee consisting blue collar 
and while collar workers and sparing the boundaries of several local 
trades council areas. Meetings were organised to discuss the events 
on the Clyde and to raise levies in such major plants as Glacier Metal, 
Massey Fergusson, the Ailsa Shipbuilding Company, Irvine dockyard, 
Glenfield and Kennedy and Skefko. Often these meetings were held in 
company time. In the case of Skefko the workers took over the works 
canteen on one occasion for this purpose, V/hen the management 
threatened to call the police, the stewards threatened to call the 
men out on strike. The damaging prospect of 'enlightened* Swedish 
management using the civil authorities to evict their workforce 
from the premises was, however, sufficient inducement for the Skefko 
management to permit the meeting to continue unhindered. (24) In 
South Wales thirteen district authorities and local trades councils came
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together to form the Cwmbran District Action Group. (25) The 
leaflet issued by the Doncaster and District Trades Council on 
'Unemployment and UCS' also provides an example of the way in which 
local groups attempted to mobilise support around the question 
of UCS.
"Workers of the UPPER CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS are the first 
British workers to reject redundancy.
Instead of the platitudes spoken by many politicians 
over the years on the subject of unemployment, these 
workers claim We are going to work - when the bosses 
say There is No work for us.
This cuts directly across statements made by Davies 
and Carr, with their accusations of the lazyness of 
workers being responsible for our economic problems, 
lazy workers do not demand the RIGHT TO WORK." (26)
The leaflet concluded with an appeal to workers in the area 
to organise weekly levy to support the work-in to be forwarded 
to the trades council treasurer. It was distributed both in 
the town centre and in the mines and factories throughout the 
area. (27)
It was not possible, however, to send a speaker to each of 
the thousands of factories who were by now giving financial 
contribution. To meet this need for communication the stewards 
issued a four page tabloid-style paper titled "The Butchering 
of UCS* in mid-September. (28) Printed on the presses of the 
Co-operative Press in Manchester and laid out by members of 
the Glasgow branch of the National Union of Journalists in their 
own time, one hundred thousand copies were prepared for 
distribution throughout the country. It contained an interview
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with Ken Douglas, together with extracts from the Ridley letters 
and lively presentation of the main outline of the UCS workers' 
case, posing the question for workers elsewhere to ponder,
'What other industries have had the benefit of the Ridleys of 
the Tory Party' "WHO IS NEXT?" (29)
In the interview Douglas reiterated the details of the 
increase in the company's productivity in terms of steel 
throughput, the level of anticipated profits for 1972 and the 
improvement in management and labour relations. UCS had been 
building ships so fast said Douglas,
"the problem became where to park them. Our fitting out 
basins are full." (30)
As to the UCS order book being 'thin' as the Report had claimed, 
this was part of a deliberate policy first adopted by Douglas at 
Austin and Pickersgill which ensured that contracts were taken on 
at profitable prices and early delivery dates could be offered when 
there was a suitable market. The company had been short of working 
capital from the outset, drained by inherited losses from yards some 
of which would have gone bankrupt in their own right. In fact, said 
Douglas, given the required assistance "we could have broken ttirough 
into profitability". It was the cash flow situation which brought 
the company dov,n, not the question of future profitability, for UCS 
had been in line to win £100 million worth of new orders which were 
lost as soon as liquidation took place. Describing the Ridley papers
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as "a very biased and prejudiced report" Douglas pointed out that 
Ridley had reached his conclusions with regard to UCS on the basis 
of "little more than one hours*discussion with him in January 1978"# 
While the Four Wise Men were criticised for coming to a conclusion 
in a relatively short space of time "at least they took five weeks", 
said Doug^las* ( 3 I )
The shop stewards published an appeal to the British working 
class:
"Brothers and Sisters - no group of workers has ever had a 
better case than we in the UCS,
We have proof and evidence that if there was any decent or 
appropriate legal system in this country, Ridley would be 
in the process of being prosecuted for anti-social activity*
We believe that the more we make our case known throughout 
this country, and given the support of ordinary decent people, 
and the whole British labour movement, such is the strength 
of our case that we can shake not only this Government but 
bring into action all decent minded people*
No-one likes to see an injustice being done and this is an 
injustice that is happening right now to the UCS workers*
All this is being perpetrated by a Government who have not the
slightest conception of what it means to stand in a dole queue -
and who, for that matter, don't care*
WE AÏÏE DEMANDING THE RIGHT TO WORK." ( 3 2 )
In all, the professionalism of the UCS tabloid was a substantial
propaganda coup for the UCS cause and was an interesting attempt to 
use a popular media form to get across a highly political message 
although some of the NUJ members who assisted the publicity sub­
committee were none too happy about the sharpness of the politics#(33) 
Indeed, so adept were the Co-ordinating Committee at handling the 
mass media that certain writers have since attempted to characterise 
the whole workers' campaign as an example of media 'myth-making'*(3 4 )
162,
Arguments about who if anybody was manipulating whom are rather 
beside the point* The really key development, of which the coverage 
of the workers’ case by the mass media was merely a particular 
example, was that for the first time a group of shop stewards became 
the authoritative spokesmen on the whole future of their industry*
Thus as a result of the fact that they were successfully challenging 
Government policy, the UGS workers became the voice for all British 
shipyard workers*
One of the most important solidarity meetings of the whole 
sixteen months of the campaign was manifested in the gathering 
of representatives from the shipbuilding and shiprepairing shop 
stewards from all over Britian. They met in the Clydebank yard on 
September 29th.. It had been some time in the history of the 
industry since a meeting of this nadure had taken place. It was a 
measure of the unity which had been generated by the campaign and 
the recognition of what was at stake that made this event possible.
The numerous visits by UCS stewards throughout the UK explaining 
first-hand the situation on Clydeside to other groups of workers 
had of course, laid the groundwork of contacts, particularly in 
other shipbuilding areas. Traditionally yards on the Tyne, on 
Merseyside and on the Clyde had competed against each other for 
orders. The Geddes restructuring unfortunately had not affected 
these historical attitudes of suspicion. What brought them together 
was the prospect of a massive contraction of the industry as a whole.
It had become clear that the UCS crisis was only one manifestation 
of the Tory Government’s general attitude to the industry and speaker 
after speaker from yards all over ths' country underlined the point 
that were UCS to go down they themselves might easily be next in line.
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As Harry McLevy from the Robb Caledon yard in Dundee put it, 
summing up the mood of the delegates;
"this conference today gives us the long overdue opportunity 
of beginning to create an organisation which could co­
ordinate anddevelop a strategy of all the shipbuilding 
workers in this country." ( 3 5 )
The conference considered and unanimously endorsed a resolution 
which in its final amended form listed the shop stewards’ demands 
for the industry, first among which was full retention of ship­
building and the labour force on the Upper Clyde. Secondly, the 
resolution called for a halt to redundancies throughout the UK 
shipbuilding industry as a whole and to this end, the retention 
of the Shipbuilding Industry Board with an expansion of the industry 
as its primary objective. Thirdly the resolution called for publp.c 
ownership of the entire shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry in 
line with an emergency resolution to be moved at the Labour Party 
Conference the following week by the boilermakers’ union. Thus for 
the first time in the history of the industry the shop stewards 
spoke with a united voice on the major issues affecting their 
industry*
To give weight to the resolution it was suggested that there 
might be a delegation of stewards sent to the forthcoming annual 
Labour Party Conference to support the passage of the boilermakers’ 
emergency revolution and that a lobby of Downing Street could also be 
held at which all areas of the industry would be represented* The 
lobby in turn might be backed by a stoppage in every yard for the 
duration of any talks with Heath* It was agreed that whatever happened, 
if an attempt was made to reallocate any one of the fourteen suspended 
UCS orders to another yard it would be blacked by the workers there.
Given that there were twelve districts represented at the conference 
embracing twenty-two yards it was unlikely therefore, that if they 
were not to be built at UCS that these ships would be built any­
where else in Britain.
From all sides support was flowing in for the fighting fund.
Large sums were now coming in from major unions, £2,000 each from 
the IBM and NUl^, £1,000 from USDAW and ITOPE and from BATA a further 
£1,000, From the shop floor workers at Ford and Chrysler, came 
large donations, Outwith industry there was further support from 
the world of entertainment. Everything from folk and pop concerts 
to performances of classical music were held to raise money for the 
campaign, Alex Clark, the Scottish Secretary of the actors* union 
Equity handed over £500 to the Fighting Fund at a UCS mass meeting.
The money was the proceeds of a remarkable benefit concert held on 
the 1 9 th of September in the King's Theatre in Glasgow which starred 
a number of well-known local entertainers, four of whom, Glen Daly, 
Russell Hunter, Archie Duncan and Johnny Beattie had started life in 
the shipyards and gave their services free of charge. The fee for 
the rent of the theatre which came to £300 was reimbursed by Glasgow 
Corporation to the Fighting Fund, Arthur Dooley, the sculptor who 
organised an exhibition in Glasgow of works by the Merseyside Workers 
Artists Association gifted one of his works, a figure of Christ rising 
beside a shipyard crane for which Clydebank Town Council gave £1,250 
which also went to the Fighting Fund, Even Clydebank's dust carts 
were mobilised in the campaign and carried posters urging support for 
U G S , (36)
A number of local authorities voted to give sums of money directly 
to the Fighting Fund including Fife and Dumbarton County Councils,
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Troon, Saltcoats, V/hitbum, Kilsyth Tovm Councils, It v/as only an 
intervention by the Secretary of State for Scotland who refused to 
allow local authorities to give money for this purpose which finally 
prevented fifteen other local authorities contributing, (37) In 
Aberdeen, door to door collections for UG8 were authorised while in 
Dundee and Glasgow flag days were held during September, The flag 
days, organised by the Trades Council in the Glasgow area, provided 
a welcome opportunity for the wives and families of the UCS workers 
to become directly involved in the campaign to keep the yards open, (38) 
The Vale of Leven District Council in whose area the threatened 
Plessey factory was situated organised a postal protest of 1,000 
letters to John Davies signed by members of the public on unemployment 
at UCS and Plessey,
In August, the Clydebank Council convened a joint meeting of 
local authorities to discuss resistance to the Government proposals. 
Thirty-nine local authorities were represented and considered a 
draft resolution which proposed, among other things, an Inquiry into 
the current crisis, the retention of UCS as an entiry, preservation 
of present UCS labour force and requested that the Government meet a 
delegation from the meeting which it was agreed would be comprised 
of representation of fifteen local authorities. (39) The motion 
which was submitted to a meeting of Glasgow Corporation in September 
once again caused divisions amCng the Tories which led to bitter 
exchanges between Provost Diddle and Councillor Turpie. The latter 
had proposed an amendment on the same lines as in early August, 
seconded by Wober, implying full support for the Government’s policy 
towards UCS, This time it was ruled out of order, A furious Turpie 
accused the Provost of attempting to "muzzle positive alternatives" 
and then moved an amendment to remit the Clydebank motion which was
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duly defeated by 55 votes to 34 <■ It was left to Councillor Mains 
of the Labour group to come to Provost Liddle’s defence and demand 
that Turpie withdraw his remarks about the Lord Provost* (40)
Since the crisis had first broken in June, the local clergy of 
Clydebank of all denominations had been in open identification with 
the shop stewards' campaign. They too had seen their community 
wasted by the steady redundancies of the past years and perhaps more 
than any other section of the populace, excepting the workers them­
selves, were aware of the misery and spiritual ruin which so often 
accompanied unemployment. This issue was one on which the churches 
could not now remain silent and still retain any credibility among 
their congregation. The Sunday following the announcement of 
liquidation, special prayers had been conducted in all churches in 
Clydebank for the to\m and its industry. Several ministers had 
travelled with the men on the train to London to lobby the Prime 
Minister and tlP's , In London the demonstration to Downing Street 
was joined by Lord McLeod of Fuinary, a former Moderator of the 
Church of Scotland who had seen for himself the social consequences 
of unemployment during the Depression, among Clydeside shipbuilding 
workers in the Covan Parish, The following week the Clydebank and 
District Ministers' Fraternal called a meeting in the Town Hall at 
which over twenty local churches were represented. The meeting was 
addressed by Provost Fleming who welcomed this initiative and latterly 
also by Jimmy Reid, despite a certain reluctance on the part of a 
few of the clergy, Reid stressed the argument that the object of 
the shop stewards was not however, to bring down the Government but 
simply to safeguard the jobs of men. Several proposals for expressing 
the churches concern were discussed including a 'quiet' letter to 
the Prime Minister, an immediate telegram and a petition to be
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circulated among local congregations. A motion to support the first 
UCS demonstration was agreed in principle by 22 votes to 5 but it 
was left to individuals to associate themselves with it or not*
At this meeting the group was formed "to take united Christian 
action for the well-being of the community". It was known thereafter 
as the Clydebank and District Christian Action Group (CDAG) and its 
meetings were attended by two shop stewards from UCS. {4 I )
The Group's Chairman, Father Thomas Glen recalled that the first 
meetingtad been a somewhat 'stormy affair' but surprisingly 
constructive*
"The will to help in every possible way was there. At the 
risk of being thought to interfere in politics the views 
of the meeting had to be brought to the attention of the 
Government; and the views of the meeting were quite clear; 
people are more important than policies; policies, no 
matter how sound in themselves, ought not to be implemented 
in such a way as to destroy their community; the UCS is 
not just an industry, it is the life blood of Clydeside." (4 2 )
Father Glen's position with regard to the work-in was also fairly 
positive:
"It is difficult to blame the mens' action in seeking to 
keep the yard doors open* Once closed they imay never 
open agarn" (4 5 )
The more progressive members of the clergy were associated with all 
the public demonstrations of the UCS workers as well as the delegations 
and one of their number, Stuart Borthwick, attended UCS shop stewards' 
meetings on occasion.
At one meeting however, that of the August 10th Scottish shop 
stewards conference held in the Rosevale at which about a dozen clergy 
were present, the intervention of a more right-wing minister produced
an angry uproar among the workers. Alex Lawson, Minister of Kilbowie
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Parish Church, Clydebank went to the microphone to argue that the 
proposal for a half-day stoppage on Wednesday 18th August would be 
'disastrously harmful' despite the prior agreement that no minister 
would speak* Borthwick, industrial chaplain at Singers, had to 
rush forward to disclaim the remark and save a rather tricky situation 
which the wortly gentlemen had created. (4 4 ) fact, Lawson
achieved a minor notoriety during the UCS campaign for his outspoken 
ant i-c ommunism *
At the September meeting of the CLCAG when it was becoming clear 
that the Government were intent upon pushing ahead with the White 
Paper proposals which would have excluded the Clydebank Yard, Borthwick 
proposed that a letter be sent to the Prime Minister in the following 
terms*
"Clydebanlc and District Christian Action Group
We, the Clydebank and District Christian Action Group, 
representative of all Christian denominations in Clydebanlc, 
deploring the indignity to which our craftsmen are being 
subjected by the decision to butcher the UCS as outlined 
in the Ridley Report, call upon Her Majesty's Government 
to take cognizance of the continued mental suffering among 
the people of Clydebank. We condemn the lack of immediate 
constructive alternative plans by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to allay the fears and despairs of our people and 
call upon Her Majesty's Government to declare the Upper 
Clydeside a distress area and to take immediate and positive 
steps to give the necessary financial aid to make the UCS a 
viable shipbuilding structure," (45)
Interestingly the language used was not so different in style and 
content from that of the shop stewards in their pronouncements.
The prestigious Church and Nation Committee of the Church of 
Scotland declared for its part that it was "greatly disturbed" not 
only by the severe affect which the closure of much of UCS would have 
on communities already suffering from unemployment, but also by the
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Government’s failure to appreciate "the special difficulties and 
opportunities of Scotland" and continued,
"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Government 
have acted so inconsistently, unwisely and without sufficient 
regard for the social and human consequences of their action 
that the effect is punitive." (4h)
One of the more sociologically predictable results of the churches* 
open identification with the UCS cause was that the ecimenical 
movement in Clydebank received a considerable boost, culminating 
in late November in a united chuz'ch service, the 'Industrial Sunday', 
at which members of the different churches in the t o m  gathered to 
pray for the future of its industry. In the period since UCS, indeed 
the churches have continued their involvement in campaigns against 
factory closures in Clydebank by lending considerable moral weight 
to local committees against unemployment.
The wide character of this opposition to the government was 
expressed in the numerous attacks from all sides on the White Paper, 
Here the STUC performed a unique role that went far beyond giving 
its official blessing to the shop stewards* action. It was able to 
channel the gi^oundswell of anti-Tory feeling that had emerged in 
various sections of the population even outwith the normal boundaries 
of the trade union movement. This it had achieved first by agreeing 
to the Special Congress and then sponsoring a 'Committee of Inquiry* 
into the consequences of the rundown of UCS, The STUC Inquiry as 
it was known became the initial focus for an emerging broad popular 
alliance of anti-Tory forces which sought to challenge the 'lame 
duck' assumptions upon which government policy appeared to be based. 
It became a kind of alternative 'Select Committee* appointed not by 
Parliament but by the labour movement which called for *paper% and
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persons'. Indeed, the idea of such a committee had first been 
mooted by Benn who had repeatedly and unsuccessfully called for a 
full-scale Parliamentary inquiry into UGS, (47) Nov/, for the first 
time, the labour movement decided to sponsor an inquiry of its 
own into the implications of the UCS liquidation which became a 
model for many subsequent battles against redundancy*
The remit of the inquiry covered "the wider social and economic 
consequences of the decision to run-down Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Btd."(4 8 ) 
By concentrating on the likely consequehces of the Government's 
proposed action rather than simply the causes it v/as hoped that 
the Inquiry would not become a political arena in which one party 
apportioned the blame to another* Not only in its remit but also 
in the appointment of the three assessors to head the Inquiry 
every effort v/as made to preserve its 'objectivity' in order that 
its findings could not be written off as mere propaganda* The 
Inquiry was chaired by Raymond Illsley, Professor of Sociology at 
the University of Aberdeen, assisted by Frank Cousins, the former 
General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union and 
by George H, Perry, the Chairman and Managing Director of General 
Motors in Scotland* While perhaps the attempt at 'objectivity' was 
a little naive and while certainly the attempt to restrict evidence 
solely to the consequences, to the exclusion of consideration of 
the causes, proved not to be feasible in practice, nevertheless the 
Inquiry, meeting in public over nine days in Glasgow City Chambers 
and Clydebank Town Hall, received a mass of pertinent oral and 
written testimony which it examined in scrupulous detail*
Over forty witnesses submitted evidence including senior 
management and workers' representatives from UCS and other yards on
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the Clyde, academics from several Scottish Universities and from 
south of the border, a range of local authority representatives, 
administrators, planners and social workers, industrial and commercial 
spokesmen, MP's and even the liquidator himself. The refusal by 
the Government to take part did not materially damage the stature 
of the Inquiry given the diversity of groups who were willing to 
submit to the scrutiny of this body. It was a considerable success 
in terms enhancing the authority of the STUC to speak not just on 
the problems of shipbuilding but on all major issues of importance 
in Scottish economic and social affairs since the Inquiry had 
examined the wide ramifications of the proposed closure. This role 
of providing a national forum for Scottish opinions was to be 
further developed in the Scottish Assembly which the STUC was 
subsequently to organise and is discussed further in a later chapter.
In terms of immediate political impact, however, perhaps the 
most useful evidence gathered by the Inquiry was the first full 
text of the Ridley letters from which hitherto only exerpts had been 
published.(4 9 ) These were submitted to the Inquiry on behalf of the 
UCS Co-ordinating Committee and were published in full in the 
following d a y ’s Daily Record under the banner headline ’Bloody Butchering
In late September when it became clear that the Government still
intended to implement the recommendations of the Four Wise Men it
was decided that the White Paper needed to be challenged at once
(51)
by issuing an Interim Report of the Inquiry’s findings. The economic 
consequences of proceeding on the basis of the White Paper proposals 
were conservatively estimated as resulting in a net job loss of
1 6 , 0 0 0  plus redundancy payments of £3 million and Social Security 
payments of over £6 million. The cost of creating new jobs to 
cater for 5,000 redundant workers was estimated at a fuirbher £ 2 4
. (50)
m g * .
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to £52 million, not to mention the costs of repairing the damage , 
to the regional economy resulting from the liquidation. Presumably 
the Government had also made their calculations and judged the 
price sufficiently worthwhile for their purposes. the Inquiry
produced that was new, was an estimate of the social as well as 
economic costs entailed. .This was a kind of social *cost-benefit 
analysis’ described thereafter as the "social audit", (52) It 
attempted to highlight the damaging effects on the individual, the 
family and the community of the consequences of unemployment.
Such aspects as the loss of personal dignity end self-respect, 
increasing boredom and domestic tension, loss of savings, the 
progressive lowering of living standards, of nutrition and health 
were the subject of moving testimony by those who had suffered their 
effects, by academic investigators as well as by bodies such as the 
Child Poverty Action Group. The bleak outlook in terms of futui/e 
labour relations on Clydeside not to mention the prospects for more 
vulnerable groups such as older workers, the handicapped and school 
leavers were carefully recorded. The final report based on a more 
comprehensive review of the evidence and running to ninety pages of 
detailed argument further served to underline these conclusions 
against the background of long-term regional economic decline in 
heavy industry. (53)
The range of support for the UCS workers and the deep antagonism 
to Government policy across the whole range of the social spectrum 
was given an important focus by the STUC Inquiry. The outlines of 
a broad democratic alliance of anti-Tory forces had become visible 
in which those who normally saw their interests aligned with the 
status quo openly began to ally themselves with the workers, an 
altogether unprecedented political development. It was the prospect
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of these cracks in the edifice of capitalism opening up still 
further which prompted the first signs of a rethink by the 
Cons ervat ive Government.
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Chu. pi or Six 
THE MONKEY NOT THE ORGAN GRINDER,
If the UCS demonstration of June was greeted with a sullen 
■silence by the Government, the August demonstration generated a 
flurry of activity, *
The morning following the demonstration, Ray Macdonald received 
8, message from Sir John Eden indicating he would be in Glasgow at 
three o'clock that day. That same morning in London, Eden had met 
Vic Feather who presented his CDA plan aî.id recounted what had taken 
place the day before in Glasgow. Eden was coming north to meet 
members of the STUC Economic Committee, the Confederation and two
members of the Co-ordinating Committee, which duly elected Reid and
Airlie to represent them. The meeting \/as held at the Department 
of Trade and Industry Offices in Glasgow and produced the first 
indication that the Government was prepared to try and lower the 
political temperature.
What had happened to produce this trip north only became apparent 
to Reid and Airlie when a messenger from the liquidator entered the 
room at the DTI Office during the meeting. The peculiar manner and 
timing of this interruption were not unconnected with a brief 
discussion which Eden had had with the liquidator -immediately on his 
arrival at Glasgow Airport a short while before the meeting commenced.
A document was duly passed over to the stewards to read. It was
headed "Comment by Mr, Robert C, Smith, Official Liquidator on the 
Statement issued by Mr, Archibald D, Kelly last night," Its contents 
were considerably more dramatic than its dry title might have suggested.(1)
Archibald Kelly, or as he was variously knovni on Clydeside,
'scrap-iz'on Kelly* or 'cash-down.Kelly* w^ as a self-made local
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entrepreneur whose speciality lay in acquiring companies who were 
in serious financial straits at rock bottom prices. He had 
acquired the Ardrossan dockyard some years previously and sold off 
its contents for scrap, Mr, Kelly also had a reputed fondness for 
paying out huge sums of cash on the nail for these deals. Hence 
the nicknameBo Within a couple of weeks of the June announcement 
of liquidation, Kelly had expressed an interest in acquiring the 
Clydebank yard. Early in July he had met the liquidator in 
Clydebanlc to discuss his £1 million bid for the yard, \#en the 
stewards learned that he had actually visited the Clydebank yard 
to look it over, they were furious and demanded that the liquidator 
in future only allow him in on official business, (2) Since then 
they had refused to meet Kelly or hold discussions with him. The 
stewards had made their position plain. They were fighting for 
the survival of UCS as an intact unit and were not interested in 
buyers for individual parts. Nevertheless, Kelly with a good eye 
for a likely bid, had continued meetings with Government to see 
what public funds might be available to him to assist in the purchase 
of Clydebanlc, should his bid become feasible.
Although at that stage the Government, in line with the Report 
of the Four Wise Men, had no interest in making a further financial 
commitment to Clydebank,- Kelly's interest as a private buyer might 
eventually provide some convenient means of disentaglement as far 
as the Clydebank yard was concerned. He was at any rate, the only 
prospective buyer on the horizon.
At his latest meeting with Eden in London two days before,
Kelly had gained the impression that the Government might even be 
prepared to consider a bid from him for all four units* Kelly was 
apparently convinced that he might b ) considered a candidate for
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assistance to buy the consortium. In good faith he had issued a 
statement to that effect, declaring his interest. The 'comment* 
delivered from the liquidator which Reid and Airlie now read from, 
seemed to confirm this interpretation of events,
"Mr, Kelly's interest appears to offer the prospect of a 
significant retention of shipyard jobs which, in the 
absence of a shipbuilding purchaser, would be in jeopardy 
I hope that the Trade Unions will bear this in mind in 
view of Mr, Kelly's expanding interest.
In continuation of the discussions which have taken place 
over the past few weeks, and following }'Ir, Kelly's meeting 
with Sir John Eden, I expect Kir, Kelly to visit all four 
divisions of the company in the next ten days and I shall 
provide him with all the information he may require..*,"
Given the confidence of owners in the Clyde - and that is an 
inescapable essential - I see no need to talk of the closures 
of any of the yards. I never have,"(3)
Although the liquidator's wording seemed to suggest that Kelly's 
bid now for the four unite was a realistic prospect, Eden still 
maintained that he had come to Glasgow to discuss the details for re­
organisation of the Govan-Linthouse complex as proposed by the Report 
and perhaps a private investor for the other two units. The stewards 
now Bei:eed upon the liquidator's ovrn statement; "I see no need to talk 
of the closure of the yards - I never have." They pointed out that if 
Govan and Linthouse were viable and if, according to the liquidator, 
Scotstoun and Clydebanlc were also viable, then there was surely an 
economic argument for retaining them as a group and avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of marketing and design departments and so on. They asked 
if Eden was prepared to halt the impending redundancies while Kelly's 
proposals were examined. The stewards for their part intimated that 
they were willing to go anywhere for discussions and if the redundancies 
were suspended they would postpone the following day's mass meetings 
to allow Eden to visit Clydebank. At that point the meeting broke up 
to allow each side time to consult and consider their position. The
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question now was whether or not the Government were seriously prepared 
to move from their commitment to the White Paper. Reid and Airlie 
reported back to the UCS shop s te wards. (4)
When the meeting reconvened at 11pm that night in Eden's hotelp 
hopes Of an immediate solution were quickly dashed. The Government 
had obviously decided not to budge and Eden declared unequivocally that 
there was no future for a "UCS Mark II", Furthermore, when the talks 
had concluded, at his 1am news conference Eden announced that unless 
there was a speedy solution to the crisis, even the Govan and Linthouse 
units would be danger. Nor would he agree to the stewards’ demands 
to halt the first baton of redundancies due later that day. Indeed, 
he said, the further 1,000 redundancies which were due next month were 
inevitable. Just in case there was anyone who missed the point, the 
liquidator in a separate announcement, also declared that these 
redundancies were inevitable.
The situation was one of stalemate with the pressure now on the 
stewards to find an early solution both tb halt immediate redundancies 
and, if even larger lay-offs were to be avoided, to find a way of 
persuading the Government to begin work on I4 contracts which were 
suspended on liquidation. If the Government saw Kelly as bait with 
which to lead the stewards to the negotiating table, the stewards saw 
Kelly as providing them with vital room for manoeuvre while not conceding 
any of their major demands. That weekend, Reid, Airlie and Barr flew 
in a ’plane specially chartered by the Scottish Bsfly Express to Islay 
to talk terms with Kelly at his holiday home. The fact that a, capitalist 
newspaper had hired the ’plane for Communist shop stewards was used
(5)
by the’ultra-left’to paint a pictui’e of 'Stalinist sellout’. Once 
again the stewards indicated that they were prepared to withdraw their 
presence at the Clydebank gates as a gesture of goodwill should Kelly
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v;ieh to visit the yard for talks with Smith, a rather different 
attitude to Kelly than previously taken. Meanwhile Kelly’s 
financial adviser, a certain Mr, Sharp, did his sums and the 
liquidator named his price for the whole consortium.
In actual fact K e l l y ’s proposals for the four yards were by 
no means wholly acceptable to the stewards. They involved closing 
the east yard at Clydebank and redeveloping it as a dry-dock complex. 
Plans for the other yards were somewhat more vague but included the 
possible future -phasing out of Scotstoun. Nevertheless, the key 
thing was that it was a bid for the four yards as Airlie pointed out 
to the shop stewards meeting which met to assess the situation.
"Some people may criticise us even talking to Kelly but I 
think we've got to face up to the facts of life. In my 
opinion, and I hope there's nae press here, is there? 
Personal opinion, ah, he's a scrap merchant, but it 
smokes this Government out if we can get a bid for all 
four units. Because one of the points that Eden was making, 
that no-one yet was interested in bidding eh, for the four 
units intact." (6 )
In their discussions the stewards agreed that the Wilson plan 
for the Upper Clyde was not likely to be adopted by the Government, 
nor for that matter were Kelly's proposals, if only because Kelly 
lacked the expertise to handle a complex of that size. The stewards 
issued a statement endorsed by mass meetings of the workers, that 
they would, however, support Kelly's bid, guaranteeing the full 
co-operation of the workforce, provided the necessary Government 
financial assistance was forthcoming. It was as Airlie said privately 
to the stewards, 'a propaganda exercise' important in further under­
mining the economic logic of the Advisory Group's recommendations, (?)
A few days later, as expected, the Government described Kelly's 
scheme as 'not credible* and Kelly understandably was somewhat piqued
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at being 'led on*, although not sufficiently so, to prevent him 
from re-submitting his original proposal for Clydebank alone.
If the.Government was giving Kelly the brush-off they were by 
comparison almost enthusiastic about Vic Feather's proposed Clyde- 
side Development Authority, The TUG Economic Committee with Feather 
and McGarvey, the STUC and the stewards met Davies in London at the 
Department of Trade and Industry on Ihiday August 27th. The day 
before Eden had told Kelly that the Government intended to proceed 
with their plan for Govan and Linthouse. This together with the 
announcement by the liquidator of a further 224 redundancies meant 
that Reid and Airlie were very worried men when they arrived in 
London to meet Davies. Any hope of an early solution to the UCS 
crisis was rapidly evaporating. Moreover, Davies had rejected the 
suggestion by Feather that he intervene with the liquidator to halt 
further redundancies while consideration was given to the CDA proposals. 
On the other hand, Davies expressed the view that the CDA scheme did 
"merit considerable thought" and indeed the Government wished to 
consider it more deeply, (s) Feather was asked to give further 
details of his proposals and return the following week, significantly, 
with McGarvey and Service to discuss the matter again.
With preparations now being laid behind the scenes to establish 
an'embryo board' to run the Govan and Linthouse yards the Government 
obviously fel. t that the time had now arrived for a serious discussion 
to begin and in that sense Feather, Service and McGarvey were obviously 
the kind of 'responsible* trade union leaders with whom the Government 
preferred to negotiate. Indeed^ now that Feather had decided to assert 
the authority of the national TUG leadership, it was in the Interests 
of the Government to do everything possible to bolster that authority.
As far back as July the Executive Council of the Confederation 
had agreed that its Shipyard Negotiating Committee chaired by
1Ü4,
McGarvey would conduct any negotiations on UCS "in consultation 
with the local representatives of the union and other appropriate 
local interests." (9)
Now, for the first time, neither local Confederation officials 
nor the shop stewards were present when McGarvey, Service and 
Feather met Davies the following Tuesday, August 31st. A perfect 
cabal was in the process of formation which would possibly lead 
to the eventual exclusion of the militant shop steward leadership-^, 
from the ensuing negotiations.
The main item on the agenda for the Davies meeting was 
purportedly the CDA proposals on which Feather tabled a six page 
document both giving more information on his scheme and asking a 
number of questions concerning the financial position of UCS, the 
structure of the proposed Govan-Linthouse Company, the exact status 
of Kelly's bid, the truth about the rumours regarding a reported 
bid by the Connell family to buy back Scotstoun and the current 
order position of UCS, The key phrase in the TUG document as far 
as the campaign to save the yards was concerned was as follows;
"Some flexibility in regard to the preservation of a 
single entity might be forthcoming from the unions if 
it was clear that the Government really intended ship­
building to continue on a large scale on the upper reaches." (10)
With 'flexibility* being offered by Feather, it is a fair 
guess that McGarvey would also have been anxious to impress on 
Davies the Confederation's desire to be 'constructive' , The 
subsequent official DTI reply to Feather's questions in a letter from 
John Davies' private secretary, contained little that was not 
already public knowledge. However, it did promise substantial 
financial assistance to a commercially sound buyer for Clydebank
or Scotstoun. while it reiterated Government's intention to press 
•Tnr-i.raTr-'t^ -f-.Vif? nnv^n^DinthousG comnlex. It alsOffl however, contained
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a statement that was the nearest the Government came to repudiating 
the Advisory Committee Report. V/hile referring to the Report’s 
recommendations for Govan and Linthouse as the best hope for 
retaining a viable shipbuilding industry on the Upper Clyde it 
commented;
"This is what the Advisory Group said, based admittedly, 
on a rapid survey, I can tell you in confidence that 
the Department has commissioned a much more thorough 
review by consultants of the technical and financial
aspects of setting up such a company to give it the
best possible chance of commercial success." (ll)
Not being party to Feather and McGarvey’s discussions with 
Davies on August 31st the stewards naturally were more than a 
little disturbed by press comment the following morning that besides 
discussing the CDA proposals, a broader ‘dialogue* had been 
initiated in which McGqrvey had offered, without consultation with 
the worker^ a two-shift or even three-shift working as an 
attraction to new buyers in return for assurances that the yards would 
be kept open for five years. The press interpreted this as meaning
also that McGarvey henceforth, on behalf of the National Confederation
would handle all negotiations with Government.(12) McGarvey, 
immediately contacted by the stewards, claimed that he had been mis­
quoted and invited four shop stewards to meet the Executive of the 
Confederation at Blackpool the following Sunday morning,where they 
would be prior to the TUG Congress, to hear a full report of the 
meeting with Davies at first hand.
As it turned out, when the stewards arrived in Blackpool they 
found the meeting had been postponed until the afternoon. Further­
more, it was not an Executive meeting at all, but a simple report 
from McGarvey aud Service to the stewards. Indeed, the local
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Confederation officials Joe Black and Donald Tonner who had not 
even been invited, had to ask specially to be represented at the 
meeting to find out what was being said to the stewards. (13)
Once again McGarvey assured the UCS stewards that he had not 
made any offer as regards shift working. However, McGarvey did 
argue that the Government were prepared to move their position to 
some extent as regards providing assistance for private buyers for 
Scotstoun and Clydebank and that accordingly the unions should now 
maice some 'concessions' in order to meet the Government 'half-way', 
that is, abandon their demand that the four yards be retained as a 
unit intact. The stewards' attitude was that there was little point 
in making concessions before discussions had really begun. The 
'dialogue' as Airlie pointed out in a report-back to the UCS stewards, 
should not be seen as something which was a substitute for developing 
the wide movement of solidarity. It was this active solidarity which, 
up to à point, had caused the Government to move and would always 
be the best safeguard for achieving their demands, Reid therefore 
warned against any attempt to pose the 'dialogue' against the need 
to sustain the mass movement of solidarity.
"We shouldnae get diverted on these lines. We press right ahead 
with the meetings, the campaign, the demonstrations, and along­
side that OK we can have the 'dialogue*. But we've made it 
clear to the Confederation, and its absolutely agreed that 
there will be no commitment on our part or their part if it 
doesn't come back in the final analysis to this committee and 
to the workers of the UCS." (I4)
If the stewards privately had serious reservations about what 
McGarvey was up to, their public position was one of complete unity.
In that sense, their objective was to retain the widest possible 
support as a public breach with the Confederation at this stage 
would have been as disastrous as a. premature confrontation with 
the Government or the liquidator. While they were in Blackpool the
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stewards took the opportunity to present their, case to the delegates 
and mobilise wider support at the official trade union level. From 
the Confederation they also got assurances that the appeal for 
finance for the fighting fund and pledge of support first passed 
in an emergency motion at the Confederation’s Annual Meeting in 
June VO uld he reiterated.(l5)
Major.unions would now he asked to step up financial support 
and indeed, the electricians’ trade union gave a thousand pounds.
At the Sunday night eve of Congress Tribune rally, chaired by Hugh 
Scanlon who himself made a strong plea for assistance to the UCS 
campaign, Reid spoke to the delegates of the Left in the Labour 
Party. They also succeeded in getting the TÏÏC bo have circulated 
to every delegate as part of the official Congress Papers, a five 
page memorandum from the Co-ordinating Committee outlining the his tory 
of UCS and attaching photostat copies of the Ridley papers. (16)
Later in the week, a special coach took UCS workers down to Black­
pool to listen to the debate on Clyde shipbuilding on Wednesday.
The motion^ again moved by McCarvey and seconded by John Boyd of the 
AUhWp called for the nationalisation of the industry and would in 
any event have been passed unanimously, McGaxvey, however, called 
for a card vote to show the Tories the strength of the trade union 
feeling on this issue and in his remarks to the delegates went out 
of his way to stress the "identity of interest" between the Con­
federation and the stewards, a sure sign of real tension underlying 
their relations.(I7) Whether or not this " identity of interest" 
would be sustained as the ’dialogud’ gained momentum was a matter 
of speculation.
For McCarvey at least, the time had come for compromise to 
nudge aside militancy. His eagerness to pursue the dialogue with
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Davies was restrained only by the Imov/ledge that the character of 
any compromise would be conditioned by the public commitment that 
the labour and trade union movement, and the Confederation in 
particular, ha,d made to saving the Upper Clyde yards. Thus for the 
UCS shop stewards, while they had been given assurances at Blackpool 
that any future discussions between the Confederation and the Govern­
ment would still be on the basis of proposals covering all four 
yards, it had become clear that they could no longer rely on the 
Confederation continuing to support the original demand of the campaign 
that the yards be retained as an intact unit. Given this and the 
Government’s rebuff of Kelly’s proposed bid for the four yards, with 
the increasing unlikelihood of a bid of similar scope being made by 
anyone else, the stewards were forced to malce a major tactical 
reappraisal.
Confirming earlier press speculation about a shift of line, 
the stewards now stated publically that although they refused to 
consider any yard in isolation, if ’cumulative proposals’, that is, 
proposals covering all the four yards but not necessarily retaining 
them as a single unit, were put forward, they would be seriously 
discussed by the Co-ordinating Committee and the UCS worker 8 .(1 Q)
While the argument was repeated that if the yards were viable . 
singly then there was a better case for the consortium as a whole 
being viable, it was now accepted that ’retaining the yards intact' 
did not necessarily imply under the one single ownership.
It could be argued with hindsight that this tactical shift was 
simply a realistic response to the fact that the original demand of 
the campaign to preserve the Upper Clyde yards as a single unit was 
simply unwimiable. Short of immediate Government nationalisation, 
not a very likely occurence under the c\n?rent administration, there 
seemed little chance of any other source of necessary finance to
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purchase and run the industry along its former lines. Private 
enterprise had already failed and was unlikely to accept a solution 
on the shop stewards*terms in the foreseeable future, even if the 
Government were to have offered ’bribes' to a potential purchaser 
of the group in the shape of further massive subsidies, something 
which it had been disinclined to do for the old UCS set-up. The 
problem for the shop stewards and the workforce was in the short term, 
given these conditions, to ensure that while the four yards might not 
necessarily be preserved together as a unit, they would nevertheless 
remain subject to a, comprehensive solution that safeguarded the future 
of all the yards and the entire workforce. Ultimately it would have 
to be a Labour Government which would guarantee the future of the 
entire industry by taking it into public ownership. Probably the 
most politically responsible course of action would be that which 
ensured that such a government would have something there to nationalise 
when it came into office.
Nevertheless, to concede even that certain of the yards might 
be retained as separate entities, presumably under private ownership, 
inevitably created the danger of future inter-yai'd rivalries as the 
solution for particular yards appeared safer or more satisfactory 
than for others. This would inevitably undermine the unity and 
resolve of the workers to fight for their common guaranteed survival.
It was perhaps the awareness on the part of the shop stewards* 
leadership of the sensitive character of this issue which made them 
at first rather less than forthright about this shift in position.
\Vliile it could be argued that such a change was in no way a * sell-out *, as 
arguably there was little alternative to abandoning their original 
slogan, failure in the first instance although not subsequently, to 
argue tlrcough its implications with the mass of the UCS workforce 
squandered a valuable chance to educate them in the full complexities
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of the struggle they faced. If the demand was henceforth to be for 
a solution covering all the yards although not necessarily under one 
organisational umbrella, it had to be made clear to the workers from 
the start that this in no way implied unconditional acceptance of the 
Government’s plans for Govan and Linthouse, or abandoning Clydebank 
and Scotstoun to their separate respective fates. This certainly 
was a contributory although not the sole or even the main cause of 
the difficulties that were later to beset the UCS campaign. In 
fact, as events were to show, the stewards held steadfastly to their 
demand for a comprehensive solution concerning the future of all four 
yards and its workers as a precondition to any eventual agreement with 
the Government, even in the end, at the sacrifice of their own position 
as a leadership. The problem was, that in the long protracted discussions 
and manoeuvres to achieve a satisfactory solution, other less conscious 
groups within the various yards were able to sow the seeds of doubt and 
division, a fact which the Government and the mass media were well 
aware of and exploited to their advantage with almost disastrous con­
sequences, What was remarkable, in retrospect, was for just how long 
and with what assidious skill the unity of the workers was retained, 
despite the continued surges of divisive undercurrents. Here the shop 
stewards* leadership can take full credit for the manner in which they 
consistently opposed every manifestation of sectionalism throughout the 
campaign either on a yard or an individual trade or departmental basis.
The immediate question facing the UCS workers now was how far 
they could ensure that their voice would be listened to in the ensuing 
discussions and negotiations between the Government and the official 
trade union movement. Would "in consultation with the local representative; 
mean that while McGaxvey and Service did the talking to Davies, the local 
Confederation officials and shop stewards would sit waiting patiently
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outside the room to be ’consulted* only when the bargain had 
already been struck. Further talks with Davies were due to take 
place the following Monday September 13th and a full shop stewards 
meeting agreed that this time Reid and Airlie would be present.
As regards the question of their being consulted Jimmy Reid 
assured them,
"If there are two members of the shop stewards Co-ordinating 
Committee going down to participate in this dialogue they 
will either be in that room or in my opinion, we tell them 
to get the first train back to Clydeside and they're going 
home." (19)
In the event they were not invited to participate directly in the 
discussions but neither did they take the first train home. To 
have done so would have been to spurn completely auy real future 
say in discussions between the Confederation and the Government 
and to run the risk of being permanently relegated to the sidelines 
as the official movement took over the leadership and direction of 
the fight. O.P. Snow's first rule of politics was very pertinent: 
"Never be toopcoud to be present"^ even if in this case it was largely 
in a consultative role.(20)
In fact, it was a,t MoGarvey's insistence as much as anything 
that the 'normal procedure* of the Confederation was maintained, of 
not allowing local stewards to participate directly alongside 
national officials in major negotiations. What was not said but 
clearly understood by all, was that without the physical presence 
of the shop stewards in the same room MoGarvey's scope for manoeuvre 
with Davies wuld be much greater. John Davies certainly did not 
want them there either. In any event a precedent had already been 
set by the very fact that the 'dialogue' had been initiated between 
Davies and McGarvey alone. Only continuous pressure by the shop
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stewards therefore would ensure that the voice of the UCS workers 
themselves would continue to be heard and moreover listened to in 
any future discussions.
The next major event expected to produce some announcement of 
the Government's position on the UCS crisis was Edward Heath's 
visit to Glasgow on Friday September 10th. The visit had been 
planned several months before and its purpose was to allow Heath 
to speak to the party faithful in Scotland on the Common Market.
When he arrived at the Central Hotel he was met by angry shouts
of 'Heath out' from carefully fenced-in UCS demonstrators who
were joined by unemployed Plessey's men. Heath was also to specie
on Scottish industry at a limcheon for leading figures in the west
of Scotland and was expected to touch on UCS at least. In the
event he said practically nothing on the subject of UCS, When the
lunch was over Alex Kitson of the 8TUG, went up to Heath's suite
with two redundant UCS stewards, David Reid and Sam Gilmore. An
unholy row developed in the corridor outside Heath's third floor
room when it was indicated that only the two UCS stewards would be
allowed in, whereas Kitson, who had come back specially from the
TUC Congress at Blackpool and was representing the 8TUG, was not
to be allowed in. When Dickson Mabon, a former Minister of State
for Scotland together with three other Labour MP's arrived to talk
to Heath about the CDA proposals and were likewise told that Heath
would not see them, Mabon's language, while not quite as 'unparliamentary'
as the by now four-lettered, fuming and tieless Kitson's, indicated
that his sense of dignity had been offended by the PM's "extreme
discourtesy",
"after all, we are his colleagues, he seems to forget that, 
we are his parliamentary colleagi.es not his inferiors." (21)
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If the occasion of Heath's visit to Glasgow produced no new 
public initiative from the Government on UCS it was nevertheless 
important for behind-the-scenes discussions which Heath had held 
with Scots insurance tycoon and treasurer of the Scottish Conservative 
Party, Hugh Stenhouse, concerning the proposed Govan/Linthouse 
company, while outside Kitson and Mabon had been storming up and 
down. Stenhouse it will be recalled, had been on the board of the 
previous rescue attempt at Govan, the Fairfields company.
The announcement of the 'embryo’ board for Govan and Linthouse 
which would provide the nucleus of key management figures for the 
proposed new company was already several weeks overdue. It was 
becoming a matter of coiranent that the Government was having 
considerable difficulty in persuading leading businessmen to take 
an interest in the proposed new company while the shop stewards * 
attitude was adamant that any board based on the Government's 
proposals would be meeting in 'glorious isolation'. There would 
be no co-operation from the workforce. The day before Heath's 
visit to Glasgow, John Davies confirmed rumours that his flying 
visit to Prestwick Airport the previous Monday had been for discussions 
with Lord Weir, Chairman of the Weir Engineering group about joining 
the board, Weir had turned the offer down. Whoever could be 
persuaded to direct the hew company would have to be a man not 
afraid of unpopular causes. As the Government searched around for 
suitable candidates, the clamour continued to grow to publish the 
'background papdrs' upon which the recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee were purportedly based.
As if to add to the Government's increasing embarrassment the' 
report of the Shipbuilding Industry Board written prior to liquidation 
was published in mid-September, together with an accompanying letter 
from its chairman, Sir William Swallow dated May 1?th 1971.
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Referring to UCS the SIB report said that the company at long 
last "should make the long awaited turn to profitability,"
The Report noted that,
"Old troublesome contracts had been completed, the labour 
force had been brought into line with future requirements, 
settlements had been reached with the unions, and the 
company's order book was such that new orders for early 
delivery could be taken on satisfactory terms." (22)
The stewards claimed that this effectively repudiated the 
Government's whole position while Scottish MB's renewed demands 
for a Select Committee of Inquiry into the UCS liquidation. DTI 
officials countered thab the report was merely further evidence of 
the fact that Government was not kept informed of the real situation 
by the UCS management, for within a few weeks of its submission, 
the UCS management had come to the Government to request more aid.
The same day as the SIB report was published the stewards 
released the full transcript of the edited interview with Ken Douglae, 
previously published in abridged from in the four page tabloid 'The 
Butchery of UCS* which must have added to the Government's discomforture.(23)
The complete transcript contained a savage attack on the 
Conservative Party's approach to the shipbuilding industry which 
according to Douglas even under the previous Tory administration had 
shown "no inclination to support shipbuilding" ,(2/) ) On the question 
of the current proposals for the new post-UCS set up, Douglas commented 
harking back to Geddes, "I thought the whole was greater than the 
parts, is it not?"(25) Douglas was a man bitterly frustrated at 
being halted so very nearly within reach of M s  original goal. He 
had joined the UCS board in August 19^9 and said then that he needed 
two years to make the compamy a success but the two years were not 
up when UCS was forced into liquidation. From the shop stewards 
point of view it was also an important morale booster because Douglas
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publically stated his o\m attitude to the work-in a©,
"an orderly demonstration of the mens' wish to express 
their right'td work." (26)
As if their problems in finding a new board, the SIB report,
and Douglas' interview were not enough, the day before the
Government .was' at last due to announce the shape of the new
company for Govan and Linthouse, the Connell family demanded that
the Scotstoun yard be included in any new plan for the Upper Clyde yards.
Charles Connell who was the son of the former o^mer,
Sir Charles, and still the yard's divisional manager,had been 
prodding Government to consider the saving of Scotstoun for some 
weeks, and this had given rise to the rumours that the family were 
trying to buy it back. At a meeting with the shop stewards in 
the first part of August the younger Connell had promised tnat 
the management would fight to save the yard and not 'throw in 
the sponge'. (2 7 ) Having found the Government "about as unpenetrable 
as a stone wall" with regard to their proposals for Scotstoun, the 
Connells now called a press conference to make public the arguments 
they had formulated previously. (28)
The inclusion of the Scotstoun yard would, they said, provide 
a flexibility which the proposals for the reconstructed yards 
lacked. The Govan yard- was restricted to ships with a 90' beam 
with an upper limit of 50,000 tons. Scotstoun's big berth on the 
other hand could handle "Panamax" ships with a beam of 1 0 2 ' and 
could readily be adapted to handle dry cargo sliips in excess of 
100,000 tons without substantial capital expenditure. This was 
the area the market was moving into it was claimed.
In the lifetime of UCS the yard had lost £9000,000 as against 
£24 million for the Group as a whole. Moreover, the productivity
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record of the yard v/as somewhat better than the others while it had 
the advantage of valuable contacts with ship ovmers, for future orders.
The die had however already been cast, albeit with some 
difficulty, three days beforehand at a secret meeting in a Troon 
hotel between John Davies and the men who were eventually to 
comprise the new board for Govan and Linthouse, Gordon Campbell 
who had flovm in from Inverness was also there. Among the leading 
industrialists at that meeting were George Perry of General Motors 
in Scotland, Robin MacLennan of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce,
Ronald Lyon, chairman of an industrial development company later to 
figure in the Plessey saga, Angus Grossart, joint managing director 
of an Edinburgh merchant bankers. Lord Clydesmuir^chairman of the 
Scottish Council (Development and Industry), Matthew Wylie, the 
GDI Scottish Chairman,. A.G. MacCrae, chairman of the Clyde Port 
Authority and the liquidator, Courtney-Smith,
The new board whose composition was prematurely leaked in the 
Scottish press had as its chairman, Hugh Stenhouse and an managing 
director, Archibald Gilchrist, a former engineering manager at 
Barclay Curie and currently managing director of an Edinburgh 
firm, manufacturing ships steering gear and stabilisers, (2 9 )
Grossart, Lyon and MacLennan were also made directors. Ken Douglas 
who was on holiday in Spain at the time was not initially to be 
included in the new board. Perhaps he had blotted his copybook 
by the comments made in the published interview released by the 
shop stewards. Possibly he too would need some persuasion to 
serve on the new board in a new capacity.
It is suggested that to get Stenhouse,to take the job on 
required strong appeals to his Tory Party loyalties to help the
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Government out of its difficulties,(3 0 ) No doubt Edward Heath 
had made similar points to Stenhouse in previous discussions with 
him during his Glasgow visit. When the new ' ■ appointments 
were announced Stenhouse resigned as treasurer of the Tory Party 
in Scotland commenting, "I feel that politics do not mix with 
business." (3 I)
The official announcement of the new board took place at a 
press conference in Glasgow's City Chambers held by John Davies, 
Eden and Campbell, The new company had been promised £1 million 
of private capital at the outset and it was intended that it 
would come into full operation, at the end of the year, Davies, 
however, suggested that if the stewards maintained .their hostile 
attitude to the new company and insisted on the demand for a 
solution covering the four yards, then "however reasonable and 
understandable it was at the first crunch of this dreadful 
situation with UCS", such a reaction now could be a matter of 
"grave peril for the whole future of shipbuilding on the Upper 
Clyde."( 5 2 ) Hugh Stenhouse was even more blunt on the matter,
"Well of course, if people won't co-operate there is very 
little you can do, but I cannot believe that people wish 
to live on charity, because that is the alternative. I 
cannot believe that, wives and children, and after all, 
there could be 150,000 people in the west of Scotland 
affected by this, I cannot believe that people will not want 
to co-operate with us who want to do something for the 
west of Scotland, (33)
When the new management, namely Stenhouse and Gilchrist went to 
Linthouse to see the liquidator later on that same day, Airlie 
and a group of stewards were waiting for them on the other side 
of the wire-mesh gates, Stenhouse had borrowed a small car for 
the occasion belonging to his secretary which no doubt he regarded 
as more appropriate than a chauffeur-driven limousine. As they 
arrived at Linthouse and parked their car outside, the gates were
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opened slightly and Airlie stepped forward to confront them. For 
once, Stenhouse lacked his characteristic bluster and asked 
meekly if they might be allowed in. They were told by Airlie that 
while they would be allowed in that day it was on the understanding 
that it would be as private individuals and not as directors of 
the new board. They would not be allowed to look round the yards 
but in future they should make alternative arrangements to meet 
the liquidator, Gilchrist, probably somewhat intimidated by.the 
situation managed to say to Airlie that he had served his time at 
Linthouse, If it was an attempt to ingratiate himself he failed.
He received the crushing reply from Airlie, that he would "never 
be the managing director" there.(34)
Speaking to the Commons the following day at the start of 
a special recall session of Parliament, Davies reiterated the 
Government's belief that "the proposals cf the Advisory Group 
offer the best prospect of an enduring and viable shipbuilding 
under talcing". (35) Nothing had happened he said to alter the 
Government's view since he last made a statement at the end of 
July. Moreover, Davies announced that the Government did not 
consider as acceptable the proposal of the Connell family for 
the inclusion of Scotstoun yard, (36) So far as the Clydebanlc yard 
was concerned, Archibald Kelly had contacted the DTI that very day 
to announce that he was withdrawing his bid for Clydebanlc. (37) 
Kelly's estimate that to have taken over the yard and its existing 
contracts would have cost him £5 million in potential losses did 
not bode well as regards future likely purchasers for Clydebank,
Among the conditions of Government for the new company the 
"most critical one" was the co-operation of the workers. In 
this regard said Davies, referring bo the events at Linthouse, "the
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reaction of the men yesterday was not helpful and in my view not 
in their best interests, "(39) Government support he warned 
would only be forthcoming "if acceptable agreements can be reached 
with the unions about working practices and wage rates," (39)
The battle lines were now being cbrawn with increasing 
sharpness as the response of the workforce to the announcement of 
the embryo board made plain. The men were seething. The previous 
day's confrontation between Airlie and Stenhouse had merely been 
the first skirmish in what could easily become an a,ll out political 
and industrial war. The solidarity was there, the unity was there 
and if it came to a real fight the UCS workers knew they would not 
be left to stand alone. Certainly John Davies' warnings were 
unlikely to shalce their determination very much. They had already 
come through over three long embattled months. If a real showdown 
was to be avoided now some very nimble footwork would be required. 
It was here that Danny McGarvey and Hugh Stenhouse were really to 
come into their own.
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Cliapier Seven 
PROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION
The announcement of the composition of the board based on 
Govan and Linthouse brought for the shop stewards a time of 
reckoning. They were faced with two potentially major problems 
concerning the future conduct of their campaign.
The first problem was that external pressure on the workforce 
to 'see sense' and abandon their 'intransingence* could now be 
expected to come from all sides. In particular, therefore, the 
need to ensure that the Confederation did not attempt to make a 
compromise over the heads of the UCS workers would be paramount.
The previous few weeks had already shown that such an outcome was 
by no means a remote possibility at least so far as McGarvey 
and Service were concerned. If anything, it would now be harder 
to prevent the Confederation from accepting terms for a solution, 
possibly even to the eventual exclusion of Scotstoun and Clydebank. 
The announcement of the embryo board for Govan and Linthouse had 
added a reality to the Government's proposals which they had 
hitherto lacked.
The second problem that faced the leadership was quite simply 
that of maintaining the unity within the ranlcs of the ÜGR workforce 
which would enable the stewards to continue to campaign for a 
solution that covered all four yards and the labour force. Among 
the UCS workers themselves the prospect of at least some jobs being 
saved, particularly of those workers in the yards whose futur;e now 
seemed more certain, could create an 'I'm alright Jack' type of 
attitude. Predictably,- in a period of increasing likelihood of 
confrontation there would be attempts to undermine the authority 
of the shop stewxirds in the eyes of the workforce by Opportunist*
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elements on the one hand, and on the other, by 'ultra-leftists' 
seeking to pose wholly unrealisable demands of a more revolutionary- 
sounding nature.
When the shop stewards from the four divisions met on the 
morning following the announcement of the new board in the Clyde­
bank canteen, future tactics were of critical importance, Airlie 
put the plan of the Co-ordinating Committee to them for discussion.
By proceeding with their proposals the Government had sharpened the 
confrontation. So far as their physical presence in the yards and 
access for Hugh Stenhouse*s board was concerned, said Airlie,
"The gates will need to be manned as they've never been manned 
before, right? They don't get in and if they're gonnie get 
in, and this is the recommendations, they'll need to bring a 
team with them to trample over the top of us, because that's 
the only way they'll be allowed in these gates." (-j)
The Co-ordinating Committee had outlined several options. Firstly, 
not only would the new board not be allowed in the yard, but if 
any of the existing management co-operated with the board they 
also would be excluded. There would be no co-operation with or 
recognition of the new board. Indeed, to underline this point the 
Co-ordinating Committee declared that it would itself be meeting 
in the Linthouse boardroom in future, not that they had any real 
intention of talcing over the running of the yards on a day-to-day 
basis.
Secondly, if any shipowner paid installments to the new board 
their vessels could be 'impounded' by the workers and thirdly, 
they were putting the proposal to the shop stewards for an early 
mass meeting of the entire workforce from the four yards as a 
public display of their unity. To any wavering elements among 
them it would be pointed out that no-one at this stage was 'fireproof
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The majority of jobs were still potentially at risk. There would 
be no negotiations except on the basis of their demand for a 
solution covering all four divisions without contraction of the 
labour force, (2 )
Now, from an*ultra-left*'shop steward, Joe Moriarty came the 
suggestion that the tactics be changed from a work-in to a sit-in. 
It was the first time that such a proposal would seem to have had 
a superficial credibility in terms of the new situation which now 
demanded 'militant* solutions. Reid handled the suggestion by 
arguing that as far as the work-in went,
"...to abandon this tactic would be to lose and undermine 
the support throughout the country." (3)
It was still early days and Reid's approach to Moriarty's proposal 
was firm but low key. Among the workforce, however, there appeared 
to be little if any sympathy for the idea of a sit-in at the mass 
meeting.
That morning the Daily Record headline pleaded to 'Brother 
Dan' to come to Clydeside and help restore the situation since it was 
now 'time to spealc out'. (4 ) Sam Barr had warned the stewards to 
be wary of inviting in the Confederation because it would be seen 
as a sign of weakness on the part of the shop stewards' leadership. 
Thus while the stewards' public position was one of total unity with 
the national Confederation, privately they had reservations, Airlie 
underlined the point referring to the traditional role of the 
Confederation, by pointing out that,
"History has shoivn us that you don't negotiate redundancies, 
you oppose them because once you negotiate them you're 
accepting them, its the format it'll take, so therefore 
there'll be nae negotiation anc only resistance," (5)
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At a press conference immediately following the shop 
stewards * meeting, Airlie and Reid announced the stewards * 
reaction to the new hoard, debunking the suggestion in certain 
sections of the press that the Government had in any sense taken 
a new initiative by pointing out that they were precisely the 
proposals of the Advisory Group for the butchery of the industry 
of two months previously. , Their position as UCS workers was 
also the position of the National Confederation it was emphasised, that is, 
no discussions except on the basis of proposals that covered the 
four yards and the entire labour force. In a voice dripping with 
contempt Reid commented on the composition of the board,
"It's abundantly clear that all self-respecting industrialists 
in Scotland have refused to,touch this board with a barge­
pole. They've scraped the bottom of the barrel and they've 
come up with proposals for the composition of the board which 
in 0 U 3? opinion is more reminiscent of Monty Python's Plying 
Circus (].aughter) than a serious proposal eh for the ship­
building industry. We understand there's a rubber goods 
maiiufacturer, (laughter) a merchant baiAcer, eh someone else. 
Cumulatively they know nothing about shipbuilding, with the 
exception of Gilchrist and his knowledge is very limited.
And it would seem to me that the diff,...the Government has 
had the utmost difficulty in. finding self-respecting Scots 
to serve on this board and no wonder, because these men that 
are serving on this board are virtually quislings to the 
Scottish people and the Scottish community," (6 )
It was a stinging attack on the psuedo-patriotism of Hugh Stenhouse 
and Scottish big business. Reid pointed out that only a few months 
before, Stenhouse had publically argued that shipbuilding on the 
Upper Clyde should have been closed years ago. In fact Stenhouse 
had made these remarks in a speech advocating the development of 
Hunterston as a deep sea terminal and oil complex at a ceremony 
bestowing an honourary degree from Strathclyde University upon 
him, Stenhouse had actually formed a company to explore the 
possibilities of such a project development at Hunterston. It was
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a telling blow which did more to damage his credibility in the 
eyes of the workforce than the fact that he was the ex-Treasurer 
of the Conservative Party in Scotland,
The purpose of the all UCS mass meeting was to demonstrate 
the determination and unity of the workforce to themselves and the 
outside world. To the eight thousand workers gathered at Govan, 
both Airlie and Reid as the principal speakers outlined the dire 
consequences of any lack of unity. Perhaps as many as six thousand 
workers would go 'dovm the road’ and those that were left would 
have to accept lower wages and the introduction of double-shift 
working. Airlie read out the lead story in that morning’s Glasgow 
Herald headlined "Government Demand Pledge from Govan Workers" 
which suggested t M t  Jolin Davies’ Commons statement, that Government 
support would only be forthcoming if there was a satisfactory 
agreement between the unionsand the new company, implied precisely 
this kind of erosion of wage levels and working conditions. (7)
It was vital to point out to the workers the inconsistency in the 
press which eight weeks previously had used terms like 
•carve-up', ’disgraceful* and ’unnacceptable' in demanding that 
the Government rethink its proposals for UCS and yet were now 
calling the workers ’intransigent* and ’inflexible’ when substantially 
the same proposals were being put into operation. The early 
sympathy in certain sections of the press for the workers’ plight 
now evaporated as an attempt was made to suggest to the workers 
that Clydebank and Scotstoun should be abandoned to their fate.
The unreasonableness and inflexibility lay not with the 
workers, claimed Reid,but with the Government who despite the 
exposure of their White Paper to massive condemnation had puEihed 
through their policy for a drastic reduction in the industry on 
the Upper Clyde. The message to the workforce was clear, UCS had
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become a symbol of the struggle against Government policies which 
had resulted in a million people facing unemplojcnent. The ranks 
must now close otherwise they would be letting themselves and 
their fellow workers dovm. As Reid put it,
"Our proposals spring from a sense of responsibility 
to ourselves and families and our community and in 
the last resort to the British working class. I t ’s 
impossible for us to accept this," (9 )
When Airlie called for questions to be put on the report a member 
of the UCS Clydebank Planning Department, a certain McKenzie, came 
to the platform to put his point of view,
"Now at the outset I must congratulate, must congratulate 
the Co-ordinating Committee and the shop stewards of UCS 
for the fight they’ve fought. But lets get to the reality 
brothers, that if, and its happening, that UCS is closed, 
there is no UCS now, that two and a half thousand of you 
people are gonnie be employed, it means that ten thousand..,"(9 )
He was interrupted by an explosion of anger, shouts of ’get him
o f f ’, ’If h e ’s on the work-in get rid of h i m ’ and other less
restrained comments could be heard. It was precisely the kind of
defeatist attitude which the calling of the mass meeting had been
intended to guard against. It was a dangerous moment not least of
all for McKenzie, but the men were solidly behind the stewards.
They had passed the first public test of their unity in the new
situation that faced them and were not to be seduced by the promise
that some would save their skins by going along with the Government 
proposals.
While at Govan as the assembled workers roared 'aye* as a 
unified and defiant mass in support of the shop stewards recommendations, 
■ in Newcastle that same morning, Danny McGarvey indicated that he 
and Service would meet Stenhouse and Gilchrist the following week 
for discussions, Stenhouse, taken by surprise, immediately post­
poned a business trip to Australie,. McGarvey was quoted as saying 
that the Confederation were not going to discuss any one division
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individually, but he added somewhat ominiously, that "members 
elect union leaders to lead, not to follow," ( 1 0 ) The problem 
immediately facing the stewards was therefore whether or not to 
join in the proposed talks between McGarvey and Stenhouse which 
had all the flavour of a*sell-out'. Either way they were in a 
difficult situation, and they knew it. Predictably the press 
that weekend played the ’red* card, Nigel Lawson of The Sunday 
Times in a hostile review of a pamplilet by Communist Party Scottish 
Secretary Alex Murray on UCS, described the ’work-in’ as "a 
colossal sham. " The fact tha,t Reid, Airlie and Barr were identified 
in the pamplilet as active members of the Party’s Scottish Committee, 
and their names appeared without their union initials, alongside 
those of Dickie, Cook and Gilmore described as ’Left militants’, 
who did however have their union initials bracketed beside them, 
was used by Lawson to suggest that Airlie, Reid and Barr were 
Communists first and trade unionists very much second. Lawson 
further suggested that behind the.declared aim of the ’work-in’ 
was an attempt,
"to provoke the Gove miment into some rash countermeasure or 
confrontation - ideally, say, sending in the mounted police." (l'i)
Henceforth, Lawson became persona non grata so far as the UCS 
workers were concerned.
For its part, the Government also stepped up the pressure on 
the workers. In a speech to the Hallam Conservative Luncheon 
Society, John Eden warned the workers tint their continued intransigence 
could put at risk the chance of a fresh start. The press release 
of E d e n ’s speech contained a little prod for McGarvey to get on 
with it, not that he needed much prodding at this juncture. The 
Daily Record had already seen to that. Sir John, was a little 
more eloquent however.
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"Honourable men with a deep faith in Clydeside have come forward... 
It is encouraging to know that experienced union leaders are 
turning to them, for these men will understand that the new 
company represents thousands of jobs and security for countless 
families." (12)
The next day the Co-ordinating Committee carried out their threat 
to meet in the boardroom of UCS at Linthouse.
Comfortable as their physical surroundings may have been in 
comparison to the Clydebanlc apprentices* classroom in which they 
usually met, the same could not be said, however, of their overall 
tactical situation. They had occupied the boardroom to show that 
they were the force to be reckoned with. The press and TV cameras 
had been allowed to record the scene for posterity and then, were 
ushered out the door. The stewards had some very tough talking to 
do, aware that their room for maneouvre was gradually shrinking.
They had received a summons to meet McGarvey the following morning 
prior to the commencement of the proposed discussions with Stenhouse.
The problem was that MoGarvey’s initiative was clearly an 
attempt to assert the leading role of the Confederation and had 
inlierent in it all the dangers that Sammy Barr had warned against.
\'/hen they finally emerged from the boardroom, Airlie announced they 
had indeed agreed to meet the Confederation. AI.though he did not 
say so at the time, it was obvious that to have refused would have 
been to risk complete isolation, but as regards any invitation to 
meet for discussions with Stenhouse in the afternoon Airlie said, 
with an implicit warning to McGaiUfey.
"We will only meet Mr. Stenhouse on the basis of discussion 
of the fou2? yards cumulatively, with all the labour force.
We will not meet him on the basis of what appears to us to 
be putting into practice the Government’s commitment^ based 
on the White Paper, the commitment on the complex based on 
Govan and Linthouse." (I3 )
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The following morning Ban McGarvey and Jack Service together 
with Joe Black and the local officials met with eleven leading members 
of the Co-ordinating Committee in the North British Hotel in Glasgow 
to prepare for the talks with Stenhouse, McGarvey assured the stewards 
th&t the Confederation’s position regarding UCS remained unchanged 
and that the basis of any discussion would be the four yards and the 
labour force. Stenhouse on his part, had already indicated that he 
was prepared to listen- to proposals even although they went beyond 
those of the Wiite Paper. At a hastily convened shop stewards’ 
meeting that lunchtime, the stewards finally agreed to proceed with 
an exploratory meeting to see whether Stenhouse could be persuaded 
’to extend his position to cover the four Yards’. (I4) The public 
position of the trade union side was one of complete unity when they
reconvened that afternoon in the North British Hotel, this time with
Stenhouse, Gilchrist and Ken Douglas present.
The latter who had returned from holiday earlier in the week 
had accepted a position on the new board on a temporary basis as 
Deputy Chairman of Govan Shipbuilders. It was a move which the 
stewards angrily interpreted as an attempt by Douglas to ’save his 
own skin’. Their anger was fuelled by the discovery that despite 
Douglas* recent claim to be able to run the Scotstoun yard profitably
as a unit on its own, given the necessary re-equipping, he himself
had previously formulated plans for the rundown of Scotstoun and 
Clydebanlc in 1972 had UCS stayed in business. There were bitter 
comments about Douglas, even to the extent of suggesting barring him 
from the yard along with Stenhouse and Gilchrist if necessary. All 
this however, was very much secondary to the main business of the 
talks with Stenhouse,
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Airlie reported back to the Co-ordinating Committee at seven 
o'clock that evening, ( 1 3 ) They had failed to persuade Stenhouse to 
talce Clydebanlc into consideration in his plans, but Stenhouse had 
recognised that there was little chance of his gaining the co-operation 
of the workforce if Scotstoun and Clydebank were as he put it,’running 
sores', Stenhouse had announced that he was prepared to consider 
Scotstoun on the basis of a feasibility study of its viability. 
Clydebank however, was a different matter and while he could not 
consider it himself he would put the point to Davies before he left 
for his trip to Australia, that a solution would need to be found 
for the yard, Du 3.-ing a recess in the meeting Service, obviously 
encouraged by the discussions, ’phoned Davies to arrenge a meeting 
for the following week to discuss Government aid to resolve the 
problem of Clydebank being made available. Stenhouse also asked the 
stewards to consider making a ’gesture of goodwill’, basically allowing 
himself and Gilchrist to tour the three yards, Govan, Linthouse and 
Scotstoun, so that he would be able to argue with Davies and with 
shipowners worried about their orders that the situation was more 
hopeful. It was eventually agreed by both sides to reconvene the 
following morning.
The decision as to whether to offer a ’gesture of goodwill’ 
was the subject of considerable controversy among the Co-ordinating 
Committee that evening with Reid, who had been absent from the crucial 
afternoon meeting with Stenhouse, arguing vehemently that there should 
be no visits to the yards unless Stenhouse also visited Clydebanlc 
thereby illustrating his ’maximum i n t e r e s t (I6) To Reid, with the 
reaction of the Clydebank workers to consider, it appeared perhaps 
that Airlie and the Confederation had been somewhat too accommodating 
towards the other side. To allow the new board to visit the yards
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without some commitment to examine all four yards v/ould create a 
dangerous situation in which divisions between the workforce in 
different yards could have been opened up. On television later 
that night Stenhouse was almost expansive about the progress they 
had rna.de in the d a y ’s talks.
"You Imow we're talking, w e ’re talking sensibly, w e ’re 
talking reasonably, eh and w e ’re talking the same language,
Ve all want to keep as many people in employment as possible,
I must say I was encouraged. To everybody I would say, 
please d o n ’t run away and say w e ’ve solved the thing, we 
haven’t, but there is hope that there will be jobs for a 
considerable number of people still, in Govan and Linthouse, 
and possibly, as far as I ’m concerned, at Scotstoun, "
Danny McGarvey was equally soothing,
"We’re no longer shouting at one another. The war of words " 
is over and both sides agree that eh, we had to get round 
the table and find out what was in each other’s minds, 
because the man was entitled to this. They’re entitled to 
know factually what their prospective employer, future 
employer has got in mind and eh, how far w e ’re prepared 
to go with him and talk with him." (18)
For McGarvey it should be noted, Stenhouse was already a ’prospective* and 
’future employer’, but for the moment the stewards remained silent.
It was true that by talking about Scotstoun, Stenhouse had moved 
from the \'liite Paper proposals but there were too many imponderables 
in the situation, above all concerning the future of Glydebanlc. It 
was not clear what eventual Government backing Stenhouse would be 
able to call upon to get his new company off the ground should 
discussions ever reach that stage. The question of the inclusion of 
Clydebank therefore, in a future scheme was financially and politically 
the key to any further ’progress' in the resumed dialogue, for unless 
there was some indication that the Government was seriously concerned 
about the future of all yards there would be little point in pursuing 
the talks with Stenhouse from the Co-ordinating Committee’s point of 
view.
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Early the next morning these developments were reported to a 
full meeting of ÏÏCS shop stewards to get further endorsement before 
representatives of the Co-ordinating Committee met Stenhouse once 
again that day to put it to him directly, that unless he was prepared 
to include Clydebank in his interests then there would be no ’goodwill 
gesture’, and neither he nor any other member of the board would be 
allowed in the yards. After a careful weighing of pros and cons as 
to the advisability of this further meeting, it was agreed as the 
oorrect manner in which to proceed. One thing was certad.n, that with 
the morning press hailing the previous day’s discussions as a 
’brealcthrough’, especially for the future of Scotstoun, a mass meeting 
of all UCS workers the following day, would be required to explain 
the real position to the workforce. While there was despondency emong 
Clydebank workers, there were already elements in Govan that were 
feeling rather pleased about their future prospects of employment. (19)
In fact, when the stewards, accompanied this timely Joe Black 
representing the Confederation in the absence of McGarvey, met 
Stenhouse that Thursday morning and reiterated their position^ they 
had expected that if Stenhouse*s reply was to the negative, discussions 
would cease in the traditional manner, at least for a time. Instead, 
Stenhouse indicated that provided he got Government backing he was 
prepared to consider Clydebank seriously as well, Stenhouse perhaps 
felt that the talks must be kept going at any cost. It was however, 
a major tactical victory for the stewards despite the qualifications 
attached to Stenhouse's offer, because the onus once again was put 
upon the Government to justify the break up of the consortium,
Stenhouse had apparently capitulated and in raising the prospect of 
a revived UCS set-up,placed the ball firmly back in the Government's 
court. It must have been a very angry John Davies who watched the 
television news that evening which showed .Reid and Airlie talcing
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Stenhouse on a tour round the yards beginning with the Clydebank 
yard as Reid had insisted previously. An exhuberant Stenhouse 
thumped Reid somewhat vigorously on the shoulder as he announced 
to the cameras,
"I couldn't have had better conversations than I've been 
having these last two days. I ’m not promising at this 
moment that I can do anything for Clydebank, that's up 
to unions and Government. But I've said this morning, 
if I'm asked to help by the Government and by the unions, 
right? With all the financial backing I'll need and all 
the help I'll need from you, right?..," (20)
A somewhat crumpled Reid quipped from beneath Stenhouse's hearty hand, 
"Yes, don't shake too much or I won't be any help."
Stenhouse continued unabashed,
"Then please, I will take it on but only if the two sides 
can agree on some plan." (2 1 )
But Stenhouse warned, it was to be "jackets off, none of this bloody 
nonsense" so far as the co-operation of the workforce was concerned 
if he was to consider Clydebank as well, (22)
On Friday morning Reid gave that assurance of co-operation 
publically on behalf of all UCS workers who were assembled for another 
four-yard mass meeting, this time at Clydebank to hear the report of 
the Co-ordinating Committee of the past few days events and endorse 
the pledge "to work for the future of the industry" provided all the 
yards including Clydebank were saved. In a statement that to many 
people must have seemed a remarkable one coming from the mouth of a 
Communist shop steward, Reid promised,
"We will co-operate. We will co-operate by uni.eashing the 
creative ability, and in some instances, it could be genius, 
of the entire labour force. That is the co-operation we are 
talking about." (2 5 )
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It was a theme that was to be reiterated many times over, The key 
thing now however, would be what Davies said to them in London on 
Tuesday October at their next meeting with him.
When Jack Service and Danny McGarvey met Davies in London, it 
was made clear from the outset that the Government was not prepared 
to provide the backing for Stenhouse to include Clydebank. McGarvey 
indicated however, that he was in contact with a group of 'public- 
spirited' Scottish businessmen who would be prepared to bid for 
Clydebank if sufficient funds were forthcoming from Government. It 
was a potential 'compromise' that neither the stewards nor the Govern­
ment seemed to give much credence to, Davies suggested that the 
individuals concerned would need to bring their bid forward before 
consideration could be given as to the amoxmt of any possible 
assistance, Davies emphasised that the.order position in Govan was 
becoming serious, a fact that the stewards were only too well aware 
of even though there were fourteen orders on the books which had 
been suspended at liquidaton, McGarvey and Service decided there 
and then, they would come to Glasgow for discussions on Sunday with 
the liquidator, Gilchrist and the Irish Shipping Company who had 
four of the suspended ships on order with DCS to clarify the position 
regarding these orders and hopefully ease the immediate problems of 
employment in the yards, McGarvey was ready to offer 'guarantees' 
of co-operation from the trade unions should they be released.
Once again, the stewards had been excluded from the actual meeting 
with Davies but when it broke up it appeared from McGarvey's report 
to them that little more than an agreement to meet again the following 
Tuesday had come out of it. In a television interview afterwards 
McGarvey modestly claimed he was '^quietl^^ confident" that they would 
solve the serious situation which had arisen, (24)
216.
It is a fair guess that despite what McGarvey told the stewards, 
he and Service had given private assurances to Davies that they 
would bring the UCS workers to heel if only Davies would be a little 
more forthcoming. Hence his proposals concerning the Scottish 
businessmen and for weekend talks with the Irish Shipping Company, 
Unfortunately for McGarvey’s strategy, Davies made it all too clear 
that so far as the Government's patience was concerned, time was 
running out.
That evening Davies made his own statement to the media on the 
talks with the Confederation. He warned the unions that the ship­
owners were "at the end of their tether. " that unless "meaningful 
discussions" begun with the new company Govan Shipbuilders at once, 
no new orders could be placed in the interim and the Govan yard would 
have its labour force reduced drastically in the near future. While 
he had agreed to meet McGarvey and Service the following week Davies 
now declared that even Tuesday next might be "too late," (25)
"We....we have to try and get customers who are apparently 
losing, confidence in the future of their ships to reinstate 
their orders, and to go through with them, and unless we do, 
then in fact the truth is that within so short a time we should 
not have work to be done, in particular, in the yard which is 
looked upon as being the most promising in the future." (26)
The Irish Shipping Company, the main shipowners concerned, 
immediately denied they were ’holding a gun’ at the head of anyone.
The company was prepared to be flexible on delivery dates and their 
assistant manager O ’Neill expressed surprise at the strength of Davies* 
statement. (2?) The next day representatives of a further four 
companies with six ships on the suspended order list also denied they 
had presented the Government with any ’ultimatum’. It was pointed out 
in fact as shipowners they had collectively approached Nicholas Ridley
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on August 2 7 th regarding the exact status of their order, and since 
then they had received no communications from the Government, (28)
The shop stewards who met to hear the reporfback from Reid and 
Barr of the London meeting considered their next move in response 
to Davies' statement. On behalf of the Co-ordinating Committee Reid 
gave an assessment of the situation.
"V/hat's clearly happening is that they are trying to divide 
the ranks, and note the tactics: the yard that is supposedly
in dispute as to its future (Clydebank), has got a works 
prograjrane over the next period. Govan, that's supposed to 
have some elements of survival, will have the redundancies, 
and they get, or they think they'll get, a division, you know, 
in the ranks, as a result of this divide and rule eh tactic. 
It's the opinion of the Co-ordinating Committee, that we've 
got to go from this meeting today, malce a most sharp indictment 
of Davies - it's blackmail." (29)
At the press conference following this meeting Reid denounced 
Davies' statement once again as,
"a,, despicable attempt to blackmail and intimidate not only 
our workers and the people of Scotland but the entire trade 
union movement." (30)
Holding up a list of the fourteen ships held in abeyance since 
liquidation, Reid charged that their release could be secured 
immediately by Davies "lifting the 'phone". This would provide the 
necessary continuation of work for Govan.
It was indeed difficult to put any Interpretation on Davies' 
statement other than a crude piece of intimidation. Publication of 
letters which the DTI officials had received from the Irish Shipping 
Company purportedly justifying the Government's statement that the 
shipowners were losing confidence, did little to salvage Davies' 
reputation since they too were followed by further vehement denials 
of 'pressure* by the Irish Shipping Company, However, if Davies had
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hoped to provoke a split in the ranks of the UCS workforce his attempt 
failed. Once again,the stewards turned the tables on him in the most 
effective way possible; by talcing the issues to a mass meeting.
Airlie in one of his finest fighting speeches exposed the implications 
of the Government maneouvres and roared out the message of unity to 
the workforce once again.
iiThat was the statement by Davies, Unless we co-operate in 
our own butchery, then there will be no shipbuilding industry 
in the Upper Reaches of the Clyde, But werare saying that 
there are forces outwith 10 Downing S t r e e t t h e r e  is forces 
outside Parliament, and that's the British trade union and 
labour movement, and we are saying that if we're a symbol, 
then its this movement's responsibility to see that we are 
not defeated and the only way we'll be defeated; if they starve 
us into submission. We are confident... that this movement 
recognises what's at stake, its the Right to Work. And we're 
confident that we shall not fail. But even in a final 
analysis if we're to be defeated, a personal opinion, I would 
rather be defeated on my feet, than grovelling intae the 
yards accepting wage cuts." (applause and cheering), ( 5 1 )
If Davies' spies were doing their work properly he would have been 
in no doubt that the workers remained solid despite yet more forlorn 
calls for a sit-in from the'ultra-left*, The shop stewards' grip on 
the situation had not slackened nor were they about to lose their 
nerve. If Davies wished to precipitate a confrontation, it would 
be met by a united working class response. Once again the situation 
had reached a flashpoint.
It remained to be seen what if anything, the forthcoming 
meeting on Sunday in Glasgow between McGarvey, the liquidator and 
representatives of the Irish Shipping Company regarding their future 
orders, would produce. The stewards agreed to attend the meeting 
but they had already made their position plain time without number that 
there would need to be a package deal covering all the four yards 
and the entire labour force before the UCS situation could be resolved. 
The news that because of the crisis Stenhouse had cut short his
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business trip and was returning hurriedly from Australia to be at 
the Sunday meeting was received with a distinct lack of enthusiasm 
by the shop stewards. (52) Attitudes had hardened again considerably, 
the prospects for the Sunday meeting were poor to say the least,
I
The only value of the meeting from the shop stewards* point 
of view would be to secure a consensus among all parties to the 
discussion that the Government should be pressurised to release 
immediately the four orders for the Irish Shipping Company to the 
liquidator. Had they been released, however, to Govan Shipbuilders 
it might laave been thought to constitute de facto recognition of 
the new company without any guarantees as to the labour force, wage 
rates and the future of the other divisions. This was the line 
agreed between McGarvey and the shop stewards prior to the commence­
ment of the meeting. In any event Govan Shipbuilders Ltd,, were 
not yet in a legal position to accept orders as a trading company.
At the meeting, at which the Irish Shipping Company, Stenhouse, 
Gilchrist, McGarvey and the. stewards were present, the liquidator 
indicated that he had deferred repudiation of the Irish orders so 
that they would continue to qualify for an investment grant. For 
his part he was willing to continue with these vessels in order to 
keep the yards as going concerns with the proviso that he be protected 
from any further losses to the creditors for whom he was acting as 
liquidator. The liquidator, in fact, had previously expressed his 
willingness to proceed with the orders to the Department of Trade 
and Industry and would buy in materials for new work if he was provided 
with the necessary financial baclcup, but like the Irish Shipping 
Company he too had heard nothing from the Government, From the 
stewards point of view the discussions up to this juncture looked 
quite promising.
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Reid in recounting the progress of the meeting to the UCS 
shop stewards the next day then described McGarvey's intervention 
which changed the situation dramatically. McGarvey had asked the 
liquidator why he had not sought 'assurances' from the unions and 
then, contrary to what had been agreed beforehand, he turned to 
Stenhouse and asked him if he, Stenhouse, would be prepared to 
accept these orders. When Gilchrist indicated they could not accept 
the orders on behalf of Govan Shipbuilders for another three months, 
McGarvey then turned to the representatives of the Irish Shipping 
Company and asked them why they as the shipowners had not requested 
'guarantees' from the trade union movement.(55) McGarvey was obviously 
prepared to go to any lengths to effect some kind of compromise 
however limited. Perhaps he really was frightened by John Davies' 
bellicose statements. What was certain was the fury of the shop 
stewards at what they saw as a betrayal of their stated position 
by McGarvey. But McGarvey's real 'betrayal' of the stewards came 
during his press conference when the meeting finally broke up four 
and a half hours later. It had been agreed that a trade union 
statement be issued at the end of the meeting reiterating the united 
position of the trade union side regarding the need for an overall 
solution for the four yards and holding out the prospect of 'meaningful 
discussions', only if the Government released the suspended orders 
to the liquidator. However, on television that night McGarvey sang 
a very different tune,
"And I thinlc, while the unions have moved, they've not moved 
in the sense that we are departing from our major principle 
because, I will convey this to Mr, Davies on Tuesday night, 
the problem is, that if you continue to argue about the four 
yards in a situation which is developing to your advantage, 
then no-one will thank you for being negative," (5 4 )
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In reply to the Interviewer's question on whether there had been 
a compromise, true to his instincts as a trade union official of 
the right-wing variety, McGarvey said,
"I would say that there's a compromise in a sense, that we 
realise the need to get the workforce in Govan, Linthouse, 
Scotstoun firmly established in the hope that the Minister 
once seeing this gesture coming from us, that he himself, 
will see that the fog is lifting as he said the last time 
and bear with us in relation to Clydebank," (55)
When the stewards heard later of this 'compromise* they were no 
longer prepared to 'bear with* McGarvey. As Reid said to the shop 
stewards, the need for a break with McGarvey had been apparent for 
some weeks but whereas it would have been premature up till then, 
the real responsibility for abandoning their publically committed 
position, if this was indeed the intention, would now be seen to 
lie with McGarvey with all the consequences that this entailed. 
Reid warned bitterly.
"And I'm making this point. If any national trade union 
leader, wants to stick the knife into this movement, they 
will not be allowed to do it under the cloak of darkness 
or with stealth, or in their plirasoles. They'll be forced 
to do it in the full light of day, in front of the mass 
media and with the millions of the British working class 
watching them." (56)
Moreover, McGarvey had further infuriated the stewards by privately 
suggesting that unless they were prepared to accept 'discipline' 
of officials of the trade unions he would call a separate meeting 
of members of the Boilermakers Society if necessary to ensure that 
his own position was adopted. As Sammy Barr, himself a boilermaker, 
commented regarding McGarvey's threat to use his influence in an 
overtly sectional mariner to force the stewards into line,
"....if we have a split on this issue brothers, it wou3.dn*t be 
a betrayal to the boilermakers, it would be a betrayal to every 
worker whose working in the UCS and also a betrayal to the labour 
and mass movement and trade union movement of this country." (57)
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The recommendation of the meeting was that all those stewards 
who were present at the Stenhouse talks when the tenor of the trade 
union press statement had been decided, should once again reiterate 
to the press what had been the previous day's agreed statement.
Further, that the whole Co-ordinating Committee including particularly 
the boilermakers' conveners meet at York on Wednesday to lobby the 
delegates to the Confederation's quarterly meeting in order to get 
a reiteration of support for their cause. Finally, that an urgent 
appeal be issued to the labour and trade union movement to come 
forward with the kind of financial support which they had promised 
to UCS to help them in this crucial period.(5 8 ) Meanwhile, the stewards 
were urged to go back to their departments and explain to the men 
that there would be no question of a 'sell-out' of Clydebank. The UCS 
workers were prepared if necessary to disown McGarvey publically.
Airlie warned them to be on their guard against the 'faintheart^' . (3 9 )
Outside the Clydebank canteen with the leading stewards, 
gathered round him, Reid indicated to the assembled press that the 
statement he was to read out was what had been originally agreed 
with McGarvey the previous day.
"That the Government must release the orders of the Irish 
Shipping Company through the liquidator immediately. This 
is necessary in order that the yards continue as going concerns 
which also meets the needs and interests of the liquidator 
who is representing the creditors. That such an attitude 
and decision on the part of the Government would create a 
climate of opinion within which discussions will take place 
as to the future of the four yards or four divisions of the 
UCS. That these discussions will involve all interested 
parties including the Govan Shipbuilding Company but these 
discussions either with one party or more than one party 
would have to be discussions along parallel lines, ensuring 
the retention of the four divisions and the labour force." (4 0 )
Reid then asked each steward in turn for confirmation that he had 
given a correct statement of what was agreed and then with biting 
sarcasm added,
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"It's possible, that one person might get the wrong end of the 
stick. It's possible. It's possible that two might get,
I'm talking about the ten, two might get the \rro n g end of 
the stick, It's possible that three, but then it's stretching 
possibility and probability very far. But I want, I would 
suggest to you that it's apsychiatrio phenomenon unknown in 
medical history that ten people at the one meeting, aye plus 
two union officials could eh simultaneously eh have either a 
lapse of memory or eh eh simultaneously make the wrong 
interpretation." (4 1 )
The stewards had set the record straight. They had made 
clear to McGarvey and everyone else that the issue of Clydebank 
would remain an integral part of their demands. Indeed, by suggesting 
that only the release of the Irish orders would create a more 
conducive 'climate of opinion* for discussions to begin, they attempted to 
reverse Davies* ultimatum of the previous week that before there 
could be any release of guarantees for shipowners, 'meaningful 
discussions' with Govan Shipbuilders would have to take place.
Securing more work was the immediate tactical aim and to acliieve 
this the stewards had at least to concede the possibility of talks 
with the new board. Any such talks, however, could only take place 
'along parallel lines', that is in the context of a four yard 
package, whatever McGarvey may have said.
To this end, ten members of the Co-ordinating Committee 
travelled to London to be present while Davies and McGarvey held 
the discussions arranged the previous week. Once again, the trade 
union side met beforehand. This time tempers ran high as bitter 
recriminations were exchanged over responsibility for the past two 
days public breach between the stewards and the Confederation.
The shop stewards accused McGarvey of having been in collusion 
with Stenhouse the preceding Sunday while McGarvey in turn accused 
the stewards of a 'stab in the back' and vigorously denied an 
attempted tsell-ou1î of Clydebank, It cannot have been a pleasant
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experience for a national trade union official of McGarvey's 
stature to be publically reprimanded in the media by a group of 
shop stewards and it took all the diplomacy of the local Con­
federation officials to pour oil on the troubled waters. (42)
The outcome of nearly five hours of discussions at the 
Department of Trade and Industry Offices in Victoria Street was 
almost a, foregone conclusion. The Confederation promised to enter 
discussions on working practices and wage rates with Govan Ship­
builders on the understanding that the Government provided the 
required gparaiitees to enable new orders to proceed. What was not 
a foregone conclusion by any means and required McGarvey to consult 
several times with the waiting shop stewards was the form of words 
which any statement issued by the parties to the discussion would 
take. The Government had sugared the pill slightly by agreeing 
that a feasibility study be carried out as to whether the Scotstoun 
yard might be included in the final Govan Shipbuilders set-up.
This was by no means a cast-iron guarantee to save Scotstoun but 
at least provided some hope for the yard where before there was 
none. The key area of contention had been and remained Clydebanlc,
In the agreed minute of the meeting which was signed by 
John Davies, John Eden, Danny McGarvey and Jack Service, the shop 
stewards with Clydebank very much in mind, had insisted that the Confeder­
ation place at the top of the page as their principal objective 
"to seek means of preserving employment in all four yards of the UCS I' (43) 
In what was a rather peculiar but in the end prophetic formulation, both the 
Cm&dacatim as well as the Government, undertook to "make every effort 
to encourage a purchaser for Clydebanlc Yard," ( 4 4 ) Furthermore the 
minute stated that any such purchaser would be "eligible for substantial
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financial assistance" under the Local Employment Acts. (45) 
fact, Davies had already publically made this offer in the Commons 
several weeks before. (4 6 ) Given the scale of aid necessary however, 
it could hardly be considered an enticing offer for a prospective 
shipbuilding buyer, especially since Govan Shipbuilders would probably 
eventually require assistance on a much more generous scale. The 
Government had not made any real commitment to Clydebank nor had the 
CSEÏÏ stipulated that such a buyer should necessarily be a shipbuilding 
concern as a precondition to any eventual agreement.
The Victoria Street document*was therefore more of a conditional 
truce than anything else. There would be a temporary cessation of 
hostilities and in that sense it marked a step backwards from direct 
confrontation and a step towards an eventual negotiated settlement. 
Major areas of ambiguity and uncertainty would need to be resolved 
however and, as far as they went, the talks were only the first 
staging post in what was still to be a long journey.
From London the shop stewards travelled to York the following 
day to ensure that the Confederation understood the position of the 
UCS workforce with regard to the scope of any eventual solution.
From Glasgow, the rest of their colleagues on the Co-ordinating 
Committee travelled to York to meet up with them. The Confederation 
for its part endorsed the document as "an interim step to resolve 
the problem." (4 7 )
Reporting back to the UCS shop stew^ards Airlie gave the Co­
ordinating Committee’s interpretation of the Victoria Street document 
in an optimistic resume" designed to quieten the workers’ fears that 
the Confederation had made a major concession.
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"Ve made our position quite clear to Barmy McGarvey. We're 
saying in effect that this is the key paragraph, unless 
there is a definite commitment to Clydebank and Scotstoun 
and with guarantees for all the labour force, because you 
can secure the four yards but you've still got to discuss 
the labour force, then no meaningful discussions can take 
place. That would be our position and as regards the wage 
rates and the working practices our position on that is 
this: That trade unions always discuss working practices
and wage rates, but never to my knowledge do they discuss 
it to take a wage cut or worsen your working conditions." (4 8 )
Essentially Airlie argued that their position had not moved 
but as Reid pointed out, whereas the previous Monday, McGarvey's 
attempted 'betrayal' in the discussions with Stenhouse and the 
Irish Shipping Company had led them to believe they were in danger 
of being totally isolated, they had managed to bring McGarvey back 
into line on Tuesday, prior to his meeting with Davies. In turn, 
this had prepared the way for the Confederation's vote on Thursday 
reiterating the unified trade union demand for the four yards to 
be kept open. Furthermore, by endorsing the Victoria Street document 
as an 'interim solution' Reid was able to argue that they had achieved 
a victory since the Confederation was now not only committed to the 
preservation of the four yards but also of all the jobs within the 
yards. This was an even firmer commitment than previously, and was 
no doubt in part a result of the fact that the entire Co-ordinating 
Committee had been at York to lobby the delegates. Moreover, up 
to a thousand expected redundancies would now be halted as an immediate 
result of the discussions in London. Vliat ha,d guaranteed the overall 
success of their lobby of the Confederation, however, was possibly 
the influential role of other key trade union leaders such as Hugh 
Scanlon in bringing pressure to bear on McGarvey beliind the scenes 
and McGarvey's own knowledge of the likely odium that would be heaped 
on the perpetrator of any 'sell-out*. Both Reid and Airlie, being 
engineers themselves, had of course, been able to establish good
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links with Scanlon which proved to be of great value throughout 
the whole campaign.
The work-in would continue, however, including the manning 
of the gates until all their demands were won. They would 'keep 
their guard up' because as Airlie warned, any sign, of wealcness 
or division would be seized upon by the Government,
"Our vigilance carries on because, Jimmy made the point 
yesterday, it's important, we're in the woods, we're 
still in the woods, we've no won nothing, there is a 
chink of light, but when you're in the woods the wolves 
are ready to devour you.,,and we've also got to appeal 
to the mass eh movement outside to still keep their 
powder dry, that support at this period is even more 
crucial because, we're in the crucial- point. Tommy Preil 
made the point, his experiences in this movement, that 
that just when you're on the point of victory it's 
snatched from you and that's what we've got to guard 
against," (4 5 )
To make precisely this point to the mass movement the publicity 
committee issued a leaflet to the movement which explained that 
despite press claims to the contrary, the shop stewards demands 
had remained unchanged, (5 0 ) Needless to say the press had had a 
field day in reporting the outcome of the Victoria Street discussions 
and were suggesting that the workers had now abandoned Clydebank.
Back in the yards the press reports of the talks had created some 
confusion among the workers. Moreover, the absence of the leader­
ship of the Co-ordinating Committee from the yards for the greater 
part of that week had given the 'ultra-leftists* the opportunity to 
move a vote of no confidence in the shop stewards leadersip and 
accuse them of betraying the workers. The spokesmen for the'ultra- 
left* on this occasion was Conn Higgins who after having clashed 
with Reid during the preceding Co-ordinating Committee's reportback 
to the shop si:ewards now came to the platform during a mass meeting 
of all UCS workers at Linthouse that Friday morning to attack the
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leadership once again. Higgins denounced the Co-ordinating Committee 
for moving avray from the original demands and argued that all they 
had brought back was,
"More vague woolly phrases. What it means, we're letting 
Clydebank go to the wall and if you vote on this resolution 
as an acceptance of it as in the Minute of this meeting with 
McGarvey and Davies, you are immediately letting your fellow, 
workers in Clydebank fight this fight on their own....Brothers, 
I make a motion that we reaffirm, the four yards and the 
labour force intact but under the one economic unit. That 
is not what is contained in this Minute, nor is it what the 
Confederation are looking for. If you vote for this you're 
voting for a, 'sell-out'," ( 5 0
Higgins' best argument was not, however, that the four yards remain 
intact as a unit, since this would be to gamble all plausible 
chances of success on what had now become a point of purist principle, 
but the fear that Clydebank would simply be abandoned to its fate.
It was therefore quite disturbing when he was able to read out a 
report in The Guardian of the previous day's Confederation meeting in 
York which quoted Jack Service as saying that if it was "75 per cent 
or nothing" then the Confederation executive would have to be "very 
responsible in its attitudes, (5 2 )
Wlien Reid came forward to reply to this challenge the gloves 
were off
"I have said at a mass meeting, so has Airlie, and I'm saying 
it again. So far as I'm personally concerned and I know 
this is the position of the Co-ordinating Committee, there 
will be no blood money, there will be no selling of bodies, 
and that's our fellow workers. As far as we're concerned, 
and if there's to be jobs to be lost, and I say this in no 
self-sacrificial way because my integrity's involved. I'll 
make sure I'm among them, because we're not being party to 
any 'sell-out* of a struggle and a movement that has lifted 
the working class struggle of this country to a new level and 
to a new dimension," (5 3 )*
Reid reiterated that there would be no recognition of Govan Shipbuilders,
nor would they be allowed to impose a managerial structure until an 
—  —   ^ *1 nc, u r n « »nd 1 A.bour forc.0 had been reached.
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As for maintaining the four divisions as an economically intact 
unit,
"Your Co-ordinating Committee has said to you and they've 
said it to others, that if there are cumulative proposals 
that in the short term guaranteed every job and the 
continuation of work in the four divisions, if we rejected 
' it, we would be crucified as rigid dogmatists." (54)
With regard to Service's alleged statement this would be 
raised at the Co-ordinating Committee immediately after the mass 
meeting and they would demand that either the Confederation confirm 
Service was misquoted or if he was not, reprimand him for talking 
in terms outwith the decision of the York meeting, Reid continued,
"Now look lads, I'll say this. It's bad enough when you're 
getting hammered from some papers from the right, but part 
of our problems throughout these last few weeks has been 
the criticisms that have come from positions so far to the 
left, that as I've said before, by Einstein's theory of 
• relativity, they're so far to the left, they're ending up 
rubbing shoulders with the right and to all intents and 
purposes the net result of their action is the same as that 
that's desired by our enemies on the right, which would be 
to seek the disunity within our ranks. I'm on the left,
I'm a militant, I'll fight, but when you fight you've also 
got to be guided not only by the heart but by the brain and 
the mind, and I would argue here that the proposals put to 
you, is an insult to characterise them as a sell-out." (55)
At the end of the meeting there were five votes against the recommendation. 
The workforce had remained loyal once again.
For over six hundred UCS workers their final public demonstration 
was a trip to Brighton to lobby Edward Heath at the Tory Party Annual 
Conference. For the delegates seated in the conference hall, the 
massed sound of hundreds of irate Clydeside workers jeering and 
shouting outside, must have been an awesome noise, perhaps even 
the ghastly shape of things to come, only foreshadowed in the very 
worst nightmares of loyal Tory party constituency workers. In any 
event. Heath refused to meet the'UCS workers, preferring instead to
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let one of his . advisors see a deputation led by Gerry Ross,
It was to be the last major mass public demonstration by UCS workers.
Had it not been already decided upon as a spontaneous response to 
Davies' initial 'blackmail' tlireat, it is doubtful in the light of 
the outcome of the subsequent talks at the DTI, whether or not it 
would have taken place at all. The real political centre of gravity 
of the UCS campaign was shifting from demonstrations in the streets 
to discussions behind closed doors.
In Parliament, John Davies.also put an optimistic gloss on his 
account to the Commons of the substance of the Victoria Street talks. 
Announcing an advance of a further million working capital to 
the liquidator and the intention of the Government, in the light of 
the discussions, to release further financial guarantees to enable 
the Irish orders plus an order for the Brazilian Government to proceed, 
Davies remarked,
"It is already abundantly evident that the ship orders being 
worked on by the liquidator are likely to realise a heavy 
loss, as will the new work needed to maintain employment at 
Govan and Linthouse.... This refutes the assertions that UCS 
was on the verge of turning the corner into profitability." (5 6 )
The fact was, however, that the £1-^ million plus the previous sum of 
£ 4  million already advanced to the liquidator constituted a figure 
sufficiently close to that originally requested to be a matter of 
some embarrassment to the Government and provoked some scathing 
questions from Benn,
Vdien the following day A.P. Crawford, the ex-financial director 
of UCS and now with Yarrows, attacked Davies' statement as "blatantly 
misleading" for comparing the company in liquidation with what its 
performance might have been under normal operation, once again the 
Government's image was somewhat tarnished, (5 7 ) The statement was made 
to a session of the STUC inquiry to which Crawford was giving evidence that
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In the Commons Davies revealed how far the Government had 
moved from the original Advisory Group proposals hut in a way that 
would allow him to maintain the support of the Government's ovm 
rank and file supporters, the Tory back-benchers, who cannot have 
been entirely pleased by the concessions the Government now appeared 
to be making and needed some assurance.
"The prospect for future employment, I suggest, has to be 
seen in a range which at the low end, starts at the 2,500 
figure put forward by the group of experts, but it has 
been, I think, confidently hoped that the figure might be 
materially improved, and improved not only by adding the 
numbers employed in the new project as a result, perhaps, 
of the inclusion of Scotstoun and perhaps double-shift working, 
or better still at the Govan-Linthouse yard, but additionally 
by other employment being offered to the workers at UCS and 
either on the lower Clyde or at Yarrows." (58)
So there it was; 'perhaps* the inclusion of Scotstoun but 
also'perhaps', and here again the sting-in-the-tail of 'double- 
shift working' at Govan. In any event the numbers v/ould include 
jobs at Yarrows which would benefit by new defence orders and at 
the yards on the Lower Clyde, where Bruce-Gardyne once again 
trumpeted the supposed vacancies for 1,000 UCS workers lying open 
at Scott-Lithgow's yard, (59)
With the final resolution of the UCS crisis still undecided 
both sides still had everything to play for. If the Government 
could achieve a compliant workforce at Govan Shipbuilders prepared 
to accept double-shifts decimated by redundancies and prepared to 
take the kind of lower wages offered at Scott-Lithgows, this would 
have massive repercussions throughout the industry as a whole. If 
the trade unions could get a four yard solution that safeguarded the 
workers* jobs then they could claim an historic victory which would 
have demonstrated the power of the organised workers to reverse
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Tory Government policy. Either way each side would now face new 
and even more subtle trials of strength in the coming period.
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THE WAITING GAME
By the end of October the UCS campaign had been going for 
over four months, far longer than anyone had anticipated. Always 
a factor v/as the effect on the morale of the workforce of a drav/n 
out struggle such as it was. turning out to be. They were i.n a 
period of marking time while they awaited the result of the 
promised feasibility studies for Scotstoun and a search for a 
suitable buyer for Clydebank was conducted. Until these issues 
were settled the Victoria Street document would remain a most 
uncertain pledge so far as the shop stewards were concerned.
However, from the Government the pressure on the stewards to enter 
into negotiations on wage rates and working practices with Govan 
Shipbuilders was relentless.
The position of the local officials of the Confederation for 
the first time did not fully accord with that of the UCS stewards. 
Whether due to instructions from their national officials or otherwise 
the Clyde District officials had begun what were described as 
"exploratory talks" with Govan Shipbuilders Ltd., at the end of 
October, Certainly the Government's announced intention to confirm 
the Irish orders and the Brazilian Government's dredger, placed the 
Confederation under an obligation to at least be seen to be ready to 
have such discussions although in the end any agreement would need to 
be accepted by the UCS workers. What worried the shop stewards apart 
from the fact that they were not represented in these "talks about 
talks" was that they were taking place in the absence, as yet, of 
any guarantees which would secure the future of the Clydebank yard 
and could possibly therefore, result in a, split among workers.
Informally the stewards admitted to James Jack that they were 
concerned about the decline in outside suj.)port for their cause and
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that they had therefore decided to convene another all Scottish 
shop stewards conference. ( 1 ) Clearly their communica.tion with 
the labour movement as to the exact position of the campaign 
needed to be improved. As it was, the tailing off in the level 
of contributions to the fighting fund with key establishments 
such as Scott Lithgows and Thermotanlc ceasing to pay weekly 
levies altogether, forced the shop stewards to seek assistance 
from the Confederation fund for UCS on two successive weeks to 
cover the £6,000 per week needed to meet the wages of the work-in.
In some cases it was the authorities who placed objective difficulties 
in the way of the solidarity campaign. The NCB, for example, 
refused to allow the continuing use of its computer for the miners 
to make deductions for their weekly levy to UCS. The decision to 
publish in the Morning Star the special leaflet explaining the 
terms of the Victoria Street document which the Co-ordinating 
Committee had issued previously for mass distribution was further 
evidence of their growing concern about the level of support in 
and the need to communicate with the wider labour movement. (2)
It was in these circumstances that Airlie gave his estimate of 
the tactical position to a full meeting of UCS shop stewards in the 
Clydebank canteen which was to discuss the proposals to be put to 
the Scottish shop stewards conference the following week.
"It's becoming quite clear that the campaign is at a relatively 
low ebb and there is a certain complacency creeping in, 
particularly in the broad movement but also within our own 
ranks, and we've got to guard against any complacency because, 
we're still in the woods, we're still surrounded by the 
wolves," (3)
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This last phra.se taken from the leaflet published in the Morning Star 
exactly captured the mounting fears of the leadership as they 
surveyed the problems confronting them. Certain of the problems 
not surprisingly, were of a domestic character. The degree of 
uncertainty which had crept into the rsnlcs was accompanied by the 
growth of rumours, in itself a sure indication that the role of the 
shop stewards Co-ordinating Committee as the authoritative spokesman 
was being undermined. Extremely damaging were those rumours which 
suggested that not only were there large numbers of workers now 
volunteering for redundancy but also that they were receiving 
immediate redundancy payments. Both rumours were untrue but were 
given widespread currency. They undermined the unity of the work­
force to the extent that every 'volunteer*, real or imagined, was 
effectively a man who was publically prepared to opt out of the 
struggle by refusing to join the work-in* As it was nineteen men 
altogether had volunteered that particular week, far fewer than the 
figures that were circulating in the yards and overall very few of 
the 'volunteers' were from the ranlcs of the work-in itself. One 
steward complained during discussions that even when he had addressed 
meetings in England for the solidarity campaign the workers down there 
had raised this as a question.(4) Airlie's position on the 
'volunteers' was quite simply, that they should be allowed to go.
"It would be \rro n g for us to try and stop them because they 
would only be a festering weakness within our own.ranks." (5)
Moreover if a settlement was arrived at that preserved the entire 
labour force, those who had previously applied to the liquidator 
for redundancy would still have to go; a simple assertion of working- 
class justice.
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There were other problems though that threatened the unity of 
the workforce. At Scotstoun it was reported that Charles Connell 
and his managerial staff had decided that they would 'throw in the 
towel' after all, by refusing to pay the 50 pence levy. Sam Barr 
.commented bitterly,
"We made our feelings quite clear to Connell, Miller, Orr and 
other members of the monthly staff, that this was a struggle 
that involved everyone and the ultimate aim was to save ship­
building, the four yards end everyone's job concerned in it 
on this river, and if they think that the workers are the only 
people who is gonnle sacrifice, then they've got another 
thought coming."(6)
As if this were not bad enough, over in Go van, the cauJ.kers began, 
not for the first time, to throw their weight about: unless an up-
to-date financial report was issued they had threatened they would, 
withhold their weekly levy. (7)
From Iiinthouse convener Willie Mclnnes came a rare explosion 
of anger caused by the discovery that the overtime ban which had 
come into operation as soon as the jobs were threatened had been 
broken by Govan plumbers working in the Linthouse yard unbeknown 
to the stewards there. It transpired that the plumbers who were 
involved in maintenance work had taken the opportunity to work 
substantial overtime using as their excuse the essential nature of 
the maintenance jobs. It had been the rule that any overtime 
requests should have been cleared with the Co-ordinating Committee 
since there would be an argument for reinstating men on the work-in 
rather than allowing overtime working to be done. As Willie Mclnnes 
observed dryly,
"Aye, two nights and a Sunday - working class support !" (g)
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The only cheering news that day was the announcement by Benny Biggins, 
the painters* shop steward at Clydebanlc, that the liquidator had 
decided to reinstate six of the painters on the work-in.
The main task before the shop stewards meeting, however, was 
not so much the internal difficulties which though troublesome, 
were still well within the capabilities of the leadership to contain. 
The key to resolving these difficulties and the wider uncertainties 
lay in elevating the campaign again in order to regain former levels 
of political and financial support. The main business of the day 
was, therefore, the proposals to be put to the forthcoming all- 
Scottish shop stewards conference on unemployment.
To keep their fight in the public eye the stewards had already 
agreed to send delegations to all local demonstrations against un­
employment sponsored by the STUC in major Scottish cities during 
the coming period. The main proposal which would be put to the 
Scottish shop stewards conference was that the national lobby of 
Parliament on unemployment called by the TUG for November 24th should 
be supported by a Scottish delegation, possibly to be coupled with 
a stoppage of work, and that the TJCS shop stewards would take the 
opportunity to address a meeting of national shop stewards at a 
rally in London on that day. A second proposal to elevate the 
campaign was that a call should be made to the STUC to convene a 
Convention of the Scottish People-what was to become the Scottish 
Assembly-to discuss unemployment as a national issue. Finally, 
and most importantly, it had to be made clear to the movement in 
Scotland and indeed nationally, that despite the complex and 
difficult stage which the struggle had reached, the involvement 
in discussions or 'dieJLogue' with the Government did not mean that
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the UCS situation was about to be settled or, indeed, that the 
workers had in any way modified their demands to save all the 
yards and the labour force. The UCS workers still had a card up 
their sleeve which they could play if the Government did not treat 
their demands with the necessary urgency, and Reid spelled it out.
"You'll remember some months ago the question was raised here 
about what do we do about the boats. And it was me that was 
arguing that its premature, the time will come and when the 
circumstances are right, and I'm convinced between now and 
the end of this year, unless they come forward with proposals 
that the time will have arrived, it will be right, it will be 
opportune, and we've got to then say, these boats are no' 
leaving these yards,"(9)
Indeed, if it was the Government's intention to' prolong the 
negotiations in the hope that the workers'resolve would crumble 
they had greatly underestimated the determination of the UCS workers 
to see the struggle through to the end. They would not baulk at 
delivering such an ultimatum to the Government in the next three or 
four weeks if there appeared to be no prospect of progress in the 
interim period. Confrontation, yet again, was on the cards.
These points, endorsed by the UCS stewards, were put to the 
Scottish shop stewards at the Rosevale meeting the following Monday. 
It was however a sorry affair in comparison to the tremendous 
enthusiasm of the meeting in August. With no more than 6OO stewards 
present, about half the previous number, it was.clear that the public 
campaign had lost much of its momentum. The outstanding contribution 
that day came not from Reid or Airlie but from Ian McKee, the AUEW 
district official for Dunbartonshire who was the adviser and spokes­
man for the equally determined but less publicised struggle against 
'unemployment being conducted in the Vale of Leven by the Plessey 
workers, who were entering the ninth week of sit-- ini'-^Ülitherto,
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Plessey workers had recognised the 'vanguard* role of the UCS hut 
now were in need of financial support themselves. To the credit of 
the UCS stewards they had no hesitation at putting the Plessey case 
to the fore as part of their common fight against unemployment.
Prom the major factories in the West Central area however, there 
was a singular absence of spealcers coming forward, to pledge their 
continuing solidarity. Only Alex Annan, the Yarrows convener, 
staunch as ever to the UCS cause, and from the official movement 
Joe Black and G alum MacKay, made any serious attempt to lift the 
enthusiasm of those present. It was left to 'wee Roddy' the fighting 
fund treasurer making a rare public appearance, to put the message 
across regarding financial support.
"Only last week, just before we went to Brighton, just to give 
you an example, a retired woman, that's now retired and working 
in an office cleaners job, sent us her full weeks' wages, which 
amounted to five pounds odds, along with her payslip, showing 
she was behind the solidarity movement, and expressed her 
appreciation for what the shop stewards in the movement has 
done up here regarding unemployment and to try and get better 
conditions and fuJ.l employment, Ifhen we get support like that 
from an individual we know how the rest of the country feels."(11)
As regards the day-to-day management of the fighting fund McKenzie 
assured the delegates,
"I can tell you its run like a bank. Your money's well founded. 
There's not a penny goes any\'/here it shouldn't and in the final 
stages, every quarter its audited by the Bungh Chamberlain of 
Clydebank who is an official CA. Now you know yourself nobody 
can put their signature unless it's official, and done legal.
So there is no worry about where the money goes, or where it 
is. All we're not going to tell you is how much is in the bank 
left, because we find, or we envisage that if Davies knew how 
much we had got in the bank left, and I may say we're looking 
for it to be added to every week, Davies will then escalate 
the pay offs and put us out of the game." (12)
Even Airlie, however, lacked something of his characteristic self- 
assurance that day. It was clear that such mass meetings by themselves,
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were no longer a guarantee of the automatic enthusiasm which UCS 
workers had become accustomed to receiving from the grass roots of 
the labour movement.
Undoubtedly the fact that the whole affair had continued for 
so long partly accounted for the diminished level of support from 
outside the ranlcs of shipbuilding. Even with a shop stewards 
movement^ which in the west of Scotland at least ^ contained many 
politically conscious left-wing individuals besides numerous 
Communist shop stewards who in any event could be expected to maintain 
a firm commitment to the UCS cause, there was still difficulty in 
sustaining wider trade unionist support over a long period.
Whereas for a considerable time UCS was regarded as being in 
the forefront, other issues like Plessey's sit-in arose in the 
course of events which also demanded attention and material support.
The first conference of shop stewards during the previous summer 
had provided an outlet for the spontaneous explosion of anger 
generated as a result of the initial liquidation announcement.
With the Confederation now engaged in discussions with Govan Ship­
builders and the Government the situation was rather different. 
Doubtless the intervention of the Confederation meant that the Co­
ordinating Committee was no longer looked to as the sole authoritative 
spokesman for the UCS workers and in that sense the 'dialogue' between 
McGarvey and Davies and the Victoria Street document probably had 
created the impression that somehow the whole affair was less urgent 
than before. Certainly this was the view which the mass media appeared 
to project. Moreover, given that the UCS workers were themselves 
marking time to some extent, the best that such a conference could 
have hoped to achieve was to give the most active elements in the
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trade union movement a first-hand accoimt of the real situation. 
Unfortuimtely that situation lacked any immediate for^rard perspective 
other than maintaining solidarity where possible. The question for 
the UCS workers was whether they should take independent action to 
speed up the tempo of events or continue to allow the Confederation 
to exercise its growing influence.
When the Co-ordinating Committee met the next day to review the 
situation it was obvious that if they were to emerge from the 
dangerous haitus into which the campaign was slipping a new attempt 
to regain the initiative with the Government was required, Reid 
had talked about issuing an ultimatum with respect to future vessels 
being launched. Three ships were due to be launched with the next 
ten days; the Glenpark from Scotstoun, the Samjohn Pioneer from 
Clydebank an,d the Norse Marshall from Govan. The tactical problem, 
facing the Co-ordinating Committee was if they issued such an ultimatum
now, would they be able to retain, at the same time, the full support
of the official movement, of the Confederation and the unity of the 
UCS workforce. Reporting the substance of their discussion to a full 
meeting of UCS shop stewards from the four yards, Airlie gave the
Co-ordinating Committee’s estimate of the correct tactic to be adopted.
"It was considered a short, short sharp ultimatum you know, 
within a matter of days unless the position was resolved, that 
no ships would leave. I think w e ’ll have to come to that.
But the position in our opinion will be, once we make that, 
naturally the shipowners will get worried, they will halt pay­
ments. The liquidator in turn will possibly then stop wages, 
so that i t ’s a matter of short sharp conflict, a matter of 
weeks so to speak. Now we might need to face up to that but 
what w e ’re saying here in effect is this. Tliat even if' the 
three ships go, it doesnae really weaken vmr bargaining position, 
but the ultimatum’s going in, in the sense that w e ’re not 
allowing, and the wording, that w e ’re not allowing a position to 
develop without proposals, that our assets are going to go.
In otior words, not another ship will leave. That gives the 
ultimatum to the Government; it lets the Confederation know 
the position and it gives our allies so to spealc, in the 
Confederation, time to work in order to get support. The 
problem is that if you take a sharp decision, within a matter
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of days, you could have a problem at the mass meeting because 
you’re suddenly springing it on the lads out of the blue so 
to speak,"
Certainly an immediate refusal to allow the launch of the ships 
currently nearing completion could be construed as a panic reaction 
and could have certain dangers of isolating the shop stewards from 
the Confederation, allowing McGarvey to get ’off the hook’ by 
claiming that his efforts to reach a reasonable outcome were being 
’sabotaged’ by the wild antics of the shop stewards.
The agreed proposal therefore to be put to the mass meeting of 
all UCS workers the following day, the first meeting for several 
weeks, was for ’confrontation’, if not immediately, early in the 
new year, in the continuing absence of new proposals covering all 
the yards. In the short term, however, there was the problem of 
ensuring that the TUG campaign against unemployment received the 
fullest possible support from the UCS workers themselves if they 
were to be able to continue to seek assistance from the movement on 
the grounds of their leading role in the fight. The realities of 
the situation however, were that there was likely to be insufficient 
support among the UCS workers for a full or half-day stoppage of 
work on November 24th. With the approach of Christmas and the lack 
of overtime working and the 50p weekly deduction eating into wages, 
the maximum stoppage that the Co-ordinating Committee felt able to 
recommend to the shop stewards was for two hours oniy. In the event, 
however. the November 24th TUC lobby was not even mentioned at the 
next day’s mass meeting which concentrated solely on the issue of 
the question of the ultimatum concerning future launches and agreed 
in principle to halt future launches if necessary. (14)
246,
Over the following seven days the stewards grappled with one 
further issue which was to add new complexities to the struggle, 
the order for four ships for the Irish Shipping Company, The 
patience of the Irish Shipping Company had been rewarded by the 
Government’s promise of favourable credit terms amounting possibly 
to some £15 million, Tlie news that the workers had issued an 
ultimatum that no future orders would he delivered had alarmed 
the company somewhat, added to which they were under some domestic 
pressure to withdraw their orders from the Clyde and place then in 
Ireland, Accordingly the company had approached Danny McGarvey at 
the Confederation’s meeting in York on November 10th, seeking 
clarification of the position. McGarvey agreed at once to set up 
a meeting of all parties concerned including Stenhouse, the 
liquidator and Irish Shipping Company, Two days later he and Service 
travelled north for a second round of discussions on the Irish 
orders with the local Confederation officials and the leading shop 
stewards whom he once again summoned to a meeting. This time the UCS 
stewards had no hesitation about attending such a meeting for they 
Mew what was at stake. In any case since the ’reaffirmation’ at 
York in October the stated position of both the 'Confederation and 
the shop stewards was that a solution had to encompass the four 
yards and the entire labour force. There was no question of any 
discussion eroding this position. It was agreed, therefore, that 
McGarvey would put forward the argument on behalf of the trade union 
side that the four orders for the Irish Shipping Company be distributed 
throughout the group on the basis of two to be built in Govan, one 
in Scotstoun and one at least in Clydebank. V/hile it would have been 
a disaster were the Irish Shipping Company finally to withdraw, 
nevertheless, the trade union side had also to argue for an equitable 
distribution of the orders from the point of view of their public 
campaign and to secure continuity of employment in all the yards.
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They were clearly in an awkward situation so far as insisting on
t
the latter point was concerned with not only the Government ajid 
Stenhouse putting pressure on them but in this instance, the ship- 
ovrners as well.
The only hopeful development and it was still a very long ehot 
indeed, was emergence of a new potential interest in the Glydebank 
yard. This was apart from Kelly, who had yet again indicated he 
would like to renew his bid, a proposal which no one seems to have 
taken seriously, This new interest came in the form of a US 
consortium called Brealcsea Tanlcships Inc,, who the previous week had 
identified themselves through their solicitors to the liquidator as 
a concern primarily hoping to build liquid gas carriers. As far 
back as September there had been speculation that a US consortium 
might be considering buying Clydebank but it was not till the end of 
that month that they had been named. (I5) Although the contact 
with Breaksea was still very tentative since no one knew exactly who 
they were or what was the full nature of their proposition, it v/'as 
a straw that seemed well worth clutching at in the circumstances.
When the trade union side and Stenhouse, Courtney-Sraith and Greer of 
the Irish Shipping Company finally got down to discussions on the 
orders, McGarvey pressed the liquidator for fui*ther details on Breaksea 
with the intention of asking Davies to encourage the consortium's 
interest and examine whether it had some substance to it# Indeed, 
the only step that the Government had talcen so far in respect of 
Clydebank, which went any way towards fulfilling the terms of the 
Victoria Street document was to appoint PA Management Consultants to 
identify possible purchasers for the yard including potential 
uses other than shipbuilding. As for the immediate question of 
the Irish orders, McGarvey reiterated to Stenhouse and the others
248.
the trade union position that any read progress would depend upon 
resolving the Clydebank situation and that one of the orders cxight 
to be placed there to ensure continuity of work, for example, for 
the duration of any future discussions with an emergent purchaser 
such as Breaksea,
Stenhouse was quite adamant however that none of the Irish order 
ships would be built in Clydebank although he did not rule out 
the possibility of one being placed in Scotstoun even though at 
this stage the feasibility studies for the yard were not available, 
McGarvey’s response was that unless one of the ships went into 
Clydebanlc, Govan Shipbuilders Ltd. would have problems in getting 
off the ground. His performance on this occasion was in Sammy Barr’s 
words, "splendid". The impasse was finally overcome by a suggestion 
from the liquidator, who in any case wan the person who had legally 
to accept the orders on a caretaker basis for Govan Shipbuilders, 
that both he and also the Government might view sympathetically 
the resuscitation of one of the old suspended orders for the Clyde­
bank yard as an interim measure. Ibis could be construed as in the 
interests of the creditors since it held together the skilled work­
force at Clydebanlc and of course, the workforce could be regarded 
as one of the main assets of the company to be protected on financial 
if not on social grounds. In return the shop stewards agreed to 
recommend to the workers that the Irish Shipping Company be given a 
’guarantee' that the four-ships would be delivered on time irrespective 
of whether or not a satisfactory solution had in the meantime been 
found for Clydebank,(16)
From the shop steward's viewpoint they had really no alternative 
anyway and indeed, if a resuscitated order could be placed in Clyde- 
banlc, that in itself would be a partial victory since it could provide
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a much needed breathing space to allow a suitable purchaser to be 
found. The question was immediately raised though as to the exact 
status of the 'guarantees' to the Irish Shipping Company since 
they could hardly be of a binding legal character. Perry Greer 
seemed pleased enough, however,
"I am perfectly happy, absolutely happy. These men have given 
us their word and I know jolly well as a wee boy who lived in 
Glasgow, that when these men give you their word, you can take 
it absolutely, and that's what we are doing." (1?)
Certainly the stewards had conceded that as far as the Irish orders 
were concerned they were prepared to treat Clydebank as a separate 
issue, although the issue of the future of Scotstoun remained also 
to be resolved. The press the following morning acclaimed this in 
jubilant terms as another 'unprecedented initiative* of the unions 
and a victory for 'common sense* industrial relations representing 
a major shift away from their previous 'hard line'. (18) Exactly 
one month before they had hailed the Victoria Street document in 
much the same terms.
Undoubtedly the shop stewards had been forced to adopt a 
tactical position which again created considerable confusion 
among the workforce. Even some of the more politically aware 
elements felt that this move could be a potential betrayal of the 
Clydebank workers and a de facto recognition of Govan Shipbuilders. 
There were bitter discussions in the ensuing days on this issue.
As Gerry Ross recalled,
"The Irish order to us in Clydebank looked as if we were creating 
a situation that Govan was going to be a reality, going to be a 
viable project, and there was nothing on the horizon, nothing 
on the horizon for Clydebank," (I9)
In the event it took the combined weight of Airlie, Reid and McGarvey 
to persuade Ross to accept the position on the Irish orders.
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Now for the first time there was talk of a serious threat of a 
’split* among the workforce* A certain disarray even penetrated 
the Co-ordinating Committee resulting in petty squabbling which 
came close to getting out of hand. It was obvious that a mass 
meeting urgently needed to be called the following week to try 
and stabilise the situation. According to the rotation of venues 
the meeting should have been held in Govan. With the situation 
as it was, there were advantages in holding it in Clydebank, if 
only to reassure the workers there of their continuing importance 
in the struggle. Regret ably, the Co-ordinating Committee divided 
on the issue of where the meeting should be held. It was eventually 
resolved by the casting vote of the chairman who in the absence 
of Airlie happened to be Bob Dickie. Certain Govan shop stewards 
rather mischievously reported back to their departments that it was 
the Clydebank Convener who had decided the issue and already some 
Govan workers were considering boycotting the meeting. (20) Although 
the issue was a trivial one the fact that it could be used to stir 
up trouble in this way was an indication that certain of the more 
•backward* elements in Govan were beginning to get the ear of their 
fellow workers. The haitus had indeed produced a degree of com­
placency in the ranks and among some in Govan, an indifference to 
the fate of Clydebank. The sorry fact was that even at the previous 
mass meeting in Clydebank, of the forty or so buses required to 
transport the Govan and Linthouse men over the river to Clydebank, 
sixteen had to be sent away because several hundred Govan workers 
had slipped off rather than attend the mass meeting. (21 ) This time 
there was no actual boycott by Govan workers but the mass meeting 
was held in private with no members of the media allowed in, which 
was perhaps just as well, for as Airlie stood up to deliver the
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report on the previous week’s discussions the atmosphere was none 
too friendly. In the report, delivered in an utterly matter of fact 
and low key tone, Airlie put fonward the substance of the meeting 
with McGarvey and the Irish Shipping Company, Carefully, Airlie 
attempted to rebut the argument that the ’guarantees' amounted to 
a de facto recognition of Govan Shipbuilders,-
"That is not the position, but what is the alternative of not 
giving these guarantees; would be that the Irish Shipping Line 
would probably cancel it, V/hat is the reality?
One, that the Government are guaranteeing fifteen million 
pounds to the Irish Shipping Company to cover these ships.
We're saying eh, that if the keel is laid, wherein, in effect 
we have trapped the Government into an outlay of fifteen 
million pounds, if these ships are not built. Secondly the 
first ship will be delivered at the end of 1972, We're saying 
in effect if we're still here in 1972, the end of 1972, it 
would be a good problem.
And thirdly, it would be a public position, but the reality 
in absence of proposals that . cumulatively covered all yards 
would be a confrontation in saying not a ship is leaving here.
So therefore, if there’s no wage bill we would be going out 
the door so to speak. There'd be no work on any ship, in 
other words, we'd still be kept, we couldn't work on the Irish 
ships because the liquidator refused to pay the wages. So, in 
effect there is no substance in the guarantee, it is a guarantee 
in words only." (22)
In the face of attacks by several disgruntled workers Airlie 
thundered out the campaign slogan and placed his personal integrity 
on the line, echoing the words of Jimmy Reid,
"It’s been said from the platform, there’ll be no blood money. 
All the yards all the labour force, and if there's any jobs 
going doivn the road, my job'll be the first. There'll be 
no sell-out and let me assure the brothers of that." (25)
In this context Sam Barr who was the next main speaker had the rather 
'dicey* task of trying to stir up enthusiasm for the November 24th 
TUC lobby on unemployment which had to be put to this mass meeting 
if the UCS workers were to decide that they were going to support it.
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As it was, by the time Bob Dickie had finished a couple of brief 
announcements and Barr had come to the microphone large numbers 
of workers were already to be seen drifting away from the meeting 
and had to be-called back.
The local Confederation had agreed to support the call for a 
stoppage from the previous Scottish shop stewards meeting in the 
Rosevale but had only felt able to recommend a one hour token 
stoppage. In criticising the feeble response of the local Con­
federation Barr warned that UCS workers had a special responsibility 
in the unemployment fight.
"Now our shop stewards, taking into consideration that having 
been up and down the country, it is obvious, that for us to 
take an hour's stoppage would be a disgrace. It would be a, 
situation where we would be letting down the workers all over 
this country who have been contributing into our fighting fund. 
And what our recommendation is, whether it’s accepted or not, 
our recommendation is from the shop stewards committee that 
there be a two o'clock stoppage on Wednesday the 24th of the 
UCS workers." (24)
Immediately having moved the recommendation, sensing a 
possible defeat, Barr promptly proposed an amendment that was 
totally contradictory to his own motion and argued, that they 
should instead go along with the local Confederation's resolution 
after all. It was Alec Bill, another and well-respected member of 
the Co-ordinating Committee who saved the day by appealing to the 
workers.
"If it went about the country that the UCS workers were only 
prepared to take one hour's stoppage, then we would be a 
bloody laughing stock."(25)
The . amendment was dropped and the motion was promptly carried but 
by any account it had been a most uncomfortable mass meeting.
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The shop stewards had singularly failed to give new impetus 
to the struggle through recreating some of the enthusiasm of the 
early months of the campaign. Perhaps with hindsight it was un­
realistic to expect that the mere issue of an ultimatum that the 
vessels would he held would itself regenerate the campaign, far 
less intimidate the Tory Government who by this time must have been 
well aware of the flagging morale of the workforce. In any event, 
the difficult tactical question of the 'guarantees' for the Irish 
orders had taken something of the bite out of the ultimatum although 
it still pertained to the future launches of ten other vessels 
currently at various stages of construction in the yards. It 
would only be after the new year, however, that the ultimatum would 
be put to the test, and one thing that issuing it had visibly not 
done, was to stimulate the Government into any kind of activity 
regarding a solution to Clydebank's future, while on the issuing 
of the feasibility reports for Scotstoun, it began to look as if 
the Government was being deliberately dilatory.
And then by malign chance a new uncertainty intruded.
Hugh Stenhouse was killed in a road accident leaving the embryonic 
Govan Shipbuilders temporarily without a chairman. Prom the 
Government's point of view, Stenhouse's death deprived them of a 
major prop which gave any sense of reality to the future company 
and posed once again the thorny problem of finding someone suitable 
and willing to undertake the job. If anything, the sudden removal 
of Stenhouse from the scene added to the growing sense of limbo 
which pervaded the whole UCS affair with the coming onset of the 
Christmas holidays.
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Although it is difficult to prove it seems likely that the 
Government deliberately played the waiting game. Parliament 
actually went into recess without any new statement on UGS from 
Davies despite being repeatedly questioned on this by Teddy Taylor, (26) 
It was becoming increasingly obvious that feasibility reports 
which Stenhouse had originally indicated to the stewards would 
be ready by mid-December would not now appear until after the 
new year while in the absence of these, no serious direct negotiations 
between the stewards and Govan Shipbuilders could begin, irrespective 
of whatever the Confederation may have said. A full month had 
passed since the mass meeting in November to discuss the guarantees 
for the Irish orders, with almost no movement on either side and 
in the words of Bob Dickie,
"With the present uncertainty we feel like condemned men in 
the yards, not knowing whether we will get a repreive or 
otherwise." (27)
The final inconclusive act of the UCS saga for1971 was the 
arrival in Glasgow of John Davies a few days before Christmas., 
Predictably, the talks between Davies and the stewards ended in 
deadlock with neither side making any concessions. Davies warned 
the men that he intended that Govan Shipbuilders should begin 
operating officially as a company in January but that financial 
backing and the securing of new orders for the company depended 
upon the stewards agreeing to a formula covering wage rates and 
working practices. The stewards in turn demanded assurances on 
Scotstoun's future and on the future of Clydebanlc as a precondition 
to any negotiations. By early February the unemployment position 
in both Clydebank and Scotstoun would be fairly serious and in 
this regard the stewards' time left for manoeuvre was quickly
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running’ out. By then they wou1.d see the possibility once again of 
a head-on clash with the Government, as Airlie made clear in his 
resume"to the full shop stewards committee of the abortive 
discussions with Davies.
"We envisage that after the new year then we have a meeting 
of the stewards. We adopt a strategy that will differ, 
will have to differ, from our previous strategy because 
the crunch is coming and quite frankly after the new year,
( ) we've had six months and naebody really has shed
any blood, and we've had a lot of, if I may say so, eh 
statements for action.
Well the people who've been shouting for action in the last 
six months are gonnie get their wish like, I hope they're 
around when that action comes." (28)
The question was however whether they could rely on the 
necessary solidarity from the labour movement should there be a 
'sharpening' of the struggle, for as an isolated group of workers, 
the time that they would be able to sustain a confrontation would 
be limited. If the last Scottish shop stewards meeting was any­
thing to gn by there might well be problems. In addition the 
attitude of the Confederation was becoming increasingly openly 
Conciliatory, particularly at the local level. Significantly,
Davies had claimed to reporters after the December talks had 
broken up that while the stewards had rejected discussions with 
Govan Shipbuilders as 'premature' this at least was not the position 
of the Confederation's Chairman, Dan HcGarvey^^^^Tesumably, Davies 
had been given good grounds for holding this belief.
As the year drew to a close the prospect facing the shop 
stewards was the rather sombre one of an early confrontation in 
the new year as vessels became due for'launching. Once more they 
were under pressure from all sides to abandon the work-in and let 
Clydebank seek its own salvation. Not surprisingly^among the
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leadership the enormous strains of the past six months were 
beginning to take their toll with Reid hospitalised suffering 
from over-exhaustion. Even Breaksea, the only real glimmer of 
hope, was proving to be reticent about the character of its 
proposals for Glydebank and had managed to elude even the best 
efforts of the British Ambassador in Washington to ascertain 
its real status and purposes.
With the start of 1972 the pace of events dramatically 
accelerated. On January 4th the work-in resumed with the shop 
stewards once again manning the gates. The same day Government 
announced the name of the new Chairman of Govan Shipbuilders,
Lord Strathalmond, If Hugh Stenhouse had had all the prickly 
hustle of a local entrepreneur who thrust his way to the top 
of the business world, Lord Strathalmond had all the polish and 
control that one would expect to find in someone groomed from 
birth to serve in the higher echelons of monopoly capitalism.
Known as Billy Fraser in the oil industry, he had been a managing 
director of British Petroleum since I962, son of the first 
Baron Strathalmond, himself a former chairman of BP, and grandson 
of William Fraser one of the founders of the shale oil industry 
in Scotland, Educated at Cambridge he had practised as a 
barrister after the war, eventually becoming managing director 
of the Kuwait Oil Company from 1959 to 19&2 and had served as 
the key ’trouble-shooter' for the oil companies in the crucial 
Teheran negotiations with the oil-producing nations. He wa.s also 
a personal friend of John Davies who himself was a former managing 
director of Shell Hex and BP, (50) Within a matter of days 
Strathalmond had met McGarvey, local officials, the liquidator, 
the local authorities an.d even arranged a meeting with twenty-
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four Scottish FP's at the City Chambers and had visited the 
yards impressing one and all with his good intentions. Indeed, 
Strathalmond's initial meeting with the shop stewards at the 
yards was almost friendly in comparison to the reception which 
Stenhouse had received, as the TV cameras recorded,
Strathalmond: "Mr. Airlie, I have seen you on television
so often, and Mr, Reid too,"
Airlie; "Oh you'll get on television oftener than
me, its part of the game."
Strathalmond: "You were having a bash at me yesterday."
Airlie: "You Icnow our position."
Strathalmond: "Yes, I've got it absolutely,"
Airlie: "Well, your appointment is successor to the
late Sir Hugh Stenhouse, but we must 
reiterate our position, that we wish there 
can be a solution to the problem but you 
understand without a solution that will 
cover the four yards, that will make 
meaningfull discussions impossible as 
far as we are concerned."
Strathalmond: "I've got your position absolutely clear," (31)
As Airlie commented later, Strathalmond seemed "a very nice and 
reasonable lad." (52)
The appointment of Strathalmond signalled a new element of 
flexibility in terms of a willingness to consider Clydebank and 
the men's jobs as the heart of the problem , Moreover, 
Strathalmond. admitted that though some of the capital for Govan 
Shipbuilders might come from private sources the bulk of it 
would need to depend on the Government. The question would be 
just how much the Government were prepared to put up, on which 
Strathalmond quipped referring to Davies, "John and I are going 
to have one of our usual rows," (35)
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The second development and one which was to dominate events 
thereafter, was the attempt by McGarvey to break the deadlock 
over Clydebank by going to the United States along with Service, 
to seek out Breaksea for himself in Houston. It was an 
extraordinarily bold gamble but if it came off it would give 
McGarvey a chance of decisively outflanlcing the shop stewards 
and would make his reputation ever after as the saviour of UCS. 
McGarvey had hoped to pressure Davies into a joint approach to 
Breaksea with the DTI, in order to be able to give the widest 
possible 'assurances’ to the company and when that did not 
materialise he even offered to talœ along the liquidator to the 
US, Courtney-Smith had also declined so it was almost completely 
a solo initiative with quite a lot at stake. Indeed McGarvey 
had hinted that if his visit did not pay off then the Confederation 
and the workforce would have to "face up to the realities of life 
relative to the Govan position". (34) If Breaksea did not turn 
up trumps then, McGarvey would argue that the York 'reaffirmation' 
would need to be overturned and immediate recognition given to 
Govan Shipbuilders.
If the Government had not managed to find out much about 
Breaksea, The Sunday Times had and it carried a profile of the 
men behind the consortium, the weekend of McGarvey and Service's 
departure. They were first, Karl A, Mai ley, the chairman, 
aged thirty-one and a property dealer, second, Mel Friedman, 
aged twenty-nine, an attorney specialising in murder and obscenity 
cases and third, Ken Aj:kwright aged fifty four years from South 
Wales who had served in the RAF from 1939-52 and was a consultant 
to the US Government on the design of military vessels. Collectively 
their connection with shipbuilding was remote, being basically a
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'front company' set np in April of 1971 to do a feasibility study 
on the possibility of building liquid nitrogen gas carriers.
Based in Houston, Texas, Breaksea was characterised as a company 
"living off the fringes of the oil industry" and its directors 
were described with savage accuracy, as"the archetype wheeler- 
dealer group served with every hamburger in this oil rich city". (35) 
On the television news, McGarvey's crumpled face was a strangely 
incongruous sight as he posed for photographers against the back­
ground of Houston's skyscrapers, with an equally diminutive Jack 
Service standing beside him looking distinctly nervous about it 
all. Somehow the UCS story had become associated with shots of 
welders at work, pictures of huge demonstrations, of hands going 
up at mass meetings, and of Reid and Airlie dominating press 
conferences. Indeed, the fact was that none of the leading shop 
stewards were invited to accompany McGarvey and Service to the 
States,
The meeting with Breaksea, however, proved inconclusive as 
Karl Maley and his co-directors flew off to various parts of the 
US after a brief discussion with McGarvey to see whether their 
'b ackers' would speed, up their decision on the Clydebank bid.
It had emerged moreover, that this was only one of five sites 
being considered in feasibility studies by Breaksea. The presence 
of Service and McGarvey had however, created considerable local 
interest in Houston.
Over the next few days several other concerns expressed 
possible interest in Clydebank and had discussions with McGarvey 
of whom the Marathon Manfuacturing Corporation, an oil-rig building 
concern, emerged as the most likely prospect. There has been much 
speculation as to how McGarvey made contact with Marathon whether 
through John Davies, a prior tip from anonymous businessmen or
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purely by chanceV Marathon was especially attractive as they 
claimed that they would not need to modernise the yard and could 
be in operation within three months. On this optimistic note 
McGarvey had reported to Davies on his return and on January 20th, 
five days later, he came to Glasgow for talks with the stewards at TJGSo 
In the interim he had also reported to the Shipbuilding Committee 
of the Confederation which had decided to recognise Govan Ship­
builders immediately, a decision endorsed a couple- of days later 
by the emergency committee of the Clyde district of the Confederation. 
This move, foreshadowed prior to McGarvey's departure for the States, 
not surprisingly enraged the shop stewards.
The entire UCS shop stewards committee of two hundred or so 
gathered in Clydebank Town Hall for a meeting that became a 
'showdown' between McGarvey and the stewards. It lasted four 
hours and produced angry confrontation between McGarvey and the 
stewards. McGarvey had intended to bludgeon the stewards into 
immediate recognition of Govan Shipbuilders in return for a 'holding 
position* whereby the liquidator would guarantee that there would 
be no redundancies until the interest of the American companies 
in Clydebank had become clear, a proposal which if accepted,vrould 
ease immediate pressure with respect to jobs in Scotstoun and 
Clydebank, Without agreement from the shop stewards, however, the 
Confederation's recognition of Govan Shipbuilders was meaningless.
The problem was that, in reality, McGarvey had not returned with 
anything more concrete for Glydebank than a few expressions of 
interest by the Americans. To recognise Govan Shipbuilders under 
these conditions would be a tacit acceptance of the position that 
the workers had suspected McGaiarey of secretely adhering to all 
along, namely that 'half a loaf is a!lvjays better than none’.
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As Airlie recalled, the "gloves were off" at that meeting.
At one stage things became so heated that the meeting adjourned 
while McGarvey took the Co-ordinating Committee aside for a 
separate discussion in another room. Words like 'Judas' and 
'traitor' were some of the more polite terms flung about as 
McGarvey threatened once again to call on his own members in the 
Boilermakers Union on a sectional basis to recognise Govan Ship­
builders, that is, to appeal to the workforce over the heads of 
the Co-ordinating Committee. None of the boilermakers' stewards 
however, would support him and McGarvey realised he was totaJ.ly 
isolated, he was 'not on'. He left the meeting a 'changed man', 
having suffered a, humiliating defeat in the face of the stewards 
unshakeable resolve to maintain the four yard position,(37)
The following day at a meeting with Smith, Strathalmond and Douglas, 
McGarvey secured broad agreement that a 'holding position' of no 
mandatory redundancies would apply for the next six weeks. This 
temporarily solved the immediate problem of redundancies. In the 
yards a mass meeting at Linthouse backed the stewards position once 
again of no recognition for Govan Shipbuilders without firm proposals 
for Scotstoun and Clydebaiik. A new problem faced the stewards 
however. In November they had taken a decision that no more ships 
would leave the yards and within a week or so, with three ships now 
ready to be launched or delivered, they would have to decide whether 
circumstances had altered sufficiently for them to abandon that 
position or whether the time had come at last to force the Govern­
ment's hand. The waiting game was over.
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Chapter Nine 
THE PHOENIX ARISES
The agreement by the shop stewards to accept a 'holding 
position' for six weeks had served to avert immediate redundancies 
at Sootstoun although until another ship order was placed both 
there and in Clydebank, the situation would remain precarious.
The logic of accepting this position was, however, that the status 
quo would prevail all aroundg This meant that the UCS workers were 
under pressure not to upset the applecart. The problem was that 
the mass meeting decision of November, that no more ships would be 
allowed to go in the new year unless a solution had been found for 
Scotstoun and Clydebanlc, now implied a rather different course 
of action. Within a matter of days the New Westminster City was 
due to be delivered from Govan and shortly thereafter, Clydebank 
and Scotstoun were each to launch a ship. If ever there v^ as a 
good time for confrontation, this was surely it, particularly if 
it was a question of ensuring unity of the workforce by involving 
each of the yards in withholding vessels at the same moment in 
time. The question was, however, not quite so simple as that.
First at the Co-ordinating Committee and then at a full 
shop stewards meeting the argujTient flew back and forth. It was 
undoubtedly the most difficult tactical decision with which the 
UCS workers had been faced in seven long months of st:ruggle.
The temptation to have a short sharp confrontation, after all 
the promises of action, was certainly strong. As Sam Barr said 
to his fellow stewards in the first public disagreement among: 
the leadership of the B'CS campaign?
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"all over the country and even in the, the ÏÏCS itself, 
you know when you're talking to lads in the yards they're 
saying 'V/lien are we gonnie have a go? We are getting 
sick of the situation. It seems to he that we're looking 
as if we're on the retreat all the time. Let's have a 
go'. I'm getting that, I don't Icnow about the rest of the 
shop stewards but I'm getting that point of view from them, 
and the other thing is that even the movement itself is 
thinJcing its a big kid-on. The papers are having a go about 
the work-in numbers and what have you. Everybody thinlcs 
its a kid-on the whole situation in the Upper Clyde," (■])
Certainly press reports earlier in the month had been suggesting 
that the numbers on the work-in had been grossly exaggerated by 
the shop stewards and that more workers were volunteering to 
accept redundancy, (2) There was also a degree of demoralisation 
in Barr's own yard as a natural consequence of the seemingly end­
less delay in producing the feasibility report for Scotstoun and 
the insecurity caused by the absence of any new orders to begin 
work on, Barr's impatience was thus understandable. If the 
situation was allowed to drag on a further six weeks with nothing 
resolved, then the chances of mounting a successful confrontation 
would be poor indeed. It was also true that with the miners now 
on strike and also the car workers, both of them major contributors 
to the fighting fund, the overall financial position was not as 
healthy as it might be and wou].d be even less so if events continued 
to move at such a slow pace. Moreover, doim the road at Yarrows 
the boilermakers, another major contributer to the fund were also 
out on strike.
From Willie Clydesdale came other, more cautious counsel,
"And I'd say at this time, it isnae the best time for us 
to have confrontation because who are we gonnie confront?
We're gonnie confront the Government and ask them to get 
a buyer for Clydebanlc and here's big Ban MoGarvey came in 
on Friday with these prospective buyers and if wo have a 
confrontation at the present time, none of these buyers 
are gonnie even look at Clydebaik." (3)
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Clydesdale's argument was reinforced by the obvious point that in 
a confrontation MoGarvey would go to the Confederation and argue 
that the stewards were behaving irresponsibly. It was an argument 
which had been used before but certainly carried a degree of force, 
and it was echoed by Gerry Ross,
"Eh first I would like to say that I disagree entirely with 
Sammy's sentiments because its a day to day struggle and Sam 
knows it as well as I do. And at the start of this campaign 
we agreed on the philosophy and the politics, the four yards 
and the entire labour force together. And during the period 
of the campaign, we were forced by circumstances to change 
that policy. Today we're in the position of having a situation, 
where there is a possibility of three of the yards being in the 
one consortium and another yard under another ovmer. And there­
fore on that basis, we get an education and a strategy to fight 
as the struggle develops." (4)
On the other hand, respected figures like Sammy Gilmore, Jimmy Ranlcine, 
Stan McNee, Tommy Preil and Da^ y^ Cooper were quick to argue against 
this view. Prior to the shop stewards meeting, the Co-ordinating 
Committee had thrashed out the issues for an hour and a half and had 
finally arrived at a recommendation to allow the launch and delivery 
of the vessels to proceed by twenty-nine votes to fourteen, a two-to- 
one majority, but hardly a unanimous recommendation. Alec Bill 
articulated well the very mixed feelings among the Co-ordinating 
Committee members.
"Now I was at the Co-ordinating Committee this morning and as 
eh Jim Airlie pointed out, there was a really good discussion 
this morning, because I found myself, that depending on who 
was speaking I was changing my mind backwards and forwards to 
what was the necessary thing to do, eh Willie Robertson had the 
honesty to get up on his feet and actually state that, but as 
various spealcers spoke you found yourself going backwards and. 
forwards regarding what the proper decision eh that should 
be taken," (5)
Jiimny Airlie in replying to the meeting was likewise utterly frank 
about his own doubts. It wras a decision which either way held dangers
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and what was at stake was too important for petty dissembling. 
Airlie was clearly thinking aloud as he warned the stewards,
"Let me say that the stewards from the start of this struggle 
are engaged in possibly the most difficult struggle a working- 
class leadership can be involved in. Because you can battle 
on wages and conditions, if you make a tactical mistake it 
means you go back into your work, and you get nothing, but 
you're there, you learn from your mistakes, and you’re there 
to fight another day. But part of the problems we face as 
stewards, as the leadership, and you're never certain in 
your tactics because there's always arguments for and against, 
but malce a serious tactical error and you'll no' live to 
fight another day, so we've all got to bear than in mind when 
you arrive at a conclusion, and that's no' me putting it in 
a dogmatic manner, I thinlc that's the reality of the situation." (6)
The actual vote at the shop stewards meeting after further 
lengthy discussions resulted in an almost even number of stewards 
for and against the recommendation, obviously an unsatisfactory and 
inconclusive position whatever future action was contemplated. It 
would require a further meeting to resolve the issue and when the 
discussion was eventually resumed three days later,the Co-ordinating 
Committee this time had made a firm recommendation that the vessel 
in question, the New Westminster City, be released, in order to avoid 
creating an atmosphere of crisis during the negotiations with Marathon, 
Indeed, representatives of Marathon were touring the yard that very 
day and the situation looked somewhat more hopeful than it had done 
previously. The Co-ordinating Committee, said Reid, had in the mean­
time informed MoGarvey that they intended to make this recommendation 
to a mass meeting on the understanding that if by the end of February 
a solution had not been reached to the problem of Clydebank and 
Scotstoun then this was positively the last s M p  to go, a stance which 
McGarvey had said would receive his support in the Confederation. (?) 
This time despite real doubts about McGarvey's position voiced by 
several stewards including Sam Barr, it was agreed by a decisive
268.
majority that a recommendation be put to a mass meeting of the workers 
the following Monday to release the vessel, with Barr, McHee, Cooper 
and the others now voting in favour.
At the shop stewards meeting it liad also transpired that the 
problems of maintaining the unity of the workforce were not simply 
confined to Scotstoun. For a number of months the members of the crane 
department in Govan, a key section of the yard workforce had been 
refusing to contribute their 50 pence per week to the fighting fund 
despite the intervention of officials of the GMWB' both at national and 
local levelo This in turn had led to other sections particularly among 
the lower paid workers, such as tank cleaners, women cleaners, platers 
helpers and red leaders also refusing to pay the levy. Relatively, 
of course, the 5G pence was more burdensome on the lower paid workers 
although there were provisions for payment of a reduced contribution 
to be made. On a previous occasion the stewards had taken the cranemen 
off the cranes and replaced them with cranemen from Scotstoun who were 
on the work-in. This time the alternatives open to the stewards were 
either to physically prevent them from coming into the yard and risk 
stopping production which would create very damaging publicity, or as 
Airlie recommended, to take the cranemen's stewards who al.so happened 
to be the Govan stewards' convener and sub-conveners, Cook and Mclnally, 
off the Co-ordinating Committee and joint shop stewards committee. As 
Airlie commented echoing the feelings of the other shop stewards, the 
cranemen were a 'bunch of slags' but they would be dealt with when the 
time came. A confrontation with them now would be a diversion, (8) 
Meanwhile other more pressing concerns had come to the fore.
Later that day the shop stewards were to meet the representatives 
of Marathon led by Wayne Harbin, their smooth-talking president. 
Marathon had already held discussions with Davies at the DTI in London 
to ascertain what Government assistance they would receive should they
269.
come to Clydebank. Now they had come north to see the yard for 
themselves and judge its potential. Their opinion of Clydebank's 
equipment which they related to the shop stewards was that it was, 
to say the leasts old and delapidated, a view which noone would 
contest. Indeed, they marvelled at the quadity of the products that 
the workforce had produced with such antiquated machinery. As such, 
the main asset which they said they were interested in was the work­
force itself, with its skills.(9) At this stage, the main problem 
seemed to be technical, whether the river could accomodate the size 
of oil rigs and support vessels they intended to build. Accordingly, 
given that this could be resolved, Marathon expected to announce 
their decision on Clydebank within two to three weeks and start 
production within thirty days of that, since much of the basic design 
work for their product had already been done. The shop stewards 
had reassured Marathon as regards their worries of 'labour unrest', 
that they need have no fears. The workers would give their full 
co-operation and honour any procedural agreements. For their part. 
Marathon indicated that they were interested in negotiating a wage 
agreement lasting tliree to four years which would have a 'built-in 
escalation clause* to cover cost of living increases and moreover, 
in general, they would pay above the normal rates. There was 
even vague talk of a future expansion of the labour force.(10) It 
looked slmost too good to be true and indeed, before very long it was 
to turn out to be such.
The shop stewards had agreed that given that the delivery from 
Govan was due to talce place the following Tuesday, it was necessary 
to hold a mass meeting of the workforce on Monday 31st January in- 
order to inform them of the discussions with Marathon and secure their 
agreement that in view of these developments the delivery should be
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allowed to proceed. If these negotiations were unsuccessful then 
within four weeks they could stage a confrontation with the Govern­
ment, hopefully backed by the Confederation and the labour movement. 
These points were put by Reid and Airlie to the workforce assembled 
on Monday at Linthouse, Sam Barr's estimate of the problems at 
Scotstoun in terns of morale had not been mistaken for from one of 
the Scotstoun workers came a sharp attack on the Co-ordinating 
Committee for having,
"ceased to be a representative body. They're now their own 
body. They've fallen into the trap of so many militants in 
the past, that once they've got authority, they forget about 
us...they've become an establishment."(11)
Predictably, the argument being put was for immediate confrontation 
unless a new order was placed in Scotstoun at once to prevent future 
layoffs. Before Sammy Barr could be given the chance to reply another 
worker had come to the microphone demanding to know whether Marathon 
had stipulated a 'no strike clause*''in any labour agreement and whether 
all the unions were 'to come under the one umbrella', that is, negotiate 
as a common trade union side rather than as traditionally, section by 
section, with the boilermakers as 'kings of the river' receiving the 
highest differential payment. Press comment several days before had 
suggested that Harbin and MoGarvey had discussed such an agreement 
at a meeting in London*s'Hilton Hotel prior to Harbin's visit to 
Clydebank,(12) In his previous report to the shop stewards of the 
discussions with Marathon, Airlie had not mentioned either of these 
two factors, both of which could now be exceptionally awlward in 
securing the immediate agreement of the workers to allow the release 
of the New Westminster City never mind any longer term more enduring 
settlement of the UCS issue. This time Airlie's reply was low key, 
even a trifle defensive.
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"On the point the brothers' raising, fellow workers, first of 
all we entered into no deep discussion with the Marathon 
Company. But as regards the 'no strike* clause, vdiat we 
undertook, provided that a mutually acceptable procedural 
agreement was dra;m up, we would honour it, from our part.
But mutually, that's the word. They've got to honour their 
part of it, and there's no question of no strikes. Provided 
they honour their part, we'll honour our part. We're not 
slaves, we wouldn't be selling our birtlirights." (15)
Without further substantial discussion the motion from the Co-ordinating 
Committee was put by Airlie and was carried. Once again, a confrontation 
was avoided but the question of a 'no strike clause' and of abandoning 
traditional sectional wage bargaining was left hanging in the air.
They were to reappear, needless to say, at a later date.
If Clydebanlc was one side of the UCS affair upon which there 
seemed to be some progress,the same could not be said of Govan Ship­
builders which remained the paper company it had been since the 
Government had first announced the embryo board. Formal negotiations 
between the management and the workforce on wage rates and working 
practices, of the kind that Davies had demanded still had not taken 
place although the local Confederation had prepared a lot of the 
ground should the conditions for such discussions arise. These were 
unlikely to emerge until the issue of Scotstoun was resolved and the 
overall future of the company v^as secured by the Government providing 
sufficient initial capital for Govan Shipbuilders. That such capital 
would be forthcoming, and it would need to be substantially in excess 
of anything that the Four Wise Men had conceived of, was by no means 
a foregone conclusion. Indeed persistent rumours were circulating in 
early February of certain elements in the Tory party conducting a 
powerful rearguard action which,if successful, could leave the new 
company under-capitalised just as the old UCS had been. With the 
publication of the Scotstoun feasibility report now imminent it was
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clear that the Government was faced with the choice of either 
accepting that Scotstoun would be part of the new group, primarily 
on what the Government saw as non-economic grounds, or rejecting 
it, which could well precipitate a final confrontation with the 
workforce. The former option would be expensive, but the latter, 
given that they already had their hands full with the miners’ 
strike was hardly a more desirable option.
Behind the scenes informal discussions took place between 
Douglas and the Co-ordinating Committee concerning the rumours 
about the future finance for Govan Shipbuilders. Indeed, Douglas 
had made it known to the stewards that if insufficient finance was 
offered by the Government, the Board would resign. (14) Meanwhile 
Strathalmond had gone to London to put personal pressure on Davies 
to supply the necessary finance. With the 'holding position' 
ceasing to be operative at the end of the month a decision from the 
Government was now also a matter of urgency. It had been hoped 
that the shop stewards could arrange a meeting with Davies at the 
end of the first week in February to add their voice to the demand 
for sufficient finance but the meeting was postponed to the middle 
of the month to allow further consideration of the feasibility ■ 
report by the Government and also of the Marathon interest. The 
stewards agreed to go to London that week any\-:ay in order to discuss 
the overall position with McGarvey and the Confederation. As 
Barr said of McGarvey,
"we know the sort of things that's happening within the UCS. 
He's divorced from the situation and also, that ive cannae* 
have a situation where we have argued from the very beginning 
that the, that the official movement, I'm talking about the 
Confederation officially, will have the opportunity of talcing 
the struggle from the shop stewards..." (I5)
When the stewards along with McGarvey and the Confederation officials 
finally met Davies on February 14th they were sufficiently reassured
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both on the question of the extent of aid which the Government was
prepared to give to Marathon and on the future of Govan Shipbuilders,
with the inclusion of Scotstoun, for them to agree at last to an
early start to formal negotiations with Govan Shipbuilders on wages
and working practices. Marathon under the Local Employment Acts it appeared
would receive import duty relief on tools and equipment, a contribution
of 30 per cent towards their wages and salary bill over the first
tlni'ee years of operation and would also qualify for grants to modernise
and re-equip the yard. The only problem seemed to be Marathon itself
who despite their promise of a decision on Clydebank by the middle
of the month had suddenly become remarkably reticent, so much so that
Eden even offered to send over DTI officials to Houston to iron out
any difficulties the company had over the extent of assistance
that would be made available. It was clear however that these
technical problems if indeed that is what they were, were not going
to be overcome before the moratorium on redundancies ran out at the
end of February,
For this reason, somewhat earlier than he would have preferred,
Davies was constrained to announce the general terms of Government 
assistance to Govan Shipbuilders which included the Scotstoun yard, 
during a debate on unemployment on February 28th, The level of 
Government assistance exceeded the hopes of even the most optimistic, 
amounting to £35 million in all, of which £17 million was to cover 
losses on orders during the first tliree years of the company's 
operations and £18 million was for investment in the yards and working 
capital with a total labour force of 4,300? equivalent to the numbers 
currently employed,(16) The 'lame duck' policy of non-intervention 
had been well and truly torpedoed. It was a dramatic shift from the
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scheme of the Four Wise Men for 2,500 employed at a cost of £10 millions, 
Singled out for special praise by Davies, was Dan McGarvey as the 'bne 
man who has played a consistently constructive and helpful role in 
trying to make this phoenix rise again." (17)
The anger and resentment felt by Tory MP's at this massive 
D-turn in Government policy was articulated by Jock Druee-Gardyne 
who rose to interrupt Davies during his speech and reminded him of 
Davies' omi question when Benn had been Minister of Technology and 
the Conservatives were in Opposition, as to whether or not "an 
open-ended subsidy" to one yard would "undermine the viability of 
the other shipyards including shipyards on the Clyde?"(18) Perhaps 
the publication by the Aims of Industry of a pamphlet a few days 
before entitled 'Power on the Shopfloor? Co-operation, Control or 
Chaos?' which described the work-in as "a quite substantial step 
along tie road to anarchy" had fuelled M s  anger, (I9) Of course, 
it was not just shipyards that Gardjme was worried about. As MP 
for South Angus this was hardly a major constituency problem.
Rather it was the clear implication that the Government had been 
forced to recognise that any future economic decision on the basis 
of profitability could no longer be taken in a political and social 
vacuum if it involved large-scale redundancies. The social costs 
which the STUC inquiry had attempted to measure had now entered the 
equations of Government policy options and with unemplojnment ■ at one 
million the Heath government felt it had no alternative but to abandon 
its 'non-interventionist' stance towards regional industrial problems. 
The 'lame duck* strategy had become a dead duck, killed by the DCS 
workers. ■ . .
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In a letter dated February 7th from Strathalmond to Davies 
which outlined the Govan Shipbuilders estimate of the Hill Samuel 
feasability study of the company's future, Strathalmond observed,
"we feel the problem of shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde 
must be treated at the outset as a social one, or one in 
the national interest, or both." (20)
This letter which Davies had referred to in the Commons debate and 
had placed in the Commons librai’y for early consultation by members 
prior to publication of the main report itself, was in accord with 
the Government's recognition of the new realities it faced. Hence 
also its republication as Annex to the report a few days later. (21)
The Hill Samuel report itself was less than optimistic about 
the futui'e prospects for early commercial success at least until its 
fourth year of operation, by which time it could be malcing a small 
profit by producing ships at the rate of fourteen 26,000 dwt bulk 
carriers per annum. The report recommended, in contrast to that of 
the Four Wise Men, that since it was "unlikely that Govan Shipbuilders 
can attract any private capital except perhaps a small amount on a 
purely emotional basis and anyway in terms of the company's overall 
requirements such finance was "virtually meaningless", that the 
company be wholly ovmed by the Government, at least for the first 
four or five years.(22) • Furthermore the presence of private capital 
would involve "greater pressure on Govan Shipbuilders to disclose its 
results in detail" which it was argued could be damaging to the 
morale of the workforce and the company and those it dealt with. (23) 
It was hardly an unrestrained shout of enthusiasm, but all things 
considered, it was not a bad outcome from the point of view of the 
UCS workforce. Undoubtedly without their campaign the report might
276.
have been very different in nature as Hill Samuel themselves seemed 
to imply in their final paragraph.
"In our view, there can be no question of the establishment 
of Govan Shipbuilders, in accordance with this Report, being 
a proposition which would attract commercial support. The 
decision whether or not to establish it must, therefore, be
judged on other considerations.24)
It only remained for John Davies to attempt to present the report 
to the media as yet further justification of the correctness of the 
Government's initial policy towards DCS.
"Well I thinlc that the £35 million is a result of a really 
deep study made of what is necessary to keep shipbuilding 
going on the Upper Clyde..,.points out just how ridiculous 
it was to suggest that with a handout of £6 million last 
summer you would have seen it survive," (25)
The fact was however, that the 'other, considerations* signalled a 
decisive shift in the strategy of the Conservative government, (26)
There remained from the point of view of the UCS campaign the 
question of Clydebank and the Marathon proposals. With the announce­
ment of the Government assistance to establish Govan Shipbuilders, 
Marathon, from having already lost their initial urgency suddenly 
became downright indifferent towards their involvement in Clydebanlc.
In reply to Eden's offer to send over DTI officials to discuss details 
of the assistance that would be made available to the company, itself 
a higlily unusual step, Mara/thon now said there would be little point 
in such a visit talcing place unless tne Government was prepared to 
give them financial support on a scale comparable with that received 
by Govan Shipbuilders, Marathon saw themselves as entering a buyers' 
market and were determined to extract the maximum advantage from this. 
Moreover they knew that if Clydebank was not taken over the whole 
Govan Shipbuilders package would be threatened leaving the Government
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5.n a very awkward position. With no other serious contender in the 
field except possibly Dreaksea Tankships who still showed no signs of 
being in a position to make a bid for Clydebank, Marathon could afford 
to stand pat. Arguments from the DTI that assistance to Marathon 
should be confined to the Local Employment Acts since there was no 
comparison between supporting an ailing shipbuilding industry and 
being asked to support oil-rig buildears in a period of high demand 
failed to talce cognizance of the fact that Marathon Icnew they had 
the Government over a barrel. (27)
After a further flurry of telex messages between London and 
Houston it v^ as finally agreed that the liquidator together with DTI 
officials and members of the Local Employment Acts Finance Advisory 
Committee, the committee which advised the government, would fly to 
Texas as a seven man team in early March, After several days of 
discussions in the United States the liquidator duly returned and. 
announced that he was confident that Marathon's bid would shortly by 
forthcoming and the company envisaged a starting date of May 1st. (28)
The relevant papers concerning Marathon's bid were not, however, sent 
over from Houston for a further week and it was on March 20th that they 
were received by the Finance Advisory Committee, By the end of the 
first week in April, still no definite decision had been reached, 
while as an additional complication Marathon had decided to resubmit their 
original bid in order to take advantage of new regional incentives 
offered in the Tory budget thus hopefully getting the best of all 
possible worlds. As it was, private meetings of backbench Tory MP's 
had already given Davies a rough ride over the extent of the aid to 
Govan Shipbuilders. The government's defeat over the miners' strike had 
rankled deep and MP's now wanted assurances that Marathon would not
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also be treated as a 'special case*. The involvement of Communists 
in both the leadership of the UCS and the mineworkers was too much 
to bear for the more apoplectic backwoodsmen and had led to Gordon 
Campbell launching a bitter attack on the harm being done to the 
country's image "especially by Communist shop stewards."(29) The 
workers, he said, were being misled by "wild men, be they Communists, 
anarchists or whatever," (30) However, it was not only from within 
the ranks of the Tory Party that the Government was under pressure.
From the shipbuilding employers came opposing pressure in the shape 
of renewed demands for increased assistance for the industry which 
would allow them to compete on favourable terms with Govan Shipbuilders,(31) 
Hence the importance of the budget incentives and assistance to the 
industry. It was clear that the Government was now prepared to take 
the problem of regional unemployment very seriously indeed. In a 
cabinet reshuffle in early April the new post of Minister of Industrial 
Development was created with Christopher Chataway specifically 
responsible for dealing with regional problems such a,s shipbuilding.
As far as the Upper Clyde was concerned, it marked the ministerial 
demise of John Davies and the entry of a new face in the final 
chapters of this episode.
At the beginning of March the workers had been assured by 
Strathalmond that a suspended bulk carrier order would be placed in 
Scotstoun to tide things over until the new company was launched.
In return the stewards had agreed to release a vessel due for delivery 
from Scotstoun thereby averting the possibility of three hundred 
redundancies. Now a month later further redundancies were imminent. 
Together with the delay over Marathon, the workers' mood was one of 
exasperation. They had expected an announcement on Marathon before 
the Faster parliamentary recess and bad even . oohtacted Benn to see 
if he could raise the question with Davies but they had received no
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satisfactory answer from the Government, Yet again they were faced 
with the problem of deciding whether to allow movement of ships, this 
time the Tacoma City from Govan and the Samjolm Governor from Clyde­
bank, the former due to be delivered to the owners and the latter due 
to go into the Govan drydock. The oTguments were much the same as 
before on the shop stewards committee, (32) If the two ships were 
held the Government could well have an excuse to slip "off the hook". (33) 
Moreover although progress towards settling Clydebank had not been 
as fast as they would have wished they had received informal news 
from Strathalmond that the Government intended to confirm not one but 
two orders for bulk carriers for Scotstoun the following week and 
indeed the liquidator had already ordered 5OO tons of steel in 
anticipation. Any confrontation now might well jeopardise this and 
the possibility of a favourable announcement on the Marathon deal,
Airlie conveyed the Co-ordinating Committee recommendation however 
that even though the vessels would be allowed to move, the talks on 
working practices with Govan Shipbuilders which were now nearing 
completion and due to be signed the following Monday, should be 
suspended until the Government reach firm agreement with Marathon, (34) 
Against Airlie*s advice it was agreed however, to put the whole issue 
to a mass meeting of the workforce the coming Friday, since many of 
the stewards felt that the shop stewards could not take a decision 
to release vessels yet again without consulting the 'bears*. The 
Co-ordinating Committee had left open the question of whether or not 
a mass meeting should be held on this question. The decision to 
release a Scotstoun vessel the previous month had been taken without 
consulting the workforce at a mass meeting, on the grounds that some 
movement towards a solution was apparent. New, the problem was, as 
Airlie pointed out, that with a new revolt over the 50p levy, this
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time among the boilermakers' foremen in Scotstoun, there was a danger 
of "washing dirty linen in public". (35)
In fact, the mass meeting held at Clydebank on Friday 7th April 
was the first one to be held since the end of January. Willie 
Clydesdale had suggested at the previous shop stewards meeting that 
Jimmy Reid give the main report as the most persuasive speaker.
Now Reid delivered a long and emotional speech, one of his best in the 
UCS campaign, reviewing the developments in relation to Govan and 
Clydebanlc, the solidarity they had received, the change they had 
brought about in the Government's approach and finally, the dangers 
at this stage of too hasty action or of divisions in the ranks of the 
workers to their final objective of a favourable Government decision 
with respect to Marathon. As Reid made clear however, if it became 
necessary, they would still fight,
"But if on the other hand, and we must be reaching the end 
of this struggle, and we're not talking in weeks...If on the 
other hand these authorities v/ho've told us with absolute con­
fidence that the decision is in the pipeline, and that decision 
does not materialise, then they stand accused. Not only accused, 
but found guilty of playing with the lives and livelihoods of 
working class families. The eruption of anger from ourselves 
and the rest of the Scottish working class will more than 
compensate for the departure of one or even two vessels from 
this river. And last, but by no means least, if we get a duck 
egg, and nobody's telling us that we've any likelihood of 
getting one, the tight control, or the control we have in these 
yards can be tightened absolutely, which means that everything 
in these yards is in the control of the working class, and the 
workers, and the working class movement of this country, I 
want here to malce this last plea to you. There are difficulties. 
There's always dangers. There are always risks. The shop 
stewards may have made mistakes in this nine months. Well I 
want to say here and now that whatever mistakes we've made, 
they've been infinitesimal as compared to the generally correct 
leadership and proposals we've put to you as a workforce. And 
above ail today, we don't mind discussions, but we want unity, 
and. I'm asking and appealing for the maximum unity aJ.ong the 
lines of the proposals contained in the report on behalf of the 
■Joint Shop Stewards -Committee, And let us ensure that no 
precipitant action will create the situation where we are accused 
of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. That, brothers and 
sisters, is the report of the Joint Shop Stewards Committee," (36)
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Not surprisingly this time it was two Clydebank workers who came 
forward to argue against the recommendation. The first was Tommy 
Stewart, an ETU steward, who cited Plessey*s and the Fisher-Bendix 
struggles as examples of where an uncompromising stance had secured 
victory for the workforce. The second worker was another Clydebank 
steward, Joe Moriarty, a supporter of the Trotskyite Socialist 
Labour League. Moriarty reminded Reid of his statement at the 
November mass meeting that unless there were guarantees for the 
four yards and the labour force by the new year there would be 
action by the workers, Moriarty continued,
"I'm beginning to wonder just which new year. Because since then 
we've had a meeting on the 31st January as you know, we took 
another decision to give more boats away. And now we're being 
asked to do the same thing again. And I'll be the first to 
concede, we can't be accused of allowing our negotiating 
position to be whittled away when we're giving our position 
away by boat load." ('37)
In his reply to the discussion Reid confronted Moriarty,
"Joe cajEie to make his point here, and quite frankly, 
whilst I'm prepared to accept Tommy Stewart and the other 
Sammy, I don't know his second name, from Govan, I want 
to make a point here aboui? brother Moriarty, Our campaign, 
there's never been one instance on which he agreed with ' 
the Co-ordinating Committee in the shop stewards committee. 
We've been wrong, we've been wrong. Joe told us at a 
mass meeting I think in September here in Clydebank, 'I 
disagree with brother Reid. We've not, should be. 
fighting for the four yards but for the overthrow of the 
Tory Government'. The sort of bloke where if you formulate 
a wage demand for ten pence an hour, and the shop stewards 
go up the stairs and come back with thirty-five pence an 
hour, hefs saying 'Reject it. Settle for nothing other than 
the overthrow of the system'." (Moriarty shouting) "Wait 
a minute. Hey, Joe, I'm telling you something. I*m telling 
you something here and now. That if we accepted your 
leadership months ago, we would have all been on the labour 
exchange and maybe fifteen to twenty workers that wou3.d 
have been-daft enough would have been left wi' Joe." 
(Applause and more shouting), "Wait a minute, the fifteen 
or twenty of them, storming up Whitehall, trying to batter 
the Tory Government intae submission wi' wrapped up copies 
of the Workers' Press." (38)
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The recommendation to allow the vessels to go as a, 'measure of 
good faith' was 'carried overwhelmingly' but in the meantime 
there would be no further formal discussions on working practices 
with Govan Shipbuilders as far as the shop stewards were concerned.
In fact, the final agreement on the employment charter on 
working conditions was signed by Govan Shipbuilders and the Clyde 
Confederation three days later without the stewards being present, 
somewhat to the annoyance of the Clyde District officials. By 
their absence this was the very least the shop stewards could do to 
demonstrate that they were still determined to ensure a resolution 
of the Marathon issue before any agreement with Govan Shipbuilders 
would be endorsed by the workforce. The fact that the Govan agree­
ment itself was eventually, however, to become a matter of bitter 
contention among the workforce was not something that could have 
easily been foretold at this juncture.
Chataway at Question Time on April 17th reported that this 
agreement was now being studied by the Government, He also announced 
that a further £1 million was being made available to the liquidator 
for working capital, pending the takeover by Govan Shipbuilders Ltd. 
in addition to the loan of £1.5 million announced at the end of 
November. ( 39) Now at last came the long awaited confirmation of 
the orders for Scotstoun. These were for two 26,000 ton deadweight 
bulk carriers for J.C, Harrison Ltd. They were to be built at the 
original contract price prior to liquidation and would involve Govan 
Shipbuilders in a loss of £2 million which was to come out of the 
total of £17 million allowed for this purpose in the Hill Samuel 
report.(40) The Government had agreed to find the initial costs of 
construction and had undertaken that in the event of delivery date 
not being met they would refund payments to the ovmers. (4.I) This
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provoked some sharp questioning on "unjustifiable restrictive 
practices" from Sir Tufton Beamish and some more probing by Bruce- 
Gardyne on the 'monitoring' of the unprecedented financial assistance 
under the local Employment Acts being talked about for Marathon. (42)
By contrast Teddy Taylor intimated that "the news of the two new 
orders will be greatly welcomed on Clydeside",(43)
Questions concerning the progress of the Marathon negotiations 
did not however, receive the same kind of detailed answer. Harbin's 
reforrau3.ated application for assistance had clearly driven a hard 
bargain and the Government had invited him to London for further 
discussions. After some hesitation involving what seemed to be a
threat to call the whole deal off, Harbin finally agreed to come
to London to meet Chat away and hold discussions with the DTI during 
the last week in April. After two days of discussions it was announced 
that only £1 million separated the two sides and a further couple of 
days thereafter a verbal agreement was finally reached with the 
Government after some hard bargaining. By any account the protracted 
negotiations with the Government paid off handsomely. Although 
Chat away had gone to considerable lengths to emphasise that Marathon 
would receive no special provisions other than the Local Employment
Acts they also benefited from the incentives outlined in the V/hite
Paper on 'Industry and Regional Development'. (44) This included 
22 per cent of the cost of investment in plant, machinery and 
building, 100 per cent depreciation and a 40 per cent tax allowance 
on new industrial building. Under the Government's special assistance 
to the shipbuilding industry announced in the budget they would also 
receive 10 per cent of contract values for 1972, 4 per cent in 1973 
and 3 per cent in 1974. Under the Local Employment Acts they would
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also get grants of 3O per cent of the wages bill for the first 
three years and loans at favourable rates. Thus Marathon benefited 
under the pre-budget system of incentives and also under the new 
regional aid system designed to replace thi.s. Not surprisingly 
Chat away was somewhat vague about precisely how much all this would 
amount to characterising it in a Commons Written Answer as a "matter 
of Commercial Confidence," (43) Despite all.this however, Marathon 
had made it clear that the final package would only be signed and 
sealed when they were satisfied that the trade unions would accept 
certain conditions which the company intended to impose.
The future of all four yards as such looked more promising.
The question now would be wlmt sort of arrangement would Marathon 
come to with the unions. In the event, this was to provide the 
most difficult problem of all if the original demand for 'all the 
yards and all the labour force' was to be fully met. Even before 
the ink had dried on the agreement between Marathon and Chataway 
rurûours were already circulating in the yards that there would be 
considerable redundancies among the finishing trades at Clydebank.
In addition, it was also widely believed that Marathon might attempt 
to force their pet scheme of a legally enfoxpeable 'no-strike' deal 
upon the workforce. Moreover, although Marathon had set July 24th, 
the end of the Clydebank holidays, as their new official starting 
date, it was by no means clear how many men they would be taking on 
during the initial work of reconstructing the yard. On the question 
of the future labour force when the company finally became fully 
operational the Marathon spokesman was more optimistic on the television 
news that night.
Interviewer?
Marathons
Interviewer!
Marathon!
285.
"Do you t hi nie you are going to be able to 
keep on the whole of the labour force 
currently there which is around two thousand 
six hundred men?"
"Well I don't lenow specifically the numbers 
and the mix of the various crafts that are 
there. We haven't gone into that detail but 
once we are in operation we expect to employ 
upwards of two thousand people."
"How confident are you of being able to malce 
a profit on Clydeside, something which other 
people have found rather hard to do?"
"Well, if we didn't feel that we would be 
making a profit at Clydebank with the modern 
shipyard that we plan to put in, specialised 
for the construction of oil platforms we 
wouldn't be coming here. "(46)
Whether @r not "upwards of two thousand" jobs would appear remained 
to be seen. On the question of making a profit at Clydebank, with 
up to f6 million in loans and the same amount again in grants.
Marathon were in a more than favourable financial position. Perhaps 
the biggest uncertainty however, was whether this marriage of American 
style 'free-enterprise* capitalism and a labour force that was 
strongly unionised could be made to work.
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Chapter Ten 
THJi] MARATHON AGREEMENT
The day that Harbin and Chataway concluded their agreement in 
London, Jimmy Reid alone among the UCS shop stewards leadership had 
not been present. He was being installed as the student-elected 
rector of the University of Glasgown His election was a magnificent 
tribute by the students to the fight of the UCS workers. (1)
In the high vaulted neo~Gothic chamber of the University’s 
Bute Hall, Reid's powerful baritone Soots voice echoed almost 
incongruously as he delivered his inaugural address to a,n audience 
which contained many figures from Scottish public life and letters?. 
Reid denounced what he described as the contemporary social malaise 
of 'alienation* defined as when 'ordinary people feel they are in 
the grip of forces they can neither understand nor control’. It 
was a version of Marxism, if indeed such it could be called, which 
resonated with the Christianity of which Reid was a professed admirer, 
making a broad ethical and humanistic appeal to human goodness 
coupled with an impassioned plea to reject the self-seeking mentality 
of the rat-race. Indeed, it was perhaps this lay preacher air of 
moral conviction which produced remarkable scenes of fervour among 
his listeners, even be it said, among that least excitable breed of 
person, the pallid and cloistered inhabitants of academia. In any 
event, the University took the miusual step of printing his speech 
in full in pamphlet form and for a while it assumed the significance 
of a minor classic, (2) For Reid, it was a great personal triumph to 
be f#ted by the dons. It remained to be seen whether or not this 
newly legitimised public persona would also mark out Reid's eventual 
accommodation to the status quo like so many previous militants.
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While the Rectorial celebratlais vjse proceeding however, vital 
discussions were being held elsewhere. At Clydebank, the shop 
stewards met to hear the outcome of the meeting that had taken place 
in London between McGarvey plus the full time officials and Harbin. 
Co-ordinating Committee representatives had been present during 
part of the two and a half hour discussions with Marathon when a 
number of contentious issues had been raised. Each side was surveying 
the terrain now that the Government had accepted Marathon's bid, 
before the serious contest over the future labour agreement with 
Marathon began.
From the UCS workers' point of view the problems of transitional 
employment during the reconstruction of Clydebank Yard were crucial. 
The proposal had been put that Marathon agree to -allow two or three 
ships from the liquidator's suspended list to be constructed in the 
yard although the liquidator would be responsible for the men's 
wages. The east yard of Clydebank was to be rased to the ground and 
the argument was also made that some of the sections such as joiners 
who would, be surplus to Marathon's future requirements should be 
employed in the sub-contracting work of reconstruction and eventually 
be offered the opportunity to retrain as steel' workers. For their 
part Marathon were interested, not surprisingly, in securing maximum 
flexibility in terms of demarcation procedures which McGarvey had 
conceded could be possible, provided the Clydebank workers reached a 
'domestic agreement', so that any major concessions would not be 
taken as an automatic precedent throughout shipbuilding, Harbin 
also had in mind a further innovation in the shape of a common bonus 
scheme which would be paid to company employees on a yearly basis. 
While McGarvey rejected a yearly bonus scheme outright he did accept
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that a six month common bonus might be agreeable although there was 
no question of the unions acquiescing to Harbin's other deniand, , 
namely a legally-binding 'no-strike clause' as part of a long term 
labour agreement. Marathon also wanted to reserve for themselves 
alone the right to call in an arbiter in the event of any dispute. 
Obviously such questions would need to be thrashed out at length. 
Finally, there was the question of the possibility of redundancy money 
for ex-UCS employees who were to be taken on by Marathon. By the 
terms of the Redundancy Payment Act, Marathon was technically 
classified as a new industry and therefore the terms of the act were 
deemed to apply to the Clydebanlc workers.
The way in which the Co-ordinating Committee had presented the 
redundancy money issue to the shop stewards however, was that 
Marathon's eventual labour requirements might necessitate some of 
those who had previously volunteered and had accepted redundancy 
payments through the liquidator being re-employed. The fact that 
they had deserted the struggle and would be financially better off 
as a result was suggested as a possible source of contention and 
bitterness. What was not said however, was that despite their 
determination to secure priority for all work-in members, allowing 
volunteers to re-enter the yard at any future date would be in 
clear contradiction with the previously stated policy of the Co­
ordinating Committee towards volunteers. Moreover, it was realised 
even at this early stage that to accept redimdancy payments for 
Clydebank workers while those at Govan Shipbuilders got nothing could 
totally undermine the unity of the workforce in any future battles. 
The plan therefore was to explore the possibility of redundancy money 
for all ex-UCS workers and not just those at Clydebank. One clear 
difference' emerging between McGarvey and the stewards on this issue
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was that McGarvey favoured accepting any redimdancy payments that 
were offered as a 'cushion* until all the ex-UCS men were eventually 
re-employed by Marathon. This of course, implied that not every one 
would be immediately re-employed. Indeed, it was McGarvey who had 
first raised the issue of redundancy money. If however, the stewards 
went along with this, it would be tantamount to conceding redundancies 
with no guarantee as to when, if ever, the workers would get back 
into the yard. If they did accept redundancy money it would have 
to be on the basis of reasonable guarantees of early re-employment 
by Marathon or temporarily working for the Liquidator in the interim. (3) 
One further and awkward complication which began to loom larger 
throughout the month of May was that once again the Govan yard was 
running out of work. There would clearly be further lay-offs unless 
new orders could be found, a situation which could only compound 
the already complicated problems facing the UCS leadership.
In this atmosphere of uncertainty rumours were once more rife 
inside the yards. On the shop stewards committee new dissensions 
emerged which were symptomatic of the increasingly narrow and self- 
centred attitudes being adopted by certain sections of the workers, 
in particular, the growing feeling that some groups of workers were 
being more favourably treated than others. The seeds of potential 
division had been first planted when the shop stewards conceded that, 
the demand for the four yards 'intact* be modified to the four yards 
'cumulatively'. The fate of the Clydebank yard and Govan Shipbuilders 
became no longer as inextricably bound up together as they had been 
twelve months ago. The near certainty that Marathon would proceed 
to tak:e over the Clydebank yard signalled the beginning of a major 
shift in outlook among workers who had formerly possessed the unified
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identity of UCS workers but now became ex-UCS workers. They were 
increasingly becoming prospective Govan Shipbuilders workers or 
prospective Marathon workers. The problem was that the shop stewards' 
leadership had to find ways of preserving the elements of inter-yard 
and inter-departmental solidarity that had carried them through the 
early phases of the struggle when the immediate threat of mass 
redundancies, was easily and clearly identified. For many workers 
it was no longer the Tory Government which worried them but rather, 
how to secure the best possible deal for their particular group or 
section with their future employer.
The erosion of attitudes of solidarity even extended towards 
those two hundred or so workers who were still left on the work-in, 
who of all the ex-UCS workers were objectively the least well placed 
regarding guarantees of future employment in either. Marathon or 
Govan Shipbuilders, Indeed, from being the heroes of the UCS campaign, 
the work-in was rapidly becoming the scapegoat for all the Einxieties 
of the workforce, a most ironic situation. Specifically, the growing 
hostility towards the work-in was reflected in the arguments which 
took place on the shop stewards committee around the question of 
whether or not the work-in members should be given holiday pay out 
of the fighting fund. Given that they had already received such pay 
the previous Christmas and Easter it was revealing that the holiday 
pay for the Fair had now become a controversial issue. The climate 
of opinion in the yards had changed.
The recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee, although 
eight stewards had voted against, was that the work-in personnel 
should receive holiday pay which would amount to about £80 per man.
The Co-ordinating Committee had further recommended that for the
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holiday period of three weeks, the 50p levy would'no longer be 
taken from the rest of the workforce, in an attempt to make the 
I  recommendation more palatable. In retrospect, to concede that the 
levy should be discontinued, even if temporarily, while the work-in 
was still an objective necessity, was to prove to be a very unwise 
move. It was a sop to the resentment towards the work-in on the 
part of a number of the 'bears*.
Among the immediate objections raised by certain shop stewards 
to giving holiday pay was firstly that the fight was still not over 
and that the funds should therefore be conserved. Given that the 
exact amount left in the fighting fund was still a closely guarded 
secret this point was not entirely implausible. Second, the more 
devious argument was put that the money was collected for the right 
to work, not to hand out as holiday pay. But as Willie Clydesdale 
pointed out,
",,,,Anywhere we went, that's what we asked for, it was money 
for blokes on the work-in, because that's what we needed the 
money for. And if we'd nae people in the work-in there would 
be nae UCS, Govan Shipbuilders or anything else, the thing 
would have fell flat. And I don't see that at this stage 
when we started up at the beginning, saying that we would 
support anybody on this work-in, and so that they wouldnae 
lose, for anybody at this stage to say that they're no' due 
this holiday money, when everyone of us is going oot wi* 
holiday money, I think its bloody ridiculous." (4)
Some stewards, however, warned that there was such an 'undercurrent' 
of feeling in the yards against the work-in that if holiday pay was 
given certain workers were threatening to stop paying the 50 pence 
levy. Others argued that the work-in members would also be claiming 
sick benefit as well as receiving holiday pay. As Airlie commented 
rather acidly, however,
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"The position is that in the work-ii"^  we've got 
responsibility, and if we're gonnie investigate 
the work-in, who're claiming sick money, then if 
you're getting into that Bobby, there might be a 
lot of other workers who are in the same position.5)
Finally, the argument was put that the issue be taken to a 
mass meeting of all the workers. Airlie pointed out however, that 
it would be impossible, even if it was desirable, to hold a meeting 
on this one issue alone. Questions were bound to be asked arising 
from the negotiations over labour agreements with Marathon and 
Govan Shipbuilders that were still at this stage the subject of 
detailed discussions. Roddy McKenzie raised the further objection 
to a mass meeting, that the difficult question of misbehaviour 
and breaches of discipline by members of the work-in was bound to 
be brought up and could also result in the stewards coming under 
severe criticism because of their failure to impose the necessary 
discipline on the work-in. This was a commonly cited reason for 
bad feeling towards the work-in members although it should be remembered, 
that since the great majority of those on the work-in could not 
actually work at their previous jobs, the stewards were faced with 
a tricky problem in enforcing discipline. As McKenzie pointed out,
"They're going out when they shouldnae go out, they're 
ignoring the stewards in the yards. The other men are 
looking over their shoulders and they're saying, 'I’m 
paying him, what are youse d o i n g ? t h e y ' l l  need to 
be told - 'one misdemeanour and you're down the road'." (6)
The problem of absenteeism and of members of the work-in ' jumping 
the wall' was particularly a cause of concern in Govan and indeed, 
Airlie reported that they had had a meeting with the Govan work-in 
that very morning. The Govan stewards he promised would be taking 
a very firm approach to any future misconduct.
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"We laid it on the line to them that if they stay up 
in the hut they've got, they call it Stalag 17» 
(laughter) and from time to time the stewards will 
malce periodic checks, particularly in the afternoon. 
Now anyone that is missing will he pumped on the 
spot. Now it may be that a lad is legitimately 
going somewhere in the yards to see somebody, but 
if that's the case he'll report it to another lad, eh 
one at the work-in, and then, incidentally we've 
detailed a bloke who'll taJ.ce the job weekly of 
collating where everybody is at a given time. And 
if he says so and so's away there, then their 
respective steward'll investigate it, if he's no' 
there he's getting the pump. We're stopping the 
kidding because there is talk about the work-in.
But I would put to anybody, if they want to have a 
reason for no' supporting the struggle or no' 
paying the 30p come out and say it. Don't use the 
question of the work-in's eh holiday pay," (7)
The decision was finally talc en that there should be no mass meeting 
on this issue but not before all the arguments for and against had 
been gone over yet again. Tactically it would have left the floor 
open for a public airing of grievances real and supposed against the 
work-in and the shop stewards' leadership,as well as numerous other 
more serious issues, at a time when maximum unity was required to 
conduct the difficult and protracted negotiations with Govan Ship­
builders and Marathon. Nevertheless, the pressure to hold a mass 
meeting soon was once again building up and could not be ignored 
indefinitely since the arguments about holiday pay were really 
only the surface ripples caused by much deeper currents of internal 
division.
Within seven days the issue of holiday pay for the work-in 
was brought to a, head by the refusal of the Scotstoun joiners to 
pay the 5Op levy if the work-in received holiday pay. Indeed, the 
joiners had gone so far as to instruct the liquidator to cancel the 
form for automatic wage deductions to the fighting fund. The
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question of a mass meeting therefore became urgent. Open revolt or 
defection by a major section of the workforce was a serious matter, 
in that other sections were also threatening to follow suit. As 
Airlie had pointed out to the shop stewards, widespread refusal to 
pay the 50p effectively would mean that the struggle was over. The 
workers would also need to be given an immediate report on the over­
all situation including the thorny issue of whether there would be 
any redundancy money for Govan Shipbuilders workers, (ô)
Airlie informed a hastily called mass meeting the following 
morning that Govan Shipbuilders lawyers were investigating the 
position in order to see whether a legal loophole could be discovered 
whereby they could also get redundancy pay. On the question of 
holiday pay for the work-in Airlie spelled out the arguments of the 
joint shop stewards committee.
"There is no doubt that if it had, not been for the work-in, 
we would not have secured the foua? yards. The finance is 
available and the bulk of that finance came from the broad 
movement. And the argument that the work-in has had tax 
rebates and redundancy pay....But we've got to look at the 
other side of the coin. In the event of us being unsuccess­
ful to get every work-in member re-engaged, he goes on that 
street, and he would get no eamings-related benefit because 
in effect, if he's been in this work-in for ten months, in 
effect, he has not earned nothing.
You can make any criticisms you like about how some of the 
work-in have been acting, that may be a criticism of the way 
the joint shop stewards operated the work-in. You're entitled 
to do that, but what I say you're not entitled to do is to go 
back on your decision." (9)
From the Govan caulking department, one of the sections that 
was eventually to do the most damage in terms of the unity of the 
struggle, a worker came forward to argue against the shop stewards 
recommendation.
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"Blantyre, caulker, Govan, I would like to move that I'm 
against the recommendation to pay the work-in holiday pay 
for the holiday period. The reason I wanted to make this 
motion is that they've already had a good sum of money wi', 
as already stated, wi' the rebate plus their redundancy,
A lot more, twice as much as I'll get for ray holiday pay.
They should put that rebate money by if they're wanting money 
for a holiday. The second point is. I'd like tae eh, like 
Jimmy to explain why eh UCS workers of Clydebanlc are going 
tae get a redundancy and that other divisions in the UCS 
aren't, 'cos they're just UCS workers, same as us," (10)
On the last point the worker made, Airlie merely repeated that 
the problem lay in the wording of the Redundancy Payment Act. The 
first criticism, however, which Airlie had tried to preempt by 
admitting that the work-in members had received certain financial 
benefits, he now answered scornfully,
"We can argue that they should have saved by for a rainy day.
Most of us are ( ), are one week's pay away from the
breadline. That's the position we live in. And I, quite 
frankly, would expect a Tory or someone who has no understanding 
of how ordinary workers live, to make tha.t point, but I don't 
think it should emanate from our ranks," (11)
It was a good point which drew forth spontaneous applause.
Once again the platform carried the day, A few days later however, 
the caulkers got their revenge when a departmental meeting in Govan 
passed a motion which proclaimed that they would not accept 'outsiders' 
into their trade who had undergone retraining, . This was a clear 
pointer to future trouble when it came to reabsorbing surplus personnel 
from the work-in, particularly those who had been members of the 
finishing trades and had learned new skills as metal workers. As 
a result of this decision a mass meeting of all boilermakers in 
Govan, Linthouse and Scotstoun had to be called which vras addressed 
by the Glasgow District delegate Jimmy Ramsay and the stewards' 
conveners. At this meeting it was agreed to accept work-in members 
into the Boilermakers Society. It had been argued, for example, by
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way of justification for what was obviously naked sectionalism, 
that unemployed members of the Society on the union's register 
should receive priority. By a fairly narrow majority of 685 to 
586 votes the meeting agreed that the principle of the work-in 
be adhered to, (12) However, not content with this the Govan 
caulkers v/roto to the district committee appealing against the 
decision of the mass meeting, (I5)
The only mitigating circumstance as far as the Govan motal 
workers* position was concerned, was that the dearth of orders for 
Govan Shipbuilders as a new trading company still remained, a 
tangible factor which fuelled resentments. The shop stewards had 
hitherto agreed with the board of Govan Shipbuilders not to raise 
the issue of new orders publically while Strathalmond applied pressure 
behind the scenes on the Government, By the end of June, however, 
with still nothing certain in sight the situation was becoming 
critical. Then on the last day of June, Davies announced the good 
news in a written parliamentary reply to Teddy Taylor.
"The company has received a number of firm enquiries for 
ships and, to avoid any disruption in employment, it is 
embarking shortly on the building of two vessels in 
anticipation of orders being confirmed. The company 
will find the costs from the working capital made 
available by the Government."( 14)
In addition to agreeing to the building of two ships 'on spec' on 
behalf of the Government, Davies also announced a further loan to 
the liquidator of additional working capital of £800,000 as well 
as an official starting date for the new company for early September. (I5) 
.A relieved Airlie congratulated the Government on their 'statesmanlike 
decision',(16) Although Govan Shipbuilders was not scheduled to 
begin trading until September 8th, tv^ o weeks later5, Strathalmond and
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Gilchrist signed contracts worth £15 million for four ships for the 
Kuwait Shipping Company, a further boost to the optimistic prospects 
of the company at least as regards its future labour requirements.
Despite the vote of the mass meeting on holiday pay however, and 
the announcement of new orders for Govan, the incipient fracturing 
of internal unity among the workers gathered pace throughout June 
and July. And then the bombshell dropped. It was now certain that 
in spite of a strenuous search by Govan Shipbuilders* laivyers for 
a legal loophole there would definitely be no redundancy money for 
Govan Shipbuilders employees. The workers would have to be told 
the bad news at a mass meeting.
No doubt anticipating a back-lash from workers the Co-ordinating 
Committee had recommended that the 50p levy be suspended forthwith and 
that the situation be 'reviewed again' after the Glasgow holidays, 
that is, that the levy be indefinitely suspended, not just for a 
few weeks. This was tantamount to accepting that such was the 
strength of feeling among the Govan workers that it was no longer 
possible to guarantee mass support for the work-in which increasingly 
began to be seen as a 'Clydebank problem', despite Airlie's reiteration 
that the struggle would continue for all the jobs in all the yards.
One embarrassing feature of this decision was that it was taken in the 
absence of the Clydebank shop stewards who were by then on holiday and 
subsequently was put to a mass meeting only of Govan Shipbuilders workers 
for the same reason. Airlie's argument that the key issue was the 
preservation of jobs and not the redundancy money carried precious 
little weight for the Govan workforce among whom expectations of a cash 
bonanza for the Glasgow Fair Holidays had been building up, Al.though 
such expectations may be said to have been unrealistic it should also 
be remembered that the entire workforce had had no overtime working for
301
a year and effectively had suffered a-wages standstill in addition 
to that. The frustrations felt by the workers were therefore 
considerable and among the sections who had been used to retaining 
a differential, resentments were particularly strong. To a consider^ 
able extent the hostility towards the work-in and the arguments over 
the 50p levy derived from this. The announcement on redundancy money 
served to open still further the cracks which had developed in the 
solidarity of the workforce. (17)
The decision to suspend the levy was sharply criticised however, 
at the mass meeting. One worker came forward to argue against the 
re o omment at ion,
"I'm very perturbed at the idea of the Co-ordinating Committee 
or the shop stewards deciding to stop the 50p, particularly 
when we didn't get a very full background to the situation.
Now the situation as it stands, at present we used to have, 
up till about six weeks ago somewhere in the region of about 
400 people, to the best of my knowledge, that didnae pay.
A couple of weeks ago, the figure increased to somewhere 
about 550 approximately. These are only approximate figures 
because its difficult as you know to get full information 
on this nature.
Well I think myself that eh first and foremost, that eh 
we are the only people, a mass meeting, who can either keep 
it going or take off the 5Op and it should have been a mass 
üfôeting that takes it off. Also I thinlc this is a sign of 
weakness, which can't help us when we're negotiating with 
the management, the fact that we've stopped this 50p." (1S)
A counter motion was put forv/ard by this worker to continue the 50p 
levy 'if on voluntarily basis' rather than wait until September when 
it might become necessary to attempt to reimpose it in order to 
alleviate the expected transitional problem of employment at Clydebank, 
In a sense it did not require great powers of prophecy to envisage 
the likelihood of such a situation airising. Indeed, Marathon them­
selves, now that their deal with the Government was signed and sealed,
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were beginning to talk openly about 'inevitable redundancies?. (I9) 
Unfortunately as Airlie regretful.ly admitted the 'realities* of the 
situation made the continuation of the levy in Govan Shipbuilders 
at least, an impossibility, with votes by the Govan caulkers and 
now the plumbers at Scotstoun, to refuse to pay, Airlie sympathetically 
conceded the worker's point,
"Now I agree that the political significance of continuing 
the 50p levy, but the 50p is not the most important aspect.
The joint shop stewards has to look at the situation, 
that the situation wa,s running away with us. Because 
quite frankly, any department that‘took the decision 
tae stop paying the 50p» they were expelled from the 
joint shop stewards committee, practically. And I 
recognise the point you're making, brother, that it is 
only a minority that wefe. refusing to pay the 50p.
But rather than have what was becoming an increasing 
minority, was to suspend it, review the situation after 
the holidays. Because before we finally win all demands, 
then it'll require more than 50p and then the craws that 
have sabotaged this fight from the start will not get off 
scot- free because when we've won the labour force, and 
got in on wages and conditions, their cabis off the rank," (20)
It was a humiliating admission for Airlie to have to make publically 
but the unity of the workforce was to suffer much greater shocks 
in the weeks to come.
Marathon's original starting date of July 24th had had to be 
postponed because the Industry Bill under the terms of which they 
received aid from the Government had not yet become law. Never­
theless in early August the labour agreement which the company and 
unions had been discussing for some time was to all intents and 
purposes ready for signing, with the date for signing fixed for 
Friday August 4th. It was to be a four-yeaa? agreement which would 
give tradesmen a basic rate of £2,000 a year, at that time the 
highest on the Clyde, The contentious issue of who should have the 
right to call in an arbiter in the event of a dispute would now rest
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on mutual agreement by both sides. This meant that the deal did 
not contain a 'no-strike clause* in the sense that if both sides 
could not agree that the issue was one for arbitration, then the 
dispute would become one of direct confrontation. As such the 
agreement had been unanimously accepted at a mass meeting of all 
Clydebank workers on the Thursday of that week. The same day 
however, it transpired that only the boilermakers' local official ' 
Jimmy Ramsay would not be signing the agreement along with the other 
officials of the other eight unions involved in the Marathon 
negotiations.
One observer at the time suggested that Jimmy Ramsay had 
already been responsible for delaying the deal by contesting minute 
details in the agreement and so cluttering up the final draft that 
the whole thing had to be retyped. (21 ) Now it appeared that 
unlike his fellow officials he had not been given sufficient authority 
to sign the document and that the boilermakers' national executive 
would need to examine the redrafted document. Ramsay, to be fair, 
was playing it strictly according to the rule book. Incredibly 
however, McGarvey was on holiday in Ireland and could not be contacted, 
It seemed unlikely therefore that the boilermalcers could sign the 
agreement at least before the beginning of the following week. 
Meanwhile on Friday, the other unions went ahead with the signing 
as planned. On television that evening Reid defended the agreement 
as one which both the workers and officials agreed was good and 
would be honoured. The television interviewer probed,
"you don't deny that it is a pretty tough agreement in 
trade union circles?"
Reid replied,
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"Oh I I do deny that its tough from any side, that is, from 
the two sides. Its not tough, its co-operative, its positive 
and there's nothing in the agreement that violates any of the 
positions or policies of the British trade union movement.'(22)
This last phrase was perhaps directed as much at the boilermakers 
as it was at those who were arguing, incorrectly, that the unions 
had conceded a no-strike agreement. It was becoming clear tha,t 
the real reason for the boilermakers' union open reluctance to 
endorse the agreement was nothing to do with the details of the 
arbitration procedure which had any\-;ay been settled, but lay else­
where, In the meantime an angry Harbin issued an ultimatum to the 
boilermakers to sign by Monday or the whole Clydebank deal would 
be off because Marathon were pulling out of Clydebank.
It was a tlireat which was sufficient to bring McGarvey rushing 
back from Ireland to a meeting at the boilermalcers* headquarters 
in Newcastle which considered the redrafted document on Monday 
morning. In fact a copy of the original Marathon agreement had 
sat at the boilermalcers* headquarters for six weeks prior to this 
but had not been discussed by the executive in the ensuing period.
Now McGarvey wanted to discuss the redrafted agreement which Ramsay 
had posted to him on Friday night with everybody he could and 
immediately drove north for discussions with the local union officials 
and boilermakers' ahop stewards.
What lay behind the prevarications of the boilermakers' union 
was quite simply that the Marathon agreement would effectively 
result in the disappearance of the boilermakers' traditional bonus 
differential, in other words, the end of the historical dominance 
of the 'black squad' with all that this implied for the maintenance 
of sectional identities. The foui:‘™year agreement was to apply across
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the board to all trades and remove at a stroke the pattern of 
sectional wage bargaining which had dominated the Clyde for so 
long with the welders leading the rest of the yard workers as 
'kings of the river*. It was for this reason that McGarvey was 
now involved in a dangerous exercise of brinkmanship. With only 
a matter of hours before the midnight deadline for signing was 
reached Harbin reiterated his company's position.
"We feel its unfair to pay the boilermalcers a higher 
percentage of bonus than the other workers in the yard 
because to us, putting a platform together requires the 
assistance of everyone, and not just the boilermakers."(23)
Meanwhile McGarvey was telling reporters on his way into the Glasgow 
offices of the boilermakers* union in Lansdovme Crescent that the 
officials and stewards would have to have "a free franlc talk among 
ourselves" on the whole issue. Pressed to say what precisely the 
issue was McGarvey was somewhat reticent although he was prepared 
to admit "it may be the bonus question one way or another"^^^Isked 
whether it was just that 'the boilermakers still wanted to be that 
bit ahead of the rest* of the other workers in the yard, McGarvey 
gave the classic reply.
"No we don't want to be ahead of anyone. We only vrant to
be paid for our work." (25)
As the discussions with the District Committee were about to 
commence McGarvey informed the newsmen that there was little chance 
that the agreement would be signed that night. Two hours later a 
car rushed Jimmy Ramsay and the two boilermakers* stewards, Gerry Ross 
and Roddy McKenzie, to the Excelsior Hotel at Glasgow Airport where 
Jim Fox of Marathon was waiting and the agreement was duly signed
with an hour to go to Harbin's midnight deadline. (26)
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After the meeting at Lansdowne Crescent a chagrined McGarvey 
was quoted as saying,
"I want to make it clear that in normal circumstances there 
are certain parts of this agreement which the Boilermakers* 
Society would have fought to a standstill." (27)
However, the circumstances were far from normal as McGarvey himself 
had quickly come to realise when it became abundantly clear to him 
that the local boilermakers* stewards from Clydebank were behind 
the deal, despite McGarvey*s warning that they were "waiving their 
individual, rights to negotiate" and "in general the agreement was 
not in their interest". (28) A concession to the boilermakers alone 
on the issue of bonus would have spelled ultimate disorder for the 
Co-ordinating Coimnittee which as Airlie has suggested might not 
have entirely escaped McGarvey*s notice.
"Nhat BanrQr really was after, that's my opinion, he wanted 
to, and I've got to say this, he wanted to fracture the 
unity of the shop stewards. He wanted to demean the 
Co-ordinating Committee and the best way to do that was 
to get us all at each others tliroats on the question of 
sectionalism. It didnae work. Didnae work for a number of 
reasons. The Yanlcs werenae wanting it in any case. They 
werenae wanting a dogs 'dinner, (29)
If the Clydebank stewards did much to preserve the remaining 
unity of the Co-ordinating Committee on the issue of the Marathon 
deal they did more to undermine it in practically the same week on 
a question of bonus payments, not on the issue of the boilermakers’ 
differential but on an issue that unfortunately was to drive a deep 
wedge between the whole of the Clydebanlc labour force and the rest 
of the workers in the other yards.
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It appeared that the Clydebank shop stewards had negotiated 
a bonus of 10p per hour with the liquidator who was anxious that 
those ships for which he was responsible in the Clydebank yard be 
completed as soon as possible to make way for the entry of Marathon, 
The payment of the bonus was to be made 'behind the book*, that is 
as a lump sum at a future date provided certain production targets 
were fulfilled. This was immediately construed in the other yards 
as the Clydebank men having accepted *run-doim money*, that is, an 
incentive bonus in a redundancy situation to finish the work. 
Strictly speaking this was not the case although it could well appear 
to be such and insofar as it did so, it became a bitterly divisive 
issue. It made it easy to argue that the Clydebanlc men were only 
interested in themselves and what they could get, despite the 
sacrifices that others had made on their behalf, IVhat made it 
worse was that the 10p was also in advance of the then prevailing 
rate in Govan and had been agreed to by the Clydebank stewards 
while the Govan, Linthouse and Scotstoun men were away on holiday.
The Co-ordinating Committee had met and discussed the issue 
in an attempt to defuse the situation. They decided to claim for 
a 10p bonus across the board and abandon the claim for money 
'behind the book'. The liquidator had however, rejected this and 
instead proposed a bonus of 5p per hour for skilled trades in Govan, 
Linthouse and Scotstoun for the completion of the tliree ships in 
these yards that he was responsible for. The bonus would be paid 
out on the basis of 88.5 per cent for semi-skilled workers and 59 
per cent for the unskilled and would be calcul,ated on the levels 
of productivity achieved in the month of June, This would still 
mean the Clydebank workers had won double the bonus rate of the rest,
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In fact, since liquidation the Clydebank workers had been on average 
6p per hour below the workers in Govan and with the additional 10p 
they would now only achieve approximate parity. Nevertheless after 
lengthy discussions in which the Co-ordinating Committee eventually 
agreed to accept the liquidator's offer of 5p s.nd let the Clydebank 
bonus stand, they recommended to the shop stewards that the Clyde­
bank workers only be allowed to lift their bonus provided there 
were proposals governing the re-employment of the total labour 
force, otherwise they could take the bonus money but they would 
need to 'go down the road*, that is, accept their redundancy. (50)
Prom Jimmy McCrindle of the Govan caul.kers came an enraged 
attack on Clydebank.
"Thank you. Well brothers, I thinlc I've something to say,
I must have something to say. Naturally I don * t see any 
Clydebanlc stewards coming up here thisvmoming. Where's 
all the Clydebank stewards now we're talking about. During 
the periods, during the struggle when they were below 
Govan Shipbuilders as far as bonus earnings was concerned, 
there was not one cheep, not one cheep from any of them, 
during this fourteen month struggle while they were in below 
Govan as far as bonus was concerned. Because this bonus was 
talcen out through the average of the eight weeks' earnings 
prior to liquidation. But now, all of a sudden things have 
changed. They've got this wee bag of gold, as we pointed 
out, this bag.of gold they got. And all of a sudden things, 
have changed. They're asking us to come up to their level.
Now be honest about this - they're asking us. We 'allow* 
you to come up to our level. We will 'allow' you with this 
six pence, or five pence that's been promised by the 
liquidator to come up to our level, not talking about the 
two bob behind the book. This is facts I'm telling you, 
facts0 All of a sudden things have changed. Where do we go 
from here? Where do we go from here in Govan?" (51)
It was blistering stuff which forced Airlie to appeal for an end to 
recriminations. From the Clydebank painters' shop steward, Benny 
Biggins, however, came an equally bitter counter-blast.
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"... talking about Clydebank shop stewards no* coming up 
here - we in Clydebank have bent over backwards since this 
fight started no* to rock the boat, * don't rock the boat',
Govan’11 no* do this, Govan*11 no* do that, Connell's'il 
no* do this, Connell*s'il no* do that'. But personally 
I'm a wee bit sick o' it. The gun's been cocked on wur 
held all the time..." (32)
The Co-ordinating Committee's proposals were eventually carried 
however, as other stewards came forward to argue the more conciliatory 
approach,that the bonus was a side issue which should be forgotten 
about as the real issue facing them was that of securdng all the jobs 
in Govan Shipbuilders and in Marathon, including the work-in. With 
Govan Shipbuilders now due to go into operation on September 11th at 
which date the work-in was to cease, and with a labour agreement due 
to be signed with the company on August 24th, it was imperative that 
the total labour requirements of both Marathon and Govan Shipbuilders 
as well as of the liquidator, be sorted out as quickly as possible 
in round-table discussions within the next fourteen days. Jimmy Reid 
reported to the stewards on the moves being made to secure the backing 
of the Confederation for the demand for a full retention of jobs. 
Marathon would also need to be pressurised to speed up the construction 
of rigs and telescope their proposed eighteen-month reconstruction 
period, (55)
As Jimmy Kenny, the Clydebank coppersmith's steward, pointed 
out. Marathon had promised an initial labour force of 1,000 and in 
fact they had only taken on I70 men so far. Kenny articulated the 
impatience of the Clydebank workers who had found that in trying to 
thrash out these problems, the Marathon management had proved to be 
a somewhat elusive force, while round-table discussions had proved 
even more difficult to arrange.
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"But the point again is this, brothers. We're fed up of 
hearing its always tomorrow, tomorrow we're gonnae meet 
with Marathon and Govan, and the liquidator, its always 
tomorrow. But lets make it tomorrow, brothers, its all 
I'm asking Jiirany, is let's make it tomorrow. Thaadc you, 
brothers." (34)
Once again however, it was McCrindle who raised the difficult question 
by demanding to know whether or not part of the solution to the labour 
problems v;ould be the transfer of Clydebank men to Govan, since as 
he pointed out tc groans of disapproval from the other stewards, 
they were going to enjoy this two bob behind the book and receive 
redundancy money as well, (35) In fact the fear of an 'influx' of 
Clydebank workers had already been used to stir up feeling against 
Clydebanlc on the part of some elements of the Govan workforce. 
McCrindle, it transpired, was one such element, Reid's reply was 
categoric,
"...as far as we're concerned, the computation is not on
divisions or anything else. It's there are X number of
workers in the four divisions of the UCS, and a succèssfuJ. 
outcome to this fight is the retention of the four divisions, 
and in one way or another, all the workers that are on the 
books as of this moment, no matter where they come from, 
what they are, who they are, who they might be. That's the 
principle Jimmy. And I can assure you nobody can say who's 
moving the next place.
I'll make this point - wherever the adjustments are made, 
if there are difficulties about absorbtion in A, and it can
be accommodated by absorbtions in B, or C and B, and its
reciprocal, it could be within trades. That's got to be the 
attitude we must adopt and take up." (36)
This was a clear warning to McCrindle that any sectional attitude 
would be severely frowned upon, Miether it was a warning that would 
be heeded was another question. Certainly the mass meeting which was 
called to report on the Clydebank and Govan bonus question two days 
later raised the predictable complaint from a'Govan Shipbuilder worker*
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"Seems to me that we're trailing at the heels of Clydebanlc. 
And I think the only way we can get unity is for everybody 
to be exactly the same. In other words, no tae negotiate, 
or allow anybody to negotiate for one section of the people 
under the liquidator, and the only way to negotiate is to 
negotiate for the lot. In other words the lot should go 
back in the melting pot," (37)
As Airlie pointed out, however, it would be unrealistic to ask 
Clydebanlc workers having accepted the proposals to go back on them, 
A mistake had been made at Clydebank which would not have occurred 
had the stewards there taken the bonus issue to the joint shop 
stewards committee for discussion. (38) It was to cost the unity 
of the workforce dearly before too long.
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Chapter hieven 
THE GOV/R? SHIPBUILDERS AGREEMENT
With the Marathon deal duly signed the way was now open for the 
unions and Govan Shipbuilders to finalise the details of the labour 
agreement which had existed in final draft form since May of 1972. (l)
The first clause of the agreement had stipulated that "the current 
'work-in* will cease when Govan Shipbuilders Limited start to trade." (s) 
With round-table discussions between Marathon, the liquidator, Govan 
Shipbuilders and the unions due to take place the following day, a 
mass meeting was called of the other three yards workers to endorse 
the stewards recommendation that the procedural agreement with Govan 
Shipbuilders only be signed provided there were guarantees to cover 
the work-in, otherwise as Airlie put it, "we will have seemed to have 
sold out in the basic key symbol," (5) Clearly the stewards wanted 
the Govan Shipbuilders management to have the impression that their 
resolve on the question of the work-in remained unshaken.
Reporting back to the joint shop stewards’ committee on the 
outcome of these discussions Reid recounted the pressure which they 
had mounted on Marathon, the real focus of the round-table discussions, 
to increase the numbers they would take on at Clydebaiik before the 
end of the year from 700 to 1,300 by speeding up their work programme. 
Marathon were given a week to consider their position. In theory at 
least, there should be no question of the Govan agreement being signed, 
until the question of overall labour requirements including those at 
Clydebank were fu]-ly resolved. In fact, however, other considerations 
had begun to intrude which introduced new complicating factors.
Although the joint sliop stewards committee had considered in 
detail the various terms of the draft procedure agreement with Govan
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Shipbuilders, each constituent union's national executive had first 
to endorse its acceptance. Once again, it appeared that the Boiler- 
malcers* Society were intent on pursuing their own concerns first and 
foremost. On August 17th, McGarvey’s deputy Jim Murray had met the 
boilermakers' district committee in Glasgow and the Govan Shipbuilders* 
boilermaker stewards, and had held a mass meeting with the 1,400 
boilermakers from the Govan, Linthouse and Scotstoun yards. In a 
statement presented to Gilchrist the following afternoon, Murray 
and the district delegates put forward the boilermakers' conditions 
for their participation in the signing of the Govan agreement.
These were, first, that all 77 members of the Boilermakers* Society 
at present on the work-in be immediately re-engaged and second, that 
any new wage structure agreed would contain retrospective payments 
from the date at which negotiations with the company over a new pay 
deal commenced,(4) In effect, this meant that the boilermakers 
wanted a new wage agreement to apply from September 4th, one week 
before the company had begun to start trading officially,
A three hour meeting with Gilchrist had, however, not 
surprisingly, failed to resolve these issues, and a few days later 
Govan Shipbuilders told the boilermakers that their demands could 
not be accepted. Meanwhile, the Govan Shipbuilders boilermakers 
called a mass meeting to consider their next moves at precisely the 
time fixed for the signing of the procedure agreement with all the 
unions on August 24th.
The dilemma facing the Co-ordinating Committee, and Rëid and 
Airlie in particular, was acute. In order to preserve the unity of 
the joint shop stewards committee and the workforce at this delicate
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stage of final negotiations on the question of future overall 
manpower requirements, especially at Clydebank, and to resolve 
the outstanding problems in the Govan Shipbuilders procedural 
agreement, it was necessary not to allow the boilermakers to be 
seen to be 'out on their o^m' as regards the rest of the work­
force. Some semblance of a united front needed to be maintained 
at all costs in order to cross this final hurdle. Nevertheless 
there were more than boilermakers on the work-in and obviously some 
formulation covering the future of all the work-in would need to be 
concocted. Airlie reported to the stewards that while they could 
not get a commitment to re-employ the work-in actually written into 
the Govan agreement, they had obtained from Govan Shipbuilders an 
unofficial assurance that they would require some 200 extra workers 
by the end of the year, a figure well in excess of the number on the 
Govan work-in which currently amounted to 144 persons. The company 
had also offered to retrain where necessary those workers who were 
on the work-in but did not possess the required labour skills thus 
ensuring that the majority of the workers would quickly come off the 
work-in in one way or another, and onto Govan Shipbuilders pay-roll, 
Airlie's position, given Govan Shipbuilders' concessions, was that 
while the boilermakers* stance on their own work-in members could be 
construed as in line with the demands of the rest of the workforce, 
nevertheless, the boilermakers' hard line was creating certain 
difficulties, or as Airlie put it in his own inimitable way.
"We're of the opinion that we cannae always shove the 
employer's nose in it," (5)
As for the boilermakers' demand that the agreement on any new wages 
structure be retrospective, this had been rejected outright by
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Govan Shipbuilders, although they were willing to make retrospective 
payments a matter of negotiation once the agreement had been signed, 
Wliat they were not prepared to do was commit themselves to retro­
spective payments even before negotiations had begun.. The main 
point from the Co-ordinating Committee's view was to get the agree­
ment actually signed so that Strathalmond could go to his board and 
recommend that the company start trading as planned on September 11th, 
The question of retrospective pa,yments could be settled later on, (6)
It was under these difficult conditions that the shop stewards 
and Joe Black had met Strathalmond on the 24th of August, without 
the boilermakers, who were at their own meeting to consider Govan 
Shipbuilders reply to them. To prevent a breach in the ranks, the 
ether unions had not signed the agreement that day but Strathalmond 
had made it clear that unless it was signed quickly, the funds from 
the Government could not be forthcoming and therefore the planned 
starting date for the company would need to be delayed.
The following week the boilermakers* stewards and local officials 
met the Govan Shipbuilders management again. It appeared that 89 
and not 77 of their members as had been previously thought, were on 
the work-in. It was agreed that by September 11th, 40 of these 
would have be^m retraining in the company's training centre and by 
the beginning of October the rest would be employed in Govan or 
Scotstoun. This immediately resolved one major outstanding issue,(7) 
On the question of retrospective wages agreement, the most that 
Govan Shipbuilders could reasonably concede was the possibility of 
an interim award between the end of the current agreement and the 
start of any new one, should the negotiations prove to be protracted.
318.
On this basis a mass meeting of the boilermakers was called for the 
last day of August at which it was confidently exq^ected by Jimmy 
Ramsay and the stewards who had conducted these negotiations, that 
the recommendation from the joint shop stewards committee and from 
the Boilermalcers* society to accept the procedure agreement with 
Govan Shipbuilders would be carried.
In this they could not have been more ifrong. At a two hour 
meeting of the Boilermakers' Society in the Lyceum Cinema in Govan, 
the workers split practically down the middle and rejected the pro­
cedure agreement by a majority of exactly twenty votes. Once again 
the boilermalcers seemed determined to go it alone. Meanwhile mass 
meetings of all other groups of workers had endorsed the agreement 
and were now ready to sign. However, it appeared that a sizeable 
proportion of the rank and file boilermakers were prepared to disregard 
the advice both of their local official and even of some of their own 
stewards. It was a situation of unprecedented volatility therefore.
At Linthouse a hurriedly convened meeting of the joint shop 
stewards committee met to review the situation and hear first-hand 
reports from Sam Barr, Willie Holt and other leading boilermakers' 
stewards who were at the Lyceum meeting. On the chief bone of 
contention, the question of retrospective payments, it appeared 
that some workers had argued that the Clydebank stewards 
had settled rates of pay and agreed bonus system before Marathon 
went into operation and that Govan Shipbuilders should be prepared to 
offer likewise. With hindsight, it had clearly been a mist alee to 
allow sectional meetings rather than a mass meeting to take place 
to consider the Govan Shipbuilders' procedure agreement. However,
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as Barr pointed out, the boilermalcers now appeared to be set on 
placing not only their own future but that of all their fellow workers 
in jeopardy, (s) Referring to the boilermalcers* stubborn refusal to 
listen to reason despite the stewards* fight for the recommendations, 
at the Lyceum meeting, Barr commented sadly,
"It wouldn't have mattered if Jesus was there this morning, " (9)
Now from Reid came m  emotional statement warning of the consequences 
of failure to sign the agreement in terms of Gk>van Shipbuilders' 
future.
",,oif I was Davies, if I wras Davies, I'd be sitting 
wringing my hands tonight, because the swines that had 
crucified him have now put their bloody head in a noose, and
all he's got to do is pull it, pull it. Get in with the
boot.
'You have sabotaged every reasonable attempt,,,*
I could write his speech for him! The laughing stock - 
I tell you, its as serious as this, and therefore the the
issue, and this is why its so serious and so important^
OK, there shouldnae have been sectional meetings. We 
know that. We can't ask for water under the bridge. But 
I'm appealing, appealing that the boilermakers, and the, 
they will respond, at least I know a whole number who will 
respond, that have responded, IVenty-four hours. Twenty- 
four hours. That's the schedule. That's the time scale. 
Because if you go beyond that, you might get to Monday, but 
Davies might come in with the boot before then and the whole 
thing is up in the air, " (10)
This time however, Reid's rhetoric did not produce unanimous approval 
from his audience. Indeed, so far had cynicism crept in that one 
steward from Govan went up to the microphone and suggested that Reid 
'tone it do^m a bit* since a lot of the ammunition that the boiler­
malcers' members had used at the lyceun meeting concerned what had 
previously happened at Clydebanlc, as regards the signing of the Clyde­
bank agreement and the acceptance of the 10p finishing bonus from the 
liquidator,
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"...where we had the situation where other negotiations took 
place during the holiday. So there were seotionalised 
meetings going on at that particular time."
I5ven Willie Holt, a staunch supporter of the Co-ordinating Committee 
had to concede that,
..maybe that's what happened in the past, that's caused 
all the trouble here at the present moment.
May I say this, there was certain discussions, and I've 
got to say it, inside our shop stewards' movement whether 
to fight for the decision, I fought for the decision and 
other stewards didnae fight for the decision, and if they 
had fought as hard as I've fought there was nae need for this 
meeting the day. We got beat by 20 votes, and if the shop
stewards have convinced me that they've tried, and we got beat
by 20 votes, then I'm no' for having it. There was a 
deliberate move made by a certain section to destroy the 
bloody unity, and they succeeded unfortunately, and if Jimmy 
Reid wants to come into the meeting, Jimmy, you'll be 
destroyed." (12)
Everyone had a good idea of which section Willie Holt was talking 
about although nobody named it outright. It was no surprise then 
when Jimmy McCrindle came forward to the microphone to have his say.
Most of the gruff assertiveness had gone out of his voice. His tone
was rather more of a whine, almost abject.
"Anyway, this morning at this meeting, this morning, as you 
all know, the caulking department is one of the departments 
which have always been against interchangeability, what have 
you. But this morning, looking at the situation, I as caulker's 
shop steward of Govan accepted the position that the work-in 
men should be re-engaged. I want to malce that quite clear.
But the whole argument here today, in my opinion is trivial.
I mean, all the boilermakers are asking, as I'm talking 
from the floor mind you, noit as a boilermaker steward, they 
were only asking for this retrospective payment. Now this fella 
Gilchrist as far as they tell us, is an awful hard man. Well 
surely if they lifted the phone to Gilchrist and asked him that 
wan question, this is the whole, the whole crux of the matter, 
that if there 're any wage agreement agreed Jimmy, and if he is 
quite willing to start negotiations on Monday, which he stated, 
on a wage structure, surely then he can make it as quick as 
possible, even next week, to come to an agreement with the wages
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structure, and there'll he nae retrospective payments. Its as 
simple as that. And we're shouting and bawling here about 
this and that, and its only a wee, a wee definitely a wee 
oddity and I...I mean you must be fair on this. This is what, 
it is because, there's no doubt in my mind, if if the boilermakers 
went into a meeting tomoinrow and told them that they would be 
payed retrospective on the wage agreement, the argument would 
be finished. That's all I've got to say." (13)
Airlie*s reply was derisory. He could hardly get the words out for 
disgust.
"Well look. Look, look eh well I want to raalce a point,
Tlie brother's living in cloud cuckoo land. And let me make 
this point quite clear - you say you heard Gilchrist is a hard 
man, I don't know if he's a hard man or no' - but Jimmy, if 
you or anybody else wants to take Gilchrist on, let him get his 
thirty-five million, then take him on. But I want to see you 
in particular talcing him on when the time comes.
You're fighting about something that's no' an issue.
They're no' an operational company, they've not got the 
money, and the odd points you've made is nonsense, is non­
sense, And if that's the help Willie Holt and the other 
stewards got this morning, then it's nae wonder the decision 
went against them, (Applause). (-14)
Paced with this chaotic situation the Co-ordinating Committee had to 
cancel a mass meeting due the following day at which the proposal 
was to be put for a one-day stoppage on September 5th in support of 
the fight against the Government's Industrial Relations Act, The 
Govan welders had already decided at a departmental meeting that they 
would not attend the mass meeting anyway, which was tantamount to 
refusing to support the stoppage. Given the other circumstances 
which now prevailed, clearly domestic affairs had become an all- 
consuming preoccupation and the main priority was anyway to secure 
an early reversal of the boilermakers rejection of the Govan procedure 
agreement.
The following morning the Govan Shipbuilders' boilermalcers 
reconvened in the Lyceum, Once again the recommendation was overturned,
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this time by a massively increased majority of two hundred. Press 
reports spoke of the men leaving the meeting in a'jubilant* mood.(15) 
It appeared, not for the first time, as if the boilermakers had a 
®death™wish* o Meanwhile, later that day the other nine unions 
including the CSEÏÏ local officials and the Co-ordinating Committee 
finally signed the agreement with Gilchrist and Strathalmond. 
Strathalmond publically announced that the boilermakers had until 
Tuesday September 5th to sign otherwise he would not recommend to 
his board that the company start operations^on September 11th, At 
Brighton that weekend Donald Tonner was engaged in frantic behind 
the scenes attempts to get together the CSEU shipbuilding section 
officials who were gathering for the TUG annual conference in order 
to sort out the problems of Upper Clyde. In Glasgow however, the 
situation was moving from bad to worse.
On Friday afternoon Jimmy Ramsay had telephoned Donnelly, the 
personnel officer in Govan and requested that twelve sheet-iron 
workers, members of the Boilermakers*Society, due to start re-training 
as part of the agreement for absorbing the work-in, be stopped. They 
were told by Ramsay not to report to the training centre in the yard 
the following Monday morning. On Sunday afternoon a hastily convened 
meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee issued the following statement 
with the tliree boilermakers conveners present to endorse it,
"We have fought for fourteen months for the principle of the 
right to work and have argued that no-one has the right to 
deny us this principle. This applies to Government and 
employers, and it applies to any section of the working class.
It is now clear in our opinion that for some sections the issue 
is not retrospective payment. The issue is now out in the open. 
It is a question of people wanting to put so-called sectional 
interests before the broad mass of their fellow workers." (16)
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It had been pressure from one section within the Boilermakers*
Society in the yard which had forced Ramsay to intervene with the 
management to prevent the sheet-iron workers from being re-trained, 
yet again specifically, from the caulking department at Govan.
The caulkers objected to the absorbtion of retrained sheet iron workers 
quite simply because they feared 'dilution*. The issue was therefore 
one that was specific to the boilermalcers and seemed to concern the 
refusal to allow absorbtion of members of the union by other sections 
of the same union. In fact, however, it was not so much inter-trade 
sectionalism that lay behind the boilermakers' problems but the 
implications which retraining had for the boilermakers* overall position 
since what they really feared was being asked to accept retrained 
workers from other unions outwith the Society, In other words, it was 
really a matter of-horizontal inter-union sectionalism. It was this 
and not the question of retrospective payments which had led to the 
rejection of the Govan procedure agr’eement on both occasions. Retro­
spective payments had merely been a smoke-screen as to some extent was 
the issue of the sheet-iron workers. In a report to a full shop stewards 
committee on Monday morning Airlie outlined the steps taken by the 
Co-ordinating Committee in response to this new situation.
"We took the decision that as far as we were concerned, that these 
twelve sheet-iron workers were starting at the training centre, 
and if they weren't started, then they werenae in the work-in, 
and it wasnae the management that were sacking them, it was their 
fellow workers, and I want to raalce that point clear." (17)
The boilermakers were now completely out on their ovm as the wording 
of the press statement had made apparent, and indeed on the instructions 
of the Co-ordinating Committee the twelve sheet-iron workers had, in 
fact, reported for the commencement of their retraining. The Co­
ordinating Committee condemnation of the boilermalcers as totally 
unprincipled, naturally provoked a sharp reaction from among the mass 
of boilermakers' members when they read the press reports that Monday 
morning. Inside the yards the atraOi^ pliere was explosive with, in
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particular those boilermakers* stewards who were in favour of signing
the agreement now receiving the fu].l force of the boilermakers anger. 
One boilermakers* steward complained to the shop stewards committee.
"As it is the noo, I thinlc it'll even be worse, V/hen 
I went into tha,t meeting on Friday you could feel the 
hatred when every time anybody got up there to support 
signing this agreement. And this morning in the, in the 
yard there, its even worse. The, the people who were actually 
supporting, noo they're on for a bash against the other 
sections. And we've hardened the whole situation, and its 
gonnie be harder to retrieve the situation," (18)
Willie Holt however, gave a heart-felt reply,
"Can I just say something on that Jim, If anybody sitting here 
thinlcs that we issued that statement yesterday, no realising 
the consequences, well they shouldnae be in this room at all.
Of course we Icnew it was bound to make the situation harder, 
of course we Icnew, of course we knew. Of course we Icnew that 
some of ifur heids will bloody well roll. That's no* the issue, 
its no whether I'm gormae be shop steward at the end of next 
week or no', that's no® the issue, or whether its Archie here, 
or Joln here, or.,.
Let me ask that we have principles. I've got principles 
anyv^ ay. And I don't want to be shop steward, I don't want 
to be convener if that's the attitude of the boilermalcers 
towards their own fellow members, Noo that's got to be said, 
that's the root behind all the trouble we're having the noo.
Its no* the money, its no® money, money's secondary. The whole 
thing was roon* aboot the interchangeability wl' the, wi* the 
sheet iron workers. Noo that is the issue, and any shop steward 
that says it isnae the issue are hiding," (19)
As the sheet-iron workers ' steward wry3.y observed of the general feeling 
among the members of his trade,
"he's sitting like a'wally du^, waiting on somebody throwing 
him a scrap of meat." (20)
However, the issue went beyond the internal problems of the boiler­
makers since from whatever trade the work-in members came from, the 
right to be re-engaged, would still need to apply. It was in that
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sense that the boilexmiakers had, as Airlie put it, 'besmirched* the 
whole campaign. As Sam Barr put it with more than a hint of 
exasperation in his voice,
"Listen, it doesnae matter if its boilermakers, electricians 
or engineers, or bloody DATA members that was coming into 
that school this morning. They'd have still have had to 
come in, 'Cause that's our principled stand as shop stewards, 
that the lads liave gottae c ome in off the work-in. They 
were doing nobody harm. We werenae paying them, the manage­
ment was paying them. So why are they stopped? What's the 
point about? VRiy did you do it? Did you do it within your 
ovm, because of your own sectional interests so as you would 
no' have any problem?" (21)
This time McCrindle was totally exposed but by then the damage
had been done, sectionalism both within and between the boilermakers
and the rest of the workforce was spreading like a contageous infection.
With Strathalmond* s deadline for the boilermakers signing fast 
running out, McGarvey once again sent up James Murray as his 
'trouble-shooter' from the TUC Annual Conference for talks with 
Govan Shipbuilders and with the Govan boilermakers themselves.
It was the Marathon story all over again with the boilermakers 
attempting to win concessions for themselves by the technique of 
brinlcmanship, a mentality devastatingly revealed by McGarvey*s 
reply to a TV reporter at the TUG, when asked whether he thought 
Streathalmond*s deadline was the last chance for the boilermakers,
"Good God man, your last chance is up to your last second," (22)
The following day, Tuesday, Govan Shipbuilders officially announced 
that they would have to delay their starting date by a week, (23)
That evening Murray and Strathalmond got down to brass tacks, with 
Murray arguing, contrary to the teornis of the procedure agreement,
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for separate negotiating rights for his members, rather than 
adhering to the agreed system of a joint all-union set of wage 
negotiations. It was indeed the Marathon story yet again.
The next raoiviing Murray addressed the boilermakers at a mass 
meeting and informed them that there would be an immediate interim 
wage agreement of not less than £2 per week for all skilled trades­
men. The meeting voted to accept the Govan agreement by 900 to 300 
votes and on this still rather precarious basis the agreement was 
hastily signed. The 'bribe* that Murray was offering had obviously 
not mollified a sizeable minority of the boilermalcers. Nevertheless 
their face had been saved to some extent because the boilermakers 
could now turn to other unions and claim that they also had secured 
for them à £2 a week rise, that they were not merely out for themselves. 
Almost immediately, however, Strathalmond issued a flat denial on 
behalf of Govan Shipbuilders that any figure had been agreed upon, (24) 
Indeed, the only'person to mention the £2 increase had been Jim Murray 
himself. The Govan Shipbuilders* position remained unchanged, namely, 
that while they were not against retrospective payments, these could 
only be given after discussions on a new wage agreement had been 
concluded. For the boilermakers this was the ultimate humiliation.
Far from being able to boast that they had won an increase for all 
skilled trades, they now had to accept ta,unts by other workers of 
being *sold down the river* by their own executive. Indeed, had 
Strathalmond conceded the £2 to Murray and therefore the boilermakers 
attempt to lead wage bargaining it would have permanently recreated 
the historical divisions between the different trades in the industry 
and shattered any hope for a more enduring future unity among the 
workforce. It would have provided the continuing basis for the kinds 
of sectionalism which had proved to be so rife among the boilermakers 
in the past month and whose roots as has been suggested extended far 
back into the history of the industry.
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As it was, despite the temporary disarray among the 'boilermalcers* 
ranlc and file, within a few days a formal pay claim for aJ.l Govan 
Shipbuilders* employees was submitted by a joint union negotiating 
team representing all the unions in the yards with three representatives 
each from the boilermakers, the finishing trades and general workers 
led by Airlie. (25)
In a mass meeting the following week, to report on the offer 
made by Govan Shipbuilders, it became clear just how bitterly the 
welders in particular resented the elimination of their wage 
superiority over other workers. The unions had claimed a £6 per week 
increase across the board but had been made a final offer of precisely 
half that figure, a minimum of £3. In view of the circumstances which 
the new company was in, with pressure on Govan Shipbuilders from the 
government not to mention Yarrows and the Lower Clyde, the Co-ordinating 
Committee felt that this offer was the best they could hope for and 
recommended acceptance. The alternative was strike action and with 
the company just beginning to trade and as yet with few orders on 
the books, the prospects for any strike were far from good. In any 
event with a rate of 94.6 pence per hour for skilled men the offer 
placed the Govan Shipbuilders* workers among the most highly paid, if 
not the best paid in the industry.
The opposition to the recommendation, not surprisingly, came from 
the boilermakers’ stewards. From the Govan welders* steward 
John McMillan came a clear statement of their felt grievance showing 
that the old attitudes were by no means dead yet.
"It concerns parity. Now this is something that everybody 
else has been fighting for, with the exception of the 
division, or section, I represent. If this agreement’s 
accepted it means that as from today our differential will 
disappear," (26)
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Here it was then, the 'kings of the river* in wage terms, the welders , 
were about to be deposed and were bellowing like reactionary monarchs 
faced with a Republican constitution. Theirs : was merely a more 
concentrated expression of the diffused discontent which ha,d been 
simmering among the boilermalcers in general for some time. In reply, 
on behalf of the negotiating committee, Airlie made it clear that 
while allowances for working in obnoxious or dangerous conditions 
could still be negotiated for on a departmental basis, what 
McMillan had referred to as payment for 'skill and craft* would no 
longer pertain. (27)
"First of all, if this new wage structure is accepted, let 
us be quite clear, it eliminates differentials for all 
tradesmen. All tradesmen, regardless of their category, 
will be on the same rate. All semi-skilled workers will 
be on the same rate, and all unskilled workers." ( 28)
The threat by McMillan, that in view of this, the Govan welders would 
need to 'review the situation' along with the welders in Linthouse 
and Scotstoun, was decisively rebuffed by Airlie to the applause and 
cheers of the other workers who had long resented the welders self- 
proclaimed superiority.
"Yeh, hell look, John's making the point from a welder, but 
I'm making the point as the chairman of the negotiating, 
committee, that the position is this. That all unions, in­
cluding the boilermakers, have accepted the position of joint 
negotiations. If this meeting endorses the recommendation of 
the joint shop stewards' committee, that will be the rates paid 
throughout the group, and there will be no sectional negotiations, 
John, I've got to m^ce that position quite clear." (29)
The acceptance of Govan Shipbuilders' wage offer by the majority of 
the mass meeting was effectively the public laying out of the corpse 
of sectionalism. The exorcism of its spirit however, was not achieved 
until the very last chapter of the UOS saga had been concluded and 
even then it lingered on as a feature of the post-UCS situation.
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The immediate struggle would not be over until the problems of the 
employment of the workforce at Clydebank during the transitional phase 
of Marathon’s take-over had been solved. This was the final issue.
By mid-September there were still I9OO woi'kers employed by the 
liquidator on finishing off four ships at Clydebank. With Marathon 
only planning to take on 700 workers by Christmas this meant the 
possibility of 1000 men being declared redundant by the end of the 
year as the work for UCS was phased out. In terras of the fight to 
preserve employment this was imacceptable to the Co-ordinating Committee 
who had talc en the decision to continue the work-in at Clydebank on 
the basis of support from the workers in all four yards. It was to 
be the final test of a unity that had already been severely battered. 
With all that had gone before, it was perhaps over-optimistic of the 
Co-ordinating Committee to expect that at this late stage the workers 
in Govan Shipbuilders would willingly come to the assistance of their 
colleagues in Clydebank. On the other hand, if the principle of 
the right to work was to be maintained, it would need to be maintained 
until the very last no matter how difficult the circumstances. In 
that sense the shop stewards leadership had no alternative but to 
honour their public commitment to fight for the jobs of every worker.
With a mass meeting of all workers due to be held in Govan the 
Co-ordinating Committee suddenly announced the cancellation of the 
meeting. After hours of crisis discussions it was decided instead 
that it would be held the following morning at Clydebank where the 
main item on thci agenda would be the reimposition of the 5Cp levy 
suspended in July at the start of the holidays. The worker at the 
July mass meeting who had opposed the suspension on the basis of the 
prediction of future problems at Clydebank was now sadly proved 
correct.
330.
The mass meeting at Clydebank was a truly sorry affair. Apart 
from the Clydebank men, no workers at all from Govan were present 
except the stewards, from Linthouse only the welders of the boilermaker 
trades, and the Linthouse engineers and outfitting workers were present, 
and from Scotstoun only the general workers and the outfitter i/ith 
between three and four hundred redundancies due at Clydebank the 
following 'Friday, Reid put forward the view of the Co-ordinating 
Committee.
"Its our opinion in the G o-ordinating Committee yesterday that 
there’s only one attitude can be tak.en, and that is that there 
will be nobody going do^ vn the road next Friday. If it was 
good enough, 6 months ago, to say they’re not going down the 
road, they’re in the work-in, and if pressures are on Marathon 
or on anybody else, if that was a privilege that existed, to 
workers, 6 or 8 or 9 months ago, in Govan, Linthouse, in 
Scotstoun, its a privilege that must apply to these people in 
Clydebank next Friday m.ght. Otherwise it's a betrayal, a 
betrayal, not only of our fellow workers, but of the movement 
that sustained us over 15 months^
Now the situation has developed in the recent weeks, 
sectional differences have emerged within the workforce of the 
UCS, and there’s no good anyone trying to sweep these under the 
carpet. In my opinion and it’s always been my opinion, 
sectional differences within the working class, no matter what 
it’s based on, is always eventually self-destruction for the 
working class. And that goes for colour, for creed, for religion, 
or for caste. And as workers, we’ve got to stand together, and 
look upon each other as brothers, and only recognise one label, 
and that is 'fellow worker'. And if we’d done that consistently 
over 50 years, in my opinion we would be living in an immeasurably 
better Britain today.
But differences have emerged, and its got to be recorded.
There was to be a mass meeting yesterday, a mass meeting with 
the quite clear, decisive purpose of a total reaffirmation of 
the labour force in the four divisions, that we were still in 
it together in the fight for every job. That decision has 
never been rescinded from our previous mass meetings, and we 
ge,ve the promise that it would never be rescinded or never ended, 
un].ess it v^ as by the decision of a mass meeting of the workers 
of the four divisions. But yesterday we were faced with the 
position, where the boilermakers in Govan had decided they were 
not attending the mass meeting because they wanted to opt out 
of the fight for the jobs. Because the mass meeting was not 
about filling up your pool for next Friday •« the mass meeting
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was to reaffirm our determined stand that we were all in it 
together. And therefore, by taking the decision not to 
attend the mass meeting, they were opting out of the fight.
That was also the decision of the boilermakers in Scotstoun, 
at a mass meeting’.
The Co-ordinating Committee met yesterday and took the 
decision that those sections who had opted out of the 
fight, had abandoned their fellow workers, were no longer 
members of the Co-ordinating Committee, were not involved 
in the work-in. And if they've got workers in the work-in 
or members in the work-in, they can be responsible for 
their members. Because the money that was given to us was 
given to men that were on public record as saying, 'Give us 
your support, and we will not let you down. Give us your support, 
and we'll fight as honourable, decent, principled men for all 
our fellow workers, and in recording there a victory and 
achievement, will be doing a service to the whole working class 
movement *," (51 )
It was an emotional meeting at which each group of workers present 
from the other yards to support their Clydebank colleagues was named 
from the platform and received a separate ovation. It was a time 
to stand and be counted. It was almost a parody of a revivalist 
meeting with Willie Mclnnes acting as chairman. Airlie was called 
to address the meeting by Mclnnes,
"Well I see Jim Airlie standing there, and I never seen a 
bloke so so di,, di.. disgusted in all my life. I thinlc we 
should hear what Jim's got to tell us,"
Airlie came forward,
"Brother chairman, brothers - Jimmy's right, I shouldn't 
even be here, lliere's not a worker attending this meeting 
fae Govan, and let me say there is no justification for 
that position of the Govan workers. The yard's in turmoil,
I'm not excusing it. There was a decision at the Co-ordinating 
Committee, the workers in Govan never carried it out.
But I want to put my personal position here. Whatever 
decision that this mass meeting takes, I'm going back to the 
engineers to fight for it, and if they don't accept it, then 
they carry on without me as a shop steward, because I'm 
malcing my position clear." (52)
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Now, one after the other, stewards from Govan and Linthouse came 
fon-fard and pledged to do their utmost to regain tW support of their 
departments for the réintroduction of the 50p levy, otherwise they 
too would resign their position as stewards. The principle, preserving 
all the jobs, would be fought for to the last no matter what the 
cost to the shop stewards.
Over the next few days a vigorous attempt was made to regain 
the ground that had been lost in terms of unity. The Clyde District 
Committee of the boilermakers took the unprecedented step of 
circulating a letter to their shop stewards in Scotstoun, Linthouse 
and Govan appealing to them to reconsider their decision of no 
further support for the work-in and urging that they |put the good 
name of our Society once more in the forefront of the struggle for 
the right to work*.(35) As the letter made clear, of the 4OO expected 
redundancies 248 were members of the boilermakers but even this 
appeal was to be of no avail. At all three yards the workers led 
by the boilermakers again rejected the levy. Only the draughtsmen 
and electricians at Govan and the welders at Linthouse had backed 
the proposal at their departmental meetings. Airlie and twenty of 
the leading shop stewards on the Co-ordinating Committee had no 
alternative but to resign. The only prominent exception was Sam Barr 
of Scotstoun, In Scotstoun finishing trade workers had voted for 
the levy while the 300 boilermakers there had voted against. The 
fact that Barr did not resign with the others, however, created no 
small amount of bad feeling between some of the shop stewards.
In the midst of this debacle the only piece of good news was that 
the expected redundancies at Clydebank were postponed for three weeks 
because of an engine being placed for fitting out in the yard rather 
than elsewhere. In the meantime Willie Mclnnes was elected 'pro-tem*
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chairman of a reconstituted Co-ordinating Committee. Clearly it 
was hoped that the situation could eventually he retreived and the 
shop stewards who had resigned, reinstated.
Over the next few days the officials of the Clyde Confederation 
attempted to persuade the stewards to reconsider their position,
Airlie had taken up his tools again and returned to his department 
as an ordinary working engineer much to the embarrassment of his 
fellow workers. Meanwhile the caulkers at Linthouse had decided to 
reverse their decision on the levy and in an attempt to restore 
unity the new Co-ordinating Committee rescinded the previous decision 
not to give work-in payments to men whose departments were refusing 
to pay the levy. As a, way of creating the conditions for the 
reinstatement of Airlie and the other stewards the Confederation now inter­
vened to call a mass meeting of the whole of the finishing trade 
workers from Govan, Linthouse and Scotstoun with the intention that 
together with the Linthouse caulkers and welders and a few other 
depart*ments it would perhaps be possible to create at least a 
numerical majority in favour of the work-in, even without the 
support of the majority of the boilermakers.
At the lyceum meeting all the Confederation officials from the 
finishing trades were there; Willie Reid of the Coppersmiths,
Tommy McTurk of UCATT, Joe Brown of the plumbers, Donald Tormer of 
the engineers and Joe Black of the electricians who as chairman of 
the Confederation now addressed the meeting. The theme of Black's 
speech was unity. He began by reminding them that the roots of the 
fight to preserve shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde went back to the 
time of Fa.irfields when the worker’s at Govan had first won a 
victory against redundancy, and went on to recall how the finishing 
trades had only enhanced their position vis a vis the boilermakers 
through achieving unity among themselves.
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"And if there's anyone who thinks that this fight has only 
started in the last 12 to 18 months, then the people in 
Govan know this isn't true. The whole background to this 
position was the constant internecine warfare between the 
finishing trades and the boilermakers, and this is regret- 
able. And it's regretable because I myself personally 
have made it clear to all and sundry where I stand'on'this 
particular fight. I've made it perfectly clear on every meeting, 
whether the boile3:raakers are there or not, that under no 
circumstances was I prepared to see people get paid more than 
the finishing trade workers. And the workers and the stewards, 
wdio have attended meeting after meeting on this particular 
subject, Icnow where we stand on this issue. Now this doesn't 
mean that I'm anti-boilermaicer. My best friend's a boiler- 
malcer. But it does mean I'm pro-finishing trade.
Arising out of the fight on Fairfield's when the ten pence 
was received for flexib for flexibility money, and once we 
had achieved it, it had spread to Connells', Yarrows' and 
John Broom's, We were then faced with redundancy, the closure 
of.the yards, and the birth of UCS. Our problem at that time 
was to unite the finishing trade workers, and go forward as 
one body. We went forward as one negotiating body; the terrific 
fight we had for the painters, to bring the painters up to the 
level of the other trades, the levelling out of the wages, the 
increases which have been achieved in the last four years, 
practically 10C^ increases, was only achieved because of the 
basis of unity that was established - and it wasn't easy, 
brothers.
All the idiosyncracies of each individual union, the 
peculiarities of the electricians, the differences of the 
joiners, the position of the painters and engineers, were all 
thrown to the one side in the fight for unity. And we made it 
perfectly clear to the boilermakers and the employers, the days 
when the finishing trades were second class workers was finished. 
And this was all on the basis of basis of unity," (34)
Black went on to warn of the rising unemployment and the problems
\
of the industry. As for the criticism that the Clydebanlc workers 
should not have signed the Marathon agreement unless their jobs were 
secure, Black pointed out that as Chairman of the Confederation he 
had been involved in all the discussions and that the understanding 
■with Marathon was that 1000 were to have been started immediately.
On the question of the 'finishing bonus' Black argued that they would 
never have accepted 10 pence per hour at Clydebank if that had really 
been what it was, but rather would have claimed something nearer 
£1 an hour, rather than the meagre figure agreed upon.
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"Surely we're not going to allow ourselves to be sidetracked, 
the one or two issues which have been raised, on which, people 
may think, there was legitimate criticism. The main aim is to 
ensure that the original pledge on which we set out for is 
adhered to. And there's not a union, not a shop steward, or 
not a worker but which time after time has reiterated this 
pledge. And I feel sure you're not prepared to go-.back on 
it now. Now there can be much carp and criticism. We could 
point out that people who've received thousands of pounds 
out of the work-in have refused to pay the 50 pence. But 
surely, brothers and sisters, surely the whole movement doesnae legis­
late for the 5 centoHd balls who for some reason or other 
always want to upset everybody. We legislate for the majority, 
taking heed of the minority's point of view. We legislate for 
the future of the industry. We legislate for your jobs. And 
we legislate to endeavour to retain the magnificent unity.
Now it's true this unity was established because of the 
very difficult times that we undervrent - it's true we werenae 
easy bedfellows with the boilermakers, nobody has every disguised 
this - it is tine, in the main, the leadership has been tlrrovm 
up from the finishing trades - it's true that certain sections 
of the boilermakers, even at this day are prepared to rock the 
boat, because they thinlc that their sectional interests aren't 
being safe-guarded.
If the Upper Clyde is goniiae be brought d o m  then it'll 
never be brought down by the finishing trade unions. But also 
let me mal.ce it clear, the finishing trade unions are not 
prepared to be blackmailed, either by workers or by other 
trade unionists. Now that may sound a peculiar statement for 
a man who ' s advocating unity. When we talk about imity, we 
don't talk about subjugation, and we're saying that only because 
of this unity have we been able to establish the fight that has 
taken place. Only because of this unity have we been able to 
substantially improve your wages, out of all recognition. And 
only because of unity is the industry still surviving in the 
Upper Clyde at the present time.
Now having said this, and I know I'm speaking, in the main, 
to the converted, because most of you here have been in the 
fight from the beginning, but I'm confident that the decision 
you've reached was reached on the basis of misunderstanding, 
was reached on the basis that the full facts weren't put to 
the stewards and the workers, and was reached on the basis of 
legitimate grievances which hadn't been attended to. And I'll 
give you the assurance on behalf of the Confederation, and of 
my fellow officials and shop stewards - if this decision is 
reversed that these grievances will be examined with a view to 
rectification where they're found and proved correct. We'll 
give you the assurance that the shop stewards 'Ponderosa' will 
be cleaned out, it was becoming more like the 'Costa Clyde* 
rather than the conveners meeting place.
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"And we’ll give you these assurances, fellow workers. I’m 
asking you sincerely, and in your own interests, and the 
.interest of the industry on the upper reaches, that this decision 
he reversed, that shop stewards be reinstated, shop stewards 
be revoted in, or appointed, re-appointed, because the decision’ll 
be yours who the shop stewards'll be. Shop stewards’ll be 
re-appointed in every deparrment where there's vacancies at 
the present time. But first and foremost, the contributions 
to the work-in should be continued. We're talking about 50 
pence, that's eh what it would appear, and by God, the enemies 
of the working class are highly delighted, because at last they 
thought they'd seen a rift in the working class movement. Well, 
let us give them their answers, let us make it clear that there's 
no rift in this unity. (35)
It should be noted that the basis of Black's appeal for unity was 
itself more than slightly tinged with a sectional approach, 'But the 
officials were not to have it all their own way that morning. Prom 
the Govan joiners one worker launched a vigorous attack on thp shop 
stewards., .
"Noo I think this meeting has been called purely and simply to 
allow the tail to wag the dog. (mild applause). In my opinion, 
fellow workers, I, like every other trade unionist in this 
hall, desire unity with our fellow workers. And I don't 
identify myself with just any fellow worker. The ones that I 
feel obligated to, first and foremost, are them within the 
Govan division, whether they be boilermakers, or outfit trade, 
it doesn't matter to me.
Now what really upsets me is this - that all along the line 
we've had these magnificent mass meetings, and we've always 
been told that you would decide these matters, rightly so, so 
we did. We've given support all along, arid for this support 
the stewards have been very thankful for. But surely the time 
comes, that when we can come to a decision of vmr ovm which we 
consider reasonable, that the stev/ards must, by the same 
yardstick, accept this decision.
Now Vfhen a mass meeting v?as called in this eh and failed to 
conclude itself because of the absence of the boilermakers, the 
stevfards then, through the various departments, called meetings. 
Now these meetings v/ere called primarily for one reason only - 
in my opinion not to get the true reflection of the individual 
members, but tae bring back to the shop stewards' joint committee 
one particular answer, and that ansv^er only, with the threat that 
if we didn't see things along their v;ay, they w^ ere going to resign.
Now to me this is not democratic, and this is the main 
point that I'm in dispute with., not the 50p, this is purely 
symbolic. But I don't want ever to be dictated to by shop 
stewards. I want shop stewards to realise that their very 
purpose is to carry out the wishes of their fellow members,
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whether these wishes seek, eh whether these wishes fit in 
with the ideas of the stewards or not is not important. 
And this is the proof of the pudding, the stewards are 
there to serve the members." (36)
Then to a massive applause and cheers Airlie stood up to spealc. 
Today's underdog was obviously more popular than yesterday'-s hero,
"Eh brother chairman, fellow workers, chairman, I want to 
make eh one or two points. First of all, on the points 
of criticism relative to the agreement -* I tliink Joe adequately 
covered the point about the signing of the Marathon agreement, 
and that was part of the criticism. But quite frankly, the 
reality of life, unless there's an employer in there, there's 
nobody that you can pressurise in order to ( ) eh
maximise the jobs, and there nobody can argue that that was 
not necessary.
Now other point of the run down money, or what,the 
target achievement scheme. Now frankly, we were critical 
of that agreement being made on Clydebank, and we made the 
point there. And the main point of criticism was not entering 
into a separate bonus. But there was an argument in Clydebank, 
because consistently we had considerably lower bonus than 
applied at Govan, But our main criticisms that we made to 
the Clydebank stewards ( ) was this, with the
concluding of the recent wage negotiations, you'd have had a 
situation if that bonus hadn't been there, whereas the Clyde­
bank workers employed by the liquidator would have been eaiming 
76 pence an hour against 94* Is there anybody gonnae argue 
that their people with the liquidator didn't ha,ve a right?
Let me eh touch upon another point, Joe touched upon it 
eh eh adequately. Q,uite frahldy, the problems emanated eh 
relative to the boilermakers* sectional meeting, and the 
boilermakers quite frankly, and I want to make this in a 
fraternal manner, are rowing their ovrn canoe in this, because 
they're convinced that it is in their interests to split the 
unity in order to pursue sectional claims. At this very 
moment, the boilermakers are talking about going in for a 
shilling an hour, ROWP money. Quite frankly, they'll not be 
on because that's inclusive in the wage agreement. But the main 
point is this, and Joe touched on it - the unity of the outfit 
trades established the parity of wages. And the point you're 
gonnae reach here is this. You'll either fragment yourselves, 
you'll hang separately or decide to stay together united.
And don't be under any illusion, if the employers want to 
pick you off one at a time, and there're people here can 
remember the position in the shipbuilding industry not long 
ago, the plumbers and electricians were in - the engineers went 
in separately, and the employer picked them off one by one.
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I remember when I started in this industry six eh years 
ago, the stewards used to go up with their caps off twiddling 
their thumbs, begging, not united. If you want that situation, 
then you'll get that situation -- the orüLy way you'll avoid 
that is unity. And let me maj.ce this final point - with all 
the criticisms and the mistakes that's been made, it's seen 
in the movement that you're 'on the bus' and you're' ''fireproof'. 
And quite frankly it's left a bad taste in the movement's 
mouth. And let me touch finally on the point brother Connelly 
made about the democratic decision - I am certainly for the 
democratic decision, the decision of the engineers for instance, 
I'm gonnae deal with the engineers, was not to support their 
brothers in Clydebank. I accept that position, but what I'm 
not prepared to accept is carry out that decision as a shop 
steward. Because quite frankly brothers, if you push that 
line to its logical conclusion, you could take a decision that 
no Ugandans get in, no Catholics get in, and that would be 
against my principle, and I'm not gonnae carry out an un­
principled position. That's my position brothers." (Applause, 
whistles, and cheers.) (5?)
It looked very much as if the meeting was going to resolve itself 
in favour of the platform. Then Donald Tonner took the mike to 
address the workers and addressed the workers as 'comrades' which 
at once brought prolonged heckling from hi.s audience such that both 
Sammy Gilmore who was chairing the meeting and Joe Black tried to 
intervene to save M m .
"Well comrades, I'm not here this morning as the assistant of... 
(shouts of disapproval from workers). That is, that is the 
traditional greeting of the British working class movement and 
I'm still proud of it. Unfortunately, the ethics of that 
particular address has long since been lost. We're now to 
the stage we don't call each other brothers now, we address 
each other now as 'Dear colleagues*. Pair enough, I haven't 
got any wine stained glasses on this morning. " (38)
It wan a peculiar term to have begun to address a trade union 
meeting with the word 'comrades', traditionally reserved for 
political meetings. Perhaps Tonner was using t M s  word to under­
score the need for unity of purpose. The hostile reaction showed 
in a sense the real resistance which now existed to any attempt by 
the leadership to impose any kind of discipline and authority that
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the workers were not prepared to accept. This did not mean, as 
Airlie's contribution demonstrated, that the wider ramifications 
of the principle of working class unity could not be raised. It 
was, however, a question of the manner being appropriate to the 
circumstances. These were, above all, circumstances in which the 
leadership was on the defensive and had to be seen to be willing 
to freely accept criticism. Indeed, Joe Black and Donald Tonner 
both had stressed the need for legitimate grievances to be given 
an airing and had promised to investigate any complaints raised. 
V/hile heading off criticism directed at Clydebank it had been 
necessary to concede that the hostile feelings towards the stewards 
might be justified to some extent. In playing the role of mediators 
t M  full time officials had thus left the stewards dangerously 
e^qposed given that there was still the problem of reinstating all 
those who had resigned. It was significant that Black had been 
noticeably hesitant about suggesting that the workers should 
necessarily vote in again the same people as stewards. In this 
respect the intervention of Joe Brown of the ■ plumbers union 
was of key significance in re-establishing the basis of the stewards 
leadership and authority.
"Well brothers, the main criticism that has come from those 
people who've spoken in opposition, appears to be that they 
consider that the tail is wagging the dog. Now let me make 
it perfectly clear why we a re here. It's not a question that 
we don't accept the democratic decisions of departments or 
mass meetings. But why we are here is, beca,use we thinlc 
the decision was wrong. And we, like anybody else, have the 
right and the authority to consider that a wrong decision 
should be reversed, on the basis of discussion on a working 
class level. And that's the purpose of this meeting this 
morning,
Joe Black has outlined the overall situation regarding the 
development of the outfit and trades development. And the 
question has been raised that the reasons, one of the reasons 
why the decisions weren't being made was that the boilermakers
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had already indicated that they had opted out of the situation, 
and this is an influence on the position within the depart­
ments. Let me remind you, that we had to go to mass meetings 
of all the tJCS workers at one stage, in order to develop the 
struggle. And while we were addressing the outfit trades, 
the boilermakers stayed at their work. But we were convinced 
at that stage, that we were taking the right decision, and 
because of that, we carried on regardless of what they had 
decided at that particular stage. And therefore, its in that 
atmosphere that we're asking the outfit trades, who have 
taken democratic decision, not to pay or continue paying the 
50p, to reconsider that situation, because it's fairly clear 
that the continuation of the 50p is in itself an act of 
financial sacrifice, but its more than that. It's the 
symbolic unity that has, completely united the working 
class, not only in the Clyde, but throughout the country.
It's the basis, the financial basis, that aJ,lo\/ed the work-in 
to be organised to be self-supporting, and therefore, because 
of that, successful. And we were able to go to other people 
throughout the country, not on the basis, as we've often 
had to do, on strikes and appeals, where we're saying to them 
'Give us money in order to keep us on the street*. We were 
able to go to them, and say to them, 'Give us money to keep 
us at work'. And that's the basis of, the ^0 pence, that's the 
symbolic unity that's now being destroyed by the decision 
not to continue. And it's in that particular background that 
we're making this appeal this morning.
And let me say this to you, that once again, this situation's 
got to be made, this decision's got to be made, as it were, 
in the goldfish bowl « Because the eyes of the press, and the 
eyes of the world are watching you, as they've watched us as 
officials, as shop stewards, television and all the rest of 
it, for the last four and five years. But the differences 
this morning is this. It's not Joe Black, Jimmy Airlie, or 
Jimmy Reid who's in the spotlight. It's everyone of you, 
individually, who're sitting in this meeting, on which the 
spotlight's turned on. And it's on your decision that the 
whole development of this new concept of working class action 
will finally be determined. And it's on that basis that we're 
making the appeal to you, as individuals, to consider the 
future action that can finally hinge on the successful outcome 
of this position. Because let me say this to you. It may be 
considered that thé 5Op is a donation to Clydebank. Is there 
anybody in this room considers that you may not need the 50p 
yourself in the future? Is there anybody who considers that 
Govan Shipbuilders are so far out of the wood, that there's 
not a necessity of a similar situation developing for you in 
the future? Because as an official, being through all the 
discussions. I'm not convinced, and if you are, you can maybe 
have the luxury of taking that decision. But as far as we're 
concerned, the issue as far as the 50p is concerned, is fundamentals 
And it is one that every single individual sitting in this hall 
has got to make the decision, and I consider that if you raalce 
the correct decision, you will be applauded - not by the press, 
because that's not important, but by the workers of this 
country, who've seen your struggle develop, and wish it success 
to finality. Thanlt you. " (39 )
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Joe Brovm's contribution had made a3.1 the necessary points in the 
right way* He had reminded them of the symbolic importance of 
their action and the fact that it was they who would determine 
the final outcome of the struggle. The meeting consequently voted 
in favour of reimposition of the levy with only about two dozen 
members opposed. Now with the support of the numerical majority of 
the workforce, Airlie and the other stewards were duly reinstated.
The following day Harbin arrived at Heathrow, On learning 
from reporters that the work-in was to continue he immediately 
denounced the whole affair as "political" and "communist-inspired" 
and threatened in disgu.st to pull Marathon out of Clydebank 
altogether. (40) Reid and Airlie who with a dozen other stewards 
were about to depart for the Labour Party Conference at Blackpool 
to discuss the Marathon situation with McGarvey, expressed suitable 
bewilderment to the press. Later on Harbin attempted to qualify 
his remarks concerning the communist plot but denied that he had 
promised to employ 1,000 workers at the outset.
The stewards and McGarvey, with Chataway standing by to act 
as a mediator if necessary, finally met with Harbin who came 
especially to Blackpool for discussions, The outcome of these was 
that Marathon agreed to accelerate their production programme thus 
immediately increasing the numbers employed while the liquidator 
for his part agreed to delay 3OO redundancies due that week. It 
finally appeared, almost unbelievably as if the whole battle over 
UCS was coming to its conclusion and on terms which would allow 
the workforce to claim a significant victory for their action. It 
only remained to report the details of the settlement to the last 
mass meeting of-the UCS campaign for endorsement by the workforce.
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Marathon had agreed to take on workers who were surplus to 
the liquidator's requirements, if not immediately, then within a 
period of four weeks. Two ships being fitted out for the 
liquidator at Clydebank would be allowed to remain there in order 
to delay further redundancies while Marathon were to place an order 
for an oil-rig in the yard at once. In addition Marathon had 
offered to talce workers to the United States for a period of 
retraining of between three and six months as a 'flying squad* 
for emergency rig repairs. Marathon were now talking about eventual 
labour requirements in the region of 3,000. Govan Shipbuilders 
would also be requiring additional workers and had agreed to recruit 
from any short-term excess labour at Clydebank, With only 17 left 
on the work-in at Clydebank the stewards were now recommending that 
the work-in as such, be terminated. (4I)
The mass meeting had been in private and at a press conference 
immediately afterwards the shop stewards, with Rev, Borthwick beside 
them, as at the inception of the campaign, drew down the final 
curtain. It was appropriate that the last words should go to Reid 
and Airlie. It was, said Reid, a victory not just for the workers 
but the 'whole Scottish community'.
"In addition, could I say that this is a very moving 
occasion for us. We will have problems and difficulties, 
but the main obstacle has been overcome. And on behalf 
of the workers of UCS we want to thank everyone who helped 
us in this period; the Scottish community, the political 
parties, the churches, people in the theatre and the art 
world, eh trade unions from all over Britain and from 
different parts of the world. We intimated some time ago 
that we would not let them down given their support, I 
think we've honoured that statement." (42)
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Chapter Twelve 
THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE WORK-IN
(i) Work-ins and Sit-ins.
If the work-in had made history it was above all history made 
by working people. The purpose of this study has been to record 
that history in the making. Yet, it is important to observe that 
there are those who are prepared to attempt to rewrite history in 
the service of the ruling class in order to pretend that such 
actions by the workers are of little significance. The events at 
Upper Clyde are no exception in this respect. Professor Sykes of 
Strathclyde University provides one such example of history re­
written in a foreword to a study of UCS written for Mrs, Thatcher and Sir 
Keith Joseph's 'think-tank', the Centre for Policy Studies. (1) In 
this study, prefaced approvingly by Sir Keith himself, Sykes claims,
"That the 'work-in' asserted the right to work is nonsense; 
the shipbuilding workers, the owners and management and, 
above all, the taxpayers are all worse off than if it had 
never happened. Nevertheless the myth of a successful work-in 
has been used to support other work, or sit-ins and demands 
for Government aid in cases ranging from Triumph Meridan to 
Chrysler; from Fisher Bendix to Imperial Typewriters and the 
Scottish Daily News. And, in every case, there is nothing to 
show for it, the only winner is the extreme left with its aim 
of industrial disruption," (2)
The impact of the UCS work-in in terms of inspiring other actions 
against redundancies is at least conceded by Sykes if only as a 
myth manufactured by the mass media. (3) More debatable is the 
contention that neither the UCS action nor any of its imitators 
were successful in asserting the Right to Work. That the aim of 
the "extreme left", at least if the Communist Party is meant here, 
is merely that of "industrial disruption" is a gross caricature. 
Clearly, however, the intention of such an appraisal is to downplay 
the leadership role of the organised working class of which UCS
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provides an outstanding example and specifically, within that, 
to denigrate the part of Communists in the struggles of the class. 
These and other issues then are discussed in this chapter which 
examines the wider implications of the UCS campaign. It is 
interesting to note, however, that on the basis .of such 'history* as 
that just cited prominent Tory politicians now feel sufficiently 
safe to claim, in the words of Alex Fletcher, Minister for Industry 
for Scotland, at the 1981 Scottish Conservative Party Conference, 
that the UCS work-in was "nothing more then a grand hoax" out of 
which "only its leaders seem to have benefited," (4)
Equally dangerous, however, is the tendency by those sympathetic 
to the aims of the work-in to overestimate what was in fact achieved. 
Certain observers quite close to the events of the time have argued 
that the work-in demonstrated "the latent managerial capacity of 
the working class" and that the workers "most certainly can run 
industry." (5) The truth or otherwise of these statements is not 
at issue, only that in the context of UCS the question of 'who 
manages?' was not at stake as has previously been argued. Even 
less were there any lingering strands of more 'revolutionary* 
syndicalist aspirations emanating from either Scotstoun or Clydebank, 
both areas where in the early years of the century, at the Albion, 
works and at Singers respectively, such ideas had some currency. (6)
Again, the real level of support for the work-in should not 
be exaggerated. The problems of involving the redundant workers 
in the production process and the difficulties in maintaining 
discipline among the work-in as well as continuing financial 
support for it, even from within certain sections of their fellow
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shipyard workers, have already heen discussed. The proportion 
of those made redundant who joined the work-in was never more 
than 69 per cent. As the events dragged on, twelve months later 
that proportion had declined to I4 per cent, (7) Nevertheless, 
for at least the early months of the campaign, the figures suggest 
a high level of support for what after all was an entirely uncharted 
field of action for all those workers involved. The work-in was to 
all intents and pur'poses an untried tactic in the field of industrial 
conflict and for cautious, not to say sceptical, shipyard workers 
to he persuaded to embark on such a novel project indicates a high 
level of confidence in their leadership and in themselves.
Such working-class confidence is by no means automatic. It 
indicates the appearance of a new kind of identity in which workers 
begin to see themselves in terms of their common interests rather 
than from a sectional or sectarian standpoint. One of the most 
significant features of the work-in despite the problems which arose 
in the latter phases of the struggle was that by and large the 
workforce retained that overall confidence in what they were doing.
The fact that the shop stewards were eventually prepared to resign 
on a point of principle was not simply a set-back for the struggle, 
it also indicated that the leadership for its part, retained its basic 
confidence in the ability of the workers to see beyond their more 
narrow preoccupations even after over a year of complex manoeuvres, 
albeit that some prompting, cajolery and occasionally threats were 
required in order to retain the unity. The UCS workers were not angels. 
They were ordinary workers with all the usual human faults and weak­
nesses. The fact was, however, that they were prepared to do battle if 
they felt the cause was just and on the whole, in terms of their right 
to work campaign, they did so courageously. Without their struggle it 
is likely that two of the yards would have been lost and the workforce
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decimated. More importantly in terms of the confidence of the
working class for which they had become a symbol, the will to
resist redundancies by workers elsewhere would have been severely 
jUndermined.
' It is interesting therefore, in discussing the wider 
implications of the work-in, to attempt to provide some brief 
account of those actions that were stimulated and inspired by the 
UCS example and to assess their impact on British trade unionism.
In this regard the sit-in at Plessey's electronics firm just a few
miles down the road from the Clydebank yard at the Vale of Leven
in Alexandria can certainly be seen as directly inspired by the 
UCS events. There has indeed been a tendency in some quarters to 
attempt to counterpose the struggle at Plessey, where the workforce 
actually occupied the factory on a permanent basis, to UCS and to 
present Plessey as representing if not more a ' revolutionary * 
approach, at least on a 'higher political level', (s) Certainly 
this was the line of some 'ultra-left' groups at the time. They 
argued that from September 1971 onwards, when the Plessey occupation 
began, the tactic of the work-in had failed, the Government was
not worried by it and that it had not halted redundancies at UCS, (9)
It can be asked therefore whether the Plessey tactic of occupation 
was more successful than the work-in at UCS, not only in raising the 
political consciousness of those involved, but also in resisting 
redundancies.
The Vale of Leven like Clydebank had a long labour tradition, 
famous in the 19th century for its militant weavers, and dye and 
silk workers. In the 1920's the area became Icnown as one of the
'little Moscows', (IO) Plessey which was originally the home of the
. Argyll car works became Britain's only torpedo factory in 1937.
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After the war it was retained as the Royal Naval Torpedo Factory 
(RNTF). Plessey took over the RNTF in March 1970 after the failure 
of the Mark 24 torpedo, which was finally tested in 19&9 following 
10 years research by Navy scientists. The Labour Government handed 
the torpedo project over to private industry, to GEO - Marconi to 
revamp the design, and to Plessey to manufacture it. But for the 
workers in Alexandria,which had been geared to make the Mark 24 , 
the news of 1200 possible redundancies was a major shock in an area 
of already high unemployment at around 10 per cent. The reprieve 
in the form of Plessey's takeover, purchasing the RNTF which some 
estimated to be worth several millions for £650,000 from the 
Ministry of Defence, proved to be short lived, Plessey made it 
clear that they would build the torpedo in Ilford and intended to 
use the Alexandria factory to produce numerically controlled machine 
tools which it was claimed would raise the workforce to 2000 in 
four years, (11)
In January 1971» 500 were employed and this built up to over 
700 in May when the company announced 400 sackings on the 18th of 
that month,blaming a substantial fall-off in demand for machine 
tools. At this juncture the workers were not ready to fight 
according to the local AÏÏEW official who helped organise the 
occupation subsequently, and between May and September 5OO workers 
were made redundant. (l2) With the final closure date of September 
3rd the remaining 250 workers led by the Convener, Eddie McClafferty 
decided to make a stand with the backing of the local AUEW, took 
over the key from the security officers and began to occupy the plant 
in shifts of 20 men. A loud-speaker van toured the tovm urging
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support for the workers and local shopkeepers began to hand in food 
and blankets at the gate across which a banner was slung, 'Under 
New Management',
' The initial purpose of the action which, as at UCS had the 
full support of the men's families and the local community, was to 
stop the management removing valuable machinery which had begun to 
be placed in crates for shipment to one of Plessey's four Ilford 
factories. The shop stewards claimed that workers in Ilford informed 
them that space was being cleared to receive the Alexandria machines 
prior to the closure. Like UCS, the workers at Plessey strongly 
suspected a preconceived 'plot'. One special dust-free unit was 
reportedly worth over £1.5 million alone. (I3) Indeed, so suspicious 
were the workers of Plessey's intentions that they refused to accede 
to management demands that they allow in outside maintenance workers 
to service the machines. Instead, the workers themselves maintained 
the machines, in defiance of management prohibitions. (I4)
In mid-September 6OOO marched through Alexandria to protest 
against the closure, led by the local MP. Workers from the Ilford 
plants and from UCS had joined the demonstration, A month later 
shop stewards from all Plessey factories in Britain formed a combine 
committee with official support of the AUEW and endorsed the sit-in, 
offering to 'black' any of the machinery from Alexandria, Plessey's 
were accused of attempting to strip the plant bare, even the flourescent 
lighting being marked for carting away.
The occupation proved to be peaceful and the senior management 
did not attempt to enter the plant. Two low level managers were, 
however, allowed to use an office but conducted no work in the plant 
other than liaising between the occupation and Plessey in London.
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The only difficult moment in the occupation came during a bomb 
scare which it was thought was a management trick to get them out 
of the factory, A hundred other workers from Burroughs, General Time 
and the British Silk Dyeing Ltd. turned up at the gates to support 
the workers who made sure that the gates were not closed while they 
were outside by chaining them to stanchions sunk into the concrete 
gateway, (I5) As at UCS, however, relations with the local police 
were good. Other features of note were the presence of the ultra­
left at the gates and a flying visit from Barbara Castle who declared 
her support for the sit-in to be followed by Bruce Millan and a 
group of Scottish Labour MP's. Benn had already given his general 
support when he and Willie Ross led a demonstration back in June to 
protest against the redundancies in the Vale of Leven. (I6) To some 
extent the events at Plessey’s were overshadowed by UCS, certainly 
in the initial phases of the occupation. Some criticism was voiced 
by the workers leadership of what was felt to be the initially 
poor coverage given to their action by the Morning Star. This, 
however, was quickly rectified by a number of feature articles from 
the paper’s Scottish correspondent, Arthur Milligan. (I7) Moreover, 
the visits of various Labour politicians ensured that the Plessey 
issue received adequate parliamentary attention as well.
In November Plessey directors in co-operation with the Lyon 
Group of property developers offered to redevelop the site if the 
workers called off the occupation guaranteeing 26 permanent jobs.
Plessey offered to sell the factory and the equipment to the new 
company in which the Lyon Group had a 70 per cent interest and 
Plessey had 30 per cent for the same price of £650,000 as they had 
originally paid for it. The workers refused and decided to stay put 
spending Christmas inside the factory where they had a turkey dinner. (I8)
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By the end of January with only JO left out of the original 250 who 
had begun the occupation five months previously, the workers ended 
the sit-in, and accepted Plessey's offer to redevelop the site and 
provide permanent jobs for the remaining workers.
As with UCS, the Plessey sit-in was only a partial success 
from a purely tactical point of view. The level of support from 
the workers in the case of Plessey was not significantly greater 
in terms of the proportion of workers still involved in the action 
after five months. In both UCS and Plessey only about one quarter 
of the initial number still remained. The tactic of occupation 
was not, in itself, likely to sustain greater militancy or commit­
ment even with, as in both UCS and Plessey, the support of the 
local community for the action and a substantial measure of official 
trade union and workplace support and solidarity. Nor was there 
any noticeable difference in the extent to which the Plessey workers 
were prepared to consider themselves as performing a specifically 
revolutionary role as say compared to UCS. Even discussion of the 
issue of workers control, for which it might be argued a sit-in 
rather than a work-in might provide more congenial conditions, 
does not seem to have been an important part of the occupation. 
Indeed,Ken Coates himself concedes that the fight at Plessey's 
and the subsequent episodes discussed below were not about questions 
of self-management but rather,
"about the conditions under which employment could be 
maintained. In this sense, the sit-in, although it was a 
different tactic, had the same fundamental limits as the 
work-in at UCS." (I9)
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If, therefore, in some sense the actions on the Clyde could he 
regarded as a ’watershed’ it is initially in respect of the growing 
fight against redundancies. While it is true that neither tactic, 
work-in or sit-in, was entirely novel to British trade unionism, 
the fact was that until 1971 they had remained relatively untried.
The possibility of a work-in had been actively canvassed by shop 
stewards in 19&9 &t the Liverpool GEC■••■English Electric factory but 
in the event resistance collapsec^.^^^s regards sit-ins, there had 
been several ’stay-down’ strikes in the mines as part of the 
battle to establish the Miners Federation, Railway workers and 
car workers at Austin Longbridge are also reported to have been 
involved in brief occupations. (21) In general, however, it 
was UCS and Plessey which were the two struggles which provided 
the immediate reference point for the actions of the early 1970’s 
some of which are now briefly examined.
Of the two work-ins to immediately follow UCS, one was at the 
River Don Steelworks at Sheffield whose stewards led by Ernest Webster 
came to Clydeside to consult the UCS workers on how to fight their 
redundancies. The redundancy proposals were occasioned by the 
’hiving off’ of part of BSC to a private firm, the Firth Brown 
Company, as part of a deal to enable BSC to gain a monopoly in 
domestic stainless steel production, (22) The River Don action was 
only partially successful when, after several weeks, the British 
Steel Corporation agreed to phase redundancies of 405 workers over 
3 years, allowing the majority to be accounted for by natural 
wastage and voluntary redundancies. (23)
At about the same time in late October 1971 the workers at 
the BSA motorcycle factory in Small Heath, Birmingham decided on a
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work-in with the full backing of all local officials. The company 
was in financial difficulties and planned 3,000 redundancies which 
the shop stewards with the backing of the workforce decided to 
resist, (24) Eight days later the stewards and officials abandoned 
the idea of implementing a work-in and called instead for an 
indefinite strike. Subsequently the redundancies were unopposed 
by the workforce. George Evans, an official of the National Union 
of Vehicle Builders explained the change of tactic as follows:
"It has become increasingly evident that conditions in motor 
cycle production and shipbuilding are completely different. 
Cycle production, with its rapid flow production, and 
dependence on a mass of small components from supplier firms, 
is not necessarily able to conduct that style of work-in.
As shop stewards and officials have become aware of this 
there has been a growing feeling among a number of workers 
that a BSA work-in might in fact more quickly work them 
out of a job." (25)
Thereafter, as part of the Norton Villiers Triumph combine which 
succeeded the eventual collapse of the BSA company, the workers at 
Triumph's Meriden factory when faced with redundancies a few years 
later, formed themselves into one of the first, of three major producer 
co-operatives which Tony Benn at the Department of Trade and Industry 
was to set up during the February to October 1974 Wilson Labour 
Government, (26)
Other work-ins were to occur, most noteably at the Briant 
Colour Printing works in London and in a leather goods factory at 
Fakenham in Norfolk, both of which received widespread solidarity.
As the BSA fiasco showed, however, without the suitable conditions 
for such a struggle major difficulties could arise. Although the 
Briant workers to some extent overcame the problem of small batch 
production by receiving orders for posters and pampJilets from the 
trade union movement, including it should be noted from UCS for
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whom they published a commemorative newspaper, they were eventually 
defeated when the company sold out and the new owners suddenly 
closed the works dov/n and placed the premises under a strong 
security guard. This time the workers did not resist. (2?)
More successful was the work-in in leather goods factory in 
Fakenham, Norfolk, an area that was hardly a strong-hold of trade 
unionism. Here the workers threatened with redundancies eventually 
began to market what they produced, again with the assistance of 
the trade union movement, and eventually formed themselves into a 
small producer co-operative. (28) This apart, however, the work-in 
as a tactic was neither necessarily particularly successful nor 
particularly easy to apply for other groups of workers,
Jimmy Airlie outlined the minimum necessary conditions for a
-successful work-in towards the end of the UCS struggle. First, a
long production cycle operation is desirable. Second, the support 
of the community in general and the workers in particular is needed. 
Third, a breathing space is necessary so that industrial and political 
pressure can be mounted on the Government, Fourth, the workers 
should be able to control the component being built. (29) A further 
condition is of course that there is work in hand in the enterprise 
concerned or at least the possibility of work. The great trump 
card of the UCS workers was not only that there were ships on the stocks 
but that they could also point to a substantial list of suspended 
orders.
Whether or not it was due to these factors, subsequently it was
the sit-in which was to become the more popular form of action. At
least three sit-ins quickly followed on the Plessey example. The 
first was in the Sheffield area at %he Thomas Snow Engineering works.
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Here the workers occupied the plant for two days after which they 
started going home at night. A week later, inevitably, they 
itumed up at the factory to find themselves locked out. The second 
occupation was at the US-owned firm of Allis-Chalmers, an agricultural 
machinery plant in Mold, Flintshire. As in the case of the River Don 
the shop stewards at Allis-Chalmers had been in contact with the 
Plessey occupation and UCS and had received advice, finance and 
encouragement from the Clydeside workers. In early January the 
120 engineers at Allis-Chalmers began a fifteen day sit-in against 
four weeks notice of redimdancy. After a takeover of the company 
its new owners had intended to move production to Staffordshire 
but as a result of the sit-in the workers won a temporary repreive 
of three months and eventually secured the jobs of the workforce,(30) 
Then two days after the Allis-Chalmers sit-in began 800 workers at 
Fisher-Bendix, at Kirkby in Liverpool began their occupation, once 
more with the support and advice of the workers at UCS and at 
Plessey.
This was the first big occupation in the north west. (3I)
The plant was owned by Thom electrical company who had already been 
forced to shelve 500 redundancies the previous June as a result of 
a nine-week strike. As at Plessey and Allis-Chalmers the workers 
suspected the management of preparing to switch production elsewhere 
by dismantling the plant, in this case in order to use cheap labour 
in Spain. The workers had the backing of the Thom Combine Shop 
Stewards Committee, the AUEW, T&GWUy the Merseyside labour and 
trade union movement including the local MP’s. They conducted a 
highly effective publicity campaign calling for all the Thorn 
company’s goods to be blacked, a crll which was backed by the 
Liverpool dockworkers, (32)
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The Pisher-Bendix occupation was well organised and indeed 
was only subsequently terminated after Harold Wilson mediated 
between the workers and the management. (53) The workers secured 
a guarantee that the factory would continue to produce radiators 
and storage heaters until 1973 although one half of the plant 
was to be let to an other engineering firm who would employ the 
workforce. (34) Subsequently the Pisher-Bendix plant became the 
Kirkby Manufacturing & Engineering Company, another of the early 
worker co-operatives. (35) It is interesting to note that the 
crisis at Kirkby in 1972 was tackled by seeking wide support in 
the local labour movement. By contrast the later financial crisis 
in 1974 was resolved by direct approach to Benn without raising 
support in a public campaign of solidarity on comparable scale.
This can be cited as one of the reasons for the eventual failure 
of the worker co-operative experiments. (36) In the case of the 
third major co-operative, the Scottish Bally News, while there was 
a public campaign mounted, in the form of an appeal for subscriptions 
and shareholders, the print unions at national level were unenthusiastic 
about the venture while it transpired that the workers themselves 
were less concerned about issues of workers* control than in preserving 
their jobs. (37) It may be that Wilson's reluctant agreement to 
these worker co-operatives in the face of reportedly fierce Treasury 
opposition, had more to do with creating the climate for securing 
trade union agreement to a social contract than anything else.
So far as the immediate post-Plessey sit-ins are concerned the 
interesting feature was that only a few of them were actually 
initiated as part of redundancy struggles. The tactic was beginning 
to widen in scope. In mid-January 1972, building workers in 
Birmingham sat-in for ten days to secure 100% trade unionism at
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Bryant’s Woodegate Valley site, (38) Then in February’print 
workers in the East Midlands began an occupation after a twelve 
week strike over pay and conditions. (39) TTie really dramatic wave 
of sit-ins came from mid-March 1972 until May 1972 in the Manchester 
area following a decision by the AUEW to abandon its national wage 
claim in favour of plant bargaining. The district federation of 
the AUEW put in a claim for wage increases of between £4 and £8 
per week, a 35 hour week and an extra week’s holiday to 5Û0 local 
firms. At the height of the sit-ins,the local engineering employers’ 
association estimated that out of 150,000 employed by members of 
the association, 20,000 workers in 25 factories were affected and 
in total as many as between 40 and 50 factories were involved. (40)
The Manchester sit-ins had the backing of the local Confederation 
and came about mainly in response to management attempts to impose 
suspensions and lockouts, A lockout can give the employer the 
initiative because the men often have to approach the employer to end 
the dispute. An occupation, being a kind of ’internal picket* gives 
the workers the initiative and is often felt by management to be a 
particularly embarrassing and even threatening form of undustrial 
action. (4I) Any attempt to evict workers from a factory by force, 
however, might have run the risk of provoking wider disorder. In 
the event most sit-ins passed off peacefully without resort by the 
companies either to legal action or attempted eviction. Moreover, 
in most firms the management was still allowed access to the plant. 
Whether or not, however, sit-ins produced more favourable settlements 
than those who went on strike is open to some question since many 
of the firms placed non-publicity clauses in their agreements. (42)
It is perhaps significant, however, that no attempt was ever made to 
adopt the tactic on a similar scale in any future wage negotiations.
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There was possibly an overestimation of the effectiveness of 
’direct action* tactics in the light of the UCS and Plessey examples. 
While the actions against redundancy threats did received wide 
publicity which assisted in building campaigns of solidarity this 
could not be said of the wage claim sit-ins. In terms of general 
public opinion the response would obviously be less sympathetic to 
wage claim sit-ins. Nor indeed does there appear to have been any 
attempt for example to take the engineering workers' campaign on 
wages into the local area even in terms of co-ordinating the various 
shop stewards committees from the occupied plants. In this regard 
the sit-in as a tactic in wage negotiations had a rather limited 
application to the building of wider unity in the working-class 
movement. A useful barometer of the changing estimate of the potential 
impact of sit-ins is provided by the International Socialist 
(Socialist Workers' Party) commentator R. Rosewell, In the spring 
of 1972 it was triumphantly proclaimed that "the era of occupations 
has begun" and extensive reference was made to the turbulent occupation 
of General Motors plants in. Flint, Cleveland in 1936 by members of 
the United Automobile Workers Union, (45) By the autumn of 1972 a 
much more cautious estimate was offered suggesting that "the general 
impact of sit-downs in Britain has been less than expected." (44)
What is apparent is that the insurrectionary aspirations of the 
’ultra-left' had not been fulfilled, either by work-ins or more 
disappointingly, by sit-ins. V/hat is perhaps more significant was 
the view of some trade union officials that the effectiveness of such 
tactics ought not to be 'devalued' by indiscriminate use in wage 
bargaining situations, (45) On the other hand, there could also be 
the underlying fear among certain officials that such a tactic might 
place too much influence in the hards of the shop stewards on the
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outcome of a dispute. In fact, however, in the period from July 
1971 until December 1975 one estimate suggests that nearly 150,000 
workers took part in over 200 occupations. (46) In 1971 about
16.000 workers were involved and in 1972 55,000. In 1975 over
22.000 workers were involved in about 5I occupations and roughly 
the same number in 24 occupations in 1974* In 1975 there were at 
least 44 occupations with over 21,000 workers taking part, (47)
Moreover, the tactic of occupation eventually received official TUG 
recognition. (48) If the 50,000 workers involved in the engineering 
pay sit-in of 1972 are deducted from the total for that year it 
will be seen that from 1972 to 1975 the average number of workers 
involved annually in occupations was upwards of 20,000. However,
as a proportion of the number of workers involved in more traditional 
forms of industrial action, the numbers were relatively insignificant, (49)
Although it is not possible to give any definitive estimate 
of the overall effectiveness of embarking on such forms of collective 
working-class pressure, work-ins and sit-ins have most certainly 
come to be regarded as legitimate and relevant tactical options by 
workers faced with the need to counter a whole variety of contingencies.
In that sense the action of 1971 heralded the acquisition of new 
weapons in the armoury of class conflict. The absence of a really 
extensive study of the experiences of the use of such weapons, 
however, is itself an indication that the working-class movement 
still lacks a coherent appraisal of the significance of these actions.
While this thesis attempts to describe and draw the lessons from 
perhaps the most important episode of all, at UCS, a preliminary 
review of a few following actions suggests that the record of successes 
is probably somewhat more uneven. In the situation of industrial
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warfare, however, it is to be expected that not every battle will 
be a victory. What is important is that a single defeat when 
suffered does not lead to demoralisation of the entire army. As 
the IJCS work-in revealed, the readiness to fight in itself could 
regenerate the whole combatative mood of the class even before the 
final outcome was decided.
(ii) The Role of the Communist Party.
Although the Clydeside workers often provided direct help and 
encouragement to other groups of workers organising similar actions 
those who attempt to reveal a recognisable pattern which points 
towards an 'orchestrated conspiracy* of industrial disruption will 
be sadly disappointed. This point is important as there is some 
misunderstanding of the role of the Communist Party in particular, 
both in UCS and in the events that followed. It is to this question 
that we now turn. In their book on the work-in, Thompson and Hart, 
both members of the Communist Party, are somewhat reticent about the 
Party's role in UCS, confining themselves to the broad statement,
"Prom the beginning of the struggle the Party spared no 
efforts in mobilising its members to take up the question 
of UCS and its fighting fund in all organisations to which 
they belong, and has never ceased to expose the role of 
Toryism and capitalism in relation to the shipbuilding 
crisis and the general economic and political disasters of 
the present days," (50)
How, ten years after the event, it is perhaps possible to give a 
fuller account of this quite complex issue.
It has already been pointed out that the well-known Communist 
affiliations of Reid, Airlie and Barr were not seen as particularly 
objectionable characteristics by the UCS workforce, even though 
these three individuals were prominent among the leading shop stewards 
in the campaign. With their fellow workers on the Co-ordinating 
Committee and in the larger shop stewards committee, where a further
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half a dozen or so were also Commimists, it was clear to all that no 
attempt was being made to push a 'line' in any concerted manner by 
the Party members. Decisions were arrived at as the result of 
'collective discussions among all concerned. Indeed, as the controversy 
over the launching of vessels and the eventual brief resignation of 
Reid and Airlie but not of Barr suggests there was by no means an 
automatic accord even betwem those who were Party members. On a 
day to day basis it was the UCS workers themselves who formulated 
decisions about the conduct of the campaign.
Nevertheless the fact that three prominent shop stewards were 
all experienced Party members was undoubtably of considerable 
importance at a number of different levels. Both Reid and Barr 
were members of the Party's Scottish Committee. Reid, having 
formerly worked full-time both for the Party and the Young Communist 
League which he had joined at the age of sixteen, had also been a 
member of the Party's Political Committee and National Executive 
Committee. He remained a member of the latter during the UCS 
crisis. (51) All three men were individuals of considerable experience 
in both trade union and political affairs. While history is made 
by masses and not individual personalities, it is worth commenting, 
however, that as workers' leaders they each had their own strengths 
and weaknesses.
Reid, as spokesman for the joint shop stewards committee was 
undoubtably a gifted speaker, able to choose a striking metaphor and 
combine a fine sense of humour with moral outrage in a fiery mixture 
of political rhetoric. He possessed a rare talent of being able to 
address several audiences at once. A carefully inserted phrase at 
a mass meeting to show that he spoke the language of the 'punters', 
and in almost the same breath an aopeal to liberal sentiments that
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even a Surrey vicar would have found hard to disagree with. And he had 
on occasion, as at the Rosevale shop stewards meeting, a rare ability 
to voice the best aspirations of the organised working class movement.
In the yards themselves, he was respectfully and affectionately known 
as 'the big yin'.
If the UCS struggle became identified with the measured intensity 
and authoritative conviction of Jimmy Reid, which has been appropriately 
compared as akin to that of a Scottish dominie or kirk minister, 
this was itself a product of the way in which the whole campaign 
was consciously fought out in terms of winning public opinion to the 
side of the workers. Thus the mass media played a key role in 
providing a platform for Reid and, in a sense, in actively shaping 
his style of presentation towards the largest possible audience.
One immediate criticism of such media-oriented campaigns is of course 
that the real politics of the situation can easily become lost in the 
desire to appear 'responsible and reasonable' in front of mass audiences, 
Another criticism might be that inevitably, as the mass media tend to 
focus on personalities rather than issues, there is the particular 
danger of a working-class leadership loosing its connections with the 
ordinary workers and, in turn, beginning to overestimate their own 
importance as individuals.
By contrast to the colourful and, at times, somewhat overpowering 
fluency of Reid, Jimmy Airlie's style of operation was considerably 
more low-key. His constituency, was first and foremost in the yards 
themselves and it remained there. Like Reid, Airlie was also an 
engineer and therefore, in terms of the Govan labour force where the 
seat of industrial power lay with the boilexmnakers, he too had to 
have a fairly strong degree of personal and political self-confidence 
to survive the rough and tumble of shop floor politics, Airlie's
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strength lay in his overall organisational ability and in the 
fact that, whatever they might have thought of his politics, here 
iwas a man that workers instinctively knew could not be bought over 
by the bosses. If Reid was a 'high-flier', Airlie symbolised a 
solid, disciplined and down-to-earth approach. In contrast to 
Reid's almost cerebral and occasionally mannered tone, Airlie spoke 
from the gut. He may not have been the object of adulation by his 
fellow workers but when he spoke, they believed what he said.
The third member of the group, Sammy Barr, was perhaps 
inevitably, because of his location in the smaller yard of Scotstoun, 
a figure who tended to stay in the background, 'Wee Sammy' as he 
was known was a much more diffident character than the other two 
and as a public speaker prone to the occasional hesitancy. Never­
theless, in terms of the industrial politics of the yards Barr's 
role in leading the Scotstoun boilermakers was a crucial one. It 
meant that for the boilermakers as a whole there was at least one 
prominent convener who was politically progressive and able to use 
his influence among his fellow stewards to head off the wilder 
excesses of sectionalism to which the boilermakers membership had 
shown itself prone to. In that sense, Barr provided the role of 
'anchorman' on the Boilermakers* District Committee, in enabling 
the boilermakers and indeed McCarvey himself, to come to terras with 
the new situation which the UCS had created, in particular, in terms 
of the Govan and Marathon agreements. Like Reid and Airlie, Barr 
also was a man of acute perception who understood the way workers 
thought even though at times, especially towards the end of the 
struggle, it must have filled him with dispair.
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If the Communist Party did not direct the struggle at UCS 
in any day-to-day manner it would be incorrect to imagine that 
there were not continuing consultations with senior Party Officials 
and reports to the Scottish Committee of the Party, The links 
between Jimmy Reid and Scottish Secretary Alex Murray were, for 
example, particularly close and from the very earliest hint of 
the crisis at UCS Murray had been involved in discussions with 
the shop stewards, (52) In this regard the estimate of Ken Alexander 
may not be too far off the mark that,
"As it was a Commimist steward who proposed the work-in at 
the formal meeting of all stewards it seems reasonable to 
credit the Communist Party and its shop stewards with the 
initiatives." (53)
The really important point, however., is not so much the background 
discussions which took place as the fact that the Communist Party 
performed what is its essential role in the labour movement, of 
helping workers to formulate their previous experiences of class 
struggle, in this instance of battles over redundancies, and to 
draw the lessons from them. In other words, what matters is not 
whether the tactic of the work-in was first discussed among a few 
Communists at the Glasgow Party offices. Rather, that on the basis of 
having some of the most class conscious and experienced members of 
the working class in its ranks, the Party could offer guidance to 
the workers through its members in UCS in the form of a tactical 
innovation which precisely met the requirements of the challenge 
they faced. It was the job of Reid, Airlie, Barr and the others 
to convince their fellow workers that the action they proposed had 
some realistic chance of success. If the workers themselves had 
not been ready to fight no ajnount of persuasion could have moved 
them into action. The Party can initiate and guide but it cannot
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direct workers to take up a militant posture. They had to arrive 
at this themselves out of their own experience.
So far as the numerous other occupations which followed in 
the wake of UCS are concerned it is interesting to observe, that 
while Communists were involved in some of these actions, nowhere 
did they provide the solid core of leadership as at UCS, In the 
majority of cases, while there may have been one or two Communists 
on shop stewards committees it seems to have been more often the 
Labour Party and those of no party who provided the bulk of the 
activists. (54) Those who were seeking 'reds under the beds' were 
sadly disappointed. It is true, that in the engineering union, 
which was involved in many of the actions there was a fair Communist 
presence among the shop stewards and that in the Manchester area 
the full-time official who was involved in the wage-claim sit-ins 
was a Party member. However, the idea of the Party instructing its 
members to place themselves in the forefront of actions elsewhere 
far less instigate them at the drop of a hat, simply does not hold 
water, (55) If the work-in could not have been 'imposed' by the 
Party on the UCS workers, nor could it have been imposed on workers 
elsewhere. It is worth noting that there was no attempt by the 
Party to mechanically recommend the adoption of the tactic of 
work-in to groups of workers in other parts of the country.
Indeed, even by the middle of September 1971 when UCS was seen by 
the Communist Party's National Executive Committee to be "at the 
centre of anti-Tory struggle" it was felt that the tactic was 
"not necessarily the model for what can or should be attempted 
everyifhere. " (56)
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Ken Coates provides a useful summary comment-,
"While Communists played an obvious and effective part in 
the leadership of the UCS work-in itself, the rush of 
answering responses around the Clyde was certainly 
spontaneous and those trade union officials who were most 
actively enthused about repeating the experiment were not 
noteably linked with any particular left-wing current."(57)
The fact that the UCS work-in was led by Communists, however, 
obviously had a considerable impact on those workers within the 
yards who were sympathetic to the Party. In fact, Party member­
ship of the shipbuilding branch doubled to over 100 during the 
UCS campaign. However, while the branch conducted a continuing 
series of classes in Marxist education and the normal discussions 
of workplace issues took place, the actual involvement of the 
ordinary branch members in deciding the tactics of the struggle 
was peripheral. (58) They were given no prior information or 
instructions about what to argue with their fellow workers.
Indeed, specifically Communist branch activity in the yards as a 
whole, in terms of producing political bulletins, selling the 
Morning Star or even attempts at involving the new recruits in the 
life of the Party branch seems to have been at a fairly low level.
In time, many of the recruits that were won, perhaps inevitably, 
drifted away from the Party, The idea that Reid, ‘Airlie and Barr 
regularly reported to a disciplined collective of their fellow 
comrades does not match the reality of the situation. If they were 
active in regular Party work at all during this period, for Reid 
and Airlie in particular, it was primarily as 'star* speakers at the 
numerous rallies in support of UCS which the Party organised up and 
down the country. There was an-understandable tendency to project 
the Party through the persona of R;id, especially since he was
369 <
the figure who people had come to identify with UCS through the 
mass media. At such rallies target figures as high as .two hundred 
new recruits were actively contemplated by the Party leadership.
There was a sense in which it was felt that Reid could do no wrong 
given his role in UCS, despite the fact that a number of other areas 
of his all-round work as a Communist, particularly in his responsibilities 
as a Clydebanlc town councillor were clearly not receiving the proper 
attention,
Reid had first been elected Communist councillor for the 7th Ward 
of Paifley in Clydebanlc in I968. Two other Communists, both redoubtable 
figures in terras of their long involvement in local politics and in the 
industrial struggle of the area, Jock Smith and Finlay Hart, also 
represented the Faifley ward. Another Communist on the Town Council, 
representing the 4th Ward, was Arnold Henderson, a popular and much 
respected local personality who had first been elected in 1945 had 
retained unbroken membership on the Town Council with the exception of 
1957 when he was ousted for a year. A former convener at John Broom's 
a leading figure on the local Trades Council and the 'father* of the 
Town Council as its longest serving member, Arnold was active in the 
struggles of the workplace and the locality. He provided a model of 
how a Communist councillor should conduct himself. His deep roots 
in the local industry and in the community enabled him to take up 
the problems and grievances of those, and there were very many, who 
came to his door for advice and assistance, A personal humility 
combined with crackling energy, and a dash of acid working-class 
wit made him an individual who spontaneously inspired affection and 
respect. It was for this reason that local organisations, the 
Communist Party and the Scottish peace movement, in which he wa,s 
also a leading figure, always called on Arnold to conduct the appeal 
for funds at the end of a meeting or rally, a difficult job which far
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from regarding as being beneath him, he always conducted with 
immense style and humour and, it should be said, effectiveness.
Together with Arnold Henderson, Reid, Smith and Hart comprised 
what was a formidable group on Clydebank Town Council, working 
closely with the progressive Labour councillors on a whole range of 
campaigns, but particularly on housing, a burning issue given Clyde- 
ban's avj'ful legacy of destruction following its wartime blitz by 
the Germans. The German bombers had been seeking to destroy the 
yards, but they had missed. Instead, the town was devastated,
Provost Flemming's bitter comment about the Tories attempting to do 
to Clydebank yard what the Germans had failed to do thus reverberated 
with never-to-be-forgotten memories of the townsfolk,
Reid had been returned as a councillor in May 1971, after 
three years as a sitting councillor, although out of the 3,000 votes 
cast, his new majority of 500 was much reduced. At that time he 
made the claim that 'certain factions' in the Labour Party were 
trying to oust him, (59) His record of work on the Council, however, 
thereafter declined as the events of UCS claimed his attention. 
Indeed, even the normally sympathetic Provost Fleming described 
Reid's attendance of Council meetings as 'sparse*. (60) While some 
allowance could have been made in terms of the immediate demands 
of the sti*uggle, there were other lapses which should not have been 
allowed to pass, although in fairness it should be pointed out that 
Reid was at that time under enormous pressure which resulted in 
several periods of illness.
In fact, Reid's main contribution to the work of the Council 
came when the UCS struggle was over. This was in the Clydebank 
campaign against the Conservative's housing finance legislation.
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The provisions of the 1972 Act on housing finance differed in 
certain respects in Scotland from that applying to the rest of the 
country, but in essence the purpose of both Acts was to compel 
local authorities to bring municipal rents more into line with 
market forces under the heading of the 'standard rent' in Scotland 
and elsewhere, the so-called 'fair rent', which was also eventually 
to operate north of the border as well. What this meant was a 
doubling of rents by the financial year 1975-76 and also the ending 
of controlled rents in the private sector. If ever there was an 
issue and a time when it seemed possible that shop floor militancy 
could be linked up with mass resistance in the localities and for 
the first time, drawing together public and private tenants, then 
this appeared to be it. Early in 1972 many local authorities such 
as Clydebanlc, where left Labour, Cummunist and SNP councillors were 
united in their opposition to the Act, voted for non-implementation, 
often, again as in Clydebank, with the declared support of local 
trade unions and trades councils. With the legislation due to come 
into operation in October 1972, the National Executive Committee of 
the Labour Party recommended all Labour councils not to impose the 
rent increases which amounted to 5Op per week in the first instance. 
Its support, however, was less than wholehearted since it left the 
decision on what course of action to pursue very much up to individual 
councils.
By the summer of 1972, twenty-seven local authorities in England 
and Wales including major cities such as Liverpool and Birmingham had 
voted for non-implementation. In Scotland, besides Clydebank, other 
areas with large numbers of council houses were Glasgow with 140,000 
council houses, Dundee with 33*000 and major industrial areas in
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Lanarkshire and Fife. These had also joined the campaign, (61 ) 
However, within six months, it had become increasingly obvious that 
among many Labour councils the opposition was purely token. Faced 
with the tlireat of Government sanctions, twenty-two authorities 
south of the border and in Scotland, Dundee and Glasgow corporations 
eventually voted for implementation, (62) In Glasgow, thirty-three 
Labour councillors united with the Conservatives in a free vote to 
produce a 58-41 majority reversing their previous stand, after a 
Government appointed Recorder had conducted a public inquiry. (63)
In the mutual recriminations which followed, Dick Dynes, the right- 
wing leader of the Labour Group on the Corporation and the tenants' 
and trade union organisations each blamed the other. One thing was 
certain, that with Glasgow, the largest Scottish municipal housing 
authority, now out of the struggle, the possibility of developing 
a wider movement on rents would prove immeasurably more difficult.
It was a major set-back from which the campaign never fully recovered.
The truth was, however, that national support for rent strikes 
against the increases was not at a high level, while despite valiant 
efforts from the tenants' movement led in Scotland by Finlay Hart 
and Bill Towill, the turnout on mass demonstrations had been 
disappointing. Part of the difficulty was undoubtedly the
sheer scale of organisation which would have been required to conduct 
successful rent strikes, and in Scotland in particular, the long­
standing fear of falling into rent arrears with the consequent 
threat of eviction, undoubtedly played a role in inhibiting the 
development of a genuine mass movement. (64) The leadership of the 
labour movement in particular the Clyde Confederation led by 
Alex Ferrie and the shop stewards In the major enterprises supported 
militant action but %ith one or two possible exceptions the necessary
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mood of resistance among the workers themselves on the factory 
floor, failed to crystalise. Unlike the situation which emerged 
during I9I5-I6, the workers in Fairfields, for example, no longer
i
immediately identified with their housing problems on the doorstep 
of the yard in Govan, They were now scattered more widely over the 
city. Moreover, the visible class enemy in the shape of 'the 
Factor's man' calling to collect increased rents every Friday night 
was no longer present as an immediate focus of opposition* The 
"Factor" now was a Labour-controlled local authority. Furthermore, 
the Government legislation, especially in Scotland, meant that the 
increases were in the main, introduced piecemeal fashion, rather 
than the kind of sudden increases which might have provoked wide­
spread opposition, (65)
Eventually, only Clay Gross in Derbyshire with a population 
of 8,400 and Clydebank were left to stand alone. In Clay Cross, 
a Labour council led by David Skinner continued to defy the Govern­
ment which sent in Housing Commissioners to implement the Act,
The Government surcharged the eleven members of the council a sum 
of £556 each while disqualifying them from office for 5 years.
Six of the councillors were declared bankrupt as a result of 
proceedings arising from their campaign and attempts to indemnify 
them by the next Labour Government resulted in fierce parliamentary 
battles in which, as in the case of the savage sentences passed on 
the Shrewsbury pickets, the right-wing Labour leaders clearly 
rented on their moral obligation to correct what the trade union 
movement saw as blatant class judgements by the courts. (66) As 
Harold Wilson said of the Clay Cross rebels,
"I have always made it clear-that the law of the land, 
however unfair, however divisive, must be obeyed until 
it is repealed." (67)
374,
Although the Clay Cross rebels had the Derbyshire miners as 
a potential base of industrial support, this was not enough to 
sustain them. Clydebank had a much wider industrial base to draw 
upon and in the early stages of the campaign it looked very much 
as if a powerful movement was building up. As in Glasgow and 
elsewhere, a public inquiry was held into the non-implementation of 
the Act in the last week of December 1972. Three hundred local shop 
stewards marched into the To;m Hall and dominated the whole proceedings. 
The Reporter for the Government was forced to adjourn the proceedings 
requesting that a large banner at the back of the hall reading 
"UCS WORKERS DEMAND NO RENT INCREASES" to be taken down and that no 
'political* speeches be given in evidence. During the adjournment, 
however, the local conveners took the opportunity to make a number 
of 'political' statements while despite pleas from the Lord Provost 
and union officials, the UCS banner remained unfurled, and indeed, 
the Singer's workers hoisted theirs as well. When the Reporter 
finally resumed the inquiry, the banners stayed, (68)
Then in February 1973 the councillors were talcen to the Court 
of Session and fined £5,000 for contempt. Those councillors in 
favour of continued defiance outnumbered those against by 13 to 8, 
and in this instance a £4,000 contribution towards the fine was 
made from the UCS Fighting Fund. (69) By December of that year, 
the Council was fined a further £20,000 and a special meeting of 
the Council showed that they were now almost evenly split on whether 
to fight on or surrender, (70) With the threat of surcharge and 
possibly imprisonment now looming, a public appeal was launched by 
the trade union movement to help pay the fine. However, with two 
weeks in which to pay and only a trickle of money coming into the
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fund, the inevitable was finally confronted and the fine paid at 
the last moment from the burgh rates. With only the two SNP 
councillors against, a gesture resented as rather cheap opportunism, 
the Council voted to .end the campaign. (71 ) Scottish Secretary, 
Gordon Campbell was actively considering whether to surcharge the 
councillors for improper use of public funds when the Government 
lost the election a few weeks later. By any standards, however, 
it was a bitter defeat.
For Reid too it was a defeat and not just in the public 
identification of the Communist councillors with the campaign.
It was, in the latter stages at least, a fight which while clearly 
not winnable, Reid had been persuaded to continue with against his 
own personal inclination. Enormous pressure from the highest levels 
inside the Communist Party had been put on him and on leading members 
of the Scottish Party to continue the battle when it was already 
obvious that mass support, if it was ever there, had substantially 
evaporated as the trade union movement turned its attention to the 
economic crisis of the three-day week and the miners* strike. It 
was to be one of the episodes which perhaps sowed the seeds of 
Reid's eventual disaffection with the Communist Party,
(iii) Reid's Parliamentary and AUEW Elections.
To his credit, Reid was not a man to run away to lick his 
wounds in private. Lack of political courage was not one of his 
failings and when within a matter of days of the rents débâcle, a 
General Election was announced, he agreed, as he had previously 
done in 1970, to stand as a candidate in the Central Dunbartonshire 
constituency. The February 1974 election campaign was remarkable in
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many respects, not least because the ex-secretary.of the local 
Labour Party and several of his constituency members played a 
leading role in campaigning for Reid. Besides those who had come 
over from the Labour Party, Reid's election coam ittee comprised
I
individuals from a number of different backgrounds including 
professional journalists, and public relations experts who gave 
their services free of charge. Reid was clearly seen by these 
people as 'the man of the hour' representing a new force in 
Scottish politics with considerable charismatic appeal. From all 
over the country too, young Communist Party members came to Clyde­
bank to work for Reid's election and for older comrades there were 
memories of the campaigns in Fife in the 1950*s for Willie Gallagher, 
the last Communist MP.
To walk with the candidate down Clydebank's Kilbowie Road 
was an amazing experience. From all sides, young and old greeted 
him or waved and shouted support. His popularity seemed to be 
overwhelming. Even hardened Communist Party electoral workers 
for whom a few hundred votes for a candidate in an election was 
seen as a good result, began to believe that perhaps here at last 
they were on the point of a political breakthrough. The Daily 
Record some of whose journalists were involved in the campaign, had 
given Reid some sympathetic publicity as had the local press.
It seemed as if the Reid bandwagon was unstoppable. Perhaps it was 
the infectious excitement of the whole campaign which persuaded 
those who were a little uneasy about the 'razamataz* surrounding 
the candidate to quell their doubts. For one thing, Reid was being 
projected as 'the labour movement candidate*. No mention was made 
in any of his election material of the word 'Communist'. The
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publicity, handouts and posters read *THE WORKERS' CANDIDATE*,
'THE WORKER THAT WORKERS CAN TRUST* while button badges and car- 
stickers simply said *I*M FOR REID *. (72) V/hile it could be argued 
that everyone knew that Reid spoke as a Communist, the conscious 
downplaying of this crucial, aspect of the candidate's identity, 
perhaps under the influence of the journalists and public relations 
experts, could be construed as a rather pathetic if not somewhat 
dishonest attempt to package the candidate in a politically innocuous 
wrapper. This seemed to be confirmed when it was discovered that 
on Reid's nomination papers, the candidate was simply described 
as an 'Engineering Worker*. When the newspapers got onto this, it 
required a last minute dash to the council offices to make the 
necessary correction, (73)
As the campaign developed, it became increasingly vicious with 
ugly rumours about Reid's alleged luxury suburban villa and foreign 
holidays ostensibly paid for from the UCS Fighting Fund. The 
Labour candidate, Hugh McCartney, not known either for his charisma 
or his record of speeches on the floor of the Commons, was described 
by Reid's supporters as the 'invisible man*. The kind of bad feeling 
which emerged was typified when Reid and his supporters turned up 
at the gates of Marathon to address the workers and found none 
other than Danny McCarvey already there, speaking on behalf of 
McCartney, Something of a 'slanging match* developed as the Reid 
camp moved off to hold their meeting fifty yards away, leaving 
McCarvey with one hundred of an audience to Reid's four hundred.
And then a wholly new element intruded upon the campaign.
An address prepared by twenty Roman Catholic clergymen in the 
Clydebank area,.including Bishop Thomas Winning, auxiliary Bishop
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of Glasgow, was read out in the chapels of Faifley, Duntocher and 
Clydebank, the Sunday before the election. While not mentioning 
Reid by name, it said however,
"The church has always condemned Communism because 
Communism, by its nature, no matter how it may be 
disguised, rejects God and religion and destroys 
human freedom," (75)
Catholics were urged to vote according to their 'Christian 
conscience'. The fact that Reid was a self-proclaimed 'Christian 
Marxist' and indeed had himself been seen recently at chapels in 
the Clydebank area, was not it seems, enough to save him. Bishop 
Winning in a lengthy interview in the following day's Daily Record 
described Reid as 'an enemy of the Church,... trying to present the 
acceptable face of Communism', (76) It was it seemed, a case of 
the devil citing scripture so far as the Church regarded Reid's 
Christianity, (77) No similar advice was given in the 14 other 
seats where Communists were standing. It was an intervention which 
many regarded as misconceived, particularly when as the election 
result showed, although Winning's address may have been a factor 
in this, that Reid was not even a serious challenge to McCartney's 
vote. While Reid had more than trebled his vote to 5»928, McCartney 
was re-elected with a clear majority of 6,664 votes over the 
Conservative candidate. In fact Reid only just managed to beat the 
SNP candidate by 22 votes. (78) This defeat appeared to rankle with 
Reid who attacked the 'gutter-type tactics used in the last days of 
the election' to try and discredit him, (79) It was a charge he 
repeated when with a much reduced vote of 3*417 in a somewhat lower- 
key campaign in the October 1974 election, he attacked the local 
Labour Party in an angry outburst as 'Falangists', something for
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which they later found it very hard to forgive him. (80) Indeed, 
when in the succeeding six months he failed to attend a single council 
meeting and neglected to request leave of absence, moves were made 
to remove him from the council altogether, (01)
Not only was Reid's poor attendance at Council meetings a 
matter of criticism but so also was his record at the Marathon yard 
where he held the position of convener of the engineering workers.
This may well have been an important factor in the outcome of ATTEV/ 
elections for which Reid stood as a candidate. If the label 
'Communist* proved to be an electoral millstone for Reid, there was 
always the hope that in trade union politics where Communists were 
more readily accepted, his undoubted talents would be rewarded with 
the kind of support which the voters had been reluctant to give him 
in parliamentary elections. Reid decided to stand for a place on 
the national executive of the engineering union against Gavin Laird, 
ex-convener of Singers and the union's Scottish and North of England 
regional secretary. (82) Laird was a 'moderate' who possessed all 
the fervent hatred of an unfrocked priest for the Communist Party 
which he had left at the time of the Hungarian uprising. The 
election of Reid would be crucial in shifting the balance of 
forces to the left in the union and strengthen the growing opposition 
in the labour movement to the Social Contract. Indeed, no less a 
person than Scanlon backed his candidature at a meeting of 
Engineering Voice, the broad left forum within the union, (83)
Reid lost, however, in a postal ballot, a form of election which 
the left of the union argued gave the media unprecedented opportunities 
to interfere in the affairs of the union by influencing its members 
outside the union’s normal democratic structures. (84) When Laird's
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job fell vacant, Reid decided to stand again for the position 
of regional organiser this time against Tom Dougan of the Labour 
Party, also a 'moderate' convener at Caterpillar Tractors in 
Lanarkshire, and against a left-winger, Ron Brown, at that time 
a Lothian councillor, (85) Then, ten days into the campaign in 
February 1976 the bombshell dropped. Reid wrote a letter of 
resignation to the Communist Party, catching both the national and 
Scottish leadership totally by surprise. (86) The letter was 
subsequently printed in the Morning Star and contained a number of 
severe criticisms of the Party, (87) Reid later reiterated these 
in a two-part article in Tribune which provoked a continuing 
correspondence. (88) \'/hether the timing of the resignation had 
anything to do with Reid's campaign for union office is a matter 
of conjecture. Certainly there were long standing unresolved 
differences between him and the Party.
In any event, the fact that the 'millstone' was now removed 
from his neck was not enough to give him the outright majority he 
needed. In the first ballot in March Reid polled 13,389 votes, 
Lougan 9,662 and Brown 5,704 on a 20 per cent vote out of a possible
140,000 members, (89) In the second ballot in November 1976 between 
Dougan and Reid, Reid again lost, this time by a mere 81 votes, (90) 
Reid threatened legal action while Sunday Mail journalists uncovered 
startling anomolies in the conduct of the election. Hundreds of 
members in such strongholds of the left as the Timex Milton factory 
in Dundee and indeed, even the Dundee AUEW branch president 
Harry McLevy, did not receive ballot papers, while ex-members of 
the union who had left over three years ago had received them, much
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to their surprise. (9I) The executive, however, refused to allow a 
new ballot and the result stood while Reid eventually dropped his 
action. (92)
A couple of months prior to this, Reid had himself taken the 
next logical step. After offers from the SNP and from the pro­
devolution breakaway Scottish Labour Party, led by Jim Sillars MP,
Reid formally applied to join the Labour Party, The day after he 
lost the union election, his application to join was, however, 
turned down by the Lalmuir branch who still remembered his past 
attacks on McCartney, After a two week wait while his appeal was 
heard at national level, he was finally accepted. Within nine 
months he was adopted Labour candidate for Dundee East, an 
unprecedented occurence since Labour Party rules required a 
membership of two years as a prerequisite for a pariiamentæ:y candidate, 
Even now his troubles were not over since his candidature although 
subsequently ratified, was opposed by the right-wing Manifesto group 
of MP's. (93) The following year, Reid quit the yards altogether 
to launch himself on a career that anyway had increasingly absorbed 
his time since he first achieved public prominence, that of a 
broadcaster, quiz panellist and free-lance journalist. Reid had 
been made the 'darling of the media' and it was to the media that 
he turned for succour when his base, first in the yards, then in 
the union and finally in the Communist Party either slipped or was 
kicked away from him. There had been many loyal hard-v/orking 
comrades who Reid derisively referred to as the sellers of 'sweep 
tickets' who 'spoke deferentially to party officials', who had been 
concerned that the wooing of Reid by the media would lead to his 
eventual seduction, (94) The danger was that with the limelight 
focused on an individual, the individual concerned would come to see
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himself as entirely above the collective influence of the Party, 
Unfortunately the warnings of this offered by older experienced 
comrades were ignored by the leadership, (95) In part, the shock 
and disappointment felt by so many when Reid finally decided to 
resign from the Party was precisely because ordinary Party members 
had also been allowed to regard Reid as a hero-figure. None of 
this is to detract from the outstanding contribution which Reid 
made during the UCS campaign itself but rather to point to certain 
weaknesses within the Party, which was perhaps overawed by the 
success of the publicity which surrounded the UCS struggle and Reid 
in particular, and the discovery that here was a figure who could 
at last give them a certain credibility in terms of a wide and 
sympathetic public opinion.
If there were weaknesses in the Party's style of work there 
were also great strengths which the UCS campaign illustrated. Not 
only could the Party assist in formulating the objective of the 
UCS struggle but it was capable of mobilising solidarity among 
industrial workers in an unrivalled manner. Obviously the role of 
the Morning Star in informing workers elsewhere about UCS was of 
key importance. The question remains, however, as to whether or 
not the Party developed the full potential which the UCS struggle 
might have offered of mobilising a broader and more sustained 
challenge not just to the policies of the Conservative Government 
but to the whole system of production for private profit. It is 
also a question of the contribution of trade union struggles to 
the development of revolutionary strategies and the raising of class 
consciousness and is an issue to which a return is made in the 
conclusion of this thesis.
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(iv) The Scottish Assembly.
Certainly, the Party was also responsible for helping 
to formulate some of the wider political initiatives which grew 
out of the UCS campaign. It would be incorrect to say that the 
Party conceived of UCS as a purely industrial struggle. Although 
UCS was a 'Right to Work' campaign and was not regarded as in itself 
likely to bring the Conservative Government down, it did provide 
the possibility of creating a platform for wider political demands 
to be raised, particularly on the question of unemployment in 
Scotland, The call for a Scottish Assembly on unemployment
initially made by the UCS stewards to the STUC, can be seen as part
of the Party's attempt to broaden out the campaign and win new
allies in the fight against the Government. (96) Reid himself was
a long-standing advocate of a Scottish Parliament, The 8TU0 
appeared the obvious vehicle to take up this call because it itself 
embodied the left unity character of the Scottish labour movement 
and was therefore capable of consolidating a broader alliance for 
change in Scotland, which had already revealed itself as a real 
potentiality in the massive solidarity which the UCS workers had 
received from wide sections of the Scottish community.
With 134,000 people out of work in Scotland, the Assembly was 
an attempt to project unemployment as a national question for the 
Scottish people not in terms of a narrow chauvinism but as first 
and foremost, an issue around which it was clearly in the interests 
of other sections of the population to unite with the trade union 
movement. While the UCS struggle had to some degree helped to 
heighten national consciousness, in that it had an obvious Scottish 
dimension, it was the role of the STUC to attempt to ensure that 
the context within which the national consciousness expressed itself
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politically, was one informed by the perspective of basically 
Socialist solutions to the nation's problems rather than simple 
separatism. The Assembly was intended to unite together class 
and nation in a way that drew an extremely broad range of public 
opinion onto a platform provided by the organised working class. 
Whether providing a platform was the same thing as providing 
political leadership and direction to the very disparate interests 
which were represented in the Assembly was another question. It 
remained to be seen whether the Assembly would crystallise a more 
enduring popular alliance. Certainly the STUC's ov/n internal 
discussions as to the purpose of the Assembly identified the need 
to create what it called.
"A 'Scottish United Front' pressing in upon and compelling 
the Government to take the essential, urgent, political 
and economic decisions to obtain full employment." (97)
This conception of a broad united front was linked with the idea 
that so far as the question of political devolution was concerned 
the Assembly should constitute a kind of provisional Scottish 
parliament. (98)
Just how wide was the field of interests represented among 
the fifteen hundred delegates to the Assembly, can be seen from 
the list of those who attended. There were representatives of 
local authorities, the new town development corporations, Scottish 
MP's, the political parties ranging from the Conservative to 
Communist Party, the universities and technical colleges, trades 
unions and trades councils, the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions and the General Council itself, the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBl), the Highlands and Islands Development
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Development Board, The Scottish Council (Development and Industry), 
Chambers of Commerce, employers federations, Port Authorities, 
nationalised industries and all major religious organisations.
The Charter of Proposals presented to the Assembly contained 
a host of suggestions as to how the Government could assist the 
regeneration of the Scottish economy, covering investment policy, 
retraining, public sector expansion and planning machinery including 
the suggestion that the Clydeside Development Authority proposed 
by the TUG might be replaced by an all-Scotland development 
authority, that is, the forerunner of the Scottish Development 
Agency (SDA). (99) In that none of the measures proposed were in 
themselves particularly radical they secured a wide measure of 
acceptance by the Assembly. Even the Chairman of the Conservative 
Party in Scotland, Sir William McEwan Younger felt moved to attack 
the over-reliance on US investment capital in Scotland which was 
threatening to turn it into a "subsidiary economy." (100) Indeed 
Chris Bauer, one of Scotland's most acute political commentators, 
noted at the time that,
"Any conference which can produce that degree of unanimity 
across the political spectrum has clearly fathered a 
unique child," (101 )
What the Assembly achieved in the first instance was a bringing 
together of all sections of Scottish life and a public airing of 
felt national grievances. It discussed a series of essentially 
interim demands designed to win the widest possible support from 
those present. As Jimmy Jack noted, however, in his reply to the 
debate on the Scottish economy at the 1972 STUC annual Conference 
in April, the sheer breadth of representation produced its o%vn 
problems for the Assembly.
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"Its weakness was in the fact that some of these organisations 
were involved to stop the Assembly going too far and this 
meant perhaps their arguments would be pitched at a lower 
level than they would be if the case was being presented by 
the Scottish TUC exclusively," (102)
To pursue its demands the Assembly set up a Standing Commission 
charged with the responsibility of bringing the agreed programme 
before the Government, (IO3) Like the Assembly itself the 
Commission was comprised of a wide range of interests although in 
retrospect it was fatally flawed in its composition. To begin with 
only two of the seventeen members (later eighteen members) of the 
Commission, James Jack and Ray MacDonald, represented the General 
Council of the STUC. Thus the trade unions, given their role in 
Scottish life, were heavily under-represented. In addition, 
presumably to enhance the 'impartiality* of the Commission, no 
representatives of the major political parties were included on it. 
This was a crucial ommission if the intention was to make the Assembly 
the first step on the road to a Scottish parliament. The political 
parties were thus at the outset deprived of a direct stake in the 
development of the work of the Assembly and its authority was 
accordingly diminished. (IO4) Moreover, and more importantly in 
terms of the future character of the Assembly, the organised 
labour and trade union movement was badly under-represented. There 
was no question therefore of the Standing Commission being able to 
prepare the ground for the forging of the kind of principled alliance 
of democratic forces which would press home a programme of demands 
that challenged the real role of monopoly capitalism in producing 
the kind of regional crisis of which TICS was entirely symptomatic.
It was an error which had to be paid for with a vengeance when the 
recalled Assembly met in Edinburgh a year later. The SNP had held
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a special ®pre“Assembly* conference in Stirling the day before and 
their supporters attempted to reduce the proceedings to a virtual 
shambles by loudly heckling all the speakers who did not place the 
! blame for all of Scotland's ills on the Westminster Government.
The SNP were accused-by Ray MacDonald who was the chairman, of 
''packing* the Assembly, (IO5) Indeed, of the 953 delegates 
present, I48 were from the SNP. (106) The sad fact was that the 
Assembly itself was unable to contain the gross opportunism of the 
SNP's intervention. Significantly, at the second Scottish Assembly 
the question of oil discoveries in the North Sea now figured as 
prominently as unemployment which in the previous twelve months 
had been somewhat reduced. (107)
In many ways the subsequent rise of the SNP in the 1970*8 
can be seen as part of the political backwash from initiatives 
taken although latterly lost, in the first instance arising directly 
out of the UCS crisis, William Wolfe, then chairman of the SNP 
was later to observe,
"I believe that the lead and example given by the men of 
the TICS, and the women of the UCS was an important element 
in the rise of support for the Scottish National Party.” (108)
In part also this peculiarly Scottish flavour was of course 
something which the UCS stewards themselves encouraged. In 
particular, Reid's references to the lack of sympathy or understanding 
for their problems in Whitehall and Westminster and the continued 
claim that the UCS were fighting on behalf of the whole Scottish 
people should be noted. The fostering of nationalist sentiment, as 
against the struggle for Scottish nationhood within the context of 
a general assault on capitalist exploitation, is a subtle distinction 
which was lost in the minds of many in the excitement of mass meetings
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and demonstrations. Perhaps more should have been done to ensure 
that only the progressive content of the struggle for national 
identity would be preserved. This also in a sense was the failure 
of the STUC's Scottish Assembly.
The SNP were able to seize the political initiative under 
the slogan 'Its Scotland's Oil'. (109) It was during this period 
that the first major oil concessions in the North Sea were handed 
out to the multinationals on somewhat generous terms by Lord Polwarth 
on behalf of the Conservative Government, The SNP increased their 
MP's from 1 in 1970 to 7 in the February 1974 election and 11 in 
the October election of that year. With 5O per cent of the vote 
they replaced the Tories as the second largest party in Scotland 
in terms of votes and succeeded in coming second in 42 Scottish 
constituencies of which 3^ were Labour held. This was the factor 
which was probably responsible more than anything else in persuading 
the Labour Party, with some misgivings, to commit itself to an 
elected legislative Assembly for Scotland if it achieved a majority 
in October 1974. (IIO) However, the entire campaign for a Scottish 
Assembly was throughout hindered by the less than united and whole­
hearted support of the Labour Party in Scotland.
Although the Assembly was subsequently abandoned by the STUC 
with the question of Scottish devolution later to be taken up ty 
the succeeding Labour Government, the Standing Commission appointed 
by the first Assembly in 1972 had held three discussion meetings.
In March it also met Heath, Davies .and Campbell at Downing Street 
to present its basic proposals. The Government was, however, able 
to claim that most of what was put forward in the Assembly's Charter 
was contained in their recent budget measures and their White Paper
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on 'Industrial and Regional Development' published on Thursday 
March 23rd, just a few days previously. (111) The Commission 
which had not yet been able to study the White Paper therefore, 
had the wind taken out of its sails to some extent. At the 
prompting of the STUC, the Standing Commission met again in the 
summer of 1972 to consider how it could lend its weight to the 
campaign to resist threatened redundancies in the steel industry 
caused by BSC's closure of a number of open hearth furnaces in 
Scotland and to take up the Charter's demand for an integrated 
iron and steel complex at Hunterston. Thereafter, however, the 
work of the Commission was severely circumscribed by the refusal 
of the Prime Minister on three separate occasions to have any 
further meeting with its members. In late October the Commission 
met for the last time and agreed to reconvene the Scottish Assembly 
in January 1973 but by then much of the original promise and 
impetus for the whole campaign had been lost. (112) Indeed, 
characteristic of the failure of the organised working class to 
give leadership and direction to the work of the Standing Commission 
was the fact that it was this body rather than the STtTC which was 
allowed to convene the second Assembly,
It was therefore, almost inevitable that the Scottish Assembly 
should eventually founder. Even the Heath Government's increasing 
concern with regional problems probably had as much to do with 
preparing the way for Britain's entry into the EEC as with any 
pressure exerted by the Standing Commission, although as is argued 
below, the UCS crisis brought the regional issue dramatically into 
focus. To have become the really authoritative spokesman for the 
Scottish people the Assembly needed to find an organisational form 
which, far from just meeting every few months and addressing itself
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purely to Government ministers, coüld do what the UCS campalgTi 
had shown to he at least a possibility, namely involve the 
broadest masses of the people themselves in some form of continuous 
activity and mass struggle. It was a considerable s.chievement of 
the STUC to have attempted to develop the feelings of anger and 
frustration which had arisen out of the UCS collapse in such a 
way to raise the issue of a wider unity in defence of Scotland's 
interests. (II3) The tragedy was that it did not succeed in 
pushing forward the drive to Scottish nationhood on the crest of 
the mounting waves of class anger which were building up in 
Scotland not just on the question of unemployment, but around the 
Industrial Relations Act, and miners' strike, which were the twin 
hammer blows that were eventually to break the Heath Government. (II4)
(v) The U-turn,
In one very important respect the UCS struggle did produce 
a major shift in Government policy. With unemployment reaching 
one million and frightened by the possibility of a mmiber of 
potential UCS-type situations occurring elsewhere the Heath 
Government did an about-d'ace. The famous U-turn was in fact a 
direct response to the political pressures UCS had generated with 
regard to the question of miemploym.ent and the 'Right to Work',
The massive aid to Govan Shipbuilders and the assistance to
Marathon were the first major concessions to a new more interventionist
stylo of economic management^ In terms of the wider political
arena the scale of this shift in the Conservative Government's
overall, economic strategy only later became ful.ly apparent with
the publication of the White Paper on 'Industrial., and Regional
Development* at the end of March 1S7R and Chancellor of the Exchequer,
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Anthony Barber's reflationary budget package of the same month which 
contained tax reduction amounting to £1,200 million and finally, 
with the Industry Act of 1972 which was based on the earlier White 
Paper.
It should be remembered that the Conservative Government's 
initial attitude to intervention in the 'free play of market forces' 
had been clearly enunciated by John Davies at the 1970 Conservative 
Party Conference.
"I will not bolster up or bale out companies where I can see 
no end to the process of propping them up.” (115)
Whereas previous interventions such as the nationalisation of 
Rolls Royce could be regarded as 'exceptional cases' it was 
difficult to construe the new measures as anything other than a 
reversal of policy, a reversal bitterly resented by many Conservative 
MP's which was to sow the seeds of fundamental inner-Party dissent 
and provoke sharp criticism from the CBI, (116)
A brief examination of the terms of the White Paper and the 
subsequent Industry Act indicates as one writer has put it, "not 
just a revolution in regional policy. V/hat was really revolutionary 
was the change in Government philosophy." (117) Dealing first 
with regional policy it can be noted that when the Conservatives 
took office in 1970 they were determined to replace the system of 
direct grants to firms by broader tax incentives, a policy which 
favoured the more commercially successful. (118) Investment grants 
on plant and machinery were abolished and whole apparatus of the 
Industrial Development Corporation set up by the Labour Government 
was discontinued and the 19&8 Industrial Expansion Act repealed.
The new system was based on tax incentives. (119) The problem was
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that to be truly effective such an approach required an expanding 
economy and a high level of investment which had failed to materialise,
 ^ With the publication of the White Paper a complete reversal of 
regional policy was effected. It was one of the most interventionist 
proposals of any administration, Labour or Conservative, since the 
war. As The Economist commented rather dourly at the time,
"The lengths to which the Government was prepared to eat its 
words in the interests of getting the economy moving were not 
really clear until Mr. John Davies published the detailed 
schemes of regional incentives on Wednesday. There had been 
rumours in and out of Whitehall during the past three months 
that the Government was thinking both of restoring investment 
grants and resurrecting the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation, not much more than a year after they had both 
been abolished. They seemed too improbable to gain much 
credence. But this week the rumours came close to being true." (120)
As the White Paper indicated.
"New measures to stimulate industrial growth and create 
fresh confidence are needed. They must be as clear, simple 
and certain in their impact as possible," (121)
The measures proposed included not only restoring investment grants 
in plant and machinery which had previously only been available in 
the development areas but extending these to the whole country as 
was the tax allowance on new industrial building. The actual 
estimated cost of these grants was to be £365 million in 1973-74 
rising to £700 million in 1975-7^. Moreover, the new grants were 
not to be limited simply to projects creating new employment but 
available to help with improvements and modernisatLcn. The Economist 
calculated that £100 investment in Glasgow, would now have a net 
cost in the first year of only £38 compared with £éO in the south­
east. (122) Not only did the Conservatives restore differentials 
previously abandoned but they now exceeded anything which had been
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available under the Labour Government. (123) In addition, a new 
junior minister at the DTI Christopher Chataway who was to figure 
in the Marathon negotiations was appointed. An Industrial Develop­
ment Executive with considerable greater powers of regional discretion 
than had existed under the IDG was established with staff drawn from 
the city and industry as well as the civil service.
It was in Part 11 of the Industry Act itself that the logic
of the U-turn was clearly spelled out under clauses 7 and 8 dealing 
with what was termed 'selective assistance'. Clause 7 was confined 
to the so-called assisted areas includingthe whole of Scotland, the 
North of England as far down as Yorkshire, and Wales and the South- 
West. The Government was empowered to provide financial assistance 
where this is "likely to provide, maintain or safeguard employment 
in any part of the assisted areas", for the following purposes:
"(a) to promote the development or modernisation of an 
industry,
(b) to promote the efficiency of an industry,
(c) to create, expand or sustain productive capacity in
an industry, or in undertakings in an industry,
(d) to promote the reconstruction, reorganisation or 
conversion of an industry or of undertakings in an 
industry,
(e) to encourage the growth of, or the proper distribution 
of, undertakings in àn industry,
(f) to encourage arrangements for ensuring that any 
contraction of an industry proceeds in an orderly 
way." (124)
The wording was in places almost identical to the Labour Government's 
Act. Clause 8, which applied to the whole country, allowed the 
Government to intervene directly for all the purposes outlined in 
Clause 7 wherever such aid was "likely to benefit the economy of
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the United Kingdom, or any part or area of the United Kingdom" 
and is "in the national interest" and could not he provided from 
any other source. (125)
Thus the Government now had unlimited powers to intervene in 
the economy and moreover there was added provision made for ship­
building amounting to £50 million of special production grants over 
a three year period. (l2é) As Bruce-Gardyne complained during the 
Second Reading of the Industry Bill, the Upper Clyde was its real 
'raison d'etre'. (127) It was Benn, however, who really rubbed 
John Davies' nose in it during the debate.
"It is no secret that at present the reason why the Treasury 
Bench is so empty is that the Cabinet are rethinking Selsdon 
in the security of Chequers. Their rethinking of Selsdon 
arises because they have discovered that the policies devised 
at Selsdon, which commanded great support from them in the 
past, including support from the hon. member for Cirencester 
and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), have created a political situation 
which they cannot sustain," (128)
The philosophy of Selsdon was dead. V/hat killed it was the totally 
unanticipated level of class militancy generated by the UCS right 
to work campaign, against the background of rising unemployment 
and the manifest failure of the Conservatives to stimulate economic 
expansion. As Labour Research put it, the causes of the reversal 
of policy were firstly,
"the victory of the UCS workers and other work-ins and sit-ins, 
demonstrating the tremendous strength that the labour movement 
can acquire through united struggle against redundancy in 
conditions of high unemplojnment; and the chronic inefficiency 
and underinvestment in much of British industry which cannot 
be remedied by market forces alone." (129)
John Davies was later to echo closely this analysis,
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"I think that the thing that really developed alongside the 
problems of militancy... .was the fact that we had unemployment 
rising rather rapidly at this time..,,and, of course, that 
added fuel to the flames of militancy very much, and under­
standably in some ways. And one had to face the problem that 
this was not an issue which could be considered on its own 
industrial merits, that it, in fact, affected more and more 
the whole attitude of mind of West Central Scotland with its 
growing problem of unemployment," (130)
Again, a recent economic analysis by Keegan and Pennant-Rea describes 
what they call,
"no more and no less than wholesale panic in the ranks of 
the Government as unemployment mounted during the winter of 
1971“72 to nearly 1 million - at that stage an unprecedented 
post-war figure. The panic was such that the Government 
resorted to every reflationary device in practice." (I3I)
That the Barber boom was to be shortlived and the whole 
Government strategy was to end up in tatters under the combined 
effects of a balance of payments crisis with the economic impact 
of a sharp rise in oil prices and the miners* smashing of Phase III 
of the Heath Government's incomes policy, is a matter of record. 
Those Conservatives who had urged caution in 1972 watched the 
Government collapse in the chaos of the three-day week, and the 
February 1974 election. The lessons were drawn and as Beacon has 
commented on this period, "the star of the 'sound money' men rose 
accordingly." (132) In the election post-mortem the past 'mistakes' 
of the Heath Government were scrutinised and for some, this heralded 
a period of 'reappraisal* of the entire previous strategy of social 
and economic management. (155) Keith Joseph places April 1974» 
twenty years after joining the Conservatives, as the time when he 
personally became "converted to Conservatism," (154) For the 
Conservative Party TICS had led them from Selsdon to Preston where 
in September 5th 1974 Keith Joseph made his famous speech expounding 
the monetarist doctrine.
"To us as to all post-war Governments, sound money,may have 
seemed out of date; we were dominated by the fear of unemployment. 
It was this which made us turn back against our o\m better 
judgement and try and spend our way out of unemployment, while 
rcjlying on incomes policy to damp dov/n Inflationary effects.
It is perhaps easy to understand; our post-war boom began under 
the shadow of the 1950's. Ve were haunted by the fear of long­
term mass unemployment, the grim hopeless dole queues and towns 
which died. Se we talked ourselves into believing tnat these 
gaunt, tight-lipped men in caps and mufflers were round the corner 
and tailored our policy to match these imaginary conditions." (135)
It was the doctrine of monetarism which was to provide the 
ideological cutting edge of the next Conservative administration 
under Margaret Thatcher and the dissident 'neo-liberals' of 1972-74» 
an issup further discussed in the concluding chapter.
(vi) Shipbuilding Nationalisation
So far as the shipbuilding was concerned the U-turn not only 
resulted in the immediate rescue of the Upper Clyde yards and the 
injection of substantial new funds into the industry but it also 
meant that the next Labour administration would find it perilous to 
provide support on any lesser scale. It can be argued, in fact, 
that the movement generated around the UCS struggle placed shipbuilding 
nationalisation squarely on the agenda for the incoming Labour Government 
At the Confederation, the TUG and the Labour Party .ruinual Conferences 
in 1971 resolutionswere passed calling for nationalisation of the 
industry. At the Labour Party Conference a motion moved by Danny 
McGarvey demanded.
"that a future Labour Government should bring the shipbuilding 
and shiprepairing industries under public ownership; this to be 
a hl.gh priority of the next Labour Government. " (I5&)
The adoption of the resolution was the first step towards fulfilling 
a long-standing demand of the workers in the industry, which in 
the case of the Boilermakers' Society had been official union policy 
since 1945. (1'57) Thereafter, an unprecedented series of discussions- 
took place which involved the Confederation and the TUC along with the 
Labour Party in formulating the details of the Nationalisation 
proposals. (15C) This resulted in a joint consultative document
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which was adopted by Labour's NEC as the basis of future policy, (I59 )
As Toi^ r Benn commented, recalling his days at the Department of Industry,
"I think there's no doubt that UCS forced the Labour Party, the 
Confederation and the TUC to embody within its official policy 
the public ownership of the shipyards. And I was able to take 
with me into the Department, a policy document that had been 
through the Confederation Conference, the Congress and the 
Labour Party Conference, and I put it on the table and said,
•do it'. And that would never have been possible without 
UCS. There was no question about that in my mind."(I40)
It remained to be seen, however, whether after its stormy legislative 
passage, the newly nationalised industry which finally emerged under 
the direction of British Shipbuilders in July 1977 would differ 
substantially from previous nationalisations or whether, as in the 
case of so many other industries, public ownership was merely a 
prelude to further rationalisation in which managerial attitudes 
remained unchanged and the workers were excluded from any meaningful 
control over the industry, (I4I )
In the last part of this chapter subsequent developments at 
Marathon and Govan Shipbuilders are briefly examined. It should be 
noted that at no point during their period at Clydebank did Marathon 
fulfill their initial promise of employing over two thousand men.
Indeed, between 1972 and 1980 when they withdrew from the yard there 
was a continuous problem over orders which the company used to extract 
greater and greater concessions from the workforce while whittling down 
their numbers. Certainly the workers had been guaranteed cost-of-living 
increases but the equalisation of bonus, although it began to lead to 
parity in other yards, was something to which the boilermakers did not 
adjust easily. Once again they began to put pressure on the local 
officials to have Marathon take on men from their register rather than 
retrained finishing trade workers who were being paid off by the UCS 
liquidator. Within six months the situation was sufficiently serious 
for McGarvey to have to come back to Clydebank and address a meeting 
of 800 boilermakers urging them to stick to the pledge given during
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the UCS campaign. (I42) The finishing trade workers were being 
retrained as welders and although the welders* shop stewards were 
in favour of accepting the retrained men, the welders themselves 
were threatening to boycott the meeting with McGarvey. In the event 
they did not do so but the retraining scheme was only approved by a 
narrow majority of 5I votes despite McGarvey*s emphasis on their 
"moral obligation* to carry out their previous promises. After the 
meeting in Clydebank Town Hall McGarvey was quoted as saying, however, 
as regards the retrained finishing trade workers,
"These men obviously do not have to depend on the shipyards
as our men do." (143)
Obviously this dimension of boilermakers* sectionalism was still not 
by any means dead. Indeed, although the finishing trade workers were 
eventually accepted as boilermakers they were labelled 'dilutees' by 
the established welders. Thereafter at departmental meetings of the 
welders a notice was stuck on the door 'pukkah welders only*. (144)
In various other ways too they were given to understand that their presence 
in the Boilermakers* Society was not welcomed and many subsequently left 
the yard, tired of petty harassment by their fellow workers. (145)
In fact, however, the Marathon agreement was largely adhered to 
and the boilermakers did not succeed in re-establishing a differential.
The major industrial walk-out which took place in May 1974 resulting 
in a 6-day strike, although led by the boilermakers who were demanding 
payment of the half-yearly bonus before the Glasgow summer holidays, was 
not simply a sectional dispute. It had more to do with the fact that as 
a result of production losses during the 'three-day week* the boilermakers 
had been refused the bonus which they had previously received three times. 
The workers expected £100 but the management only offered £70 later 
increased to £80 with the remaining amount being subject to arbitration,
A change in the company's industrial relations personnel and general
/dissatisfaction over continuing wage restraint were also contributing 
factors to the dispute, (I46) Apart from this labour relations were 
generally peaceful not least because the workers were forced to adopt 
a policy of work-sharing and at one stage suspension and eventually 
voluntary redundancy which gradually whittled the labour force dovai to 
only 740 by the time Marathon finally pulled out and the French firm, 
Union Industrielle d'Enterprise (UIE) took over the yard in the late 
spring of I98O. In the interim, in 197& and again in 1978 Marathon 
had been on the point of shutting doim their operation when, largely 
as a result of pressure from the shop stewards and the STTTC on the 
Labour Government, it was agreed that orders, would be placed in the 
yard for the British North Sea Oil Corporation for jack-up rigs. As 
part of the extended haggling over the price for the later rig, the 
workers offered a flexibility deal to the company which included all 
trades in wider* flexibility. (147) By the time UIE began to take an 
interest in the yard the workers were ready to concede staggered 
holidays and the use of outside contractors to boost the labour force 
during busy periods as well as a higher degree of interchangeability.
For many on Clydeside, the fact that the Marathon Corporation had 
received I7 rig orders in the year before it withdrew, not one of which 
had come to Clydebank, confirmed the suspicion that the company had only 
really intended to stay so long as the generous government assistance it 
had initially received made it worthwhile. The fact that they had also 
managed to avoid nationalisation, although only just as it turned out, 
was perhaps further evidence in the eyes of many workers that they had 
secured a licence to freeboot with the industry and workforce of 
Clydeside, (I48)
At Govan Shipbuilders also there were initial problems with the 
welders who came out on strike over a demand for special payment for 
operating a special welding machine which had been introduced in the
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yards for some years but for which payment had never been agreed.
Once again the Boilermakers* Society advised the men to return to 
work which they did after holding out for a week but not before 
extending the strike to welders in all three yards. (149) Then in 
the spring of 1975 and again in the summer of 1975 the welders were 
in dispute and latterly conducted a go-slow in support of a claim 
for a differential over other boilermaker trades. (150) In the 
autumn of that year there was a ♦walk-out* when a payment for 
operating a new type of welding rod was also granted to platers and 
shipwrights. The welders had refused to continue to use the new 
equipment and management then stopped paying them. The welders claimed 
that their payment ought to be treated as a "skill allowance* specific 
to their group but received no support from welders in other yards or 
from other boilermaker trades or officials. (151) These actions were 
not successful therefore and the joint shop stewards committee continued 
to negotiate common rates for the various grades of workers. (152)
By 1976 it had become apparent to the workforce, however, that the 
market for ships was in a very serious position and the fear of redundancies 
altered the whole climate of labour relations in the yards as the last 
orders were nearing completion at Govan, (I55) Securing work became an 
urgent priority for the management and men and had resulted in joint 
approaches to the Government by the company and the GSEU to find orders. (15^ 
It was under these conditions that the boilermakers voted to introduce 
flexibility to all sections of the workforce following the example of 
the outfit trades the previous year in eliminating the lines of 
demarcation between the various sections. (155) The agreement was 
estimated to be worth 20 per cent in terms of productivity but because 
of the crisis facing the industry the workers agreed to this without 
demanding extra wages. All trades within the union now became inter­
changeable in theory. The boilermakers officials led the negotiations
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with the Government seeking 'spec* orders to avoid massive redundancies. 
Furthermore because of the situation in the industry the Govan workers, 
who had lodged a 26 per cent pay claim to offset the effects of 
continuing wage restraint agreed "reluctantly* to settle for 10 per 
cent being the first group of workers within the industry to do so. (I56) 
One further factor which influenced this decision was the hope that 
the newly-nationalised Govan Shipbuilders would share in the prospective 
orders of 22 cargo vessels and 2 crane ships for the Polish Government 
and thus avoid redundancies.
The issue of the Polish orders had become so contentious that it 
is worth briefly sketching in some further background here. The shop 
stewards were asked by British Shipbuilders to guarantee delivery of 
two vessels per month, plus further flexibility and the guaranteed 
maintenance of performance levels. It was hoped that Govan Shipbuilders 
would get about ten of the ordersvidle the, workers in turn guaranteed 
delivery dates at a mass meeting and numerous changes in working 
practices which amounted to broader flexibility between trades. (I57)
The total order was worth about £115 million to the industry and wuld 
seciure much needed work not just on the Clyde but in other hard-pressed 
areas such as the north e.-ast.
Then, as negotiations with the Polish Government to confirm the 
orders reached a critical stage in the last few weeks of 1977» a 
new and unforeseen complication emerged which threatened the whole 
deal. At Swan Hunter's Tyneside yard 1,700 outfitting workers refused 
to end an overtime ban in support of pay parity with the boilermakers 
in spite of the intervention of the Tyne Confederation officials 
who pointed out that the claim for parity could be pursued after the 
orders were won. Only a handful of workers, however, supported the 
officials who urged the men to give British Shipbuilders the required
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guarantee of trouble-free production. On Clydeside the local 
Glasgow evening newspaper urged the workers tiirough its editorial 
column to take full advantage of the situation,
"Now, just because their colleagues in the north-east have 
made a kamikaze decision, there is no reason why the Clyde 
shipyard workers should cut off their noses to spite their 
face.
It would be misplaced brotherhood for the Clydeside workers 
to refuse to build the ships. (158)
The probability was that if the dispute at Swan Hunters could 
not be satisfactorily resolved then at least some of the orders 
intended for there would be reallocated to the Clyde. It was a 
potentially embarrassing situation for the Clyde workers especially, 
since they had been the recipients of such magnificent solidarity 
during the UCS campaign. To lay themselves open to the charge of 
'taking bread out of the mouths of their fellow workers* vou3.d not 
only shatter the unity built among shipbuilding workers on a 
national level by the UCS work-in but would also destroy the 
credibility of the Clyde workers throughout the British trade 
union movement. Paradoxically it wa,s precisely the kind of 
horizontal inter-union sectional dispute which the workers on the 
Upper Clyde no longer embarked upon following the Marathon and 
Govan agreements but which was still rife in certain other areas 
of the industry. In part also sectional feelings had been exacerbated 
by the continuing period of wage restraint imposed by the Labour 
Government which was producing considerable frustration in industry.
It was therefore not without a degree of sympathy as well as 
exasperation that Airlie commented,
"It is our view the problem is on the Tyne and should be 
resolved on the Tyne. It is also our view all concerned 
should get round the negotiating table to resolve the problems
in the long-term best interests of the shipbuilding industry." (159)
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The view of the Confederation as expressed by. its general 
secretary, Jack Service, was also that the first priority was to 
secure the building of these orders in Britain, (l6o) With 
British Shipbuilders executives due to fly to Poland within a 
matter of days it was essential that the issue be resolved 
otherwise it was feared that the whole order might yet go to 
Japan. Prom Swan Hunter, however, an appeal was launched for the 
Clyde workers to 'black* the Tyne orders for four ships which had 
been offered to Govan, The workers at Austin and Pickersgill had 
refused to accept any reallocated order but the men at Smiths Bock 
Company on Teeside had voted to accept two of the ships after taking 
part in a sympathy strike only a few days before. It was an issue 
which was creating maximum confusion not helped by British Shipbuilders 
readiness to tout orders around the other British yards and their 
rather hard-line approach in demanding detailed concessions on 
flexibility before allocating the orders, (161)
In the event after some hesitation and with real misgivings 
the Govan workers agreed to accept the reallocated orders at a 
mass meeting of 5,000 workers with only 4 voting against. Whether 
or not they were correct to have done so it followed that this 
decision effectively undercut the attempt by the Tyne finishing 
trade workers to use the prospect of the Polish orders as a 
bargaining lever against British Shipbuilders. The Govan decision 
was also, however, supported by the Robb Caledon stewards. Indeed, 
in an attempt to answer the charge of "betrayal* Airlie even offered 
to travel to the Tyne and hold discussions with the workers there. 
However, hopes that the Tyne problem could eventually be resolved 
and the orders placed there once again were completely dashed when 
the sectional dispute spiralled sti11 further a few weeks later.
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The outfitters agreed to end their overtime ban after receiving 
£5.40 as a "fair wages* award whereupon the Tjme boilermakers 
immediately ended job flexibility and reverted to "one-man-one-job* 
because pay differentials with the outfitters had been eroded.
What angered the Swan Hunter boilermakers was the fact that the 
award had been made without requiring any changes in working 
practices or increases in productivity from the outfit trades,
British Shipbuilders had thus only served to shift the focus of 
the trouble in the yard.
The Govan shop stewards were manifestly uneasy about their 
previous decision to accept reallocated orders but were now coming 
under pressure from the Govan Shipbuilders management who accused 
them of 'sitting on a fence*. (162) Airlie, somewhat defensively 
argued,
"V/hat I object to is Govan Shipbuilders being used as a
dustbin for every problem in the shipbuilding industry." (163)
There seemed to be a growing conviction that the orders should not 
be accepted which was reflected in renewed efforts by the Confederation 
to resolve the dispute. The Govan workers were asked by the Confederation 
for more time to sort out the Tyne problem before committing 
themselves any further and in the face of another offer from 
British Shipbuilders the stewards asked for the vessels to be built 
on the Tyne or if not, for the matter to be decided by the Confederation 
at national level. For nearly two weeks the Govan workers stalled 
British Shipbuilders but with the failure of the Confederation to 
successfully resolve the Tyne difficulties, this time after receiving 
•formal instruction* from the Confederation, the Govan workers 
finally accepted the reallocated Polish orders early in February 1978.(184)
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It could be argued that in accepting the reallocated orders 
the Govan workers had breached a fundamental trade union principle 
of solidarity. On the other hand a more generous view would allow 
that not only was this an unjustified criticism, one to which they 
were extremely sensitive, but also that in the longer term interests 
of security of employment for shipbuilding workers, and not just 
those at Govan, it was vital to secure the conditions for the orders 
to be confirmed for the British yards. In that sense it could be 
held their decision to accept British Shipbuilders offer of further 
orders was an extremely difficult but responsible one and that in 
jeopardising the whole Polish order deal the Tyne workers were 
being not only sectionally narrow, but ultimately acting against 
the best interests of their fellow workers elsewhere. It was 
somewhat ironic, however, that precisely because the UCS experience 
had produced a united joint shop stewards organisation the Clyde 
workers found it far easier to comply with British Shipbuilders 
demands for flexibility and guaranteed delivery dates than their 
compatriots elsewhere for whom sectionalism was still the determining 
factor in shaping their identities. (I65)
It should be said that the Govan workers subsequently fulfilled 
their pledge to British Shipbuilders in its entirety. Indeed, when 
some of the foremen and assistant managers took industrial action, 
the workers decided that they would not be laid-off by the dispute. 
The ghost of the work-in was revived as the men agreed to * work-on* 
without managerial supervision, technically in breach of health and 
safety regulations, in order to attempt to complete the vessels on 
schedule. It was, however, mainly a token attempt by the workers 
to redress the rather bad publicity which the Govan workforce had
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received due to problems in meeting delivery dates, which although 
by no means entirely the fault of the Govan yard, did mean that 
the Polish authorities were in a position to invoke fairly severe 
financial penalties. Then in May 1979, when the finishing trades 
who had already consented to transfer certain work to other yards, 
were again overloaded with work^ .,they agreed to allow the steel 
trades to do some of their work, a previously unheard of breach of 
demarcation lines. With the Polish orders running out and the 
prospects of new orders very poor indeed, 500 men volunteered to 
work during the traditional Pair Holiday, a further inconceivable 
concession a few years previously. (166) The announcement by British 
Shipbuilders that there were to be 4»000 jobs lost in the industry in 
Scotland and 10,000 nationally by the end of 1980 produced an immediate 
walk-out on the Clyde and the threat by the Govan workers to 'impound* 
the Polish orders plus a three-week overtime Jan. (I67) However, the 
general absence of new orders removed any possibility of reviving 
the work-in as a tactic, particularly as many men took the seemingly 
attractive option of enhanced redundancy payments.
Under the Shipbuilding Redundancy Payments Scheme introduced 
in August 1978 the total average payment amounted to €2,500 per 
worker while although considerably less than settlements given to 
British Steel workers for example, still constituted a major obstacle 
in launching a campaign to resist the redundancies. In fact, only 
one worker received the maximum of £4,000 in the first two years of 
the scheme and for those workers nearing retirai age the actual 
amounts received in cash terms were anything but generous. (16S)
The chief reason why there was no resistance, however, was simply 
that the Confederation*s Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee and
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British Shipbuilders had reached a joint understanding in the so-called 
Blackpool Agreement which entailed a system of voluntary rather than 
compulsory redundancies. The Blackpool Agreement of 4'th September 
1979 envisaged 6,000 redundancies to be achieved through paying off 
the long-term sick and natural wastage in the first place, together 
with the inter-yard transfer of surplus labour and a ban on adult 
recruitment, (I69) Within a month of this agreement, however, Govan 
Shipbuilders with over 7OO workers surplus, was attempting to 'open 
the books' to a3.1 employers who wished to volunteer. (I70) This was 
not the shop stewards understanding of the 'spirit' of the agreement 
and resulted in their registering a 'failure to agree' with the 
company and the convening of a further meeting between all parties 
including the National Confederation in order to resolve the problems 
which had been raised by the Clyde workers. The pill had been 
suitably sugared, however, and with the concession that employees 
over 55 could accept voluntary redundancy, the 'rationalisation' of 
the labour force was begun, (I71) In return British Shipbuilders 
had promised Govan a further contract for two bulk carriers to ensure 
continuity of work there.
The Sootstoun yard on which £12 million had been spent on 
development since the UCS crisis was put on a 'care and maintenance' 
basis. However, with the removal of certain machinery and its transfer 
to the Govan yard there is little likelihood of shipbuilding being 
resumed there on its former scale. The Govan yard itself escaped 
the worst consequences of the new Conservative Government's industry 
policy under Keith Joseph, being designated as a 'core merchant facility 
although with a considerable reduction of the labour force from around 
5,500 to 5,200, that is, by about 40 per cent. (172) The decision not
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to shut Govan which it had been rumoured might be axed, while other 
yards'in areas with equally severe unemployment problems such as 
Robb Caledon in Dundee were eventually closed, was perhaps influenced 
by the possible echoes of the militancy of the UCS work-in. Unfortunately, 
while this may have partially shielded Govan it did not manage to 
protect the rest of the shipbuilding industry. From a labour force 
of 88,000 in July 1977 when shipbuilding was nationalised, by 1981 
20,000 workers had left the industry and on the Clyde over the same 
period, the labour force was reduced from 24,000 to 18,000. Although 
the Govan shop stewards committee has held a powerful position as the 
leading force in creating a national combine committee for all British 
shipbuilding workers, the implementation of the Blackpool Agreement, 
the recession in world trade and the EEC policies for reducing capacity 
have made the job of preserving employment and unity on a national 
scale extremely difficult. (l73) Once again the fruits of nationalisation 
have left a bitter after-taste in the mouths of the workers as the 
government played off the 'efficiency* of one yard against another.
It was a sad sequel to the unity and hopes which had been born in 
the work-in at Upper Clyde.
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Chapter Thirteen 
WORKING CLASS CULTURE IN TEE 1970's
The implications of the UCS work-in, to be fully appreciated, 
need to be examined against the whole context of the class battles 
between 1970 and 1974. Indeed, what occurred during this period, 
arguably, had long-term and lasting ramifications upon the whole 
character of British social and economic life. Yet, viewed from the 
perspective of the 1980’s, the undoubted achievements of the working 
class during the early 1970*s seem to some, not to have fulfilled 
their promise, at least so far as advancing towards the ultimate 
goal of a socialist Britain is concerned. The disappointment that 
labour’s ’forward march' has apparently been temporarily diverted 
into the blind alley of ’economism', if not permanently ’halted’ has 
led to a reappraisal of strategy and a search for the means of 
political renewal. The lessons to be dra^m from the struggles of 
1970-74 are therefore now a matter of fierce controversy and indeed, 
of strategic' importance, since the issues which we’re fought out during 
these years have mapped the terrain for the current challenges facing 
the labour movement.
About one thing most commentators are in agreement. The return 
of the Heath government in 1970 marked the initiation of a new phase 
in the political development of post-war Britain, It signified a 
tangible departure from the hitherto predominantly consensual style 
of political management towards a more abrasive confrontational 
approach, that had had its launching salvo in the 'law and order’ 
declaration of Selsdon Park but whose true conception lay in the 
contest between the labour movement and the Labour governments 
of I964-I97G over the question of the role of the trade unions in 
society. In the words of Stuart Hall and his colleagues, 1970 was
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the year which marked the commencement of "the make-or-break showdown 
between the Heath course and the organised working class," (1)
The shift to a more manifestly coercive intervention in the class 
struggle by capital can be depicted as the necessary outcome of the 
failure of the Labour Party in power to solve the deepening crisis 
of the social system on the basis of a continuing 'voluntarism*.
The Beveridge promire of ’full employment in a free society’ 
effectively represented the right of the post-war trade union 
movement to freely negotiate increased living standards for its 
members within the voluntarist framework of ’pluralistic democracy’ 
in which unions arid employers could conduct their mutual affairs 
unfettered by legislative interference. The essence of a ’free 
society’ could be counterposed on the one hand, to the totalitarian 
controls of fascism upon the trade union movement and on the other, 
as the cold war grew in intensity, to the presumed position of working 
people in existing Socialist societies.(^^The whole foundation of 
post-war stabilisation therefore rested upon the endorsement by 
organised labour of a consensus based on full employment, unhindered 
collective bargaining and the welfarism of the Beveridge Plan, under­
pinned by Keynsian economic management and the development of indicative 
planning.
By the early 1960’s,with a weakening in Britain’s international 
competitive position it was becoming increasingly clear that the years 
of full employment had enabled the trade union movement to acquire 
expectations which the deepening crisis for capital could no longer 
sustain. In particular the growth of plant-level collective bargaining 
led by shop stewards posed a considerable problem in terms of ensuring 
the requisite compliance of labour to wage restraint. Such compliance
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vas seen as essential to restoring profitability to an otherwise 
sagging economy. For the Conservative Party now poised for office 
in 1970 "the repertoire of voluntary constraints" which had sustained 
the consensus of the and 60*s vras now finally "exhausted." (3)
A new strategy was called for and the core of that strategy was a 
frontal assault on labour, particularly at the level of the workplace, 
directed against the activities of 'unofficial* shop stewards committees. 
It is in this sense that the advent of the Heath administration marked 
"a watershed, a breaking point" in which "all the contradictions began 
to intersect," (4) To understand how this critical conjuncture was 
arrived at, something of the failure of the attempts by the Wilson 
government of the 60*s to resolve the crisis on voluntaristic terms 
must be examined.
Of key importance in this respect was the eventual and stubborn 
implementation of statutory incomes policies by the Labour government.
By 1968 not only had incomes policies begun to introduce severe strains 
in the relationship between the Labour Party and the trade union 
movement, but also had threatened to undermine perhaps the central 
plank within the post-war consensus, of *free collective bargaining*.
As a result, the position of the TtJC and the predominantly right-wing 
leadership of the trade unions in supporting incomes policies m d  
become increasingly uncomfortable. As Crouch has noted,
"Unions could no longer bury themselves in industrial activity 
and ignore overall political economyv At the same time they 
were coming under increasing pressure from the opposite direction: 
from rank and file members impatient with restraint and seeking 
higher incomes." (5 )
The final years of the Wilson administration were marked by successive 
upswings in the level of unofficial strikes led by shop-floor militants
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seeking redress for pent-up grievances resulting from incomes policy.
In addition, in two major unions, the transport workers and the 
engineers, the election of Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon, leaders who 
were more responsive to shop-floor pressure, signified the final 
demise of united official trade union support for incomes policies.
It was at this time, in I968, that a Royal Commission set up to look 
at the whole question of trade unions (and additionally employers 
associations), reported after three years of researches and 
deliberations. (6 )
What became known as the Donovan Commission had itself originally 
been provoked by the need of British capitalism to come to a satisfactory 
resolution of the problem of the growth of shop stewards influence 
in industry. Donovan's proposed remedy, however, was far more subtle 
and oblique than simply outlawing unofficial strikes. Reporting against 
a background coloured by the assumptions of incomes policies, the 
Donovan Commission endorsed reformed local productivity agreements 
as a cure for the 'wage-drift' resulting from payment by results 
schemes, bonus systems and overtime payments negotiated at the level 
of the workshop or the local factory. These had made the national 
agreements between unions and employers no more than a base line for 
plant-based negotiation. As Nightingale has argued,
'’Whichever form wage-drift took, it represented a failure by 
management to control labour costs and more directly, the social 
force which determined these costs, namely the bargaining strength 
of workers on the shop floor. It was the recognition of this, 
and of the implications for profitability, that led managers.... 
to consider the relevance of productivity bargaining. For the 
real significance of productivity bargaining in this period lay 
in the attempt to increase profits by restructuring the relationship 
between earnings and productivity. Workers had developed informal 
practices to push up their earnings. By means of a 'jointly- 
regulated' collective bargaining process, management hoped to 
re-establish its initiative where it was weakest - on the shop floor. 
In this way it hoped to secure the introduction of important new 
working methods." (7)
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By regularising the procedures of productivity agreements the 
status and authority of the shop stewards would become limited since 
their ability to bargain on a day-to-day basis on traditional trade 
union grounds such as the redistribution of income, cost of living 
rises and wage comparability would be circumscribed. Instead, the 
grounds for wage increases would be shifted to questions of productivity, 
that is, increased output per unit of labour, or put another way, 
reduction of labour costs per unit of output. The door was thus 
opened for rationalisation of the labour force, 'objective* work 
measurement and intensification of labour through elimination of 
*time-v/asting* procedures and 'out-dated* working practices and 
their replacement instead by greater 'flexibility* in the workforce,(8) 
Since the early 1960's employers had turned to productivity agreements 
with increasing enthusiasm for precisely these reasons.
The move towards institutionalising the new reality of plant- 
based industrial relations could also be neatly dove-tailed with 
incomes policy since it offered workers a government-sanctioned 
'back door* to wage increases, during a protracted period of restraint 
although only on the employers' terms. (9) George Brown had been 
quite correct to describe the 'Fairfields experiment* as a 'proving 
ground' since if a 'modern* productivity deal with shop stewards 
involvement, based on work measurement and more flexible working 
practices together with a 'no-strike' agreement could be secured in 
the traditionalist heartland of British industry, then the government 
would have been given a major boost to its incomes policies. In 
fact, as happened with many of the productivity agreements of the 
period, certain paper concessions were made but as the Fairfields 
experiment demonstrated, the problems were considerably more intractable, 
so much so, that productivity agreements eventually became the 
'Achilles heel' of wage restraint policy. (10)
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The significant feature of the Donovan Report waa that the 
principle of voluntarism in the regulation of trade union affairs 
was preserved, albeit that there were some noteable dissenters 
among the members of the Commission, (ll) As a result the long- 
awaited Report received only a lulcewarm reception from the Labour 
government which might otherwise have been able to appear as a 
'moderating* influence, had more stringent measures to deal with 
shop floor power been recommended, such as for example, direct legal 
sanctions against unofficial industrial action, ( 12 ) As it was, 
with incomes policy now no longer acceptable to the unions and 
voluntary wage-vetting by the TtJC itself less than vigorous the 
government was forced to spell out an option which it had been 
hoped Donovan would have provided the arguments for,
A White Paper with the revealing title In Place of Strife, 
was published in the spring of I969 authored by Barbara Castle, 
Minister of Employment and with the strong personal backing of 
Harold Wilson, (I3) It was a document which was, however, less than 
enthusiastically endorsed by other members of the cabinet, the NEC 
of the Labour Party and a sizeable group of Labour HP's, Moreover, 
despite the support of the TïïC's then general secretary George Woodcock, 
it also found little, favour in trade union circles. (14) Whereas 
the Donovan Commission was more concerned with intervention in 
workshop bargaining in order to bring local wage negotiations more 
under central control. In Place of Strife was a perceptible move in 
the direction of legal restriction on strikes. It was a qualitative 
departure from voluntarism, a departure made more necessary by the 
fact that official trade union involvement with incomes policy had 
only served to reinforce the shift in the centre of gravity of union
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power towards the shop floor leadership. Not surprisingly, it was 
from here that the most vociferous reaction was to come.
Among the aspects of the White Paper which were found to he most 
deeply objectionable were the proposed introduction of compulsory 
28 day conciliation pauses'backed by financial penalties, ballots 
on proposed strikes and intervention in inter-union recognition 
disputes,together with rowers to compell unions to exercise stricter 
controls over union rules including, of course, shop stewards activities.(I5 
The major proposal for a 'cooling-off* period, modelled on American 
lines, did not in fact deny the right to strike completely. Rather 
Mrs, Castle,in the words of Panitch,
"required workers to accept a state imposed delay during which 
the cause of the dispute could be investigated. The fact that 
this also allowed for a period of employer, government and media 
pressure to be brought upon the strikers, and the fact that it 
removed the element of surprise which was the main tactical 
advantage of the sudden unofficial strike, she apparently did 
not regard as an important infringement of free collective 
bargaining." (16)
This was not, however, the view of the shop floor. The significant 
aspect of the opposition to In Place of Strife and indeed, what led 
to its final defeat, was not the fact that the government eventually 
conceded that it had little chance of securing a parliamentary 
majority for its Industrial Relations Bill based on the White Paper.
Rather, it was the mobilisation of the shop floor on an entirely 
unprecedented scale by the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade 
Unions, a mainly 'unofficial* body led by the left in the labour 
movement with Communist Party members in prominent positions. (1?) It 
was a uniquely important channel for the articulation of factory floor 
and shop stewards opinions and in a sense, represented the kind of 
national shop stewards organisation which left militants had tried to
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create during the two World Wars, In the front ranks of the Liaison 
Committee were, once again,the engineering shop stewards, in particular 
those in the great Midlands car factories and engineering shops, (1§) 
In November I968 a conference called by the Liaison Committee which 
had to twice alter its venue to find a hall big enough to accommodate 
the 1,800 delegates whose credentials were pouring in, was later 
described as "the largest (unofficial) gathering in the history of 
the British trade union movement." (I9) Its call for a day of 
industrial action on December 8th produced a response which
"surpassed all expectations; over a million workers downed 
tools and no national newspapers appeared that day. This \ias 
followed by further industrial action the following month in 
some of those cities which had not responded on December 8th, 
These were the first large-scale strikes, not for wages, but 
against government legislation, demanding the withdrawal of a 
Bill already being debated in Parliament. They were strikes 
with profound political repercussions," (20 )
Further actions took place throughout the following spring 
culminating in a massive May Day protest by which time not only had 
official trade union resistance stiffened at national level, although 
the position of the TUG leadership was still somewhat equivocal, but 
also even more significantly at district level local union officials 
were now involved in organising committees along with shop stewards 
under the auspices of the Liaison Committee. (21 j By any account, 
it was a remarkable display of the movement's ability to mobilise 
itself at 'the grass roots'. On June 18th the government finally 
backed do;m and abandoned its legislative measures, accepting as a 
face-saving device the 'solemn and binding undertaking' of the TUG 
contained in its Programme for Action, However, this compromise 
was not reached before a series of brinkmanship negotiations with 
the TUG during which the government attempted to persuade it to 
act as'policeman over the shop floor, only to be rebuffed by the
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General Council who warned that in terms of retaining any future 
credibility and authority in the labour movement, the mass mobilisation 
which had taken place now made such an option out of the question. (22) 
Thus as a result of the successful battle over In Place of Strife,
"many trade unions were more deeply political than ever before." a 
process that was to intensify sharply over the next period. (23)
Predictably, in the last months of I969 and the first half of 
1970 there was a "wages explosion" with actions by workers, particularly 
among lower paid in the public sector and nationalised industry not. 
previously noted for their militancy. (24) Incomes policy had 
proved particularly frustrating for these workers since the very 
nature of their work in many cases made it difficult to use productivity 
agreements as a lever in wage negotiations, [25) It was under 
these conditions, with the highest level of strikes since the 1920*s, 
many of which were unofficial, but with many traditional Labour 
supporters alienated by the experience of the Wilson government, 
that the Conservatives were returned to office in the summer of 1970. 
With the question of trade union legislation high on their list of 
priorities, Robert Carr, the new Minister for Employment set to work 
to implement his proposals for statutory intervention in free 
collective bargaining.
The Conservative Industrial Relations Bill shared many of the 
assumptions of In Place of Strife and was essentially intended to 
achieve the same purpose, the disciplining of shop-floor power tlirough 
legislative means. Indeed, this had been clear as far back as I968 
since the publication by the Conservatives of their own policy document 
Fair Beal at Work at the time of the Donovan Commission, which directly
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presaged the proposals for a much more coercive approach, (26) The 
Conservatives could argue with some justification that they were 
properly following the logic of In Place of Strife in proposing the 
registration of trade unions, compulsory and secret ballots, sixty- 
day cooling-off periods, an attack on the closed shop, an industrial 
relations court with full powers to penalise 'unfair industrial practices' 
and the introduction of legally enforceable collective agreements. (2?) 
However, as Panitch has observed, the target was again the shop floor,
"The primary aim of the Act was not to destroy trade luiions, 
as was often alleged in the course of the labour movement’s 
struggle against it, but rather to define, codify and back 
by state sanctions the obligations of the unions to employers 
and the state, including primarily the obligation to discipline 
unofficial strikes." (28)
Once more the Liaison Committee launched a massive movement of 
'opposition from below'. This time, however, faced with a Conservative 
rather than a Labour government, the TUG itself played a more vigorous 
role in opposing the legislation through an extensive programme of 
mass education, protest meetings and marches. Throughout the latter 
part of 1970 and in the spring of 1971 demonstrations took place 
involving up to three million workers in a campaign against the 
Conservatives' parliamentary Bill, By the time the Act became law 
in the summer of 1971 the stage was set for a full-scale confrontation 
between the trade unions and the government. It was at precisely 
this moment, with the trade union movement highly mobilised and more 
politically conscious than it had been for many years, that the crisis 
broke in the Upper Clyde yards. The struggle at UCS presented the 
working-class as a whole with a unique opportunity to demonstrate 
through their solidarity, their support for the resolute and implacable 
stand against the Tories which was being made on the Clyde* The 
work-in gave a significant boost to the political confidence of the labour
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movement at a historically critical phase in its development. After 
all, despite the widespread nature of the opposition to the legislation, 
the movement had not succeeded in preventing the passage of the 
Industrial Relations Bill tlirough parliament. With the Act already 
on the statute book, it would now require a boldness and determination 
of a different order to defeat it. It would require actions of 
defiance regardless of the legal consequences. Moreover, as events 
were later to show, it was the representatives of the ranlc and file 
who were to prove the most resolute in the face of legal threats; 
those very shop stewards whom the Act was designed to force the trade 
union leaderships to discipline. The UCS work-in as a dramatic act 
of working-class defiance emanating and led from the shop floor, 
initiated this new phase in the struggle against the Heath government. 
The workers on the Clyde had embarked on a new form of class struggle 
regardless of the legal consequences and the significance of their 
action was not lost upon the rest of the labour movement. The era 
of confrontation had finally arrived.
The story of the eventual rendering of the Industrial Relations 
Act inoperable has been told elsewhere. (29) The release of the 
jailed dockers* stewards as mounting waves of industrial action quickly 
escalated towards a general strike marked the beginning of a full-scale 
retreat by the Conservatives on the question of legal means to 
resolve issues of labour discipline. As with UCS there was a clear 
failure on the part of the government to understand the latent reserves 
of resistance in the working class. In this respect also, the miners* 
strike over pay in early 1972 is of immense significance for here 
were a group of workers demoralised by years of pit closures, in an 
industry which even the workers themselves had come to regard as 
declining and largely expendable. Like the UCS workers, however, once
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they had embarked on action, they quickly discovered a new self- 
confidence, It was the first national official strike among the 
miners since I926 and very quickly it became clear that organisation 
at the pit-head provided the real backbone and impetus for the 
strike, (30) What occurred outside the gates of the Saltley Coke 
Depot, as thousands of Birmingham car workers and engineers provided 
physical mass support for the picketing mineworkers, eventually 
forcing the gates to be closed and thereby ensuring the success of 
the strike, provided a vivid indication of the scope of this new self- 
confidence in the working class. (3I) These were actions of inter­
union solidarity on an unprecedented scale in post-war Britain,
The recommendations of the Wilberforce Inquiry which was 
convened to arbitrate on the question of the miners* pay award 
effectively spelled the end of the Heath government's voluntarist 
N-1 incomes strategy. While the UCS workers had forced a U-turn on 
industrial strategy so the miners did likewise on the question of *non- 
compulsory* incomes policies. The second miners* strike in 1974 which 
broke the back of Stage III of Heath's statutory incomes policy 
differed from the 1972 strike in the much more active role played by 
the official union leadership in organising the day-to-day conduct 
of the strike. (52) In certain respects the conciliationist right- 
wing elements in the trade union and in the labour movement were as 
appalled by the Heath government at the forces which had been unleashed 
during its term of office. (33) The fact that Heath called a snap 
election over the miners' strike around the issue of 'trade union 
power* and *Wlio Governs?* was as much an embarrasment to the mineworkers' 
leadership who saw themselves as pursuing a basically trade union 
demand rather than presenting a direct political challenge to the 
government, as it was to those Tories for whom the writing had
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been on the wall for Heath*s future leadership of their party.
Within the Tory Party there were those who were bitterly critical 
of what was seen as the massive failure of nerve by the Heath 
government in its inability to grasp the nettle of working class 
militancy. In the debacle of 1974 it did not take very profound 
heart“Searching to persuade Conservatives that during their next 
spell in office they would require leadership of a rather different 
stamp. The stage was set for the curtain to be raised upon what 
Stuart Hall has described as *The Great Moving Right Show', a new 
and virulent petty-bourgeois ideological radicalism providing the 
credo for a steely commitment to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to deal with the power of the shop floor. The Heath years 
in retrospect, were merely a half-hearted and latterly, apologetic 
dress rehearsal for this rightward shift, (54) What seems surprising, 
however, given the tenacity with which the trade union movement 
fought previous encroachments upon its rights, is the fact that the 
Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher could not only openly 
abandon the Keynsian economic strategy which had underpinned the post­
war social democratic consensus, but was also able to sever the 
connected integrity of 'ful.l employment' in the 'free society' without, 
initially at least, provoking widespread social upheaval. Gamble 
has commented in his analysis of monetarism,
"The social market doctrine seeks to dispose of unemployment as 
a matter for political concern or government intervention, by 
putting the blame for unemployment on the failure of individuals 
and institutions to adapt themselves to the requirements of the 
market, whatever the cost in low wages and poverty, demoralization 
and uprooted communities, lost skills and lost purposes. As 
Keith Joseph recently told workers on Clydeside faced with 
redundancy - 100,000 workers change jobs in Britain every week, 
and you may have to do the same. With more than 15 million 
unemployed in the major capitalist states this doctrine serves 
to reconcile governments and electorates to permanent high 
levels of unemployment," (35)
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The monetarist project therefore would appear to have succeeded in 
recalibrating the socially acceptable level of unemployment and 
indeed, to have largely extinguished the potency of the demand for 
the 'Right to Work*.
These new conditions have sapped much of the combatitive spirit 
of even those sections of the labour movement whose militancy was 
formerly a by-word. The concept of a 'free society* has for its part 
become the catchphrase of a new "authoritarian populism" which not 
only resonates with many of the traditional individualistic themes 
of popular conservativism, but unlike the Beveridge commitment of 
a3.1 previous post-war governments, is also deeply and assertively 
inimical, to the existing hard-won rights of the organised trade union 
movement, (5&) If the Heath government marked a temporary rupture 
in the social democratic consensus the Thatcher government has signalled 
its strident redefinition. Wliat is new in the Conservative attack 
on the working class in the early 1980*s and distinguishes it from 
the onslaught of the previous decade is not simply the lending of 
greater weight to state power as a coercive blunt instrument, but 
rather, that in addition to whatever legal bludgeons may be employed, 
a hitherto unsuspected repertoire of ideologically coercive supports 
to the efficient exercise of class domination has been revealed.
Rather than seek an early direct confrontation with organised labour 
the Thatcher government has chosen to adopt an approach which would 
'outflank* the movement ideologically first of all.
Put simply, the significant feature of the struggles of the 
early 1970's was the rapidity with which, following UCS, the Heath 
government lost the ideological initiative to the working class.
The 1972 miners' strike, for example, drew to the surface of political
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discourse arguments unheard of for decades concerning the dignity of 
ordinary labour conducted under harsh and dangerous conditions. The 
'exceptionalism* of the Vilberforce recommendations was in part an 
explicit recognition and attempted accommodation of this. The whole 
rhetorical weight of the ÏÏCS campaign rested upon a similar assertion 
of basic human rights such' as the right to work. The campaign against 
the Industrial Relations Act similarly addressed itself to the basic 
right to organise in trade unions and, if necessary, to withdraw 
labour to defend that right. The Thatcher government is not therefore 
merely a further tilting of the 'balance between consent and coercion'. 
Rather it has presented a radically new set of rules for the political 
game. It indeed has been, from the first, a government committed 
above all to regaining the ideological initiative by a vigorously 
coercive 'moralistic' redefinition of the central issues of political 
economy, a redefinition which has sought to decisively exclude 
precisely those rights which had been hitherto so tenaciously defended 
by working class actions* (3?)
The seeming rapidity of this reversal throws into sharp relief 
the general problem of the limitations and possibilities of trade 
union action in a capitalist society. This question has recently 
been raised through the wide-ranging debate initiated by Eric Hobsbawm 
whose central argument appears to be that the difficulties facing the 
labour movement are of a protracted nature and indeed, have their roots 
in a growing resurgence of sectionalism in the post-war period. (38) 
After a decline during the first half of the twentieth century, 
sectionalism among the British working class, says Hobsbawm, is now 
on the increase and poses a real threat to the development of a more 
deeply socialist class consciousness. Older systems of internal
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stratification within the working class, particularly hierarchies 
based upon skill have been undermined by technological changes and 
the introduction of new systems of wage payment, all of which tended 
to erode former differentials and the sectional identities based upon 
them, (39) However, rather than the class becoming more 'homogeneous’ 
as a result of these changes,
"we now see a growing division of workers with sections and 
groups each pursuing its own economic interest irrespective 
of the rest," (40)
Groups of workers thus create 'potential friction' both with other 
groups and with 'the public' at large who are mainly comprised of 
other workers. Class consciousness and class solidarity and "the 
hold of the labour movement as a whole" is thereby being weakened. (4I)
Yet within Hobsbawm*s historical account there is a surprising 
absence, namely a failure to analyse the growth of shop floor power 
precisely over the period during which the new sectionalism is seen 
to have become most manifest. This omission is crunial since, 
particularly from the late 1960's onwards, as the preceding account 
has suggested, the shop stewards movement began to assume a much wider 
political role as British capitalism sought to introduce more coercive 
measures to deal with the power of the shop floor. The intensification 
of these developments, particularly during the early 1970*8 receives 
only brief and essentially dismissive reference by Hobsbawm. Actions 
such as the miners’ strikes and the fight against the Industrial 
Relations Act while they did evoke "material and moral solidarity", 
says Hobsbawm, had the character of exceptional episodes within an 
otherwise spiralling 'economism*. (42)
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"And yet this was, with the exception of the great struggles 
of 1970-74» ail almost entirely economistic militancy; and a 
movement is not necessarily less economist and narrow-minded 
because it is militant, or even led by the left. The periods 
of maximum strike activity since 1960-1970-72 and 1974- 
have been the ones where the percentage of pure wage strikes 
have been highest." (43)
At best, even those proportionately few struggles that were 
not simply about wages were notable only for a "renovated trade 
union consciousness", a kind of historical liaiigover of previous 
class solidarity, Hobsbawm concedes these struggles as ensuring.
"the survival of the strong traditional kind of working-cla,ss 
consciousness (limited though this was and is) in spite of 
the decline of the old nineteenth century industries which 
provided its main base and the numerical decline of the old 
(male) skilled worker who played such a crucial role in it; 
and in spite of the great improvement in standards of living 
which middle class observers in the 1980's expected to lead 
to 'bourgeoisification.(44)
In one respect Hobsbawm is of course correct. The industrial 
corps of the stru.ggles of the early 1970's were largely provided from 
the ranks of the 'traditional* working class, from among the 
miners, the dockers, the engineers and shipyard workers. Moreover, 
the fact that these struggles were 'politicised* by confrontations 
between the working, class and the government and evoked widespread 
solidarity does not in itself mean that the level of class 
consciousness superceded the limits of eoonomism. Hobsbawm is 
therefore right to \fam against "the great illusion of the 1970*8, 
that militant unionism is enough." (45) A struggle is not necessarily 
less economist in nature even though it embraces certain political 
objectives and has generated a 'strong traditional working class 
consciousness', However, in seeing such consciousness as essentially
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anachronistic Hobsbawm is inevitably dravm towards a pessimistic view 
of the prospects for the resumption of labour's forward march, the 
more so if the overwhelming tendency of the struggles of workers is also 
seen as 'sectional* in nature.
There is, however, a basic confusion in Hobsbawm's argument 
which results from his tendency to equate eoonomism with sectionalism, 
V/hat was new about the miners' strikes and the fight against the 
Industrial Relations Act and previous to that, against In Place of 
Strife, was the unity of the shop floor which actively broke dotm 
sectionalist consciousness between shop floor departments and their 
unions, first at the base of the movement, and then under pressure 
from below, between trade union leaderships. A broader class cohesion 
undoubtedly began to emerge during these years which if anything 
represented an objective decline in sectionalism. The problem was 
and is, that such cohesion while accompanying working class mobilisation 
on a wide scale does not necessarily pass through the barriers of 
eoonomism. "Trade unionist struggle" is "economist" in Lenin's 
terms, not because it lacks a political dimension and is confined to 
'pure wage' issues which patently the great class battles of the 1970*8 
were not, but because it is struggle which merely "embraces specifically 
working-class politics," (46) The struggles of the trade union movement, 
while they may raise the over a]. 1 level of class consciousness do not 
automatically form a bridgehead for that wider series of demands which 
at^their highest development pose the fundamental issue of general 
societal transformation, (47)
The real problem of eoonomism lies not in sectional demands 
since economic demands will inevitably have some sectional character 
under capitalism. Rather it lies in an acceptance of a reformist
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ideology which suggests the resolution of the problems of the working 
class can be obtained within the existing framework of capitalist 
social relations. Thus the class cohesion which is developed through 
struggle while it may produce limited concessions from capital, can 
thereby also easily be dissipated in the achievement of immediate 
ganns without posing the question of long-term class objectives.
Lacking the understanding that its own problems can only be finally 
resolved by revolutionary means, the class also lacks \he comprehensive 
awareness of the ramifications of the social crisis of capitalism among 
other sections of the population. It is therefore unable to develop 
the forms of leadership which will win over other oppositional elements 
whose active support as allies is required for a revolutionary change 
to occur. A weak, sectionally debilitated working class, is incapable 
of infusing the necessary clarity and cohesion into such a revolutionary 
alliance. 11ms unity within the working class, overcoming the limits 
of sectionalism is a precondition for overcoming tie limits of eoonomism, 
although in itself the development of revolutionary consciousness is 
by no means the necessary outcome of this process. Trade unionist 
struggle is important, therefore, in that it regenerates the corporate 
identity of the class on a wider basis than simple sectionalism.
It preserves an. irreducible core of resistance to exploitation in the 
form of continuing cultural reserves of solidarity, organisation, 
discipline and collectivism, acting as a countervailing force to 
sectional degeneration.
This above all was the significance of the class battles of the 
early 1970*s. They revealed the presence of a working class culture 
whose survival ha,d been called into question by the years of 'affluence* . 
It is a culture which is 'traditional*, however, not so much in the 
sense of the particular groups within the working class who are its
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carriers but rather in the broader sense that its roots extend back 
to the very origins of capitalism as an antagonistic social formation.
As Hall has pointed out,
"The dominance of one class over another does not mean that 
the latter disappears into the former. Subordinate class 
cultures maintain their autonomy, by struggle and by 
establishing their own defensive culture," (48)
Struggle can provide new content and definition to the culture of 
the working class in the form of experiences which reveal the 
wider possibilities of collective action. The innovatory action 
of the work-in was a rich expression of that culture and a significant 
contribution to its revival among other groups of workers. The 
fact that this culture is not always identical with the immediately 
visible 'culture of the popular masses' should not be allowed to 
obscure its significance as an important reservoir of class feeling 
and class consciousness. We are dealing here with a phenomenon 
that by definition is ideologically oppositional but still politically 
subordinate and therefore usually 'disadvantaged' within the unequal 
relations of capitalism. As Lenin has said,
"The elements of a democratic and socialist culture are present, 
if only in rudimentary form, in every national culture, since 
in every nation there are tolling and exploited masses, whose 
conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of 
democracy and socialism. But every nation also possesses a 
bourgeois culture (and most nations a reactionary and clerical 
culture as well) in the form not of 'elements', but of the 
dominant culture," (49)
Working class culture, then, is generated in the dynamic process of 
struggle whereby the working class begins to develop new oppositional 
social perspectives and demands which can challenge the coherence of the 
dominant culture and its assumptions. It is the process by which the class 
reveals its identity as a class. This concept of working class culture is 
therefore not one of narrow frozen postures of defensiveness which charactei
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the forme of sectionalism. Hor is it the historical residual of 
solidaristic ways of life of occupational communities. Rather, it 
refers to the dynamic dissolution of both sectionalism and localism 
through the activity of the class. The concept of working class 
culture presented here then locates the chief site of cultural 
production as one of struggle and opposition rather than accommodation 
to the inequalities of capitalism. That is, at its highest level of 
development it is the coherent expression of class interests which 
seeks the active transformation of the structures of subordination.
On the other hand, this does not imply that only the most advanced 
workers in the class are of theoretical concern as the examination of 
the tension between sectionalism and class consciousness makes clear.(50)
The analysis of the events at UCS reveals the real complexities of 
the formation of class consciousness and the problems in achieving 
clarity and direction within it. Arguably, this analysis also permits 
the concrete study of the emergence of those 'elements* of an embryonic 
'democratic and socialist culture* which reach beyond sectional and 
parochial boundaries. In view of this, it is difficult to accept the 
assertion by Richard Johnson that,
"Lenin's legacy had a tendency to relieve Marxism from the 
concrete study of working-olass culture, and to narrow the 
range of what was considered relevant to political practice." (50
Lenin's legacy is not so easily disposed of, and indeed, has a 
continuing relevance, not simply in the investigation of cultural 
formation in the working class but in the objective assessment of 
the ramifications of this formation among other parts of the population. 
If there is a single contribution of Lenin to contemporary revolutionary 
practice of central relevance today it is in his raising the question of 
the relations between the working class and its allies in the battle 
for socialism, (52)
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Indeed, it is clear from Lenin's \-n?itings that the overcoming 
of eoonomism is contingent upon, not only the internal unity of the 
class but the development of alliances with those other social elements 
which can potentially be detached from the side of the monopolies 
and defense of the status quo. The formation of alliances has a 
powerful educational role for the working class itself.
"Working class consciousness cannot be genuine political 
consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to 
all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence and a".use, no 
matter what class is affected,,.The consciousness of the 
working masses cannot be genuine class consciousness unless 
the workers leam, from concrete, and above all from topical 
political facts and events to observe every other social class 
in all the manifestations of its intellectual, ethical and 
political life." (53)
Thus Lenin spoke of "systematically acquiring and extending contact 
with other classes of society" as a principal task of the working 
class, providing the means through which its understanding of the 
functioning of the entire social system of exploitation could be 
developed, (54)
"\\Then we do that (and we must and can do it), the most backward 
worker will understand, or will feel, that the students and 
religious sects, the peasants and the others are being abused 
and outraged by those same dark forces that are oppressing and
crushing him at every step of his life," (53''
It was in this sense also that Lenin emphasised the obligation "to 
be ahead of all in raising, accentuating, and solving every democratic 
question" thereby defining the "vanguard" role of the working class 
within the alliance. (56) This is fan from the narrow and elitist 
approach that Lenin's detractors sometimes accuse him of expounding.
Even less is it an attempt to unilaterally impose the leadership of 
the working class within the alliance even though other social strata or
groups, by virtue of their class position or social composition, tend to
vacillate between capital and labour. The role of the "vanguard" rather 
is to generalise the separate and partial experiencesof exploitation within 
immediate 'programmes for action* but in such a way that the working class and
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its allies eventually come to recognise the necessary issue of state 
power.
On the question of alliances and their formation hinges the central 
issue of whether a 'broad* or a 'narrow' definition ofthe working class 
is adopted. The issue has been subject to intensive debate in the 
British and international workers* movement. (57) The problem is more 
than simply a definitional one and involves the concrete analysis of 
parti oui. ar historical realities. The attempt, for example, by Mouffe to 
pose Gramsci against Lenin by arguing that the former's concept of working 
class 'hegemony* goes beyond the Leninist conception of 'simple class 
alliance* to include a 'new dimension* of 'intellectual and moral leader­
ship*, not only caricatures Lenin but also Gramsoi, both of whom wrestled 
with the real historical complexity which the successful constitution of 
alliances pose, (58) Thus Mouffe has dismissed the Leninist conception 
of alliance as,
"a purely instrumental alliance between classes through which the 
class demands of the allied classes are articulated to those of 
the fundamentsJ. class, with each group maintaining its own 
individuality within the alliance as well as its own ideology." (59)
The UCS struggle, as has been indicated, certainly showed the working 
class to be capable of 'intellectual and moral leadership*. Mouffe, 
however, has obscured the point that the Leninist conception is not 
simple expediency but a principled.alliance of classes and social groups. 
It involves an active redefinition of social identities, wherein these 
allies themselves begin to reorientate their existing 'ideology* and, 
voluntarily subordinate their 'individuality' in the process of 
realigning their interests to correspond with those of the leading class, 
the workers. They are impelled to do so to the degree that they come 
to recognise that their own 'vital interests' can only be secured 
politically in alliance with the working class, as the class which alone 
is capable of consistently putting forward the general demands for 
radical social change which will also satisfy their own aspirations.
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This study has suggested that in forging unity in their own 
ranks, the workers at Upper Clyde also became a magnetic pole of 
attraction for a much wider alignment of forces deeply opposed to 
the threat presented by the policies of the Heath government.
Insofar as other groups and strata within the population began 
to be dravm in alongside the workers and indeed, began to dovetail 
certain of their own demands steming from the particular regional 
and national crisis facing Scotland, with those of the working class, 
there emerged the 'spectre* of an anti-monopoly alliance. There was, 
for a brief period during the UCS campaign just such a critical 
redefinition of loyalties and sympathies which placed representatives 
of the organised working-class at the head of a wider movement, that 
was eventually to succeed in producing a major turnabout on the 
question of the social implications of economic policy. Capital 
was forced to attempt to restabilise its social base as the demand 
for the 'right to work* grew from its narrow interpretation a,s the 
defense of sectional boundaries from encroachment, to a more direct 
challenge to the social legitimacy of the system, throwing into sharp 
relief the consensual heart of social democracy. The unique feature 
of the UCS campaign then, was that it was arguably the one major 
struggle that began to surpass purely economistic demands and 
exclusively working-class political objectives. It could be argued 
therefore that under certain conditions, 'traditional working-class 
consciousness* and the forms of culture in which it is preserved has 
an important role as a springboard in the development of a more all- 
embracing movement for change.
That capital was able to restabilise its social base among those 
temporarily disaffected elemoits was not an historic inevitability 
however. Rather it was the mark of the failure of that alliance to
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crystallise under a revolutionary political leadership. It is clear 
that the Communist Party, despite its considerable contribution to 
the success of the struggle in many other ways, was either unable or 
unwilling to perform its essential role as a revolutionary organising 
force. Too much importance was attached by the Party to the winning 
of positions for 'left* candidates in the official trade union movement 
while the basic day-to-day work of consolidating the political awareness 
which had emerged by developing new cadres at the level of factory-floor 
industrial branches, was insufficiently emphasised. Moreover, the 
official labour movement even in Scotland, was not an appropriate 
substitute vehicle for a vanguard party, in spite of its efforts to 
provide a national forum to ensure a more enduring structure for this 
alliance. Furthermore, the UCS workers, despite the fact that their 
action, spontaneously aroused such a wide array of forces were not 
by themselves capable of moving beyond the limits of eoonomism, even 
if it was the struggle they had mounted which had presented this at 
least as a real possibility. The failure to resolve the problem of 
leadership politically therefore meant that whatever potential for 
broader social change had been opened up could not be properly grasped.
As a result, neither the workers in the yards themselves nor 
even the shop stewards committee were able decisively to break with 
reformist objectives and in this sense they remained politically and 
ideologically subordinate. As a 'right to work* campaign the immediate 
and ultimate responsibility of the workers' representatives was seen as 
being to secure the jobs of their members. After the initial upsurge 
of the struggle, lasting perhaps three months, it even became increasingly 
difficult to persuade the workers themselves that assertions of 
sectional interests as a way of attempting to secure their 
future would be counter-produetive and ultimately disastrous.
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Only the very earliest pronouncements from the shop stewards contained 
any hint of the more fundamental challenge,that if the system of 
society could not provide jobs,then the workers themselves might have 
to consider 'changing the system'. The major demand, however, was 
phrased in terms of the necessity of government to provide the 
finance to save 'all the yards and all the jobs.' Indeed, in order 
to emphasise the 'realistic' nature of their approach the shop stewards 
expressly dcenied that it was their sole responsibility as against 
that of the broad labour movement, to bring about a change of 
government, never mind a change of the entire social system. As 
negotiations proceeded even the major demand for employment and the 
yards to be secured was redefined, perhaps inevitably, in a more 
limited way as the various parties concerned groped towards a 
settlement that was acceptable to all. The complex and protracted 
nature of these negotiations and manoeuvres inevitably helped to 
create the conditions in which sectional interests could attempt to 
undermine the former unity. Thus even the UCS campaign itself, 
irrespective of the unprecedented possibilities which it presented 
for building a broader alliance under working-class leadership, was 
in the end forced to remain within the confines of eoonomism.
In the absence of a revolutionary direction to the most prominent 
class struggles of the early 1970's the way was open for a Labour 
government to be returned which defused the militancy that had been 
built up by diverting it into still deeper channels of reformism. 
Labour came to power in 1974 promising to reconstitute the social 
consensus which Heath had dangerously mishandled. Paradoxically, it 
was able to do so more easily precisely because of the atmosphere of 
unity at all levels of the labour movement created by the unified 
opposition to Heath's policies. The industrial and political arms
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of the trade union and labour movement were united in a new accord 
which effectively offered to suspend the class war, namely the 
Social Contract,
It should be remembered that Heath had tried to involve the 
trade unions in helping to 'manage the economy' and indeed, an 
important indication of the U-tum was the series of discussions 
kno\m 8,8 the 'Downing Street talks' between the TUG and the government 
from the spring of 1972 until the late autumn of that year. It was 
the failure of these talks which finally induced Heath to introduce 
a compulsory wages freeze followed by statutory incomes policy, ( 60) 
V/hile there had been significant opposition to TUG involvement in 
talks on pay restraint with the Conservative government, now with 
the return of Labour, there was considerably more sympathy for co­
operating with the Government on the part of the mass of the trade 
union membership. It was argued moreover, that agreement to the 
Social Contract, negotiated in the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee, 
set up in early 1972, would enable the minority Labour government of 
February 1974 to go to the country again, as it did in October of 
that year, with the promise that they had somethi.ng important to 
offer the voters in terms of securing industrial peace, (61 ) The 
fact that it was Jack Jones, a former champion of free collective 
bargaining, who was the 'author' of the Social Contract, did much 
to secure its acceptability among trade unionists who would have 
vigorously rejected it under other circumstances.
The insidious confusion in the ranlcs of organised labour which 
was created by the Social Contract may be seen to lie in its 
ideological linch-pin of 'fair shares for all'. This was an appeal 
to precisely those reformist and economistic aspirations which
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resonated with hopes held for an end to the previous confrontation 
style of politics, 'Pair shares' meant that the old, the sick, 
women, the lower paid would no longer he trampled underfoot in the 
'stampede of the big battalions' to break tlrcough statutory wage 
controls. Instead, the entire trade union movement was offered 
the prospect of guaranteed real earnings, supplemented by government 
spending on direct services known as the 'social wage' which would 
protect the existing living standards of every section of the 
population in exchange for which the unions voluntarily abandoned 
free collective bargaining. Not only did the Labour government 
repeal the Industrial Relations Act and the Housing Finance Act 
but as part of the Social Contract, it initiated new legislation 
on equal pay, health and safety at work and industrial democracy, 
all on the advice of or in close consultation with the trade union 
movement.
The problem was, that implicit in the argument for the Social 
Contract was acceptance that wage bargaining was a major cause of 
inflation which therefore could only be cured either by some form 
of wage restraint or by mass unemployment, (62) Once the trade 
unions had accepted this proposition they, were effectively immobilised 
not only ideologically but also economically, Vfhat resulted in 
practice was not the redistribution between social classes envisaged 
in the Labour Party Manifesto promise Of a 'fundamental and 
irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth* but, if 
anything, a redistribution within the class, (6.3) The consequence 
of the Social Contract was that trade union leaderships came to 
sacrifice both full employment and free collective bargaining on 
the alter of 'loyalty* to the Labour government and to more nebulous 
appeals to the 'national interest'. As David Coates has commented,
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"the majority of union leaders came to play a very important 
subordinate supporting role to this Labour Government, acting 
for as long as they could as allies in the development of 
policies that involved the control of incomes and the toleration 
of rising unemployment, and eroded the living standards and job 
security of trade union members. It is this process, and its 
resulting tensions rather than any excess of trade union power 
which has to be documented and explained," (6|.)
In addition to the important dimension of reformism, Hyman 
has noted certain structural changes within the trade union movement 
itself which it is argued made it conducive to compliance and unable 
to mobilise effective opposition to the Social Contract on the shop 
floor, (65) In particular, the enmeshing of work-place representatives 
within official trade unions is seen by Hyman as undermining the 
independence and combatitiveness of the working class. The status 
and authority of conveners and shop stewards has been enhanced by 
their involvement in the new framework of s*' ^ te-sponsored participatory 
reforms and by the greater formalisation of the role of shop stewards 
in the extensive spread of procedural agreements at workplace level 
during the period from 1974 onwards. This new integration between 
shop stewards and trade unions has ostensibly produced what Hyman 
describes as "the bureaucratisation of the rank and file." (6&)
It is suggested that.
"A key mediating role is now performed by a stratum of shop 
steward leaders who have become integrated into the external 
union hierarchies and have at the same time acquired the 
power, status and influence to contain and control disaffected 
sections and sectional stewards. This fact is crucial in 
explaining the effect of the THC/government wage curbs since
1975. The very limited opposition and resistance on the 
shop floor during the first two (or even three years) of pay 
controls cannot be explained simply in terms of the level of 
unemployment, or political commitment to a Labour government, 
but owe much to the new ability of national, union leaders to 
win the backing of major conveners, and of these in turn to 
deliver the acquiescence of their own workplace organisations," (67)
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As a gloss on certain important developments in the character 
of shop floor representation and bargaining, Hyman's description 
has an initial appeal. Certainly, as Brovm has noted in a recent 
survey of changes in the pattern of bargaining,
"Shop stewards are no longer divorced from formal negotiating 
arrangements in the way that the Donovan Commission had 
criticised. The formal arrangements have in the main been 
adapted to include them and the concomitant rise of single­
employer bargaining has increasingly made stewards into the 
principal negotiators and guarantors of clear-cut factory 
agreements and procedures," (60)
Moreover, the number of full-time shop stewards and conveners 
appears to have increased dramatically, by a factor of four over 
the decade between I96B and 1978. Often, this has taken place as 
in the operation of check-off arrangements for dues, the implementation 
of the closed shop and even in certain areas where they are lacking, 
encouragement to develop shop stewards organisations, with considerable 
support from managements seeking smooth industrial relations. All 
this would tend to suggest that the independence of shop-floor 
representatives to represent their members interests is in danger 
of being compromised, \Ihat is described as "a complex system of 
linkages" is invoked to explain how national union leaderships 
"contain, control and manipulate" the ordinary membership through 
establishing "loyalties, understandings or trade-offs with groups 
at different levels of this elaborate hierarchy." (6.9) Hyman, however, 
has presented an essentially Machieavellian picture which although 
suggesting a sociological sophistication not only remains unspecified, 
but obscures the very important process of informal collective 
discipline which work groups can exercise over those representatives 
who appear unable or unwilling to articulate their views. This is 
not to say that opinions of workers and their representatives whether
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'lay* or 'union officials are always in harmonious coincidence. The 
UCS study has shovm that tliis is far from being so. However, to 
suggest that there is a necessary 'tendency' for a 'semi-bureaucracy' 
to emerge separated from the workers is to oversimplify grossly the 
character of those relations. (70)
The salient fact about the Social Contract was that, containing 
as it did many progressive features which had themselves been
demands raised by the trade unions during the previous phase of
industrial struggle, it therefore had a genuine political attractiveness 
for many workers irrespective of any 'mediatory' role performed by 
senior shop stewards. Securing trade union acquiescence at shop 
floor level was not all that difficult although it must also be 
noted that responses by shop stewards, for example, to industrial 
democracy proposals and joint consultation with management, were not 
entirely free of ambiguity. In particular, this was due to the 
recognition of the dangers of the very process Hymsn posits, precisely 
the fear of divorce from the membership. (71)
'Hyman's argument may be viewed as an attempt to provide detail
at the level of the workplace of the more extensive analysis of the
role of trade unions in contemporary capitalist society put forward 
by Marxist exponents of theories of 'corporatism', (?g) Corporatism 
is seen as a term with which to pinpoint the growing involvement 
of the official trade unions with the capitalist state and the 
employers. It is an attempt to identify an important trend within 
the trade union movement, that of union leaderships to act as 
'instruments of containment' of workers' demands, (?3) Thus particular 
emphasis is placed upon the role of trade unions as agencies of
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'social control* over their membership. Corporatism is, in the 
words of Panitch,
"a political structure within advanced capitalism which 
integrates organized socio-economic producer groups 
through a system of representation and co-operative 
mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilization 
and social control at. the mass level." (74)
The attempted involvement of trade unions in the policy-malcing 
apparatus, particularly in incomes policies, is construed as a 
means of dampening wage pressure in the absence of a reserve army 
of unemployed to regulate wage levels, (75) So far as it goes, 
this is a more or less adequate description of a less directly 
coercive response of capitalism to shop floor power although not 
of the effectiveness or timing of such response, Whether therefore 
the notion of corporatism makes possible a genuine historical analysis 
is somewhat more debateable. The nearest Panitch approaches this 
is to suggest that there are inevitable limits to and instabilities 
in corporatism created by shop floor resistance to falling real 
wages. (76) What Panitch fails to observe, however, is that on 
each occasion that capitalism attempts to integrate the trade union 
movement in incomes policies in order to solve its crisis, new 
and more damaging contradictions are thereby accumulated. The real 
limits to corporatism are fully historical, not simply in the sense 
that there is an inevitable working-class resistance to wage restraint, 
but also that the lessons of class collaboration become clearer 
with each experience of betrayal to ever greater numbers in the 
labour and trade union movement.
Thus despite certain initial gains, the Social Contract proved 
to be yet another variant of wage restraint which was eventually 
to produce "the most severe cut in real wages in twenty years," (77)
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Latterly it was coupled with a rise in unemployment to 1,5 million 
and savage cuts in public expenditure and the 'social wage', as the 
Labour government first fought to protect sterling and then oapitul.ated 
to the deflationary demands of the International Monetary Fund bankers. (IB ) 
By 1977 the movement of prices had increased more than eight per cent 
over real earnings. In relative terms also, established differentials 
between skilled and unskilled workers were upset, particularly by 
flat rate increases. (19 ) After three years during which free 
collective bargaining had been effectively suspended, an accumulated 
backlog of grievances had begun to express itself in increasing rank 
and file restiveness reflected also at the official leadership level.
It culminated in the 'Winter of Discontent', the supposed 'enfant 
terrible' of the Social Contract, as low paid public sector workers 
who had suffered the greatest decline in wages took vigorous action 
to protect their standard of living.
Many of these workers were entering into struggle practically 
for the first time a}3.d indeed, it could be argued that in terms of 
the effects of the Social Contract it was these groups who felt 
most justifiably aggrieved with the Labour government's faflure to 
meet its promises. However, it would be incorrect to see these 
struggles as somehow more sectional simply because there were short­
term disruptions of certain public services, no matter how inconvenient.
As Bernard Dix, assistant general secretary of M P E  has pointed out, 
these actions were also protests against the effects of cuts on 
public services, hospital closures and the like, as well as about 
pay. (so) Indeed, in his analysis of the development of trade 
union opposition to the cuts Fryer has noted,
"the campaign appeared to challenge traditional sectionalism, 
both between and within trade unions. Relations between 
unions, such as the NALGO/NUPE and CPSA/SCPS links, and in 
the National and Regional Steering Committees, represented 
an extension of inter-union solidarity that w^ as impressive
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Returning to Eobsbawm'e argument therefore it io difficult to accept 
the interpretation of increasing sectionalism in the working class, 
even in the more limited context of the latter years of the 1974-79 
Labour government. A more positive interpretation of these events 
would allow that in reasserting free collective bargaining these 
workers were shown to be capable of defending their own interests 
outside a framework of class collaboration and in so doing they also 
campaigned for wider community and collective interests embodied in 
the concept of the 'social wage', including the protection of 
employment opportunities. The lamentable record of those union 
leaderships who attempted to defend and preserve the Social Contract 
will not be easily expunged.
Given that much wider groups of workers have now been dravai 
into bitter actions against incomes policies its utility as a 
future strategy for capital must now be considerably reduced. 
Moreover the failure of the Social Contract and the electoral price 
which had to be paid for this has accelerated the realignment of 
those forces in the Labour Party opposed to any future 'resuscitation' 
of such an option. Indeed, the fear that a future Labour government 
might not be able to deliver trade union compliance, particularly 
as the Labour Party itself becomes more democratically responsive 
to its membership, while the Conservatives appear to have abandoned 
consensus politics altogether, is leading to the search for new 
options in the 'centre ground' of the electoral arena, (82) Whatever 
the outcome of these developments, and this is by no means clear, 
for an increasingly important part of the labour and trade union 
movement the experience of tie reformist policies of the previous 
Labour government has been salutorj>'. In the immediate sense it has 
meant that a weakened working class movement has been less able to 
withstand the attacks upon it of the Thatcher government.
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There is some evidence, for example, that for the Conservatives 
the lessons of the Industrial Relations Act have also been salutory.
Their approach to the issue of legislative restriction on trade 
unions has been on a 'step-by-step* basis rather than risk an early 
head-on confrontation, despite strident Conservative back-bench 
demands for the issues of picketing, dramatised by the Grunv/ick's 
dispute, and the closed shop, to be resolved by draconian legislation,(83) 
The I98O Employment Act began the first phase of a more subtle attack 
on these issues but differed from the legislation in placing
individual employers rather than a state-sponsored judicial apparatus 
of industrial relations courts on the front line of the battle to curb 
the shop floor. Thus workers would not recognise quite so clearly 
the class-biased nature of adverse judicial decisions. However, as 
Lewis and Simpson have argued in their examination of the I98O 
Employment Act, "in substance the intention to restrict the ability 
of the unions to enga,ge in industrial action is not dissimilar" to 
the previous Conservative legislation, (84) Despite this, trade 
union reaction has been relatively muted. On the other hand with the 
introduction of the second phase of the Conservative's trade union 
legislation, the 'Tebbit Bill*, the trade union movement has shown 
signs that it intends to mobilise itself to resist any further 
attacks, (85) Both at shop floor level the influence of the LCDTU 
has revived, while at the official level in marked contrast to 1971-72* 
the TUG itself has sponsored preparatory conferences of union 
executives to establish agreed lines of collective action. The 
potential for unified opposition in the movement is therefore greater 
in some ways than in 1971.
Furthermore, a. new unity is being generated by the growing 
recognition that there must now be a decisive break with the limitations
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of the previous eoonomism and reformism, V/hat has become knom as 
the Alternative Economic Strategy, itself growing out of the trade 
union campaign against the cuts and the Social Contract, represents 
a positive attempt to overcome these previous limitations by helping 
to create the conditions within which the sphere of challenge to 
capitalism can be significantly widened to embrace new allies for 
change, (86) The Alternative Economic Strategy constitutes a developing 
programme for left advance capable of opening up the way to a Labour 
government committed to Initiating a non-reformist response to the 
current crisis of capitalism. The conditions whereby such an adopted 
programme could become a rallying point and a realisable challenge 
leading towards a radical transformation of capitalism are now a 
vital area for analysis and debate in the labour and trade union 
movement, (87 ) What the experience of the struggle at UCS suggests 
is that given the necessary leadership, mass involvement and mobilisation 
then the working class is capable of exercising the kind of determination 
which such a process of radical transformation will require and, 
moreover, that it is capable of uniting around itself a broader 
alliance of forces for whom fundamental change now also becomes a 
matter of compelling urgency. In that sense, while it is possible 
to accept the spirit if not the substance of the argument that 'militancy 
is not enough', it may well be that labour's forward march is only 
just beginning.
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Table 1
Manual Labour Force by Occupation
Occupational Group Shipbuilding Total Manual Labour Force
Steel Trades
Platers/shipwrights 14.1
Welders 11,3
Caulker/burner/driller/riveter 6.1
Others 3*6
Total Steel Trades 55.1
Other Craft Occupations
Fitters/turners and machinists 8,7
Plumbers/coppersmiths 6,3
Electricians 5*8
Joiners 5*1
Painters 2.4
Woodworking shipwrights 0,9
Others 3.6
Total Craft Workers 67.9
Non-craft manual workers 19.7
Other employees 12,4
Total All Employees 100.0
Source; Commission on Industrial Relations, Report No, 22, p. 153- 
Figures for Great Britain as at 16 May 1970,
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Table 5
WORK-IN PERSONNEL 10 DECEMBER 1971
CLYDEBANK GOVAN LINTHOUSE SCOTSTOUN TOTAL
Staff 19 34 20 4 77
Electricians 4 23 Nil Nil 27
El, Storemen Nil 2 Nil Nil 2
El, Helpers Nil 2 Nil Nil 2
T. El, Nil Nil Nil Nil 1
Joiners 2 6 Nil Nil 6 32
Sheet Iron Workers Nil 24 Nil Nil 24
Sheet Iron Workers Helpers Nil 1 Nil Nil 1
Platers Nil 9 11 25 45
Platers Helpers Nil 1 Nil Nil 1
Welders Nil 10 Nil 25 35
Welders Helpers Nil 1 Nil Nil 1
Caulkers Nil 4 Nil Nil 4
Shot Blast Operators Nil 1 Nil Nil 1
Shipwrights Nil 13 Nil 15 28
Cranemen Nil Nil Nil 5 3
Total 284
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Table 6 Place of Residence of Employees of Govan Shipbuilders
Govan-
%
Scotstoun Marine 
%
Glasgow South and Vest
Glasgow North Vest & Clydebank
Glasgow North & East
Paisley/Renfrew
Dumbarton
Other areas
52.3 
14.9
10.4
7.3
15.1
100.0
17.8
52.0
10.6
3.0
2.5
14.1
100.0
Notes:
• Definition of areas:
Glasgow south and west: Govan, Kinning Park, Hillington, South
Side at Barrhead Employment exchange areas (EEA's )
Glasgow north vest and Clydebank: Partick, Maryhill and Clydebank
E E A ’s.
Glasgow north and east: Springburn, Parkhead and Easterhouse EEA's
Paisley/Renfrew: Paisley and Renfrew EElA's,
Dumbarton: Dumbarton EEA,
Other areas: May include areas above but information does not
allow specific allocation.
Source: Govan Shipbuilders Ltd.; Scottish Council Engineerin'
Manpower Study; Distribution of Steelworkers Houses,
1974.
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Appendix 1
Draft Scheme of Control in the Engineering and Shipbuilding 
Industry, by William Gallacher, of the Clyde Workers* 
Committee I9 I6 ,
Draft Scheme of Control in the Engineering and. Shipbuilding Industry 
(by Wm. Gallacher, of the Clyde Workers' Committee, I9I6?),
In order that the Engineering and Shipbuilding Industry may 
be more efficiently carried on, and in order that the workers may 
be given more control of the conditions obtaining in the workshops, 
it is proposed to establish a system of Workshop Committees. The 
purpose of these Committees, elected by and from the Trade Unionists 
in the shop, would be to control and regulate, both generally and 
particularly, the conditions of labour in the interests of the 
workers.
The Committees shall be empowered:
(1) To see that all Trade Union standards and agreements are 
strictly observed,
(2) Generally to supervise and enforce agreements relating to 
the dilution of labour, and particularly to secure the 
strict observance of any shop or works agreement dealing 
with this matter.
(3) To be taken into consultation by the management in all 
cases where it is proposed to transfer labour from one 
department to another, from craft to craft, or in any 
way to change the existing practice.
(4) To keep a record of all changes in shop custom or practice. 
All such records to be forwarded to and systematically 
filed by the Allied Trades Committee mentioned in Clause VI,
(5) To act as representatives of the men in any negotiations 
with the management.
10.
(6) The Glîop Co.-r’.j-tten bo inverted with co-.r.-.l•->'v
responsibility for production in the shop, and shall be 
the sole medium for contract between employers and workmen, 
having full bargaining powers in the matters of time allowance 
where premium bonus obtains and of rates under a piece-work 
system, that is to say all individual contracting between 
employer and workmen weill be eliminated.
The immediate procedure suggested would be somewhat as follows:
(a) The convener of the Works Committee would be furnished by the
employer with a complete list of existing piece-work
prices or estimated time allowances for particular operations.
Similarly, departmental sub-committees shall be 
furnished, with a list of prices and time allowances relating 
to their respective departments,
(b) When a job is to be put in hand the sub-committees of the section
concerned shall consider the time allowance or piece-work 
rate offered by the employer. Should it be deemed inadequate, 
representations will be made to the departmental management. 
Failing agreement, the matter will be submitted to the Works 
Committee at the first meeting. Should the view of the sub­
committee be upheld by the Works Committee negotiations will 
be entered upon with Works Management. In the event of a 
deadlock, the time allowance or uiece-work rate proposed 
by the Shop Committee shall be adopted pending the decision 
on an appeal from the employers to the impartial tribunal 
to be set up by the Shipyards Labour Committee.
The Committee shall be elected by a.nd from the Trade Unionists 
in the shop with due regard to the interests of the various sections
11
of workers. For each department or section of departments numbering 
fifty workers or part thereof, there shall be one representative 
on the Committee, and an additional representative for any 
succeeding fifty or part thereof.
Each department shall elect sub-committees to act under the 
advice and direction of the main committees, and composed of the 
delegate or delegates to the main committee together with two other 
Trade Unionists in the department.
In each district an Allied Trades Committee composed of the 
district officials of the Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions, 
skilled or unskilled, shall be fomed. To this Committee the 
various shop committees shall report and. it shall be the business 
of this Committee to unify the methods adopted by the shop 
committees, and to act as intermediary between the shop committees 
and the Unions concerned.
In addition, this Committee shall be empowered to deal with 
questions affecting the district as a whole, but only after 
consultation with the shop committees. The District Committee 
shall act as sole intermediary between the shop committees in the 
area and the Shipyard Labour Committee.
Each Shop Committee shall draw up a schedule stating name, 
occupation and union of the men in the shop.
It shall be the business of the Shop Committee to receive 
reports from the representatives of the departments and to act 
thereon.
12c
Appendix 2 
The Fairfield AgreementSo
dTfe X\ x-i in
(3F WCHUCING 3%IACTIC%CS ^3.
BET/fEEN
FAIRFIELDS (GLASGOV/) LIMITED . 
and
AMATuGylMATED SOCIETY OF BOILERMAKERS * SHIPw’RIGHTS ,BIACKSMÎTHS
STTUÂSTÛRLüU^JORÛüÔtS,
(3.) GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(a) Interchangeability to apply amongst all trades 
coming within membership of the Amalgamated Society^ 
Y/here Management requires interchangeability they 
will have the fullest prior consultation with the 
Shop Stewai'ds concernedo
(b) Where redundancy arises within a trade to which 
men of another trade have been transferred on the 
basis of interchangeability, the ti'ansferred men 
will revert back to their own trade before any of 
the regular tradesmen in the department are 
declared redundant
(c) Vlhen a man is transferred from one grade to 
another grade, and no retraining is involved, he 
will retain his own personal rate or take the rate 
for the new grade., whichever is the higher*
In the case of the man's personal rate being higher 
than the grade rate of his new job, his rate will be 
reviev/ed after 12 weeks* Normally the man will drop 
to the grade rate of his new job when either he 
would be redundant if he returned to his old job or 
his transfer is for largely personal reasons ^ 
otherwise he will retain his personal rate for a 
further 12 weeks and be reviewed again*
In the event of retraining being involved, the man's 
rate will be reviewed after 4 weeks and he will 
receive part or all of the difference between his 
own rate and the new grade rate according to his 
progress towards working with no more than normal 
supervis ion*
(2) APPLICATION*
(a) Fabrication and assembly work in the Fab* shop and 
also erection and fairing on the berths will be 
shared by platers and shipwrights on the basis of 
integration ioC* platers to undertake shipwrights 
work and vice versa as required*
Ur£70i cjq3S7Rjiwn3easru«Vk *
(b) The rat io between the overall numbers of platers 
and shipwrights (including woodwork shipwrights) 
which has been customary in the Yard will be 
maintained, subject to mutual agreement on fluctuation 
relcVted to the availability of labour*
(,c) Caulkers aind Burners wi 11 be Integrated into a 
common trade of CauIker/burner *
Cont inued,
î) (continued) 14*
(d) All the trades coming v/i thin membership of the 
Amalgamated Society will as required undertake 
service operations which are incidental to 
the progress of their main job. e*go
(i) Tack Vfelding or Stud vYelding*
(ii) Burning, cutting or tappingc
(iii) Drilling*
(iv) Caulking and riveting. , •
(v) Llning-offo
(vi ) Fairing.,
(vii) Making and/or fitting of items 
such as brackets, lugs, toggles 
etCo, which are a minor part of 
the job*
N*B* Bearing in mind the 8 tatutory Regulations 
and in the interest of all aspects of 
safety, both sides accept that certain 
operations will require to be carried 
out by a qualified tradesman.
The general intention of this Clause is to 
widen the scope of the duties which each 
trade may undertake in progress ing the 
normal work of their craft, while at the 
same time recogniaing the identity of each 
trade *
(e) Boilermakers who have been absorbed into the 
Yard as a consequence of the closure of
Fairfield/Rowans will continue to apply their 
traditional skills and v/i 11 be integra.ted where 
appropriate with platers, welders, caulkers and 
burners *
(3) SECURITY OF EMPLOYMENT*
The Company will afford to all members of the 
Amalgamated Society covered by this Agreement 
a period of security of employment dependent 
upon the state of the Company's order book 
and the Company continuing in business*
A period of EIGHTEEN months is contemplated 
initially, and the period of a further 
extension will be the subject of a review 
between the parties to this Agreement wi thin 
tv/elve months of its acceptance*
c ontinuedo9oc
15.
(4) WORK STUDY
As a further step in increasing Productivity 
v/e joip-S^ly agree to participate in any new 
scheme provided present level of earnings 
are not reduced as a consequence*
The introduction of a Measured Day Work 
Scheme will be based on these techniques and 
will involve operatives in the use of job card: 
for* recording achievements and non-produc t ive 
t ime*
(5) R m U N E R A T I O N ,
In consideration of acceptance of this Agreement ^ 
the Company will reward all the trades covered 
by this Agreement with a Special A1lowance of 
1/Id per hour which shall be computed separately 
and paid additionally to the prevailing rates*
16GUIDE TO RELAXATION OF WORKING PRACTICES.
23 rd May „ 1966
lo PLATERS AND SHIPWRIGHTS*
Platers assembling and fabricating material prior to 
erection «*
Relaxations « a* Accept shipwrights to share
fabrication and assembly work in 
Fabo Shop on basis of integration 
but not to exclusion of platers*
bo Accept sheet iron workers to share 
fabrication and assembly work in 
Fabo Shop on basis of intogratiouo
Co Undertake own service burning*
do Undertake own tack welding of jobs
and of fairing lugs and toggles*
eo Undertake sundry minor items of 
blacksmiths' work as required*
fo Accept fairing by welders of butts 
and searnso
go Accept fitting by welders of sundry 
items of jobbing plating work,
he Accept employment of caulkers and
burners on sundry items of jobbing 
plating work*
jo Accept employment of blacksmiths
on sundry items of jobbing plating 
work,
k. Accept manufacture and fitting by
blacksmiths of sundry items of plating work,
2o P1.ATERS 'WORKING ON SHIP,
Relaxations - a* Accept shipwrights to share fairing
and closing work on 50/50 basis of 
intégrât ion,
bo Undertake own service burning,
Co Undertake own tack welding of jobs
and of fairing lugs and toggles in 
progressing own work,
do Erect and bolt sheet iron trunking
as requiredo
cont inued* * * » * »
17.
e„ Undertake sundry minor items o£ 
blacksmiths' work as required*
£f> Accept lairing by welders of butts 
and seamso
go Accept fitting by welders of sundry 
items of jobbing plating work*
ho Accept employment of caulkers and 
burners on sundry items of jobbing 
plating work*
jo Accept employment of blacksmiths on 
sundry items of jobbing plating work,
3o SHIPWRIGHTS AND PLATERS
Shipwrights on steelwork* 
Relaxations «« Accept platers to share erection 
and main fairing on basis of 
integration but not to exclusion of 
Shipwrights* welder to assist 
erection squad*
b« Undertake sharing of fabrication 
and assembly work with platers in 
Fab* Shop on basis of intégrât ion*
c@ Undertake ovm tack welding of jobs 
and of fairing lugs and toggles in 
progress ing own work,
do Undertake own service burning,
ea Blacksmith to undertake sundry items 
of Shipwright work,
f o Undertake sundry items of Blacksmith, 
work.
4o SHIPVIPJGHTS ON WOODif/ORK.(Including launchways) and
installing equipmentc
Continue as at present
Production Welders (Shop and Ship) 
Relaxations ao Agree to platers undertaking 
tack welding of jobs and of fairing 
lugs and toggles in progressing own 
work.
Agree to shipwrights undertaking 
tack welding of jobs and of fairing 
lugs and toggles in progressing ov/n 
work ,
G« Agree to blacksmiths welding their
Vf E L D E R S  ( c on t i uxs e d )
18,
dft
CAULKERS & BURNERS
Hand and M/c Caulkers 
Relaxations
Hand and M/c Burners 
Relaxations «
DRILLERS*
Relaxations
g
h
a
d*
Agree to blacksmiths welding their 
own work on board ship*
Agree to sheet iron workers tack 
welding their own work.
Undertake fairing of butts and 
seams *
Undertake fitting of sundry items 
of jobbing plating work*
Undertake sundry minor items of 
blacksmiths* work as required.
Accept interchangeabi1ity with 
burners as a common trade of 
Caulker/Burners,
Agree to drillers undertaking
own tapping as required in progressing
own work.
Undertake sundry items of jobbing 
plating work as required*
Undertake sundry minor items of 
blacksmiths® work as required®
a® Accept interchangeability with 
Caulkers as a common trade of 
Caulker/Burners.
b® Agree to platers and shipwrights
undertaking own service burning in 
progressing their work®
c© Agree to blacksmiths undertaking
own service burning in progressing 
their work.
de Undertake sundry items of jobbing 
plating work as required.
a® Agree to other ironworking trades 
undertaking drilling of holes 
incidental to their own job,
bo Agree to undertake tapping of holes 
as required®
NoB* Bearing in mind the present
level of driller labour force^ 
consideration to be given to 
the retraining of a number of 
drillers into other trades ®
19.
SHEET IRON WORKERS.
Relaxations a® Agree to platers erecting and 
bolting sheet iron trunking as 
required.
bo Undertake sundry items of jobbing 
plating work as required©
c* Undertake tack welding of own works
do Welder to undertake progressing 
of own work, E/L Lugs,
Trays etc*
BLACKSMITHS©
teMeyiaeene^ iiraBwin-*
Relaxations a© Agree to platers^ shipwrights^
caulkers and welders undertaking 
sundry minor items of blacksmiths' 
work as required,
bo Undertake manufacture and fitting 
of sundry items of plating work 
as required in progressing own 
worko
c* Undertake sundry items of jobbing 
plating work on ship as required 
in progressing own work.
do Undertake welding of own work in 
shop and on ship as required in 
progressing own work*
e© Undertake own service burning*
fo Undertake sundry items of
Shipwright work in progressing 
own work*
BOILEmiAKERS, Boilermakers formerly employed by 
Fairfleld/Rowan referred to in 
the Agreement will undertake thei: 
appropriate plating, welding, 
caulking or burning as required*
20.
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EIEOPAICAL TIAIAU UHIOZf
traicg uhoiî
mïTOKAI. tmciï OP CCZT ÎLDAL VOLISHS & COPESR^il'EIS 
imiEPD PATiRK:AUa:B5' AsscciAaToiï
Esgpljoyeà Im the 
i m w m i m i o E  Aim oim^T D3?Aima;!ïxs 
©a
rxmBXLIO?ï àim IiT'TSRCHAt:0rvA3IIXTf 
dated 
)X8T AIE5UST 1967
%he follcxï/iïig are mutually ftgreed batueen the Compaq»' tlie partiel* 
îpatiîi^  Trades UziloziB :
1 ■ CEÎGBAJ, PKI2TC1PLU.5I
This Agreeriest affecta recognised Joiimeymsm i^embers of their 
respective Trades Uaioüs os.ly*
Thlfl Agres^eat repli^ -cea or c&scela aay agrccieeat or arranceneat, 
official or Ovher^’is-s, coaceriiing flexibilité/' cjxd lute r chan os « 
:ability bctveen the tr^dea Involved, but ail existing l'icxible 
ÊLEd Intêjrchsjsigeablc practices vill coiâtinue* . •
(c) Th© ]%l2xatlou of vorhing practices by Outfit and K^iuteni^nce 
Journeyman will increase efficiency cad im'prova productivity.
(d) This Agréeront is made betvecn FaliTlcXda (Glsagov) Limited end 
idle 1 cIpatimg Unions and affects employées of the Comoamy 
Duly. lu the imnlemcutaticu of this Agreement, no accouat vill 
bo t&keu of the prevailing cog)io\-mtat conditionsj, nationally or 
locally®
(e) Uorh‘caïuTed cut under the iutorchcngeabiXity clause of this 
Agilement vill be under the Cozm,zuy 's Mracured fvyarorh Sclieme.
(f) This Agî’eemos.t vill b@ subject to ratification l32 calemd.nr days 
£iftn>r its If the coaoitioas of the Agrccneau are act 
be lug met during the iritervoxl between rclguatiu'c and ratif d.cutica, 
the Agreecojut icty be c.uscellca on either party giving to c ale char 
ût\yj3* notice to the other*
/PI
^ K^ICTIY:': ?rAC-nCZ3;
practices coacermcd vlth overtlc© vor3clzg aud
jo b  K aa n L '" v i l l  ixs ab^jcx-Oiiede O ve rt line  jg, vucii worked^ t/111
(equitably distributed.
5 52S2%UTr:
Each trade v U I  ic?tajn its cnm identity) hut any jouraeyBan m y  
parfoi-a vjrb prevl/rusJy coiii’ined to another trade, vhera such 
work is lac:ce%WLl to the particular job being done.
^ Lirf :
To assist Btilcllitrr of ccrploymeat azid 'to nsot priorities eihd 
esergeacics, va*re" practicable, jouruey%:^% of one cruft rziy be 
temporarily tr:%alcrred to vorx in any other cr'aft lu the Outfit 
' . ' esicl Haintenasce gr^up. It is ths rsspoaslbillty of Muuageueut 
to ensure h-iut the vorh thus carried out is completed aatis®' 
Jfoctorily.
mPERVTSICR;
Joiiraeyzsea vill be euper/loed by kbe Foremm% responsible for 
the job.
PAYfCTJÎTî
A b from $rd July 19o7, all jouiv.eysem erq)loyees of the partiel** 
jpatiag Unions vill receive an increase of paymsïrt ou the hourly 
i*ate of 4-'h. As from 1th Eepteuber 19^7) a further increase of 
qpd. vill be paid oa the hourly rate, a&kiag a total of gd, per 
hour.
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Employed In the 
Z4AZK%2iakCB Aim OUWIT 
dated
■ -  . ■
$]IS3 AU3U32 1967
Fox* the CoüToai^ g^ ' .
MrOCtO?
• PerBonnoX Services
• « « • » • « * » « « Execut l vo Eansigor <* O u tfittin g
, ..« , 0,,* , . ® . Executive llamger - HID
       Executive Itxuager « Pipevods
 •      Executive M&E.ager « Plant
Fox* the Amalgamated En-sijieering Union :
et,*.4,. . . « . « e . , ® . F u X l « * t i m â  Official
X  . ■
HIxop 8te>mxd.
22.
E* the Society of Pointers & P-ecorsitorsî
MJL'»tlUe Cff iCiûl
AO««6»»(icn*o9*oo®®o«««®®.«o<i®ocecv®o ShOp StCWOXd 
®0«c«®«ciiio&o*®.c®..*®«t)®oveo«o<>e>citi.® SLOp StClf&rd
25.
F o r  the Flectrlc;.?.! Tr.vles Unionr
'FxûX^tirjü O ffic ia l
For tbs Pl\nblng Ti^dse UaloBi
8ho%) Stevard 
Shop Stevard
FuH=-tiB3 O ffic ia l
®e®®Q*ooo®o*«.**«*•• POO.*«*.***oc«o Shop 8tof7&rd
c * o  Shop Stevax'd
For the national Union of Uîiset Metal Workers & CODDersmitîrsî
* * * ® , o O * ® « * o « @ o ® * q o e « e , e , @ * o * « « o o * *  FuH.*tiBS C"«k f  iCl&l 
* # * * © m * o e o * . o * * * * e 4 # * « ® o * * ® # * ® * B o * *  ObOp StOV&rd 
4 > « ® o a o o ô o o o * 4 0 4 * # 4 « « e o 4 i « ® * * 4 c * « c . * o  Shop Stevard
For the UTiited P a t t s r s ' Associations
*#**»#.*o$4* FuH™OlxS.3 OffiCi&l 
Shop Stew&rd
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The UCS Agreements
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URPKR CLYDE SHIPBFIThERS LIMITED
EMPTjOYMEMT CHARTER
(note: When the Charter is printed in booklet
form a list of the Trade Unions signatory 
to the Charter will be included*. )
FOREWORD
This Charter describes the Conditions which govern. Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders Limited and its subsidiaries (hereafter called the 
Company) and its employees in providing' secure, safe and sFitisfying 
employment to its workpeople and a fair z’etum. to its shareholders.
The Charter provides a practical step towards implementation 
of the Geddes recommendatio.ns and towards greater continuity of 
employment.
The Charter covers the acceptance o.f m o d e m  management conceptions 
and practices y in particular those pra,ctices which lead, to the 
maximum use being made of all resources of equipment, material and 
labour, leading to minimum costs allied to increased productivity 
and higher wages.
The Company recognises the part it and the Unions must play to 
ensucre the prosperity of the Company and of its employees,
(Rote: "Employées" means all employees of each of the
member compaj.iies, and each employee ^ s length 
of seivice will be calculated as from the date 
on which his present employment with the mcmbe.r 
company commenced.)
November
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IMPLOYHCRT CHARTER
1. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES AND TRADE UinON RECOGNITION.
(a) As regards the Yards of Brov/n® .s,Coni).ell ® s, Stephen's and
Yarrow® s the Conpany will continue meantime to observe the negotiating 
procedure as prescribed in the Rational Agreement of 1/th August, I967, 
between the Shipbuilders and Repairers Rational Association and the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions,
(b) As regards the Fairfield Yard the Company will, continue
meantime to observe the negotiating procedux'e as prescribed in the 
Fairfield Booklet dated 2nd Jime and 2nd September, I966.
(c) It is the Compaar/'s intention to agree common procédural
arrangements for all five Yards, and they expect to complete such 
arrangements within a period of six months of the Merger,
(d) In the case of demaz'cation issues the Company will obseivre
in all Yards the procedurce which is set forth in the Dc-marcation 
Procedure A.greement attached,
(e) The Company recognises the right and responsibility’ of the 
Trade Unions to exercise authority over their members and to carry 
out their functions under the Procedure Agreements and also under 
the provisions of this Charter.
(f) Appointment and fmiotions of Shop Stowards/Trade Union 
Repre s ont at ive s,
Shop Stewards/Trade Union representatives appointed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Rational Procedure Agreement 
will be given full récognition by the Company and will be granted 
the facilities and ancomniodation required to enable them to carry 
out their functions. Shop Stewards/Trade Union representatives in 
the Company's emplcjmient will not be dismissed because of any act 
done by them in good faith iir the proper performance of their duties. 
They will, however, conform to the same vforking conditions and be 
subject to the same Agreements and Rules, present and future, as 
their fellow employees.
2. EXISTING AGRFFMINTS
(a) The Company will observe the existing Agreements, national, 
local or Yard, in regard to wages and working conditions,
(b) Any question involving the modification of existing Agree- 
ments affecting wages rates and/or allowances for special working 
conditions at the Yards of Brcv.’n's, Connell's, Stephen's and 
Yarrow ® s will be dealt with in the nosznal way under the Rational 
Procedure Agycement. On such questions it will be open to the 
parties concerned to agree that the matter should (i) be referred 
to Local Conference without the necessity of a Yard Conference, or
(ii) should be referred to Central Conference direct from Yard 
Conference,
27<
5. THE JOINT COmCIL
(a) A Joint Connoil will be established to co-operate in the 
development of the Objectives set out in the Eoreward to this 
Charter, to deal as expeditiously as possible with matter of mutual 
concern to the Company and its employees (other than wages questions 
and allowances) and to promote maximum efficiency end the avoidance 
of disputes,
(b) The Joint Council shall consist of Trade Union Officials 
with Executive Authority (up to three members from the Amalgamated 
Society of Boilermakers, Shipvrrights, Blacksmiths and Structural 
Workers and one member from each of the other signatory Trade Unions) 
and not fewer than five members of the management nominated by the 
Company, The Chief Executive of the Company shall be Chairman of 
the Joint Council, The Council shall have Joint Secretaries, one 
appointed by the Trade Unions arid the other by the Company,
(c) Meetings of the Joint Council shall take place monthly, but 
where an issue of special urgency arises either side may call for 
an earlier meeting. The Agendas shall be agreed between the Joint 
Secretaries and issued as far in advance of meetings as is possible, 
and not less than seven days before the meeting’,
(d) The Joint Council shall have power to appoint fx'Oïïi their number 
8ub-Comnii11ees (with powers to co-opt),
(e) Minutes of meetings of the Joint Council and of any of its 
Sub-Comniittees will be agreed between the Joint Secretaries and 
circulated.
4, MEETINGS OP EMPLOYEES
Meetings of employees may be held within the Company's premises 
with the permission of the Company, As far as practicable such 
meetings shall be held outside normal working' hours.
5. COMPrjTY RULES
The Company will provide Company Rules which will be appJ.icable 
throughout the Company and which will prescribe the general Conditions 
of Rnployment,
6. SHIFT TCRY
(a) In order to utilise the combined facilities to their fullest 
extent it is agreed that shift working will operate in accordance 
with the provisions of the existing National Agreements,
(b) The Company will initiate negotiations to establish a Poxible 
Day shift system of working.
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7» OVERTiriS WORKING
(a) Employees may be expected to work overtime provided 
adequate wa-rning is given in accordance with current Tjractices,
(b) The practice of "one in - all in" will not apply and the
Company on tkcir part undertake to spread overtime as equitably as
possible, if necessary on a rota basis, but taking into account 
special skills and records of absence,
8. INTERCHAl'JGEABILITY AT3D FLEXIBILITY
(a) Int.orchs-ngeability is the transfer of a journeyman of one 
craft to operate as a journeyman of another craft.
(b) Flexibility is the carrying out of operations by one cla.ss of
the work of another class in order to progress the job.
(0) Training will be provided for men to achieve the proficiency 
required for interchangeability and flexibility,
(d) Interchangeability and flexibility have alrea.dy been agreed to
(1) within the Steel Trades Group, and (2) within the Semi-skilled 
and Unskilled Workers Group. Interchsngeability and flexibility 
within the Finishing Trades Group will be a matter for agreement 
between the Company and the Trade Unions concerned.
9. MOBILITY
(a,) When a rationalised pay struct in? e (as contemplated in section 
11 below) has been agreed for two or more of the Compsjay's Yards 
the employees will be completely mobile as amongst these Yards. 
Pending such agreement any transfers of employees between Yards 
whose wage payments have not been rationalised will be a matter 
for agi’eement amongst the parties concerned.
(b) Where any such transfer is for a period of not more than five 
working days, then for each working day the employee shall be paid 
one retm'n fare based on the distance between the two Yards concerned,
(c) Employees sent to outworking jobs (as distinct from employees 
transferred between the Company's Yards) shall be paid in accordance 
with the Clyde District Outworking Allowances Agreement.
10. TFCENICUT'S AND TYlTUODo OF kORKIDG
(a) The wages stiucture will not be disturbed by the introduction 
of new methods, equipment or working practices but the resulting; 
increases in productivity may be the subject of a review of 
overall wage scales. The Company may, by consultation and agreement, 
ininroduce : -
(1) Work Study by methods investigation, work measurement, 
and job evaluation to produce the infoiniation necessary 
for Production Control, Labour Utilisation and an 
equitable wages structure.
(2) New tools, materials and techniques.
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(b) It will be the responsibility of the Company to continuously 
review i/orking methods and job manning as the technology of ship­
building: changes. The Company in consultation and agreement with 
the Unions will determine methods and labour leading appropriate 
to the work involved and their findings will be implemented.
11. lu^rmnmATioN
(a) This Charter will be supplemented by an agreement on rates 
to be payable throughout the Company from a date to be agreed. 
Overtime, nightshift and holiday payments wi]1 continue to be paid 
on the existing basis,
(b) The Company undertake to examines-
(1) Incentive payments, and
(2 ) Allowances existing within the various trades with a 
view to reaching agreement with the Trade Unions on a 
comprehensive nationalised pay structure.
(c) Agreements on remuneration cannot be concluded unless the 
conditions of this Charter and the Government Regulations for 
Productivity Deals are fully satisfied,
12. RECRUITMENT AND
(a) Recruitment
The Company will encourage its employees to be members of 
the appropriate Trade Union.
( b ) Re dimdan cy
One of the major objectives is to eliminate the possibility 
of redundancy. Nevertheless, as and when redundancy becomes 
unavoidable, the Company policy will take account of the Contracts 
of Employment Act, I9 6 5 , and the Redundancy Pajmients Act, 19^5s 
and be within the normal consultative framev/ork.
1 ^ ' APPRAISAL OF WORK PTRFORMAl^CES
The Company will institute regular appraisals of performance to 
assess employees for promotion and to help provide appropriate 
training. Appraisals wdll generally be by reports, either informal 
or formal.
1 4 . TRAINING
(a) The Company will organise appropriate internal training schemes 
and. take .full advantage of suitable external facilities to fit all 
employees of all grades to perform their duties effectively and to 
be ready to take advantage of p.rorotion opportunities as they come.
(b) Ma.ximum use v/ill bo made of i he :"acilities and grants provided 
by the appropriate Industry Training boards in conformity with their 
polici 0 8 ,
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(c) The company will maintain facilities for the training of 
apprentices in accordance with the agreed Training Board 
syllabuses,
(d) The Company will give employees as wide a field of experience 
as practicable and will provide, where possible, retraining; 
facilities for redundant trades into areas of shortage,
1 5 . SERVICES .AND AIwNITIhS
The Company recognises that promotion of good morale male es 
for effective v/ork and economical operation and leads to good 
industrial relat ions,
Safety Regulations,
Safety is the joint responsibility of the Company and the 
employees but they will be advised by properly constituted Coim-iittee: 
with representation from the Company and employees.
Medical Services,
In addition to the statutory Medical Services a Company Doctor 
will be retained on a full-time basis.
Reoreational Facilities,
The Company will encourage the full use of t.he facilities for 
recreation,
16, c o m m u e  a t i o n s  ,
The Company imdertakes to keep the men well info.med about the 
Company, its prospects, trading conditions and policies. Management 
will be responsible for commimicating such information together 
with information about the intentions and proposals of m;oi'iagement 
to Shop Stewards/Trade Union representatives and to the men under 
their control. The Company undertalces that any negotiations 
resulting from this information will follow procedure laid down 
for the appropriate negotiation,
1 7 , RETIREMENT BFÎUCFITS
The Company will propose a new scheme common to all manual 
employees in the Company.
18. DATE OF COr%ENC] T.L"i;T
The Charter will taice effect from the date of the Merger.
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Appendix 4
Notes of Sammy Barr's speech .at the TU Centre, Glasgow, 
15 June -1971,
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Note of Sammy B arr’s speech at the TU Centre, Glasgow,
13 June 1971.
Address to UCS Joint Shop Stewards
Fellow shop stewards,
You will have read in the press the management's statement 
regarding the collapse of the UCS and the company going into 
liquidation, also along with the announcement, the management 
have said that redundancies will take place immediately and the 
four yards in the Consortium will be phased out and eventually 
closed. The Co-ordinating Committee met yesterday to discuss 
the whole situation and have draim up certain plans and lines 
of action which we hope will be overwhelmingly endorsed by this 
meeting thereafter to be put to a mass meeting of workers for 
their approval and support, I will now present the Co-ordinating 
Committee's proposals.
That we will resist any attempt by the Government to close 
any of the yards. When the first redundancy notice is issued to 
any of our workers, we will immediately occu%)y the four yards.
The shop stewards will be detailed to take up positions at all 
entrances into the yards. No person will be able to leave or 
enter the yards without permission from the shop stewards. Under 
no circonstances will any machinery or materials be allowed to 
leave the yards. All forms of transport shall be checked by the 
shop stewards before entry. Workers who are served with their 
redundancy notice will report to their yard conveners and hand 
them their cards, the workers will then return to their nox'mal
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job and continue working as normal. All workers.who are in the 
work-in will just continue their duties as if nothing has changed.
In each of the four yards we will set up a committee to look after 
time-keeping. We will set up a committee to look after all monies 
and its duty will be to pay out work-in members. The yards will 
be occupied round the clock and this could involve wives and 
relatives bringing food, doim to the yards.
( This was the point when there was a bit of eruption a,t the 
meeting. The things that were said was something like this:
'The man's mad - he must be drunk - for Christ's sake sit on your 
arse Sammy you're going aff your heid - it will never work, there's 
no chance'. The chairman, Jimmy Airlie intervened and calmed the 
meeting down so that I could carry on with the proposals. )
I restated that it was necessary to occupy the yards, food 
will have to come from somewhere and if it means wives and 
relatives, then that will be.
It will be the responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee 
to elect a central treasurer with a sub committee of two others, 
their responsibility will be to handle all monies sent in from 
appeals and to make sure that the donations are entered into a 
ledger and that receipts are sent out immediately.
It will be the responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee 
to elect shop stewards to travel the country to appeal for finance.
It will be the responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee 
to elect a committee to deal with publicity and propaganda materials 
explaining our case, also to see that collecting cans are put into 
every shop and bars throughout ttic West of Scotland,
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It will be the responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee 
to appoint a press relation officer.
It will be the responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee 
to elect a committee to look after entertainment.
It will be the responsibility of the four yards conveners to 
carry out all decisions of the Co-ordinating Committee,
All Co-ordinating Committee decisions will be presented to a 
mass meeting of shop stewards for their endorsement, to be followed 
by a mass meeting of all workers for their agreement and support.
All workers will be levied 50p per head every week which will
go into the central fund to be used to provide finance for
delegations of shop stewards whose job it will be to travel round 
the big industrial toims addressing mass meetings of workers and 
appeal for finance. It will also provide finance for the conveners 
who will address a mass meeting of liPs in the House of Commons,
it will help pay out hardship cases in the work-in.
I Icnow that these proposals may sound unrealistic or even 
far-fetched, but they can work and be carried through as long as 
they are explained in detail.
These proposals are something new, they have never been tried 
before in a fight against %'edi.mdancies and closures and no doubt 
we will make certain mistalces, but the Co-ordinating Committee 
feels that this strategy will be successful. We have nothing to 
lose in trying them out and everything to gain if successful, 
Afterall, if you go into history you will find workers who went 
on strike against redmidancies anc closures, have been defeated,
35.
4o
BO let US try something new. The Co-ordinating Committee felt 
that these proposals will catch the imagination of the people of 
the country and will receive mass support.
Our slogans vrill he simple:
'Not a man will go do\m the road - a worker by his inheritance 
has the right to work - not a yard will close. These principles 
in themselves are worth fighting for'.
The Co-ordinating Coromittee fully understand that we are 
taking on the Government and the systems which we are living under 
and know that the road will not be smooth, but we are confident 
that we will win as long as we stand united; there will be no 
room for weaklings; a victory for us will bring and give a new 
weapon to workers involved in industrial struggle.
We must win - we will winj We owe a victory not only to 
ourselves, but to give a lead to the workers who are in similar 
disputes, that with the correct leadership and organisation, 
advances can be made in the interest of the working people of 
this country.
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'Blueprint for the work-in®.
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Ca-Ordlnat:!îi"r Shou StsvmrdB CfZTltteo
this Comz^ ltiteo shou3.d have the responsibility fcr or^g^nlsln^ tha
1, Finding ways ©nd inaaas of %>roadening tho so ensuring; the
maxl%3um oupportg both morally and finanolally on our bahaïf*.
Ê4 Our involv®!Sefit in Demonsti'&tlo'qs and Lobbies oto,
The dlBti'lbution of all propag-^ïcla material intomally and 
I ext'arnal3.yo 8«g. Broadsheetj, Newsletters etc.
4* The distributionf collection and tabulating of petition forms*
3* C o m p ilin g  a s p e a k e r p a c k ,  consisting of speakers notes^ Broadsheets^
Newsletters e t c .
6o Clerical facilities should be provided by Govan Bivlsioïu
i Ü
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Co-OitMi'ik'f zy Ghoo Gt:A u.vCs Ccr/zIttGe
^hls CouM.iitteo should hrroc the veapons Ability of ; -
lo hcolfîfuf? wr.ûtilviy printing of all prop^gonda, Cv,g,. Drcr.érhosts. 
Nerslotters srrf Esnd Bills sto*
fij, Slcprn,^  üOsi,pn and p:'lntlng of all portars. Inolurlng those for
 ^ e n lo r-ta ln u o n t, bu t o n ly  ca a ro m lt I'rcjj- the  app rop irls ta  G o u r lt t i
;i. liiBortlBf of all Adds. In ITorspaprrs & rnagaalncS;. but only on a 
' remit from ths app'ropr-lato CcrnittGOa
44 Furohasing and control of all stationary for internal use*
So Clorlcal facilltios should bo provided by Govern à lin'cbouso Division^
i 1
I lî
40.
' C c - O r d r n a t i ! ‘ O ; C r : : ; ; r i t t c o  S h o p  S t o u r . Y v s  C ' o m n u t t f X D
'This Covulttoo chorld have the rvspiuislbility for Drgrnioinr; th.c 
following;:-
Ir hSiiuooto for opoakrvG and cislognticns should luve the rirvit to 
reeciurondotlons «
i
Î
Sb Be responsible for all travel arrongerunts of oTo?c;:ovs end 
Ï delep.atloas.
J?« Bnsm'lng that financial arrangements have been mo.do for spoakors 
; and dGlegatlons,
4e Be responsible fop all visiting party's to the yards.
3® Dealing with all legal aspaato^
6a Clérical facilities should ba provided by Clydebank.
41
! Co-Crdlnntin:, (yr rlttee 8bcn Ctcvrcrdo Ocumittae
I ■  ■ ■    ■............ ............
g 4
Thio Couuittüe should have tha pospousibility to2-
1 . Follow up all plocijoa of financial supports
Find wasy and rcaans of raising cash*
3» Make arrangemonto for the oollootion of cash that has to be 
collected personally from faotcries^ shoes and pi-bo etc*
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Tlxit no;7 pcsitlonT, of. !\3zlïitn7vt TrcP&ürcr ô: Saorctarj h'-'i r.iade, 
T'hu.a cïi5Uri?3s continuity hslny; nuintalrcd in tho cvsnc of Æny 
enfo^ OGocl atsonca of the tcjo foin Office Donnais*
Se That all telephone s:a;3tay;en thet require 8c;:io eort of action te
put on to oordo as v;ali an coln.^  ontarcO into a book., with the 
card balDp passed to the Secretary for action.
That all aoinrjitteaa should have the rlpht to so-op'b other 
m-SBberQ of the Co-ordinating CcL-rnittee to carry cut S(%te special 
task.
PK That all ûOE^iittoas should n:ake a financial statement every week,
i 'SO helping to make this Ccniuittse cash ccnsoiouao
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Appendix 6
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd* Liquidation Press Releasesp 
June 1971.
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M o n d a y ^  14th June, 1971
12. 30 p. m. Message received by A. E. Hepper from the Secretary of State
The Secretary of State said that li. M. Government had now reached 
the firm conclusion that they cannot put in large sums of money to save 
U.-C. S. but that they were seeking to enlist the co-operation of the
Provisional Liquidator so that they could explore what parts of the Company
I
might be saved and that they will be prepared to give him funds to that end,
It was agreed that a statement will be issued but not before 3. 30 p. m.
U P P E R  C L Y D E  S H I P B U I L D E R S  L I M I T E D
45.
f ■
O N  14th JUNE, 1971
The Directors of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Limited profoundly regret to 
announce that in view of the present financial position of the Company as 
disclosed'in the most recent review of its affairs, they have been obliged ' 
to instruct an application to be made to the Court for the appointment of a 
Provisional Liquidator.
I
The Company was formed as a consequence of the policy outlined in the 
Geddes Report and began operating in February 1968. Throughout the 
three years to the end of 1970, production was mainly devoted to completion 
of a variety of complex and unprofitable ships, many of which were inherited 
from the predecessor companies. During that period, substantial losses 
v/ere inevitably incurred, which were largely financed by loans and gT'ants 
from public funds.
B y  the end of 1970 the initial order book had been superseded by a programme 
of standard bulk carriers and "Clyde" ships which, backed by the necessary 
working capital, would have become profitable. •
However, the continuing acute shortage of working capital disrupted supplies 
and thus seriously retarded the shipbuilding programme^with the result thac 
the Company has continued to incur substantial losses for longer than had been 
forecast. Strenuous efforts have been made to obtain further working 
capital from various sources but without success.
Despite these difficulties, the throughput of steel today, measured in gross 
tons, is over 1300 tons per week, compared with the average in 1970 of 
867 tons per week. This has been achieved by a steelwork labour force 
16% less in numbers than in 1970. The overall reduction in the labour 
force in the past 15 months is 25%.
The /
46.
The number of ships delivered from the Yards now controlled by the 
Company is as follows:
Annual average deliveries over 5 years prior to 1968 8
1968 3
1969 7
1970 - 12
It is tragic that this record of achievement, which can be attributed to 
the support of our customers and suppliers, and to the performance of
our management and men, and which is now forecast to produce a profit '
f
in 1972, should be finally frustrated by the current shortage of working 
capital.
The Directors will give the Provisional Liquidator every possible 
assistance in his efforts.to minimise the loss and hardship which will 
occur. All employees should continue normal working pending further 
instructions from the Provisional Liquidator,
14th June, 1971
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Appendix 7
No Unconditional Surrender at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, UCS 
Co-ordinating Committee leaflet, 21 June 1971«
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n g
.^ 1iïJDlîlOi\!ÂL SURRE N D E R  
ER C l v o e  S h i p b u i l d e r s
I  The crisis in U .C.S. that has led to the appointment of a provisional Liquidator has been deliberately
I  manufactured by the Government. We intend to fight this and we will fight on our record.
I  F A C T ;  Output of steel in 1970 averaged 867 tons per week. This year it is already averaging
I  1,300 tons per week and ironically on the week before Liquidation actually reached 1,450 tons.
This is by a steel work force of 16% less than in 1970,
Here are the numbers of ships delivered from the yards since the inception of the U.C.S. :
1968 3 Ships
1969 7 Ships
1970 12 Ships
This year, 1971, it would certainly have been 15 ships. Again it should be noted that this production was 
achieved by a labour force of some 25% less.
The Trade Unions and the Management entered into agreements. These agreements have been honoured by
both sides.
It is now abundantly dear that certain members of the present Government had earmarked the U.C.S. as a 
political victim to satisfy the blood lust of the Political backwoodsmen in the Tory Party.
The Government refused guarantees to Ship Owners in spite of the fact that the U.C.S. Bankers felt 
that the Company was moving towards viability.
The Government withheld monies due to  the U.C.S. from the Shipbuilding Industry Board.
These actions created a crisis of confidence, obstructed the flow  of materials from suppliers and of 
cash from owners. This is the background to the present situation — a situation created by the 
present Government.
The position of the U.C.S. workers is clear — WE ARF. G O ING  TO F IG H T . But then it is not just our 
fight alone.
il One in nine males are already unemployed in the West of Scotland, and as shipbuilding is so interwovenwith the economy of Scotland, the loss of this Industry on Clydeside would have repercussions that would be widespread and shattering.
We believe that this is the crunch in the fight against unemployment, redundancies and closures.
To lose this, and this is unthinkable, we are heading for the circumstances of the "30's".
To win, would be to reverse the trend for all the workers and the community as a whole.
,# We ask for, and confidently expect, the support of A LL  Scots, men and women.
II We appeal to  all our Brothers and Sisters in the Trade Union movement for HELP.
We appeal to all business people and Shopkeepers for HELP.
We appeal to all the Clergy o f all denominations for HELP.
We appeal to  everyone for HELP.
HELPING  us is HELPIN G  yourself.
Let the voice of the Scottish people be heard.
No more closures — no more redundancies — no more unemployed. D E M A N D  THE R IG H T  TO W ORK!
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Appendix 8
Save Tipper Clyde Shipbuilders, UCS Co-ordinating' Committee 
petition.
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Appendix 10
ÏÏGS Shop Stewards® Fund, Period 23 June 1971-27 Aug-ast 1972,
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Appendix 11
Authorisation for 50p weekly deduction from wages for 
work-in levy.
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Appendix 12
UCS visit to the Department of Trade and Industry, Possible 
questions for Sir John Eden, 9 August 1971.
b’l,
  \
uC3 visit to Uepart;:.:ont of Tro.ce u industry “ . A u g u s t - i k d w .  h
1« V/hat Dlano liavo tha Covornaont nado to exuaiae
V/ilsoa®G proposalo for Gove 1111::oat ordoro for Olydo 
cIqgOj^ oupcr-ClyuQ and ore earrioro freon d*O.G*7
2ft V;il3- tho Government o;.reo to delay tho .Ig g u o of 
redundancy notices by providinc further moaoy for 
the liquidator to ailoe these and other proposais 
to bo examined?
3* 1/ill tho Government lift its baa on further ordering
for ohipo to bo built by hCS and allow the narhctlng
dopartqicnt to cock such ordc-re? '
A  i I ' ' '
4* b'hat pro gros a has the Gove 1 no oat node v;itli its cuna
proposals for Govan? and in particular how nracU private 
capital is aovj firnly pledged to keep Govan going?
5# How much money io the Governnout prepared to put in to j
Guch a venture? and in particular is it prepared to nay ' i
the full costD of capitalisation in the first instance7 i-
I6, Will the Government make available the eoxio sun an they 'Av
arc prcparod to put into tho Govan cchcmo to ;'CS as
working capital to allow it to continue while a Gtucly 
is made of the I'ilGon or other Gchcucs?
7, bill tho Govcrnnent now nublich all tho \;orklng papero ; ^-■;
prepared for, end by, the Advisory Croup to allow the f
workers and uanagero at ICS to ctudy then in their cearcli
for a solution that v.ill euvo jobs in a viable groupv
Oft Hill the Govern:.'out allow ninistors and officials to ,^ iv’o
evidence at the public cnpuiiv into fCS to bo hold soon
by the Scottish f 0*? . /
9ft Hhat action Is tha C-ovezuiuont taking in reaponsc to I'-r,
John ruvlcG pledge « after hio visit to C-laagow -* to 
thinJi again ?
10ft Hill th'D Prime Hinlstor be vioiting CCS next so nth dsiri-ag
hio visit to Scotland; and ill tho Govcaa.jont ax.reo mo
halt all recundancicG unril ho hue had a chance of cooing 
tho position for hicsolf?
A.V/ftB.
• 9.3ft7i.
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Appendix 11
The Ridley Letters.
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Appendix 18
STUC Committee of Inqtiiry into the Proposed Rnndovm of Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders3 Interim Report, 28 September 197h
COMMITTED OF ENQUIRY INTO THE PROPOSED RUN-DOWN
151.
OF UPPER CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS
Interim Renort to STUG
1, Terms of Reference
The Scottish Trades Union Congress established this Committee 
"to consider and report upon the wider social and economic consequences 
of the decision to run dovm Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd," We 
recognise, therefore, as historical facts, the liquidation of UCS 
a,nd the Government's acceptance of the recommendations of its Advisory 
Group. These recommendations were that, subject to certain conditions, 
a successor company be established at Govan/Linthouse, that the 
shipbuilding programme be concentrated on the Govan yard and that 
the liquidator be asked to dispose of the yards at Scotstoim and 
Clydebanlc, The Advisory Group envisaged that this arrangement "would 
probably give stable employment, in the first stage, for 2,000 men 
and 500 staff." Given that in June this year UCS had a work-force 
of approximately 8,100 men, the arrangement involved redundancy for 
approximately 5,&00 employees.
'The Advisory Group concentrated its attention upon the profit 
and loss account and the potential financial viability of UCS Ltd,
The company, however, employed a large work-force concentrated in 
communities constantly subject to under-emplojunent. The run do^ n^ 
occurs at a time when unemployment rates nationally and locally 
have reached crisis levels. In these circumstances company accounts 
alone may be inadequate criteria for economic and social decisions.
It is arguable that the total economic and social posts of redundancy 
to the community may substantially outweigh the trading losses 
associated with continuance. Our inquiry is concerned with these 
wider costs and with a comprehensive coinmuriity balance-sheet.
2. Form of the Enquiry
With these objectives the Committee invited evidence, oral and 
witten5 public and private, from a wide range of individuals and 
organisations associated with national and local gpvernment cmd with 
the shipbuilding industry and its suppliers, from employers mid 
workers and from specialists in economics, industrial relations, 
planning and the social services. . fter five days of public hearings
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and the study of a great volume of written and private evidence, 
our Enquiry is still incomplete.
The problem is urgent and decisions must be taken quickly.
The Committee therefore wishes to issue an interim report based on 
the evidence already received in the hope that its findings may 
influence such decisions. We would stress the fact that these are 
preliminary conclusions from incomplete information but we find the 
evidence to date so compelling that, whilst they may be modified 
by further data, we see little possibility that our conclusions 
can bc^  radically different.
5. West Central Scotland; an Economic Problem Area
Unemployed men can usually be absorbed if the region is 
prosperous and the national economy bouyant. The UCS problem occurs 
in a region which, in most years of the last decade, has had unemploy­
ment at twice the national level. Unemployment rates have been, and 
aj:e, especially high for men - and almost the whole UCS work-force 
is male. When the economy declines nationally the decline is 
magnified in this vulnerable region. In August this year the male 
unemployment rate was 10,6% for Glasgow computed with 5.0^ for Great 
Britain. The rates for Clydebanlc and Govan are probably substantially 
higher than the Glasgow level. Of these had been unemployed for 
more than six months. The figures for unemployed men in each trade 
compared with vacancies notified to labour exchanges make particularly 
depressing reading. There were roughly 20 unemployed men for eaoh 
vacancy in Glasgow, Finishing trades might expect to get jobs in 
the construction industry but in August there were 62 unemployed 
men for every vacancy notified to the employment exchange in the four 
trades most directly affected (joiners, plumbers, electricians and 
fitters). Relevant shipbuilding trades (platers and sheet iron 
workers) had a ratio of 58 to one. The usually safe professional/ 
technical/executive category is also affected (5:1) but worst of 
all are the unskilled workers (415:1). We are aware that not all 
vacancies are notified to the exchanges but nevertheless the figures 
give no cause for optimism,
■ Men out of work are therefore likely to remain out for a 
considerable period. Out of a sample of ex-UCS workers laid off in
135.
the earlier UCS run-down and interviewed during June this year, all 
of whom had left UCS for at least nine months, 51/"^  were still 
unemployed. The experience of older workers was particularly dis­
heartening; among men aged 5 0 " * 5 9 from the same sample the rate 
was 4 2 %.
Pant and opinion, lay and professional, have convinced the 
Committee that any potential solution must take account of the long­
term structural problems of the region, the current employment crisis 
and the Clydebanlc/Partick/Govan communities so dependent on this 
industry. West Central Scotland needs jobs at all times, but 
especially now,
4 . Economic Consequences of Large-Scale Redundancy
We have employed various methods to calculate the anticipated 
economic effects of run-down. Each attempts to review costs from a 
different angle. We have postulated 5,000 redundancies at UCS 
following liquidation; this is lower than the figuxe of 5,&00 calcul.ated 
earlier. We use the lower figure partly because some workers may 
be absorbed in other yards and partly because, throughout this report 
we prefer to understate rather than exaggerate the consequences.
Our first measure attempts to estimate the loss of jobs and 
the fall in personal income's consequent upon 5,000 redundancies at 
UCS, We accept as broadly correct, (though subject to our o\m later 
estimates), the calculations of Professor D, Mackay that, through 
their effects on supplying firms and on demand for other goods and 
services the chain reaction might result in a total loss of income 
in Great Britain amounting to £500,000 per week and job losses of
1 6 . 0 0 0  (including UCS), Losses in South West Scotland, within these 
figures would be of the order of £225,000 and 11,000 jobs. These 
estimates allow for the softening effect of redundancy and social 
security payments. Some of the persons thrown out of work will get 
other jobs, but, given the great pool of the unemployed, tliis will 
be because existing unemployed do not get these jobs. The loss of
1 6 . 0 0 0  jobs is therefore a net loss. It hits particularly sharply a 
region already noted for its relative poverty and economic stagnation 
and for its outdated stock of social capital (particularly housing 
and educational facilities).
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Our second measure concerns direct losses to national and 
local government. Redundancy payments to 5,000 UCS workers, using 
a conservative average estimate of £ 3 0 0  per worker, amount to 
£1,5m. To this must be added at least an equivalent amount (£1.5m) 
for workers made redundant through the chain reaction. One careful 
estimate of social security payments puts the cost for UCS workers 
alone at £3.14m, This estimate allows for the effect of working 
wives and assumes that JOjo will get jobs within six months. This 
argument, however, ignores the fact that if 3 , 5 0 0  of the 5,000 
redundant UCS workers (30^) got jobs within six months this will be 
at the expense of other unemployed men. The real cost of social 
security payments must therefore be calculated for all 5,000 UCS 
workers until the point at which regional unemployment falls back 
to its customary levels. Present indications are that this will 
be a long period in West Central Scotland so that the figure of 
£3* 1 4 m. may be a severe underestimate. To this must be added at 
least an equivalent figure (£3 . 1 4 #^) for the extra 11,000 workers 
affected by the chain reaction. Additionally central government 
will be affected by the loss of personal and corporation ta^ ices and 
by the extra support needed by local authorities for the loss of 
revenue from rates. Further evidence suggests that local authorities 
are already incurring increased expenditure through rent rebate and 
the stepping-up of welfare services. Relief pajmnents in Clydebank 
Burgh this year, even before the UCS collapse, were at double last 
years level. Taking all these items together the total loss to 
central and local governments consequent upon UCS redundancies 
cannot be less that £10ra, (£3m, for redundancy payments, £6,28m,
for social security and an estimate for relief payments aiid loss of 
rates and taxes). We have not taken into account the recent increase 
in social security rates, we have underestimated at various points 
and made relatively optimistic estimates about the up-turn in 
employment. The true figure could therefore well exceed f15m. This 
takes no special account of the further effect on business confidence 
in the region and its repercussions upon regional employment policies.
A third measure of economic consequences is based on the known 
past investment cost of creating new jobs. Experience in 19^3 
suggested that it cost Government £1,000-f1,5 OO to create a new job
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tlirough incentives and support schemes. Inflation may have raised 
this figure to £1,500~£2,000. .To trigger private investment 
resulting in 16,000 new jobs would therefore cost the Government 
something in the region of £ 2 4 ~£ 3 2 m.
These are the likely economic consequences of 5»000 UCS 
redundancies. They are not necessarily cumulative. Given the 
present economic situation the danger exists that it would be 
necessary to incur redundancy payments and social security/" benefits 
for a longish period followed later by the costs of job creation.
They might therefore become cumulative,
5• Social Consequences
We have long accepted that unemployment is a social evil, a 
contravention of the fundamental values of our’ society. In general 
tejmis we know from past experience its damaging effects on the 
Individual, the family and the community. Our witnesses have 
reminded us in terms which were often dramatic, but none the less 
real, of the loss of personal dignity it involves, of the progressive 
disappearance of self-respect, the lowering of living standards, 
nutrition and health, the accumulation of debt, the increase In 
domestic tension and the deepening of existing social problems.
We wish to select for special attention several problems 
emphasised repeatedly by our witnesses. Most important are the 
repercussions on disadvantaged groups and particularly older workers, 
young people and handicapped persons. With 20 to 50 applicants per 
vacancy older workers find gi’eat difficulty in getting new work; 
in this area with its persistent problems it seems likely that 
many workers aged 5 0  or more, once unemployed, may never return to 
stable employment for the rest of their working life - and this, at 
a time when most workers need to husband their resources against 
retirement. Young people, on the other hand, are leaving school 
with the justifiable expectation of being w’anted and valued; for 
them rejection may mean sharp disillusion and the breeding of 
resentment against employers and authority. Indeed, professional 
social workers stressed unemployment as one linlt in the chain of 
events leading to crime and violence. They also raised the special 
problems of handicapped groups of all kinds for whom work is the best
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aid to rehabilitation and to re-integration in society. Clydeside's 
resources are already over-stretched in meeting the existing load 
of social problems.
Finally we draw attention to the grave long-term consequences 
of deteriorating labour relations. Disputes and demarcation are 
traditional responses to insecurity, they are exacerbated by 
redundancy, closure, and an unpredictable future. Signs exist that 
the prospect of security and an increased trust in management was 
leading to the lowering or removal of barriers. UCS reduced its 
work-force by over 2,000 men between I969 and 1971 without major 
industrial disputes. We fear that the present crisis, unless well 
resolved, will embitter future relations on both the Upper and the 
Lower Reaches of the Clyde,
6, Possible Solution
The problems of UCS have now been diagnosed, in many different 
ways, by different observers. None deny the financial failure of 
the former company. Disagreement rests on other questions. Was 
the Geddes principle of grouping unsound or incorrectly applied?
Was a sound structure undermined by inefficient management? by 
unco-operative workers? by the burden of prior debt? by starvation 
of working and investment capital during a too-short transitional 
period? Was the falling demand for its products temporary or 
permanent? Was UCS moving into profitability? Were previous 
negotiations now beginning to produce higher productivity? etc,, 
etc. No single or simple answer can be given to these involved 
and related questions.
On the other hand, the social and economic consequences of 
large-scale redundancy at this-time are clear, inevitably and 
extremely grave. When doubt exists about diagnosis and about the 
relative future viability of alternative solutions, the greater, 
in our opinion, is the weight to be attached to known and series 
consequences.
The Government has accepted the Govan/Linthouse proposal with 
its emphasis on a smaller company under new management. lb;o alternative 
schemes have appealed to the Committee. First, Professor Alexander's 
suggestion "to create a new Upper Clyde grouping and allow 18 months
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to 2 years in which to judge the success being made of it by the 
new management and by the work people. If the conclusion then 
reached was that viability was beyond the Company, it would have a 
fm?ther fixed life of 2-3 years during which Government and local 
authorities cou3.d plan alternative employment". Secondly, an earlier 
suggestion by J, Macmichael (Glasgow Herald, 5th August, 1971) that, 
alongside the Govan/Linthouse group, the Government should establish 
in Clydebank/Scotstoun a further company which would share certain 
costly Linthouse services (eg. estimating, design and marketing), 
take on sub-contracts from Govan as well as its ovm orders. All 
or part of this separate Company might be re-absorbed if needed by 
Govan/Linthouse, but otherwise it would act as a run-down company 
and thus soften the blow of redundancy.
Both suggestions have merit in that they:
(1) avoid aggravating the already serious economic state 
of West Central Scotland;
(2) act as immediate and available purap-primers for the 
economy;
(5) give more time for considering the long-term future 
of shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde;
(4 ) allow relevant authorities time to create alternative 
employment if a planned run-down becomes inevitable;
(5) give hope for labour relations on the Clyde,
The Government has accepted the Govan/Linthouse proposal with all 
that this entails in providing public money for working and investment 
capital. The extra cost of maintaining Clydebank/Scotstoun for a 
further period must be compared with the social and economic costs 
of 5,000 UCS redundancies. We consider these latter costs to be 
the greater. The gradual and gentler solution is therefore justified, 
not only for its humanity, but for its probable economic advantage.
We therefore recommend:
1, that the newly-formed company be encouraged to fulfill 
the old UCS order book and that it be assisted by 
Government purchases of ships (for stock if necessary) 
so that it can start its life with the existing labour 
force in the four yards. If delays occur in setting up
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the Company, the Liquidator should be empowered to 
begin work on ships ordered but not yet started thus 
avoiding a damaging interim loss of orders and confidence.
It is further essential that the new Company be 
guaranteed adequate working and investment capital,
2. that any reduction in the work-force be gradual and 
phased to coincide with improvements in employment 
opportunities throughout the region,
3. that the full arsenal of existing Government measures, 
supplemented by new schemes for promoting regional 
growth, be brought to bear on the provision of nev: 
employment for the communities affected. We shall 
put forward in our final report specific proposals for 
encouraging regional economic growth.
4. that similar procedures be adopted whenever or where- 
ever large-scale redundancies from a single employer 
threaten to affect so seriously communities disproportionately 
dependent on that employer.
R, ILLSLEY (CHAIRMAN)
P. COUSINS 
G.M. PERRY
28th September, 1971.
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List of Individuals and Organisations vàiich submitted
evidence to the Committee before 28th Sentember, 1971■ HiiMp«iii«aiiBiiBia» INI mum     ■iiiiwiim b ■■ ii miiii» ■ini i laii.iir iiiiai. mi ■wiaiif  iirni —iwi»i«i i n     imnwin» mu mm     m^i m n ii n i m if ii iiriiltirmffn—  *— 
Name and Position Oral Written
Evidence
■Professor K, Alexander, Professor of Economics, 0 W
University of Strathclyde and ex-Director of UCS Ltd,
M, Barrat Bro\m, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Depart- 0 W'
ment of Extra-Mural Studies, University of Sheffield.
The Rt, Hon, A, Wedgwood Benn, Member of Parliament, 0 W
J, Black, Chairman, Clyde District Committee, Confed- 0
eration of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions.
J, Boyd, President, Clydebank and District Trades 0
Council.
J,M, Brown, Depute Tovm Clerk, Clydebank Burgh Council. 0
Martin I,A, Bulmer, Lecturer, Department of Sociology W
and Social Administration, University of Durham,
W, Campbell Balfour, Senior Lecturer in Industrial W
Relations, University College, Cardiff,
Professor G,Cameron, Department of Social and Economic 0 W
Research, University of Glasgow.
W. Challoner, British Association of Social Workers 0 W
(Glasgow North) and Tutor in Social Work, Jordanhill
College.
A, Ferry, District Secretary, Glasgow Area, Amalgamated 0 W
Union of Engineering Workers,
K, Fleet, Institute of Workers' Control, W
Robert Fleming, Provost of Clydebank. - 0 W
Jean Forbes, Lecturer, Department of Town and Regional W
Planning, University of Glasgow.
G, Gavin, Depute Director of Planning, Corporation of 0 W
Glasgow,
F. Herron, Lecturer, Department of Social and Economic 0 W
Research, University of Glasgow,
J. Hughes, Vice-Principal, Ruskin College, Oxford. W
C. Kirk, Director of Social Work, Clydebank Burgh Council. 0 W
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Name and Position
E. McDonald, Social Worker, Clydebank Burgh Council,
'Professor D. MacKay, Professor of Political Economy, 
University of Aberdeen,
R. McLellan, President, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce.
J. McLaughlin, Depute Director, Social Work Department, 
Greenock and Port Glasgow and British Association of 
Social Workers,
R,A, Nixon, Town Clerk, Clydebank Buirgh Council.
I
J, Ramsay, District Delegate, Amalgamated Society of 
Boilermakers, Glasgow,
J, Reid, Co-ordinating Committee of UCS Shop Stewards,
J. Reidford, Secretary, Glasgow District Trades Council.
The Rt. Hon, W, Ross, Member of Parliament,
Sir Iain Stewart, ex-Chairman, Fairfields Ltd,
W, Syme, Assistant Director of Social Work,
Corporation of Glasgow,
E. Taylor, Member of Parliament.
A. Thorpe, Health Visitor, Aberdeen City,
E, Thorpe, Lecturer, Department of Sociology,
University of Aberdeen,
M. Turner, Chairman, Planning Committee, Clydebank Burgh 
Council,
B, Wallace, Joint Secretary of the Joint Council,
UCS Ltd.
Oral Written 
Evidence
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
A number of individuals also gave evidence in private,
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Appendix 19
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Limited, (in Liquidation)j,
'Comment by Mr. Robert C. Smith, Official Liquidator on the 
Statement issued by Hr,. Archibald D, Kelly last night ',
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Appendix 20
Memorandum from UOS Shop Stewards Co-ordinating Committee.
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UPPER CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS 
MEMORANDUM FROM UCS SHOP STEWARDS CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was formed on yth February, I968, by 
the merger of the shipbuilding interests of five yards on the upper 
reaches of the Clyde - John Brown & Co,, (Clydebank) Ltd., Charles 
Connell and Co, Ltd., Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd., Alexander Stephens 
& Sons Ltd,, and Yarrow and Co. Ltd.
All the yards were in varying degrees of obsolescence due to 
decades of neglect by the previous ovrners. During the boom period 
of shipbuilding in the Clyde every potmd was extracted and hardly a 
penny re-invested in the industry. At the time of the formation of 
the consortium all these companies were near to bankruptcy.
The establishment of the UCS has also to be seen against the 
background of the British Shipbuilding Industry, in I966 when the 
Geddes Committee reported. This report represented the result of a 
year's very detailed study.
The conclusion of the report that are most relevant were that:-
(1) The world market for merchant ships had grown, was likely to
go on doing so and was open to a competitive British Shipbuilding 
Industry.
(2) The average size of the tankers and bulk carriers was likely 
to increase but nearly all ships were likely to be within the 
building capability of existing British yards.
(3) There were no real natural or geographical obstacles to a 
competitive British shipbuilding industry,
(4 ) Contrairy to common belief there was no large surplus capacity 
in world shipbuilding.
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(5) Probably because of this widespread but mistaken belief 
(coupled with strong, protected and subsidised Japanese 
competition) shipbuilding had produced little profit anywhere 
in the world despite full order books.
It is important here to note that Geddes underestimated the 
growth of world shipbuilding demands. The study done for Geddes 
forecast an increase from 11,000,000 GRT in I965 to 15,000,000 GRT 
in 1972. In the event the orders actually rose to 14,000,000 GRT 
in 1966, 15,000,000 by 1976 and 17,000,000 by I968, Thus shipbuilding 
has not been a declining industry.
Market research clearly shows that despite short-lived cyclical 
fluctuation world shipbuilding demand we expand at an accelerated 
pace.
Further it should be noted that the anticipated increase in the 
world population of 1,000 million by the 1980's centred mainly in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Australasia creates the human objective 
imperative of increased trade and shipping.
The conclusion is inescapable ie. Shipbuilding in world terms 
is a foremost growth industry.
It was in this context that Geddes recommended the lines on 
which British shipbuilding needed to be restructured. By and large, 
said Geddes, British shipyards are not specialised enough to be 
competitive, nor are they grouped in large enough companies to be 
able to afford the necessary skilled personnel in management, marketing, 
development, design, purchasing, orcountancy, organisation and so 
forth. Geddes therefore proposed that grouping should be positively 
encouraged with government assistance and that the ideal group should
148.
“ 5 “
consist of a headquarters which would house most of the'specialists 
needed and about 5 specialised yards. Each group should employ 
8,000 to 10,000 workers with an output of up to 400,000 to 500,000 
gross tons a year; groups should be concentrated geographically 
for ease of communication and the preservation of local pride and 
loyalty.
The concept of the UCS consortium corresponded almost ideally 
to this criteria. However, serious errors were made at the inception, 
The traditional shipyard o;ming families of the Clyde retained too 
great a say on the board and the management of the yards. They 
should have been swept a.way, along wi.th their near feudal attitude 
to the work-force, as relics of the past.
The new company also was burdened with losses on pre-existing 
contracts of £12m. The former oimer of the individual yards having 
been paid for anticipated profits on these contracts. In addition 
new contracts were taken on at ridiculous prices and were responsible 
for further losses of £9*8m.
The official liquidator on the of August, told creditors
that, of the total incurred deficit of £28.1 million, three quarters 
were incurred in the first 19 months of the company's existence.
It must be stated that if the old board had deliberately set 
out to sabotage the UCS they couldn't have done a better job.
The original concept of the consortium was only belatedly 
realised by the autumn of 1969.
This was coincidental with the changes in Management and the 
introduction of Mr. Ken Douglas as Managing Director, Only then
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were the circumstances created that allowed meaningful discussion 
to take place between Management and the trade unions.
The ensuring results were not merely encouraging but astounding 
as the following facts demonstrate:
Deliver'/ of Vessels
Group La,unches
1968 - 3 vessels
1969 - 7 vessels
1970 " 12 vessels
1971 “ 15 vessels
(This programme was being achieved)
1968 - 7 (whole year)
1969 - 8 (whole year)
1970 - 9 (whole year)
1971 “ 8 (six months only)
Group Steel Production
Gross Tons (Average) per week
1969 " 854 tons
Average Gross Tons per week for the 8 week period prior 
to 15th June, 1971 (date of liquidation) was 1,352 tons.
Total Hourly Paid Labour
15/2/70
28/8/70
8,567
6,832
6,277
When then liquidation? The answer is simple. The present 
crisis was deliberately created and was part of a pre-determined 
plot by the Minister in charge of shipbuilding Mr. Nicholas Ridley, MP, 
We enclose for your information a photostat copy of the Ridley 
letters nov; publicaly admitted as genuine.
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We would particularly draw your attention to page 3 and the 
section headed Conclusion. Quote "I believe that we should do the 
following on assuming office:- a) Give no more public money to UCS, 
b) Let Yarrow leave the UCS if they still want to, and facilitate 
their joining Lower Clyde if they still wish to do so, o) This 
would lead to the bankruptcy of UCS, " Then further "We could 
put in a Government "Butcher" to cut up UCS and to sell (cheaply) 
to Lower Clyde, and others, the assets of UCS", and still further on 
"After liquidation or reconstruction as above, we should sell the 
government holding in UCS, even for a pittance,"
All the main details of this plot have been put into operation. 
Yarrows were allowed to detach themselves from the consortium 
taking with them a £1,25 million covered berth constructed by UCS 
and was given a £4& million loan interest-free by the Government. 
"When the realities of the situation didn't match Ridley's plan there 
was intervention to alter the circumstances. For example by the 
end of October, 1970» the projected cash flow of the company showed 
in total a deficit of £165,000; this in a firm with an annual turn­
over of tens of millions of pounds,
Tliis was a clear indication that despite all the inherited 
burdens, based on the productivity of the labour force, the company 
was moving towards viability. The government in November withheld 
credit guarantees which reduced by almost 8(%o the flow of cash into 
the firm. The lack of confidence thus created resulted in a 
creditors push with in certain instances the demand for payment 
before the delivery of materials. As a result by February, 1971» 
the cash deficit w^ as £6 .4 million. Thus having created a financial 
crisis, the Ministry then used it as a justification for proceeding 
with the next stage of the Ridley Plan.
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A similar position relates to the order book. The argument 
has been advanced by the Ministry that the order book was thin.
The facts are that at the time of the enforced liquidation the order 
book stood at fQOm. But no later than May of this year the UCS 
had reached agreement on an order for 10 product carriers. These 
and other negotiations were proceeding largely on the basis that 
the much improved production programme enabled the company to give 
the best delivery prospects in Europe. These negotiations had to 
be terminated due to the liquidity crisis created by the government.
In total., the facts amount to a massive indictment of Mr, Nicholas 
Ridley, the government Minister in charge of shipbuil.ding. The 
social consequences of the "butchery" of this industry to communities 
where the male unemployment is already one in nine would be devastating. 
The Intention is to sack 6,000 workers but with the chain reaction 
in ancillary industries it would mean 15,000 to 18,000 redmidancies.
The workers in the UCS conscious o.f all the facts and of their 
social and class responsibilities refuse to accept this position.
We appeal to our fellow trade unionists for support. We 
demand that in light of all the known facts that Nicholas Ridley 
should be removed from his ministerial responsibility and that his 
"butchery" policy be totally abandoned by the goveiviment.
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Appendix 21
Record of a Meeting Between Mr. John Davies and Sir John Eden 
and Mr. McGarvey and Miu Service on 12 October 1971
R1:)CC)]-'.Ü OF A MEElLIYx BA'Ibv/MR MR dUiiii J.)AV/u\Lyoj.u
_  ....
AND m  MCGARVEY AND 0/1 Yg_.QCgQ8ER
1* Tl'io representatives of the Confederation of Shipbuilding tuid Engineering 
Unions made the following points:-
(a) Their principal objective was to seek means of preserving employment 
in all four yaxds of the UCS,
(b) In relation to the orders immediately needed :t Govan to facilitate '
' the establishment of Govan Shipbuilders Limited, the C S E U were
prepared to give assurances as to the contribution of the work force
I -
to the timely and efficient delivery of the ships, providing the
i
Government was prepared to give the requisite guarantees to the ship 
owners in question, and providing the Liquidator was prepaxed to set 
in hand work on those orders®
.(c) As soon as the arrangements envisaged in (b) above had been made they 
were prepared immediately to enter meaningful negotiations regarding 
working practices, wage rates etc., with Govan Shipbuilders Limited, 
These negotiations would cover the operation of the Govan and Linthouse 
yards and would be extended to cover Scctdtouu as well, providing the 
feasibility study showed the inclusion of the last na.med yard to be 
in tho economic interest of the whole project..
2® Mr Davies agreed in view of the undertaiclngc given by the representative of 
the G S E U to seek urgently to finalise negotiations with the ship owners in 
question with a view to reaching agreement upon the guar?mtees required to secure 
the confirmation of the orders above referred to* Ke welcomed Mr McGarvey*s 
assuranco that in these circumstances talks would quickly begin to secure the 
establishment of Govan Shipbuilders Limited.
3,«- It v/as furthermore accepted that the Government and the C S E U would
make every effort to encourage a purchaser for Clydebank Yard and that such
purchaser would be eligible for substantial financial assistance under the
Local Employment Acts, % e  C S ÏÏ U considered that this would create a
proper climate for the meaningful discussions with Govan Shipbuilders Ltd®
Signed.
JOHN DAVIES DANIIL McGARVEY
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UCS Shop Stewards, leaflet, "Ibe Four Yards must continue - No 
Lob8 of Jobs', October 1971.
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UPF^ ea CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS
The aim of the U.C.S. "w ork-in '' is exactly 
the same as it has always been . . .
kliJi^sisJ y  W 'w ; - i'I Ëi ■* nJ'A''-V?"? fi vl I.vi u ,j «: -«#^^3
D^7.«k.r 1 :/ / / . \ ',
t i  ’'i! ■'ll}' C'd ^-..v 'v i- ' V i'f ' a  , f j \ a '  .-. .1- ■■'■.■/
'"he Press has distorted statements by our Shop Stewards and Trade Union leaders 
and misinterpreted the results of discussions. Their aim and the aim of Government 
spokesmen is to divide the workers of U.C.S. and to separate us from the workers 
throughout Britain w ho support us.
The recent record of the meeting between C.S.E.U. spokesmen and 
John Davies is an example. Newspaper, radio and television reported 
that Statement as if the Shop Stewards had agreed to abandon the 
figh t for the four yards. In fact that meeting recorded the views of 
the C.S.E.U. which re-affirmed its "nrincio le  objective" of "preserving 
employment in all four yards of tne U.C.S."
A lthough it was stated that there would be "meaningfu! discussions regardmo 
w orking practices, wage rates, etc." providing the Government were prepared to 
give the requisite guarantees to the ship owners "thus a llow ing work on new ships 
to commence", f f is ra  is an even m o re  im p o r ta n t c o n d it io n . This is embodied 
in paragraph 3 of the agreed minute which states:
" I t  w as further more accepted that the Government and the C.S.E.U w o u ld  make 
every effort to encourage the purchasers for Clydebank Yard, and that such 
purchasers w ou ld  be eligible to substantial financi.al assistance under the Local 
Employment .Act. The C.S.E.U. considered that this w ou ld  create a proper c iimaie 
for m eaningful discussions w ith  Govan Snitjouilders L im ited."
This means that w ithout guarantees for all four yards and the retention of the whole 
labour force, there w ill be no meaningful discussions. U.C.S. workers w ill discuss 
the future o f the yards w ith  anyone at any time providing the results are tfiose 
w hich have always been our aim, i.e.
E i 4 f :;Ls [331 ea:':33,E9 Les eï iei:
The fight goes on— your support is even more necessary—we are right in the middle 
of the woods and the wolves are ready to pounce. We need as much money as 
possible. The treasurer is still :
R. G. McKenzie^ 
c/o Convenor's Office, 
U.C.S., Clydebank
PriF itod  t iy  v o Sf iiM iv  la h n u i a t t l io  P rta l a nd  Paps>r S h o p  ( T U ;  90  P.msiov Roa.J W e s t. G l.s iq o w  S .W  '
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Appendi.x 2 3
Üpjoer Clyde Shipbuilders, report of meeting held in Clydebank 
on 27 January 197? at 5.30pm with representatives of TI3A 
Marathon Manufacturing Coy.
UPPER CI.,y DM S H 1PBU f LD!
REPORT CE MEET ï KO HELD ÎN  CLYDELAKK ON 2 7TM JANUARY, 197 2  
a t  5 . 3 0  P . M .  V/ ÎTH R1-.PRESEKTAT I YES OF U . S . A .  MARATHON 
S H IP P IN G  MAKljPACTUTRl KG CCM PAl.Y .
DISCU S S ION
This Company were very interested in the Clydebank Yard 
and the labour force.
Workers badly in need of modern hand tool equipment. 
Company interested in Procedure Agreement and assurance
I '
from the Shop Stewards and Confederation, in that, full 
CO-' ope ra t i on will be given by work force.
They were interested in buying the whole Yard.
Their Programme; Oil Rigs, Supply Ships and Barges,
Had meeting at the Ministry of Trade and Industry and 
they were quite happy about financial arrangements.
Interested in long term Agreements with Unions on Wages 
which would include an inbuilt Clause relating to Cost 
of Living Index,
Clydebank ideal for the market which they were involved 
in, i.e. North Sea O i l ,
Représentatives would report to Marathon Board.
Shop Stewards and Unions would receive information around 
the 18th February, 1972 if they are prepared to take on 
Clydebank,
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Appendix 24
Upper Clyde Shipbuildei'B, report of meeting held in Lint house 
on 5 February 1972,
k l.iy
UPPER C LYD E SH I PBUI L IT R S
REPORT OP ME o r  I EC l iELD  IN  L I  P rLO E S E  ON 3R D E E T lU /J lY  , 197 2
PRESENT;" Mr, K , Doug 1 a s with Shop Stewards,
DISCUSSION
The up to date situation.
Tlie new %ios i t i on of Mr, Douglas in the Govan Linthouse 
set u p ’is non-'cxecu t i ve ; in charge of marketing and 
buying. ^
Feasibility report to be handed to Davies on Monday.
The position of the Board is « if insufficient finance 
is offered by the Government, the Board will resign.
Scotstoun should be included in new set up.
Certain political pressure is being brought to bear 
on Davies regarding the amount of money to be made 
available for Govan Linthouse.
16U.
Appendix 25
RMSO, Shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde; Report of Hill Samuel & 
Co. Limited,. CtïïID 4918, Karch 1972, Annex.
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A n n e x
L o r d  St r a t m a l m o n d G o v a ’n  S h ip b u ild e rs ,  
c /o  L iq u id a to r ,
U p p e r  C fy d e  S h ip b u ild e rs ,
L in th o u s e  Y a rd ,
G o v a n .
7 t h  F e b r u a r y ,  1972.
M y  d e a r S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te ,
T h e  B o a rd  o f  G o v a n  S h ip b u ild e rs  have  n o w  seen th e  R e p o r t  o f  H i l l  S a m u e l 
o n  th e  G o v a n -L in th o u s e -S c o ts to u n  p o s it io n ,  to g e th e r w ith  th e  M a rk e t in g ,  
O rg a n is a t io n  a n d  T e c h n ic a l R e p o rts  o f  M a y n a rd s . W e  have  a lso  been g ive n  
a m p le  o p p o r tu n ity  to  d iscuss these re p o r ts  w ith  th e  C o n s u lta n ts  a n d  f in d  w e are  
in  a g re a t m easure  o f  a g re e m e n t w ith  th e m . T h e re  a re  s t i l l  som e te c h n ic a l m a tte rs  
to  be re s o lv e d  b u t w e d o  n o t be lieve  th a t  these w i l l  re a lly  change  th in g s  to  a n y  
g re a t e x te n t.
W e  th e re fo re  fee l th e  t im e  has n o w  co m e  fo r  us to  re p o r t  to  y o u  o n  h o w  we see 
th e  p o s it io n ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  re g a rd  to  th e  fu tu re  v ia b i l i t y  o f  the  Y a rd s  a nd  th e  
s itu a t io n  re g a rd in g  th e  w o r k  fo rc e .
Viability
T h e  R e p o r t  show s th a t  desp ite  th e  in je c t io n  o f  v e ry  c o n s id e ra b le  c a p ita l,  th e  
c u s h io n in g  o f  th e  e ffec t o f  in i t ia l  losses in  th e  f ir s t  fe w  years a n d  th e  v ir tu a l 
d o u b l in g  o f  p ro d u c t io n  w ith  th e  p re se n t la b o u r  fo rc e , i t  is n o t  u n t i l  the  fo u r th  ye a r 
th a t  th e  o p e ra t io n  Is p ro je c te d  to  becom e  v ia b le . E ve n  th e n , as th e  R e p o r t  states, 
th e  s m a ll p r o f i t  ‘ fa lls  fa r  s h o r t o f  w h a t w o u ld  be a cce p ta b le  f r o m  a c o m m e rc ia l 
p o in t  o f  v ie w ’ .
R e g re t fu l ly ,  th e re fo re , w e  m u s t say th a t  f o r  som e years  ahead  w e  c a n n o t see 
th e  o p e ra t io n  as c o m m e rc ia lly  v ia b le . E ve n  a fte r  these in i t ia l  years th e  p o s it io n  
m u s t be d o u b t fu l  as th e  R e p o r t  assum es th a t  a il th e  sh ips , p la n n e d  b y  th e  R e p o r t 
f o r  c o n s tru c t io n ,  w i l l  be s o ld  a n d  a lso  th a t  co s t in f la t io n  a n d  s h ip  p r ic e  in f la t io n  
w i l l  go  h a n d  in  h a n d . T hese  a re  v i ta l  a s s u m p tio n s  as lia b le  to  be  w ro n g  as r ig h t .
T h o s e  o f  us w h o  a re  new  to  s h ip b u ild in g  f in d  i t  h a rd  to  u n d e rs ta n d  the  reason  
f o r  th is , p a r t ic u la r ly  as th e  C o n s u lta n ts  assure us th a t w i th in  a fe w  years, i f  w e  
fo l lo w  th e ir  p la n s , th e  Y a rd s  w i l l  be as m o d e rn  as an  average E u ro p e a n  Y a rd  
w ith  w h ic h  th e  C o m p a n y  w i l l  h a ve  to  c o m p e te . P o s s ib ly  i t  stem s f r o m  th e  fa c t 
th a t  as th e  Y a rd s  have  n o t  been e x p a n d in g  o v e r m a n y  years, th e y  have been 
w ith e r in g  p a r t ic u la r ly  f r o m  th e  p o in t  o f  v ie w  o f  in c e n tiv e  to  p ro d u c e  p ro f ita b ly .  
In d u s t r y  n e v e r ju s t  s ta n ds  s t i l l .  M o re  p ro b a b ly  i t  is th a t  s h ip b u ild in g  in  m uch  
o f  th e  w o r ld  has b ecom e  m o re  o f  a c o m p e t it io n  be tw een  G o v e rn m e n ts  o n  the  
h e lp  to  be g iv e n , in  o ne  w a y  o r  a n o th e r , to  s h ip b u ild e rs  th a n  tru e  c o m p e t it io n  
b e tw e en  these s h ip b u ild e rs .
D e s p ite  these th o u g h ts  w e fee l th e  p ro b le m  o f  s h ip b u ild in g  o n  th e  U p p e r  
C ly d e  m u s t be tre a te d  a t th e  o u ts e t as a so c ia l one , o r  one  in  th e  n a t io n a l in te re s t, 
o r  b o th ,  w ith  th e  h o p e  th a t th e re  is th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  su ch  s h ip b u ild in g  e ve n tu a lly , 
b e c o m in g  e c o n o m ic  o n  its  o w n  a c c o u n t.
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It  follows from this, i f  we are to go ahead, that:
(<7) Scotstoun should be included w ithin the group, probably as a wholly-
owned subsidiary o f Govan Shipbuilders but operating much more
independently than it has in the past under UCS to avoid building-up 
a large co-ordinating staff, and
(b) we entirely agree w ith the reasons given in the Report that in the in itia l
stages the promises o f private money should not be taken up but rather
held in suspense ( if  feasible) until some future date. It', however, despite 
our views and those o f the Consultants, it is felt by the Government that 
the ‘token’ private money already promised must be involved at the 
outset we would also hope that we can give the opportunity to all those 
employed to voluntarily contribute a ‘ token’ amount. The Government, 
private capital and, we hope, many employees w ill then all have a stake— 
albeit in very different degrees— in the future o f the Company.
Union discussions
Due to the well-known local situation it was only last week that we had 
discussions w ith Union officials o f the Confederation. These were in very general 
terms and we encountered no immediate difficulties— all present agreed they were 
‘meaningful’ and, at their request, we are now preparing proposals to be put to 
them w ith in  the next week. We believe that i f  we can demonstrate that there w ill 
be stability o f work in the future, satisfactory relations w ith  the work force 
should not be one o f our major difficulties.
Future orders
This, as we see it, is our major problem. W ork is already running out at 
Scotstoun and by the summer further work is needed for Govan/Linthouse. 
The market is bleak today and as Maynards state in their Marketing Report, our 
image ‘among potential customers is very alarming’ because o f ‘risks o f strikes, 
un-modern equipment and production methods, late deliveries, financial 
instability, high prices and poor service’ . We indeed have much to overcome.
Although the Report makes an allowance financially for uneconomic contracts 
in  the first few years, we have still to test the market. Some o f us feel that owners 
value deliveries on time much more than cheap prices with the chance o f late 
deliveries. We shall be pursuing this matter over the next few weeks as there is 
little  point in commencing a business w ith no ships to build and no money that 
we can make available to start building ships on the speculation o f selling them 
when completed.
Couclusious
W hilst, therefore, the Government is considering its position in the light o f the 
Reports and o f this letter over the next few weeks we shall:
(a) investigate future orders, including the orders now held in suspense by the 
UCS Liquidator, and
(b) continue our discussions w ith the Confederation to see whether the belief 
expressed above is correct should we be able to offer stability o f work, and
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(c) decide on the Staff required and whether there are the people o f the right 
calibre available from those left in UCS to measure up to this challenging 
task.
The whole situation is a daunting one, but our objective as we stated above 
w ill be to try  and eventually reach a situation where the Company can stand on 
its own feet w ith  much more than ‘token’ private investment.
Time, however, is now very much o f the heart o f the problem and a decision 
must be reached i f  there are not to be further redundancies, particularly at 
Scotstoun by, at the latest, the end o f this month.
I f  you wish to publish this letter, please feel free to do so.
I am,
(S/gfied) S T R A T H A LM O N D .
The Rt, Hon. John Davies, mbe, mp, 
Secretary o f State fo r Trade and Industry, 
1 V ictoria  Street,
London, S W l.
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The Marathon Agreement.
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a g h e l a d l N-!;
1h :1Vv'0C]1
THJ-) L IA D A T I IO N  S i i i r iB lJ IL E l .E G  C 0 7 . ÏP A E Y  ( U . K . )  L I M I T E D ,  
J ic re . l i ia f lc } '  c a l le d  M A R A T H O N ,  and A L L  T R A D E  UNIO NS, l i c r e l n a f l o r  
! c a l le d  Hie U N IO N S , w i th  ene m l) c m  U ic r c o f  to  be e m p lo y e d  by Tda ra tbon  . 
in  a c c o rd a n c e  v / i lh  Die oilun-' p r o v is io n s  h e re o f ,  at the  f a c i l i t y  f o i a n c r l y
! k n o w n  as th e  C ly d e b a n k  D iv is io n  o f the  U p p e r  C lyde  S h i jd n i i ld e r s  L im i t e d ,
' im a k e  t h is  a g re e m e n t  c o v e r in g  the  w ages and o th e r  c o n d i t io n s  o f 
e m p lo y m e n t  o f  th e  l a b o r r  f o r c e  o f  M a ra th o n  at sa id  s h ip y a r d  as f o l lo w s ;
1 '*
D E C L A R A T I ON ON C O M M O N I N T E N T IO N
R e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  M a ra t l ' io n  and t l ie  U n io n s  h e re b y  d e c la re  th e i i '  c o m m o n  
in t e n t i o n  to  be the  c o n t in n i t y  and s t a b i l i t y  o f e m p lo y m e n t  o f  the  la b o r  
f o r c e  a t th e  f o r m e r  C ly d e b a n k  D iv is io n  o f U. C. S. I t  i s  t i ic  m u tu a l  
in te n t  o f  and  bo th  p a r t ie s  p le d g e  m a x im u m  co -o p e ra t io n  in  re a liv T n g  t h is  
c o m m o n  o b je c t iv e  and in  e s ta b l is h in g  a m o d e m  and f lo u  r i  s h in g  y a r d ,
:n ; ■
{T E R M  O F  T U E  A G R E E M E N T
T h e  t e r m  o f  t h is  a g re e m e n t  s h a l l  be f o r  a p e r io d  o f f o u r  (4) y e a rs
I c o m m e n c in g  on J u ly  24,  1972, o r  at such  date as A la ra th o n  s h a l l  ta !:c  
!
I o v e r  th e  f a c i l i i i c s ,  and c o m m e n c e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f i t s  new  f a c i l i t i e s  and
!  i ,
' th e  p r o d u c t io n  of i t s  p ro d u c t , ,  w h ic h  e v e r  is  la lc m
ÎIL
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T jo i .J D A t)7S
H o l id a y s  w i l l  l ie  o b s e rv e d  as th e y  a re  in  effecL in  tbe S b ip b in ld in g
XndusljW  on the  U j ip o r  C ly d e  R iv e r  i ,  c. , t l i r e e  (3) w eeks  o f S in n n ie r
Î
H o l id a y s  and s ix  (G) s t a tu to r y  h o l id a y s  p lu s  th r e e  (3) days  to  be o b s e rv e d  
in  c o n s e c u t iv e  y e a r s  c o m m e n c in g  w i th  one (1) day in  1972, tw o  (2) days  
in  1 973 and th re e  (3) days  in  1 974 and th e n c e  a f te r .
I V
P E N S IO N
A r r a n g e m e n t s  w i l l  be m a d e  to  m a in ta in  th e  p re s e n t  p e n s io n  i f  p o s s ib le  
and i f  n o t  p o s s ib le  su ch  s i m i l a r  p e n s io n  as m a y  be u n d e r  the la w .
V_
W A G  ES
A . M a ra th o n  ag i 'ees  to  p a y  w ages to  th e  s k i l le d  t r a d e s  a base
I ■ '
j ia te  as fo l lo w s :
!
I 90 pence  p e r  h o iu ’ f o r  s t r a ig h t  t im e  pay  as base  pay.
i-I
Î !
B . T h e  w ages  o f  a l l  o t h e r  c la s s i f i c a t io n s  t h e r e o f  w hose  m e m b e rs  
ai'C 3 'c p rc s e n tc d  by  t l ie  U n io n s  w i l l  be in c re a s e d  p r o  r a ta  as the  
s k i l l e d  t r a d e s  w e re  in c r e a s e d  as s ta te d  in  A .  above.
vj;/ '
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C:bST O F  TUA’INF' IN OF FA S F -,67
A s  Inc  c o s t  o f l i v in g  in c r e a s e s  o r  d c c i  cacerj based ujjon the s ta n d a rd  
c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  in d e x  f o r  G i'Oal B r i t a i n ,  b la ra t l ' io n  a g re e s  to  in c r e a s e  o r  
clec’j 'e a s e  the  in c o m e  o f  t l ie  e m p lo y e e s  c o v c i ’cd by  th is  a g re e m e n t  as a
c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  in c r e a s e  p r o p o r t io n a te ly  to  the  change in  the  c o s t  o f  l i v i n g
(
in d e x  as i t  a p p e a rs  on th e  e f fe c t iv e  da le  o f th is -a g re e m e n t .
j
A t  the  end o f  each six- and tw e lv e  m o n th  p o r o d  d u r in g  th e  t e r m  
o f  t h is  a g re e m e n t  the  c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  in d e x  w i l l  be re v ie w e d  f o r  the  p u rp o s e  
o f  r e v i s i n g  th e  in c r e a s e ,  i f  i i e c e s s a r y ,
V I I
A N NUAL, W A G E  R.FAUF W
A t  each a n n iv e r s a r y  da te  o f  t h is  a g re e m e n t  h la ra th o n  and t l ie  U n io n s  a g re e  
to  r e v ie w  th e  w ages o f  th e  e m p lo y e e s  w o r k in g  in  the  s h ip y a ix îs  on th e  
U p p e r  C ly d e  R iv e r  and to  a d ju s t  the  w ages  in  th e  v a i r o u s  c r a f t s  o f  the  
e m p lo y e e s  o f  M a ra th o n  b ase d  upon  a c o m p a r is o n  o f the w ages .
T h e  e f fe c t  to  be a c h ie v e d  b y  the  e x a m in a t io n  o f the o th e r  w ages  i s  
to  b r in g  abou t a c o m p a r a b i l i t y  o f  the  w ages o f th e  e m p lo y e e s  o f  A la  r a th  on 
and o th e r  e m p lo y e e s  w o r k in g  in  s i m i l a r  t r a d e s  on the U p p e r  C ly d e  R iv e r ,  
Upon a g r e e m e n t  b y  t i ie  p a r t i e s  i i e r e to  o f  th e  avcmage w ages the  w a ges  o f  
•;he e m p lo y e e s  o f M a ra th o n  w i l l  be r e v is e d  a c c o r d in g ly  and n o th in g  h e re to  
bcfe:. r e d  w i l l  need to  be b ro u g h t  to  A r b i t r a t i o n .
V I I I  ■
P  31 O F  U C T I O N  1 'ONUS
M a m t h o n  ag i 'ee s  to  pay  t i i c  e m p lo y e e s  r e p re s e n te d  l iy  the  U n io n s  s u b je c t  
to  t h is  a g re e m e n t  a P r o d u c t io n  B onus  based  on the f o l l o w in g  t e r m s  and 
c o n d i t io n s :
V H L  168.
r R 0 r ) I K ' ' L 1 0 N  B O N U S  (coiitcl. )
A .  T he  bonus si m i l  be ten  (10) p e rc e n t  o f  t l ie  s t r a ig h t  t im e  base  ra te  
as s ta te d  in  A r t i c l e  V  of t h is  a g r e e m o i t  as t]).a.t a r t i c l e  f ix e s  the  base 
r a te  f o r  each c r a f t  and c la s s i f ic a . t io n  th e re u n d e r ,
13. T o  be e l ig ib le  to  r e c e iv e  the p ro d u c t io n  bonus an e m p lo y e e  m u s t  
h a ve  \vo r ] :e d  n in e  (900) h u n d re d  l io u r s  in  t l ie  s ix  (C) m o n th  p e i ' lo d  
p ro c e e d in g  th e  da te  o f  the  c o m p u ta t io n  o f t l ie  bonus.
1. I f ,  due to  in c le m e n t  w e a th e r  o r  la c k  o f  m a te i ' i a l  w lien
e m p lo y e e s . in  any c r a f t  o r  c la s s i f i c a t io n  a re  u n a b le  to  
w o rk ,  tl'-at t im e  so lo s t  s h a l l  n o t  be coun ted  in  
; • d e t e r m in in g  t h e i r  e l i g i b i l i t y  to  r e c e iv e  the  bonus.
j 2, A n  e m p lo y e e  s h a l l  no t be d is q u a l i f ie d  f r o m  r e c e iv in g  the
bonus i f  he s u f fe r s  a jo b  c onn ec te d  i n j u i ’y  o r  an i l l n e s s  
c e r t i f i e d  b y  h is  P h y s ic ia n  and i f  he p e r f o r m s  such  v /o j 'k  
as he is  c e r t i f i e d  to  do by  h is  phyosician upon such  w o r k  
b e in g  o f fe i 'c d ' t o  h im  b y  M a ra t ] ]o n .
3. T im e  o f f  due to  le a v e s  o f absence  a p p ro v e d  in  w r i t i n g  by
th e  p e rs o n n e l  m a n a g e r  s i ia l l  n o t  be coun ted  a g a in s t  the  
e l ig i l i i l i t y ^  r e q u i im m e n ts  to r e c e iv e  the p ro d u c t io n  bonus.
C. T h e  bonus w i l l  be c o m p u te d  f o r  the  s ix  (G) m o n t i i  p e r io d  e n d i i ig
i
i I
at the  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f th e  S m n m c r  h o l id a y s  and t l ic  s ix  (G) m o n th  
p e r io d  e n d in g  at the  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e .C h r is tm a s  l io l id a y s .
D./
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D, T l i c  bonus w i l l  bu pa i ' .  ' • a l i  j i i roc lüoüon cnr i jdoyces as 
d i s l b i g u i  :.;]iecî f j  om any o j ’a f l ,  c la s s  o r  d o p a r ü n o n t  so as to  e n c o u ra g e  
a i l  e m p lo y e e s  to  m e e t  p i m d u c t i on s c l i c d u le s .
E. b i  o r d e r  to  be o le g ib ' lo  to  I 'c c c iv e  the  p r o d u c t io n  bonus the  e m p lo y e e s  
o f M a  ra t  l ion  m u s t  m e e t  Ihc  p ro d u c t io n  s c h e d u le s  at t l ie  end of each
s ix  (G) m o n t l i  p e r io d  as d e te r m in e d  b y  M a ra th o n s  o b l ig a t io n s  to  i t s  
c u s to m e r s ,  P r o d u c t io n  s c h e d u le s  w i l l  l ie  pos ted  in  p r o m in e n t  p la c e s  
in  each d e p a r tm e n t  at the  t im e  o f  the  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  each jo b .
I X
O V E R T I M E  P A Y  . .
F o r  a l l  h o u rs  w o rk e d  in  e x c e s s  o f f o r t y  (40) h o u rs  in  a w eek, e m p lo y e e s  
s h a l l  be p a id  one and one h a l f  ( l y )  t im e s  the  r e g u la r  base  ra te .
D o u b le  t im e  o r  tw o  (2) t im e s  the  r e g u la r  base  ra te  w i l l  be p a id  
f o r  w o r k  on Sunday and h o l id a y s .
L E G A l .  E N F O R C E A B IL I T Y
T h is  a g re e m e n t  i s  no t  in te n d e d  to  be 1 eg a l l y  e n fo rc e a b le  in  a c c o rd a n c e  
I Vvith the  p r o v is io n s  o f  P a r t  111 Sec. 34 o f  the  I n d u s t r i a l  R e la t io n s  A c t  o f 
1971. '
♦
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! A  R IB  T  RA T IO N  P R O C É DU R i f
! h
T h e  p a r t ie s  a g re e  tha t in  o r d e r  to  a v o id  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t io n  by  Hie 
U n io n s ,  in d i  v J d u a l ly  o r  c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  o r  by  th e i î ’ in  e m b e rs  o r  an y  o r  
a l l  o f  th e m  th a t  th e y  s h a l l  be bound to the r e s o lu t io n  th e r e o f  by  the 
fo B o w in g  m e l l io d ; /
, 211 170.
■ 6 . 1 ' ' Ixlu U-o '^Ja ].)
A .  I f  an e m p lo y e e  w is h e s  to  ix ü s e  any q u e s t io n  in  w h ic l i  l ie  is  
d i r e c t l y  and p e r s o n a l l y  c o n c e rn e d ,  he s h a l l  f i r s t  d is c u s s  i t  w i th  ) i is  
f o j ’ e in a n . I f  l ie  so v / is l jc s  he m a y  be a c c o m p a n ie d  by h is  s l iop  s te w a rd .
I F a i l i n g  s a t is fa c t io n  t l ic  shop s te w a rd  s h a l l  l iave  the r ig h t  to  p u rs u e  the  
q ue s t io ] ' ] ’ w i th  l l ie  ■majiagornent. ' ' - *
I B .  V I ] e r e  a q u e s t io n  to  be r a is e d  a f fe c ts  a g ro u p  o f e m p lo y e e s .
Hie s i io p  s te w a rd s ,  who m a y  be a c c o m p a n ie d  by  a m e m b e r  o f  the  g ro u p  
c o n c e rn e d ,  s l ia l l  d is c u s s  i t  w i th  t l ie  f o re m a n  o f H.e t r a d e  c o n c e rn e d ,
: F a i l i n g  s a t is fa c t io n  th e  shop s te w a rd s  s h a l l  have  the r i g i d  to  p u rs u e  th e  
a q u e s t io n  w i th  th e  m a n a g e m e n t .
M  ■ C. In  th e  even t o f  the  m a n a g e m e n t  w is h in g  to  d is c u s s  a q u e s t io n  
a f fe c t in g  a g ro u p  o f e m p lo y e e s ,  the  q u e s t io n  s h a l l  be r a is e d  in  the  f i r s t  
p la c e  w i th  the shop s te w a rd s  o f  the  u n io n  w hose m e m b e rs  a re  in v o lv e d .
D. V d ie re  any  q u e s t io n  l ia s  n o t  been s e t t le d  in  tw o  (2) w o r k in g  
days  u n d e r  any o f  the  p ro c e e d in g  p a ra g ra p h s ,  i t  s h a l l  be th e  s u b je c t  o f  
I a c o n fe re n c e  w h e re  the  C o m p a n y  s h a l l  be re p re s e n te d  by the  M a n a g in g  
D i r e c t o r  o r  such  o th e r  p e rs o n  as he s h a l l  de le g a te  to  ac t  in  h is  b e h a lf .
I T h e  U n io n  o r  e m p lo y e e  in v o iv c d  s h a l l  bo re p re s e n te d  by  i t s e l f  o r  h im s e l f  
I o r  a n y  o th e r  p e rs o n  o r  o f f i c i a l  o f  the  U n io n  s e le c te d  to do so. 
i 1 T h e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  so s e le c te d  s h a l l  m e e t  and e n d e a v o u r  to  
s e t t le  the  m a t t e r  be tw e en  th e m . F a i l i n g  to  do so a f t e r  a p e r io d  o f  ten  
(10) days  the U n io n  m a y  at i t s  so le  e le c t io n  c a l l  i t s  N a t io n a l  O f f i c i a l s  
o i '  t h e i r  I 'e p j 'c s c n ta l iv o s  f o r  a c o n fe re n c e  A’d th in  lAventy (20) w o r k in g  
days  w h ic h  p c r s o j is  s h a l l  then  e n d e a v o u r  to r e s o lv e  the d is p u te .
A R I H T R A T ' f O N  J 'M O C E D U R  10 (could.  ) I 7I .  *
E, A f t  cm l l i c  p i 'o ced u  ]'(\s rcUoj-i'ocl to  nbovo Ijavc- licoî) co'duiu.olod 
and (he d is p u te  I ja s  n o t  been I 'eso lvec l,  b o t l i  the  Union.s o r  ]\Ta ra thon  m a y  
re q u e s t  t l i c  D o p a r lm o n t - o f  E ï i i p lo y m e n t  at G la s g o w  to f u r n is h  a l i s t  o f  
s u i ta l ) l  e a r b i t r a t o r s  to  r e s o lv e  t l ie  d is p u te .
T h e  p a r t ie s  a f te r  c a s t in g  lo t  as to  w lio  s h a l l  s t r i k e  f i r s t  s h a l l  
a l t e r n a t e l y  s t r i k e  f r o m  th e  l i s t  o f  a r b i t r a t o r s  u n t i l  t l ic  l a s t  r e m a in in g  
a r b i t r a t o r  s l i a l l  be s e le c te d  to  d e te r m in e  the  is s u e  o r  d is p u te .
T h e r e a f t e r  a j id  at t l ie  e a r l ie s t ,  p o s s ib le  c o n v e n ie n c e  the  a r b i t r a t o r  
s î ia l l  h e a r  th e  e v id e n c e  o f  a l l  p a r t ie s  c o n c c i-n ln g  the  d is p u te  and si 1 a l l  
m a l ce an a w a rd  and d e c is io n  in  w r i t i n g  r e s o lv in g  sa id  d is p u te  b y  w h ic l i  
a w a rd  and d e c is io n  the  p a r t ie s  l i c r c t o  a g re e  to  be f i r m l y  bound and b y  
w h ic i i  th e y  a g re e  to  ab id e  w i th o u t  r e s o r t  to  s t r i lc e ,  w o rk  s toppage , 
lo c k o u t ,  o r  o th e r  in d u s t i ' i a l  r e m e d y .
B o th  p a i ' t i c s  a g re e  th a t  t h e i r  in e rn b e rs  and e m p lo y e e s ,  M a n a g e rs ,  
o f f i c e r s  and o f f i c i a l s  s h a l l  be re q u i jm d  b y  th e m  to  ab ide  by  such  d e c is io n  
as w e l l .
kj.j
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In  case  o f  d is p u te s  o v e r  D ie a l lo c a t io n  o f  w o r k  th e re  i v i l l  be no s toppage  
of. w o i 'k  o r  o th e r  i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r r u p t io n  o r  a c t io n .  The  U n io n s  w i l l  
s e t t le  a l l  D e m a r c a t io n s  a m o n g  th e m s e lv e s  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  t l ie  N a t io n a l  
D e m a r c a t io n  B ro c e d iu 'e  A g r e e m e n t  1069 be tw een the  S h ip b u i ld e r s  and 
H c p a i i ' c r s  A s s o c ia t io n  and Die T r a d e  U n ion s  a f f i l i a te d  to  the C o n fe d e ra t io n  
o f  S h ip b u i ld in g  and E n g in e e r in g  U n io n s  w i th  Avhich both p a r t ie s  a re  
f a m i l i a r  and w h ic h  s h a l l  be m ade  a p a r t  h e r e o f  by  r e fe re n c e  t h e r e to  as 
i f /
XI)
i ) E M A R C A T fON SE T 'J 'L E A IE N T S  (conUl. ) 172.
:if the snrno I jad been eo jr ied  a I 1 cngHi l ie r e b i  fcm ;dl jni lyjo.-jes, bTa ro l l ion  
s h a l l  be a d v is e d  o f  the  o u tc o m e  o f such  s e t t le m e n t  and M a i 'a th o r i  w i l l  ab ide  
by  Die U n io n s  d e c is io n  D ic ro o n .
T l ie  U n io n s  a g re e  th a t  th e y  and D ie i r  m e m b e rs  and o f f i c e r s  w i l l  
a b id e  by  the  set d e m e n ts  m a d e  as s ta te d  above.
x%n_
J N d lE N T  T O A B ID E  B Y  T U E  A G R E E M E N T  ' .
T h e  P a r t i e s  have  f r e e l y  e n te re d  in to  t l i i s  a g re e m e n t  b y  n e g o t ia t io n  and i t  
i s  in te n d e d  to  be b in d in g  and th e  p a r t ie s  a c c o r d in g ly  c o m im it  th e m s e lv e s  
to  ta k e  a l l  such s te p s  as re a s o n a b ly  n e c e s s a r y  and ] i ra c t ic ;a ] i le  to  p r e v e n t  
a n y  p e r s o n s  c o v e re d  b y  i t  f r o m  a c t in g  in  b re a c h  o f i t s  p r o v is io n s .
X I V
W O R K  R U L E R  CO V E R IN G  C O N D U C T  OE E M P L O Y E E S A N D  P E N A L T IE S  
T h e  p u b l is h e d  Y a r d  R u le s  is s u e d  u n d e r  d a le  o f A p r i l  18, 19G9, w h ic h  
a r c  in  e f fe c t  at th e  t im e  w hen Iv la ra th o n  ta k e s  o v e r  the  y a r d  a re  adop ted  
as i f  th e  s a m e  had been c o p ie d  h e r e in  at le n g th  f o r  a l l  p u rp o s e s .
X V
C O N D IT IO N  A L I .O W A N 'C E
M a r a th o n  ag i 'ees  to  f o l lo w  p r a c t i c e s  on the  U p p e r  C ly d e  as r e g a r d s  Die 
p a y m e n t  o f  c o n d i t io n  a l lo w a n c e  f o r  c e r ta in  w o r k  such as, but n o t  l i m i t e d  
to ,  " d i r t y  w o r k " .
T h e  shop s te v /a i 'd s  have  fu rn is h e d ,  a l i s t  o f  a l l  such  a l lo w a n c e s  w lh c h  
s h a l l  c o n t r o l  th e se  p i 'O v is io n s  u n le s s  c lum ged  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  Die 
t e r m s  o f  A r t i c l e  V I I  o f  t h is  a g re e m e n t .
\ .1
Tl'iK V/IIOLF A G R E E M E N T  
_ _  .................
T he  j i n r t i c s  ) iavo se t out t h e i i '  c m t iro  a g i 'e c m c i i t  l ie i 'c j r i  and w i l l  n o t  bo 
I 'o q u i i 'c d  to  b a rg a in  about w ages, h o u rs  o r  o th e r  c o n d i t io n s  o f c n ip lo y u n o i t  
e x c e p t  as o th c rv c is e  p ro v id e d  h e r e in .
W i tn e s s  o u r  hands  in  b c l ia l f  o f  the  p a r t ie s  cact i o f us 
r e p im s e n t  at G LA S G O W , S C O T L A N D ,  
t h is  d a y  o f  b la y ,  1972
M A R A T H O N  S H IP B U IL D IN G  C O iV IP AN Y ( U .K .  ) L I M I T E D  
A t t e s t : ____   B y _____________________
S e c i ’ e t a r y  P r e s id e n t
F O R  T H E  U N IO N S
A m a lg a m a te d  S o c ie ty  o f  B o i l e r m a k e r s
S h ip w r ig h ts ,  B la c k s m i t h s  & S t r u c t u r a l  W o r k e r s  B y
E l e c t r i c a l ,  E le c t r o n ic  & T e le c o m m u n ic a t io n
U n io n /P lu m b in g  T r a d e s  U n io n  , By_
N a t io n a l  U n io n  o f  S liee t M e ta l  W o r k e r s ,
C o p p e r s m i th s ,  H e a t in g  & D o m e s t ic
E n g in e e r s  & V e n t i la t o r s  - By_
N a t io n a l  U n io n  o f  R’u r n i t u r c  O p e r a t iv e s  B y
A m a lg a m a te d  U n io n  o f  E n g in e e r in g  W o r k e r s  B y
U n io n  o f C o n s t r u c t io n ,  A l l i e d  T ra d e s  &
T e c h n ic ia n s  B y
A m a lg a m a  lcd  S o c je ty  o f  W o o d o u lU i ig  ivlacdrini :jLs B y__
G'CJ'jO'al & k 'i iin .icdjia l WoiJwoas U n ion____________________B y__
T r a n s p o r t  & G e n e ra l  VVorjcei’S U n io n  B y  _
T H E  SHOP S T E W A R D S '
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Appendix 27
Agreement between Govan Shipbuilders Limited and the Confederation 
of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions.
? r?
A G R EEM EN T
betw een
GO V A N  SIIIPTTJTEDERS L IM I T E D  
and
T H E  C O N F E D E R A T ION O F  S H IP E i ; IL D IN G  A N D  E N G IN E E R IN G  UN IO NS
dated
lie U n io n s ,  h a v in g  a l r e a d y  d e c la re d  p u b l i c ly  th a t  th e y  w i l l  g u a ra n te e  t h e i r
/
) in p le te  c o - o p e ra t io n  to e n s u re  d e l i v e r y  on t im e  o f the fo u r  sh ips  c u r r e n t l y  
An g b u i l t  f o r  the  I r i s h  S h ip p in g  Co. L im i t e d ,  have now extended  t h e i r  
ta ra n te e  in  s i m i l a r  t e r m s  to  c o v e r  the t im e l y  c o m p le t io n  o f  the sh ip s  w l i ic h  
Lve r e c e n t l y  been p la c e d  in  the  S c o ts to u n  Y a rd ,
l e  U n io n s  a f f i r m  t h e i r  d e s i re  to  c o -o p e ra te  f u l l y  w i t i i  Govan S h ip b u i ld e rs  
im i te d  and re c o g n is e ,  a g a in s t  the  b a c k g ro u n d  o f  a d e p re s s e d  w o r ld  m a r k e t ,  
a t bo th  m a n a g e m e n t  and m en w i l l  r e q u i r e  to  m ake a jo in t  and d e te rm in e d  
■fort to  a c h ie v e  s u b s ta n t ia l  im p r o v e m e n t  in  p r o d u c t iv i t y ,
is  now a g re e d ,  b e tw e en  Govan S h ip b u i ld e rs  L im i t e d  and T he  C o n fe d e ra t io n  
' S h ip b u i ld in g  and E n g in e e r in g  U n io n s ,  tha t ;
T h e  c u r r e n t  ’ w o r k - i n ’ w i l l  cesse  when Govan S h ip b u i ld e rs  L im i t e d  
s t a r t  to  t r a d e .
T h e  U . C .S . E m p lo ^ m ie n t  C h a r te r  w i l l  be r e v is e d ,  and upda ted , to  
e n s u re  no im p e d im e n t  to  the  e f f i c ie n t  u t i l i s a t io n  o f m a n p o w e r ,  
m e th o d s  and e q u ip m e n t ,  so th a t  any  p ra c t ic e s  in c o m p a t ib le  with- t i i i s /
177.
t
/ t h i s  o b jc c U v c  w ou ld  r a p id ly  be e l im in a te d .  I t  is  accep ted  tha t  
a r ra n g e m e n ts  f o r  s h i f t  w o r k in g  w i l l  be in  a cco rda nce  w i th  the 
p r o v is io n s  o f  the re le v a n t  N a t io n a l  A g re e m e n ts .  The  a r ra n g e m e n ts  
f o r  i n t e r  c h a n g e a b i l i ty ,  f l e x i b i l i t y  and m o b i l i t y  as a g re e d  in  the 
U . C .S .  E m p lo y m e n t  C h a r t e r  w i l l  con t inue  and the U n io n s  re  - a f f i r m  ■ 
the  im p o r ta n c e  o f the  R e la x a t io n  o f W o rk in g  P r a c t ic e s  A g re e m e n ts
. ' I
i n  e n s u r in g  e f fe c t iv e  w o rk in g .
1
I
• T h e r e  s l ia U  in  each Y a rd  be a J o in t  C o n s u l ta t iv e  C o m m it te e  w h ich  
w i l l  m e e t  r e g u la r l y  f o r  the  in te rc h a n g e  of in fo r m a t io n .  T he  
C o m m it te e  w i l l  c o m p r is e  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f M anag em e n t and the  
w o r k  f o r c e  and shou ld  be re g a rd e d  as s u p p le m e n ta ry  to  the n o r m a l
d a y  to  d a y  chan ne ls  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n .
I
T h e  N a t io n a l  P ro c e d u re  A g re e m e n t  between the S h ip b u i ld e rs  and 
R e p a i r e r s  N a t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  and The  C o n fe d e ra t io n  o f  S h ip b u i ld in g  
and E n g in e e r in g  U n io n s  w i l l  a p p ly  to  a l l  th re e  g roup s  o f  h o u r l y  p a id  
w o r k e r s  in  the  Y a rd s  -  S te e lw o rk e r s ,  O u t f i t t in g  T ra d e s  and G e n e ra l  
W o r k e r s ,  and to  a l l  s t a f f  who a re  m e m b e rs  o f  a p p ro p r ia te  U n io n s .
I t  is  f u r t h e r  ag re e d , in  the in te r e s t  o f  t im e  sa v in g  and the  pre v e n t io n  o f  
le a p - f r o g g in g  c la im s ,  th a t  p a y  and p r o d u c t i v i t y  n e g o t ia t io n s  w i l l  ta ke  
p la c e  j o i n t l y  w i th  a l l  m a n u a l  w o rk e m U n io n s  excep t w h e re  the  n e g o t ia t io n s  
c o n c e rn  such m a t te r s  as bonus s c h e m e s  o r  a l lo w a n c e s ,  r e le v a n t  to  one 
U n io n  a lo n e .  The  a g re e d  in te n t io n  is  t l ia t ,  excep t w h e re  c le a r l y  
in a p p r o p r ia te ,  c la im s  s h o u ld  be j o i n t l y  fo rm u la te d  and j o i n t l y  n e g o t ia te d .
//  :-3-: ’78'
(a) H a v in g  a g re e d  to  w o r k  w i th in  the  v a r io u s  N a t io n a l  
A g re e m e n ts ,  the  C o m p a n y  w i l l  hon ou r cmy N a t io n a l
, W age A w a r d s .
(b) T h e  e x is t in g  w ages  a g re e m e n ts  and bonus s c h e m e s  
w i l l  c o n t in u e  on an i n t e r im  b a s is .
i - ' '
(c) T h e  C o m p a n y  w i l l  w is h  to  n e g o t ia te  a new wage s t r u c t u r e
I
'and w h i le  th e s e  n e g o t ia t io n s  a re  in  p ro g r e s s ,  i t  m a y  be 
n e c e s s a r y  to  im p o s e  a c e i l i n g  on e a rn in g s .  I t  is  expec ted  
I th a t  d is c u s s io n s  w i l l  s t a r t  a ro u n d  A u g u s t /S e p te m b e r  1972,
and' e v e r y  e f f o r t  w i l l  be m ade  to conc lude  a g re e m e n ts  as
r
e a r l y  as p o s s ib le  t h e r e a f te r ,  bu t  no t la t e r  than  J a n u a ry  1973.
I
(d) T he  p re s e n t  s a la r y  a g re e m e n ts  conc luded  w i th  D . A . T . A .
i
1
. and th e  C . A . W . U .  and o th e r  U n ions  on b e h a lf  o f  s ta f f  w i l l  
c o n t in u e  u n t i l  J a n u a ry  1973.
(e) I t  i s  hoped th a t  b y  the  t im e  a g re e m e n t  is  re a c h e d  on a new  
w age  s t r u c t u r e  th a t  G ovan S h ip b u i ld e rs  L im i t e d  w i l l  have  
o b ta in e d  s ta b le  e x p a n s io n  o f  p ro d u c t io n  f o r  at le a s t  tw o  
y e a r s  ahead in  w h ic h  even t the  C o m pa ny  w o u ld  w is h  the  
new  a g re e m e n t  to  r im  f o r ,  say , tw o  y e a r s .
T h e  U n io n s ,  a c t in g  on b e h a l f  o f  t h e i r  m e m b e rs ,  re c o g n is e  the  im p o r ta n c e  
o f  a v o id in g  any u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  a c t io n  o f  any k in d  w h i le  the  N a t io n a l  
■Procedure is  b e in g  in v o k e d ,  and r e - a f f i r m  t h e i r  in te n t  to  w o r k  w i th in  the 
V a r io u s  N a t io n a l  A g re e m e n ts ,  n o t in g  in  p a r t i c u la r  C lause  1 .1 9  o f  the  
P r o c e d u r e  A g re e m e n t  and C lause  16 o f  the D e m a rc a t io n  A g re e m e n t. , '
/ 179.
:"4
7. T h i s  A g re e m e n t ,  a l tho ugh  not le g a l ly  e n fo rc e a b le ,  has been
e n te re d  in to  f r e e l y  b y  the  p a r t ie s  to  i t  and is  in tended  to  be 
b in d in g ,  and the p a r t ie s  a c c o r d in g ly  p ledge th e m s e lv e s  to  
ta k e  a l l  such  s teps  as a re  re a s o n a b ly  p r a c t ic a b le  to  p re v e n t  
a n y  p e rs o n s  c o v e re d  by  i t  f r o m  a c t in g  in  b re a c h  o f  i t s  
p r o v is io n s .
S igned  on b e h a l f  o f  S igned on b e h a l f  o f
■GOVAN S H IP B U IL D E R S  L lh ï ï T E D
A N D  E N G IN E E R IN G  UN IO NS
D M F / j c j
G ro u p  P e rs o n n e l  Dept, 
M a y  1972
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Statement from Govan Shipbuilders Ltd., 5 September 197?
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GOVAN SHIPBUILDERS LH/iITED 5th September 1972
As one. Union has not yet signed the Procedure Agreement it was 
decided at the Board this morning that we must now tell the Liquidator 
that for practical reasons we will not he. able to operate the Yards 
from 11th September,
Pull consideration was given to a suggestion put to us yesterday by 
■representatives of the Boilermakers Society regarding an interim 
wage award and subsequently discussed with Confederation officials.
The Board found this suggestion, which involved a wage negotiation, 
unacceptable at the moment for two reasons -
i) we cannot enter such negotiations with any union that 
has not signed the Procedure Agreement; until all 
Unions have signed, the Company cannot operate;
ii) the type of proposal put to us yesterday could then be 
negotiated with all signatories to the Agreement jointly.
The Board’s view on wage negotiations is -
i)
ii)
ill)
iv)
in accordance with the Procedure Agreement, joint 
negotiations can start whenever it has been signed by all 
Unions;
the date of application of any settlement reached within 
the Company will be determined, during and as part of 
these négociations;
any date agreed in such a settlement may involve 
retrospective payment as the Company is not, in principle, 
opposed in all circumstances to retrospection; there can 
also be an interim arrangement;
it does rule out, however, agreeing a date for application 
or an interim arrangement before negotiations have bagman.
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The Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths 
a,nd Structural Welders, Clyde District Committee, 26 September 197?, 
to shop stewards in Scotstoim, Lintbouse and Govan.
/\/.lAI/jAS'ATr:D fOCIHTY or 183.
B O I L K R K A K K R S ,  S m i'.VlUGMTS, B L A C]:S?XITnS &  S T R U C T U R A L  ü ü R K C ^ g
I ' CLYDE U l L L U C T  C0:.L!1TT
Din t r i c t Del, ej? 
3\ Tm.Lio 
y<\ DOUG.YN 
J, RAIdSAY
6 Lansdowne Crescent, 
GLASGOVr, G 20 6X0.
26th September, 19 72,
TO SHOP STEWARDS Ï N 
LÏNTHOUSE AND G O V A N
SCOTSTOUN
I i
V/’orth.y Brother,
Dear Friend,
It is with grave disturbance that your District Cotataittecj 
have learned of the turmoil at present among our members at 
Govan, Linthouse and Scotstoun in relation to decisions of no 
further support for the ’work-in’ and the campaign for the 
right to work at Clydebank.
This, week there will be notices sent out to 400 workers, 
248 being members of our Society, Our Society as one of the 
major Unions in the U.C.S, struggle, played an outstanding part 
in caving the four yards. Our Pres:ident, Bro, D. XlcGarvey 
and prominent Trade Union Leaders along v/ith the people of this 
country, have fought hard against the Government decision to 
close the Scotstoun and Clydebank Yards and the loss of 6,CCO 
jobs ,
Your District Committee are appealing to you to reconsider 
your decision and put the good name of our Society once aiore in 
the forefront of the struggle for the right to work. Y/e are 
asking you to stand by your previous decision to support 
financially and morally the workers and ’work-in’ at Govan, 
Linthouse, Scotstoun and Clydebank.
The District Committee would request t h e  Shop S t e w a r d s  to 
put this appeal to their Departmental Bee ting and 'phone the 
result to the District Office.
Yours fraternally,
S. BARR
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On 2^)r’X -b.ino, Glasgow saw a ((cirons to'atiun thn likd3 of 
which it has nc vor scon hr ror?o, Thoasanis of };•.%■ >p.l.o me:nht';f and 
mo.ny ‘Vhoaaaev.is throaglrsat tha cc-untry stvpjLod wo.Ak and all
vath a common demand - '’The rlghi; to w o r k ’X  Tjo act ten \7?iS spanked 
off by tho U„OfS, cr:isis but of cou,r3 o the pr.5blr-jm is much dmoper, 
the ffC.S» wa.a just the last atraw^
Intega'ated as it ia into th:- enline range of 8oottish 
indusirnics, the rcp'-rcusaio.ns of cl Ooure on t.ho Clydo would ha 
oatautrophio. It is our heliv^f tnat the o ; on ' ury, if allowed to 
continue In its prcsont- coarso, will run Into c.^proselon,
The ÏÏ«Cf-7. shop £tov/,y,nde are n o w  propai' vi tc tak’o tie v/hols 
q VIC at ion to the c-cuntxy an? pxerrido spc alors fo.r district Commit t e a s , 
Tiado Go-vmoil ond indo.id any grjup vdo wien to hesr the casa,
In the mo5.nt.imQ supcoxd; is rsjuiro.l and ?,a aopeaj, fop that 
support,, "both moral and financial, in the knowledge tnat Wio oommimiiy 
roalisoa that this is not just th^? h ,Co 8 o vo:.Ak.'.cn ’ f.fcdit hut
 ^ «TT1 *1 ^  ^  «W ftr ». ■ * -*»» w w w m  * jfoWvO, #r#a wwea.4#
KfJ2P.TOî'TE8' fiant.
donations to s R. McF/nalo,
0 /o G urroo nsr * s Vff i : a ,
U g C el, Clydmhank D,i.vi.sion,
01y;\v;bank y
SCOl'IAlUy
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j L W  LxU/ Ü/ U v  w  u/lL/ w  V 0
I T  a E g T T ?
"'W E CO ULD PUT IN  A G O V E R N M E N T BUTCHER TO C U T UP ÜCS 
A N D  TO SELL (CH EAPLY) TO LOWER C L Y D E  A N D  O TH ERS, ASSETS OF 
TH E  UCS TO M IN IM IS E  U PH EA VA L A N D  D IS L O C A T IO N "
— Mr, Nicholas Ridley, M.P. in a secret report ptesented 
to Mr. Heath before the last election
T M E  m S D LE Y  F L A N
O N E : — L e t Y a rro w s  leave th e  c o n s o rtiu m . T h e  T o r ie s  a llo w e d  th is  
in F e b ru a ry  1 9 7 1 .
T W O :— Cease a n y  G o v e rn m e n t aid  to  U C S . D e s p ite  £ 9 0 m , o f  o rders  
th e  G o v e rn m e n t refused  w o rk in g  ca p ita l o f £ 6 m . on  Ju n e  12  
th is  y e a i .
T H R E E : —C all in th e  " b u tc h e r" . M r. H e a th  d id  th a t  last T h u rs d a y  w h e n  
M r Jo h n  Davies rose in th e  H ouse o f  C o m m o n s
And so a ya rd  w ith  an 87 per cent rise in production, with a 25% 
fall in manpower, w as to  be sacrificed  to  b ru ta l p o lit ic a l dogm a.
In g ra te fu l th a n k s  fo r  p ro v id in g  th e  p lan  fo r  b u tc h e ry , M r. H e a th  
gave M r. R id le y , T o r y  M .P . fo r  C iren ces ter and  T e w k e s b u ry , th e  jo b
of U n d e r S e c re ta ry  to  M r. Jo h n  D a v ie s  W IT H  S P E C IA L
R E S P O N S IB IL IT IE S  F O R  SHIPBUILDING !l
B u tc h e r D avies has his c leaver poised t o : —
Send 6000 UCS workers and thousands more in ancillary trades to the end of 
the dole queue.
End a proud tradition of shipbuilding on the upper Clyde.
Send Scotland back to the Thirties.
THIS MUST NOT H.-VPPEN 
THE BUTCHERY MUST STOP 
THE YARDS WILL NOT CLOSE
OUR FIGHT IS YOUR FIGHT
SAVE UCS THIS FIGHT IS FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK
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UPPER CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS
W k j  s im T x  C S ly a lQ  ?
"Labour slations have never been of a higher order 
and production is running at levels comparable with 
any British shipyard at this time," —/Ter? Douglas, 
Managing Director, U.C.S., in a fetter to The Times.
Ill 1968 U.C.S. bu ilt three ships.
In 1971— it  was building a ship every three and a half weeks. 
In 1970 steel was produced at the rate o f 867 tons per week, 
in 1971— i t  was at an all tim e high of 1450 tons per week.
" , . . I  see no need la ta lli o f  the 
closure o f  any o f  the Yards .
— Mr. Robert C. Smith, Liquidator
HE SAID IT  WE MEAN IT !
W e  have exposed the butcher Ridley. W e have challenged a G overnm ent 
w h o  seek to deny us T H E  R IG H T  TO  W O R K . This challenge has n ov / been 
taken  up by the entire Labour and Trade Union  M ovem ent.
U .C .S . is still afloat. The w orkers have taken control and the yards are 
w o rk in g  norm ally.
R edundancies h ave  been declared but the "w o rk -in "  continues.
We are demanding the Right to W ork
We need cash to sustain our 
s t r u g g l e  —  U R G E N T L Y ! ! !
Your continued solidarity can make v ic tory certain.
Send donations to : R. G. McKenzie,
c/o Convenor’s OrHce,
U.C.S. (Clydebank Division), 
CLYDEBANK
P rin ted  b y  v o lu n ta ry  labo ur at tba  P rin t and Paper S hop. (T .Ü .) ,  SO Patsloy R oad  W est, G la tig o w , SAV.1
(L
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\ A N EW YEAR MESSAGE FROM U.C.S. WORKERS,
As we enter 1972 we want ic thank all those whose magnificent 
solidarity sustained us in 1971. We also renew our pledge to you 
that we will settle for nothing less than our initial and consistant 
demands —
ALL FOUR YARDS -  THE ENTIRE LABOUR FORCE 
W e are as u n ite d  as ever 
W e are as d e te rm in e d  as ever
Everything that has happened in recent weeks has further confirmed 
us in our unity and determination.
Anthony Hepper in evidence to House of Commons committee, 
commienting on the report of the "Four Wise Men”  said: —
'7 think It is one of the worst reports / have ever read. The first part 
is, to nay ntind, superficial and biased. It consists of a soties of 
assertions unsupported by factual evidence and interlaced with state­
ments that are wholly untrue. "
After an exmnsive study by the Observer (19,12.71) their reporter, 
Arthur Goodman, reached some startling conclusions on productivity 
levels at U.C.S.: —
"If we make a more conservative comparison by using the whole of 
the first half of 1977 . . . the tonnage produced shows a 20% 
improvement while t.he tons per man rises to 17,7, a 527o increase. 
This is a remarkable rate of improvement in any industry and it 's 
important to remember that it is not based on fluke figu.ms for a few 
weeks here or there. It arose from a steady and accelerating pro­
gression over two years. "
The Tory Government is still stalling, but we are not prepared to sit 
and wait for their hatchet to fall. We are still building ships, but no 
ship will leave these yards in the absence of proposals covering the 
four yards and the labour force.
S o th e  struggle w il l  sharpen  in th e  n e x t fe w  w eeks  
Y o u r  s u p p o rt is m o re  necessary th a n  ever 
M a k e  1972 th e  year w h en  w e  w in  . . .
T H E  R I G H T  T O  W O R K .
Donations to:—
R.G. McKenzie, % Convenor's Office, U.C.S. Clydebank.
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D o n c a s t e r  a n d  D is t r ic t  T r a d e s  C o u n c il
Unemployment and U.C.S.
THE RIGHT TO WORK
Workers of the UPPER CLYDE SHIPBIULDERS are the firs t British workers to reject 
rectimdancy.
Instead of tire platitudes spoken by many politicians over the years on the subject of 
unemployment, tiiese workers claim V/e are going to work—when the bosses say There is 
No work fo r us.
This, cuts directly across statements made by Davies and Carr, w ith their accusations 
o f the lazyness of workers being responsible for our economic problems, lazy workers do 
not demand the RIGHT TO WORK.
Engaged in this couragous struggle, U.C.S. shop stewards have undertaken the task to 
pay wages to  Redundant workers who take part in  tlie — Work In.
Work out yourselves the cost of paying wages to these thousands of workers.
U.C.S. workers in the ir struggle against unemployment appeal to their fellow trade 
unionists fo r financial support, we appeal to you for weekly donations at your workplace 
•which w ill be undertaken by your Trade Union representitives.
Show the U.C.S. workers your Respect fo r their Courage, and understanding, of their 
(Financial Need.
A ll donations and collections should be forwarded to the TR.A.DES COUNCILS U C.S 
■FIGHTING FUND.
TREASURER 
Mr. G. ALLAN.-
7 POPULAR TERRACE,
BENTLEY
DONCASTER.
190.
I,,.- iiMiinir«n.<» u ti iairUA~i i i<« I ' l i t i w h n *> .V
/ j 5 ^ ^ 7 / p 7 P ' / q ' v 7  n r \ n  Ü  1 7
W W J u \ J Ù i O , ü à  Ü  “ /yJÀJ l X / h ,  z/
IN  TH E
1 0  '.-^1 r-1 g ", f;-, q a
Wzjii iw vjJUl:.i^j62u KyiîkJtâJ
Lxia ^ùi^û Ux5Uw*;vcc?*j
at 2 p.m.
Speakers:
GORDON M cLe n n a n
National Organiser, Communist Party
JIMMY REID
U.C.S. Shop SlGv/ard and Communist Councillor 
Chairman:
ALEX. MURRAY
Scottish Secretary, Communist Party 
Hall open from 1 p.m. Buffet open from 1 p.m.
Come early and see the Photographic Exhibition, 
including pictures of the U.C.S. demon strations 
and a display of “ Morning Star” Bazaar Goods.
Donation Ticket : 15p . O.A.P.s: 5p.
Join the Communist Party/Young Communist League
Nam e.......................... ............................................................... .......
Address............................ .................................................................
Return to Scottish Com m ittee, Com m unist Party,
W illiam  G allacher House, 69 Albert Road, G lasgow , 8 .2
P u M is h t J by tha Conirnunist Ps.My, 6 9  A 'b fU  Road. G las g o w , S 2 
as she P;ins and P.spar Shop. (T .U .) .  SO Pa s:ey Road WcsS, G lo .< fow , S W  1
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FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK.
Against the Common Market
k r o V i ’ t h e  l o r i e s  o u t
rjrt o
T h e  R ig h t  to  W o r k  is an Inalienable hum an right that belongs to every man  
and w om an. The Tories have taken aw a y  that right from  alm ost a m illion  
people, 1 3 5 ,0 0 0  of them  here in Scotland.
Thousands more are threatened w ith  each w eek that passes, at U C S , 
Plesseys, M assey Ferguson, G lacier M etals and m any others.
T hey are ruining our country, destroying our econom y and subjecting  
our people to the inhum anity of unem ploym ent.
They have to be stopped. They can be stopped.
The w orking  class is fighting back. The exam ple of the U .C .S . w orkers has 
inspired millions. It has given a glim pse of the pow er o f the w orking  class. 
The p ow er to change the policies, the G overnm ent and the system that 
produces unem ploym ent. And to replace them  w ith  nev/ policies, a new  
G overnm ent of the Left and begin to change the system to one that puts men  
and w om en , and hum an dignity, before the greed and profits o f a mere 
handful of society.
T h e  R ig h t  to  G o v e rn  o u r  o w n  C o u n tr y .  The Tories, the big m onopolies—  
and som e right w ing  Labour leaders— w hose policies w ere and are responsible  
for mass unem ploym ent and other attacks on the w orking  class, are the same 
people w h o  are trying to force Britain into the Com m on M arket.
W h y ? Because the Com m on M arket is designed to further the interests 
and profit of big business, w hatever the consequences for our people. 
T hey are prepared to sell our so vere ign ityas a nation. They are prepared to  
place the huge n ew  burdens on our balance o f paym ents— that m eans on us.
They are prepared to see prices rocket— w hich  w e  w ill have to 
pay. Again  they must be stopped— and can be. The m ovem ent of 
opposition  is greater than them, if it is m obilised and expressed.
T h e  r ig h t  th in g  t o  d o . These tw o  issues are focal points o f the m any issues 
the w orking  class is fighting  on, and w ill increasingly fight on.
The Com m unist Party is indispensable in these struggles. W e are proud  
o f the part w e  play in them. In iho U C S  struggle, and in m any others. 
O f the fact that w e  w ere the first, and are the only political party to 
oppose entry into the Com m on M arket on any terms.
O ur p a il and that o f the "M o rn in g  Star" in the fight against the 
industrial Relations A ct is also well know n.
A bigger and stronger Communist Party w ill miake the struggles of 
the working class much stronger and more effective.
Join our Party or Young Comm unist League 
Help to smash tlio  Tory attaclis. Help to build a be tte r 
fu ture fo r Scotland and fo r B rita in .
Com o along to our Rally in the City Hall on 17th  O ctober, at 2 p.m.
(Details Overleaf)
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'Man for the Job\ election leaflet for Jiiriiiy Reid, October 1974,
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I was reading in the press the other day that Lord Stokes, Chairman of 
British Leyland, has a salary of £48,650 a year — he gets more in one 
week than two old age pensioners get in a year.
Yet Lord Stokes and other tycoons, as well as their political re­
presentatives, Tory and right wing Labour politicians, tell us that we 
have got to sacrifice to solve Britain’s crisis.
In order to get us to 
agree to this we have 
got daily doses of 
gloom and doom.
‘‘We’re on the brink 
of disaster” — “ the 
worst slump since the 
30’s” and so on.
DEM AND  
I will have none of this. 
True the economy is 
in deep crisis.
True it can mean 
slashing attacks on the 
living standards of your 
family and mass un­
employment.
It  is also true that 
this will depend on the 
fight inside and outside 
Parliament.
We need, as never 
before, an MP who will 
refuse to accept that
the ordinary people 
bear the brunt, whose 
voice will be heard in 
Parliament and listened 
to, not only in .the con­
stituency but in other 
towns and cities and 
in factories, offices and 
shops throughout the 
country.
LO Y A LTY  
An MP who, along 
with all the best Labour 
MPs, will demand new 
policies that strike at 
the root cause of our 
economic difficulties, 
i.e. the stranglehold on 
our economy by big 
business, bankers and 
financiers.
This is why I ask you 
to vote for me. As an 
MP I would support, 
in the House of
Commons, policies that 
are in the interests of 
the people.
But 1 can never be 
driven into any lobby 
to vote against the 
people by any party 
whip.
1£ you v/ant an MP 
who will not be
silenced, intimidated or 
bought and whose total 
loyalty is to working 
men and women and 
their families then I 
ask for your vote.
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The highlight of the cam­
paign will come on Sunday, 
October 6th at 3 p.m.
There will be a mass 
rally in Clydebank Town 
Hall. It will be addressed 
by Jimmy Reid.
Everybody is welcome 
to come along and hear the 
real socialist candidate.
But this is far from 
being your only chance to 
hear Jimmy.
AREA
On the Monday there is a 
meeting at Linnvale School, 
starting at 7.30 p.m.
On Tuesday it's the turn 
of Duntochcr Hal! and 
Edinbarnet School, both 
at 7.30 p.m.
The eve-of-poH rally wili 
be at Clydebank High 
School on Wednesday at 
7.30 p.m.
There will also be other 
meetings up and down the 
constituency during the 
campaign.
Wherever possible, times 
and places will bo an­
nounced in the local oress 
or leaflets will be delivered 
in the area concerned.
Central Dunbartonshire
îcbsr 10th,
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Bulletin, A Montly ITevs Sheet for l.vip'ineering' V/orkere.
AUBW Voice
No. 1 JtLly 1975
No, 2 Auronst 1975
No, 3 Septombei.' 1075*
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A Monthly News Sheet for Engineering Workers
CRUCIAL ELECTIONS ARE COMING UP IS THE AÜEW (ENGINEERING SECT)
Personalities aside - why not look at some of the main issues 
involved. Which questions are uppermost in the minds of 
engineering workers at this time?
W A G E S
A record 25^ increase in prices over the last twelve months 
makes the workers pay packet top priority in order to at least 
keep up with the cost of living; yet we have actually suffered 
a fall in real earnings.
Over the past year, average take-home pay, (and this is what 
matters when it comes to paying the hills), of a married man 
with two children of school age with average tax deductions, 
has only risen by 20.8^ - 4*2fo below the rise in prices. No’w 
the Government wants us to accept even more cuts in our living 
standards. Wages are to be held down to 10^ but no action is 
proposed about prices. The Labour Government seems to have 
forgotten the lessons of the past - that wage freeze is 
totally unacceptable to v/orking people.
Press and T.V, experts deliberately mislead us by blaming 
wages for the Nation’s inflationary ailments. They fail to 
point to the real causes which are soaring profits - low 
investments and unequal distribution of the Nation's v/ealth.
199.
Trade Unionists are absoJntBly right to fight against v/ages 
being eroded along with resultant cuts in living standards.
The AU#/ can be proud of its stand in fighting against wage 
control and in defence of free collective bargaining. Members 
should therefore, when casting their vote, look for and 
support those candidates who have argu.ed for this stand.
'A  8 K - v/here do the so-called 'moderates* stand?
J O E S
All workers desire job security but the current trend does 
not help this desire. With the number of unemployed workers 
now approaching the million mark and still rising, firm 
policies are needed. The Common Market Commissioners have 
just announced a plan for ’COLLECTIVE REDUl'TEAITCIES *.
Surely what is needed is a plan for ’COLLECTIVE FULL 
. Eî/IPLOYIvIENT ' ! Any redundancy plans will affect engineering 
workers, unless of course, they are resisted by carrying 
out the AUEW policy for the 'RIGHT TO W O R K ’.
Pleasant words and resolutions v/ill not keep engineers from 
the dole queues. It's ACTION not v/ords that will count in 
showing those in power that workers are not to be cast aside 
like some old piece of employer’s rubbish fit only for the 
dustbin.
Q . U E S T I O N  ? - where do the so-called 'moderates’ stand 
on this issue? ACCEPT OR CHALLENGE?
H O U R S
Increased prices can devour wage increases, but reductions in 
hours of work are a permanent gain. Too long have there been 
delays in the fight for a 35-kour week in Engineering!
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Engineers are becoming more aware of the importance of shorter 
hours, and rightly so! Again, where do the so-called 'moderates' 
stand on this policy? If they have one at all!
D E M O C R A C Y
Always a vital issue with the Engineering Union and a proud 
history to prove it, and without interference from outside forces' 
The Engineering Union stands four-square on elections and re- 
election for all officers, together with a-rank and file policy 
making body and final appeal court. The engineers have always 
resisted outside interference in their internal affairs Ijîeath 
found this to his peril), but our enemies never give up and must 
be taught.
In recent elections for Union officers members were subjected to 
an unprecedented Press campaign aimed at influencing them in 
how to cast their vote. National daily newspapers such as the 
SUN, DAILY EXPRESS, DAILY MAIL etc. and their writers sought to 
tell members who to vote for. Y/hat have they in common with 
ordinary working class people and why should they take such int­
erest in our affairs? These same newspapers are responsible for 
misrepresenting our cases when we are involved in strikes in 
support of jobs or living standards.
The present Postal Ballot system, can give enormous power to the 
Tory press which daily pours out lies and half-truths about the 
Unions. EXAMINE THE CANDIDATES THAT THEY PROROGATE AND LIKE',VISE 
THOSE TÎIAT THEY OPPOSE.
The other source of interference in the Engineering Union's 
affairs is that of the Courts. The AUEY is being dragged bhrough 
the Courts by members who are not prepared to use and abide by 
.the Union’s normal democratic proceedures. Was the Union
201
subjected to such action when the late Lord Carron used his 
President's casting vote? NO, the democrats accepted the 
decision of the Union's Final Appeal Court.
THE LAW AND ITS COURTS NEVER ACT IN THE INTEREST OF TRADE 
UNION DEfÆOCRACY AND RIGHTS!
Let there be a strong and independent Union, the key to which 
is active participation by the rank and file members through­
out the country. Together with those members in the factories 
and Branches let us have those Officials democratically elected 
by the members and who will carry out the Union's policies and 
rules. Let there be no 'going my own way' attitudes such as 
have been experienced in the past.
UNITY IS STRENGTH - UNITY IS S'IRSNGTH - UNITY IS STRENGTH 
N E Vf S A N D  E V E N T S
POSTAL BALLOT ELECTORAL ROLL - if you are not on your Branch 
Roll you will not be able to vote! Make sure you register 
by no later than 19th August, you should then receive a postal 
ballot paper in the October elections.
23 Kelvin Hill, Basingstoke, Hants.
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O U T S I D E  I N T E R F E R E N C E
During the past month we have once more seen outside interference 
in the affairs of the AUEW. In the case concerning Divisional 
Organiser 21, Brother Brown has shoim himself quite unwilling 
to accept the democratically decided rules of the AUEW and its 
Einal Appeal Court decisions, and after takdng the issue to the 
Courts, has obtained the judgement he v/as seeking.
It has not mattered to him that un,der the AUS’W rules Einal Appeal 
Court alone hao the responsibility for the interpretation of 
27ule, and not the Courts, who are notorious for 3niling against 
the Trade Unions,
Tlie judgement made upholds the disgracefully conducted October
1972 ballot and declares invalid the further ballot in March
1973 which Brother Ron Ealverson won by a substantial majority 
and which has not been the subject of any coiiplaint*
Moreover, it overturns decisions of the Einal Appeal GouJ?t, who 
after seeing correspondence not made available to them previously, 
declared that Brother Halverson should be reinstated to his 
position as Divisional Organiser 21
go - W H O  A R E  T H E  D E M O C R A T S  ?
V/hen a worker joins the AUEW (Eiigineering Section) he or she 
has to complete a proposition form, a requirement of the form 
is that the applicant agrees to abide by the iiiles of the Union, 
yet in recent months we have seen numerous cases where members 
have deliberately flouted the rules and broght the Courts into 
the affairs of the Union.
tdiat do Brother Brom and his friends say to this ? Do they 
stand by the Rule Book or not ? It seems that they are 
m^ocx-o.ts. of convenience « democrats only vdien decisions suit 
them, and clearly contemptuous of the wishes of the members I
0_I, lL_Y_T E_E___ C__0 U_1I_T.S 
Of course Brother Dro^m has not been on his o\m in this, lie had 
the support we have come to expect from
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papers and journalists. Like Bernard Levin of "The Times", 
who is well Imoim as a ^friend’ of the trade union movement.
Have you noticed that it is the ^journalists, like Levin, who 
are most hostile to the trade unions who then give their support 
to people like Brother Brown and his friends.
Incidentally, Brother Ron Halverson is still waiting patiently 
for ’The Timeo’ to publish a letter refuting the false allegations 
made by Levin (now published 7*8*75 ”* 2 weeks late S)
THE COMMON MARKET - that they now say
*'I)a.-il,T. MlrroL- ' - 30th Jiüy, 1975
nvhen Britain joined the Common Market our car chiefs claimed thal 
a new era was dawniiig for British cars .«.,*,«• a market of 
250 million would be opening for us It sounded gxeat
but it has not worked out like that. Imports into Britain are 
now running at 30^ but out- sliare of imports into the EEC is 
derisory",
Eunny that the Mirror should be saying that now! THE 
TRADE UNIONS LERE SAYBÏG IT BEFORE THE REFERENDUM
■^'British Steel Corporation now say that because of falling demand 
the workforce in the industry will have to be cut by 40,000,
But the demand for British Steel is there - only Common Market 
regulations insist that we take steel in from other EEC countries*, 
fteel imports have risen from 2,701 thousand tonnes in 1972, to 
5,807 in 1974 and an estimated 4,57^ for 1975* V/bilst our steol 
workers are throvm on the dole, we are forced by the Brussels 
bureaucrats to import steel from other EEC countries,
MORE ON STEEL
Brother Boyd newly elected General Secretary of the AUE17 
(Eng, Section), >ra.s recently repo3:ted as saying that he welcomed 
the investment by British Steel in South Africa, It seems that 
he onooses to ignore the fact that this is contrary to hif^
Union’s policy and also against the Labour Manifesto, 
he is thinking of borrowing a few ideas from the Soutb 
Africans for the xnmning of the General Office at PecJdiam 
Road,
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UHEMPLOYf'ÎEHT - Union Policy the answer
Already unemployment has reached the 1 million mark and most 
predictions are that it will be Vj- million in the near future.
Are the dole queues of the Thirties to become familiar sights 
cnee more?
NOT IP WE FIGHT BACK, as did the lads at UCS and elsewhere! THIS 
IS YET MOTHER REASON WÏÏ IT IS BiPORTMT VHO \M VOTE FOR IN TîiE 
FORTHCOMIl^G AU#'/ ELECTIONS I Is it to be those who are prepared 
to organise ACTION against redundancies, 'or those who just mouth 
slogans and do nothing?
The Employers and the Government obviously see unemployment as a mean 
of controlling the Trade Unions, in addition the Government (contrarji 
to their election promises) has introduced wage control, limiting 
wage increases to £6,00 a week,
CONTINUING TO BLAIffi WORKEÎS FOR INFLATION WON’T WASH I It is 
Government policy that has led to rises in VAT, electricity, gas, 
fares, postal charges and many other price increases. The AUEW is 
opposed to wage restraint despite what Brother Boyd says in the 
monthly journal,
UNION POLICY BHMAITBS HIGHER XIBFSTTIEFTT AND LOIM. EXPORT OF BRITISH 
CAPITAL, TOGETHER \/ITH HIGHER WAGES FOR BRITAIN'S WORKERS'
THIS IS A FURTHER RKASON TO VOTE FOR THOSE CANDIDATES Y/HO STAI'ID BY TH 
UNION'S POLICIES,
A R E  Y O U  R E G I S T E R E D  O N  T H E  A U E W  
E L E C T O R A L  R O L L ?  T H E  L A S T  D A T E  F O R  
R E G I S T R A T I O N  I S  I9TH A U G U S T
UNION (m a l ) APmTSTRATION
The new AUEW General Secretary'' and other so-called 'moderates* are no’ 
making a song and dance about the bad administration and low finance 
of the Union, It is therfore timely to remind members that the 
previous General Secretary was also a ‘modex’a.te* and indeed the AUE17 
Executive Connoii has a long record of having a 'moderate' majority. 
The r-sfiti I i.q lU ft ra io * rte<-. Ffriou utx.king over the years
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has in many instances resulted in the wasteful use of the 
membership's money, such as the purchase of the General Office 
computer (replacing cheaper and quicker manual methods), white 
elephant buildings (not to mention book matches and ball pens) 
and the excessively costly monthly Journal (£111,037 in 1974) 
which leaves much to be desired as a means of communication 
with the membership*
THE DEMOGRACy AND UNITY OF THE AUEW AS A FIGHTMG BODY 
CAMPAIGIOTG IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL MffiEES IS NOT/ BT THE 
MELTING POT*
Tlie 'moderates' are using the capitalist press and anti-Trade 
Union journals, together with the Courts, to undermine the AUEW 
democracy.
Tins IS YET ANOTHER REASON \ m  YOU SHOULD VOTE FOR CMIDIDATES 
M-IO MAINTAIN THAT THE RANIC M D  FILE MIBBRS ARE THE ONI.Y 
PEOPLE m m  THE RIGHT TO DECIDE HOW BIEIR UNION SHOULD BE RUN X
USE YOUR VOTE BT THE OCTOBER POSTAL BALLOT.HUXU
Vote for the progressive candidates s-
Assistant General Secretary BROTHER KEN BRETT
National Organiser BROTHER PHIL HIGGS
Executive Council
. Division No 1 BROTHER JB'flT REID
Assistant Divisional
Organiser No 4 BROTHER HARRY SHERRBM
J i -V t i l O i i - f t i  N M  M  i l  .V^ a  ) !  i t .v
WAGES POLICi:
Hear HUGH SC/iIILOIT and J IÎH F I R E ID  
Come to a meeting in CITY HALLS, CANDLERIGGS, near Glasgow Gross,
SATURDAY, 6th SEPTEE^mER, 1975
Doors open 9-45 a.m. Meeting commences 10-15 a.m,
^ x-jf tt u n  a n n  x it-K -xx  x-x x x  x x x x  x  :t x  x  v ^  x  x  x x x x  x  x  x  x  x  x
23 Kelvin Hill, Basingstoke, Hhnts
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TUC 1975
A il the decisions have now  been made and once again the A U E W  m ain­
ta ined its p rinc ip led  stand on p o licy  determ ined by the rank and file  
N a tiona l C om m ittees fo r Free C ollective  Bargaining and the R igh t to  
W ork. The o ff ic ia l view  o f the AU EW  is that there is n o th ing  new in  the 
‘a n t i- in f la t io n ’ measures w h ich  are now  being applied. W ill h is to ry  repeat 
its e lf ? Especia lly as the authors o f the po licy  appear to  have l i t t le  fa ith  
in  the so-called a n ti- in fla tio n  measures p rov id ing  any real o r lasting solu­
tio n .
T IM E  W IL L  T E L L  ! WE A L L  KNOW  TH E  A N S V Æ R - D O N ’T  WE ! 
U N E M P LO Y M E N T  A N D  Y O U T H
The serious m atte r o f  unem ployed school-leavers was voiced by  Hugh 
Scanlon w ith  his po ten t com m ent “ I do no t th in k  tha t th is generation 
w ill to le ra te  the ind ign ities  and privations that m y generation had to ” .
P A N O R A M A  D E M O C R A C Y ?
Again the Estab lishm ent m ach inery and its news media are s lipp ing  in to  
w e ll-o iled  gear ! The BBC P A N O R A M A  programme on M onday,
1st Septem ber ( f irs t day o f TU C  week) showed a hypo critica l film  on 
dem ocracy in the AUEW  (Engineering Section). Far from  being balanced, 
as claim ed, it  was dom inated  th roughou t by p rom inen t righ t-w ing  m em­
bers (m oderates !) from  the M idlands area who were allowed to  a ir the ir 
views w ith o u t challenge. The o n ly  opposing view was tha t a ffo rded  to  
the U nion  President, Hugh Scanlon, toward the end o f  the program m e, 
bu t he was harangued by in te rv iew er D irnbleby who was apparently  dis­
pleased w ith  Scanlon’s comm ents. ( In c id e n ta lly -w a s  dem ocrat 
D im b leby elected o r d id  Dad in t’luence his appo in tm en t ?)
The Branch meeting shown conta ined a handfu l o f  members w ith  appro­
priate remarks from  the com m enta tor. One wonders w hy they d id  not
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f i lm  the same Branch in February this year when i t  re turned some 600 
votes fo r  the righ t-w ing  (m oderate) candidate in  the e lection fo r  D is tr ic t 
President, M any Branches w ould  dearly like  to  know  the fo rm u la  fo r 
achieving such an attendance and vote at a Branch m eeting !
The P A N O R A M A  programme had three o b je c tiv e s -to  a ttack and try  to  
rid icu le  the A U E W ’s democracy and decision-m aking, especially in view 
o f  the U n io n ’s opposition  to  wage restra in t; to  critic ise  Scanlon’s posi­
tio n  as elected President and Union spokesman; and to  question the 
m anner in w h ich  rank and file  members are elected as AU EW  Delegates 
to  the TU C.
O n ly  the merest passing reference was made to  those Unions tha t do no t 
elect at a ll, o r elect fo r life , and no reference whatsoever was made about 
the undem ocratic s tructure  o f  business organisations where small groups 
o f  shareholders can and DO take decisions which, p lay havoc w ith  indus­
t r y ,  the jobs and lives o f  thousands o f people.
SPEC IAL T R E A T M E N T  FOR TH E  AU EW
Is i t  no t strange tha t the AUEW  is always singled o u t fo r such trea tm ent 
W ould  th is  have been so i f  the late Lord  Carron had s till been President 
and app ly ing  C arron ’s ‘Law ’ ?
When the Establishm ent and its mouthpieces show such continued in te r 
est in  the U n ion  i t  is clearly tim e fo r all members to  look  deeply at the 
real cause o f  th e ir  concern !
F U R T H E R  IM P O R T A N T  B A LLO T S  IN  TH E AU EW  T A K E  PLAC E iN  
O C T O B E R -IS  TH IS  TH E R E A L  OBJECT OF T H E IR  A T T E N T IO N -  
AS IN  M A R C H  TH IS  Y E A R  ?????????
S T R A N G E  BE D FELLO W S !
Past experience shows to what extremes the so-called ‘m oderates' w ill go 
in  using the free resources o f the media in order to achieve th e ir  objec­
tives, even though th is means the underm in ing  o f  U nion dem ocracy.
The tra d itio n a l alleged friends o f the Trade Unions are again advising the 
members o f the AU EW  how to  vote in  the O ctober postal b a llo t.
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When certa in  h igh ly  paid T V  pund its  and newspaper co lum n is ts  say th e ir 
piece in  support o f  ‘m oderate candidates’ ask the questions: What do 
they  stand fo r ? Who are th e ir friends and w hy  do they get such free pub­
l ic ity  ? Bear in  m ind  the cost, when a 2 0 -second T V  com m ercia l costs 
several hundred  pounds and comparable p u b lic ity  in  a na tiona l da ily  
newspaper is s im ila r ly  priced !
IS T H IS  A  CASE O F HE W HO PAYS T H E  PIPER W IL L  C A L L  T H E  
T U N E  ?
OCT^B^^^LJECTTO^S_ „ OÇTOBE^R
E LE C T IO N S  O C TO BER
Make sure you  read the e lection  addresses o f  the candidates w h ich  are 
available at y o u r Branch. Last bu t N O T L E A S T —
USE Y O U R  V O T E  !
V O T E  FO R  T H E  PR O G R ESSIVE C A N D ID A T E S  L IS T E D  IN  T H IS  
B U L L E T IN .
A U E W  O C TO BE R  PO STAL B A LL O T S
A S S IS T A N T  G E N E R A L. S E C R E T A R Y  -  K E N  B R E T T
37 years’ con tinuous m em bership. Branch O ff ic e r fro m  1944 inc lud ing  
Branch Secretary 1953 to  1968. 13 years’ m em bership o f  the M anchester 
D is tr ic t C om m ittee . Shop Steward and Convener. A E U  Delegate to  TU C  
1963 to  1967. E lected as Assistant General Secretary' in  January 1968.
N A T IO N A L  O R G A N IS E R  -  P H IL  H IG G S
25 years’ m em bership. Shop Steward and Convener fo r  13 years. C hair­
man o f  TU C  Regional Education  A dvisory C om m ittee . V ice-Chairm an 
o f the Governors o f  the C oven try  Technica l College. M em ber o f  the 
C oventry  E m p loym en t C om m ittee . C u rren tly  Convener o f  R olls-R oyce 
L td ., C oven try .
USE Y O U R  V O T E
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E X E C U T D /E  C O U N C IL M A N ^ D IV IS IO N  O N E - Î IM M Y  R E ID
Joined the A E U  at 16 years o f  age and has 27 years m em bership. 
Was Secretary o f  Glasgow Jun io r W orkers C om m ittee  o f  the A E U  
and was a leader in  the C lydeside A ppren tice  S trike  in  1952.
A E U  N a tiona l Y o u th  Conference Delegate.
Convener and Shop Steward at Polar Engines.
G lasgow D is tr ic t C om m ittee  Delegate.
D iv is iona l and N a tiona l C om m ittee  Delegate. TU C  Delegate. 
C onvener and Shop Steward at M arathon UCS.
Q u a lity  o f  leadership proven during  the UCS W O R K IN .
A S S IS T A N T  D IV IS IO N A L  O R G A N IS E R . D IV IS IO N  F O U R -
H . S H E R R IF F
C on tinuous  m em bership from  the age o f  16. Involved in  A pp ren tice  
S trike  in  1937. Shop Stewards’ Convener. D is tr ic t C om m ittee  Delegate. 
B ranch Secretary (25 years). E lected A D O  D ivis ion F ou r in  1972, the 
o ffic e  he now  occupies.
STOP P R E S S -B B C  CENSO RSHIP
We now  learn tha t the BBC “ Panorama”  f ilm  u n it engaged in a lengthy 
in te rv iew  (one h ou r !) w ith  John Tocher, AU EW  D ivis iona l Organiser 
fo r  G reater Manchester, bu t none o f  th is in te rv iew  was broadcast. Had 
it  been broadcast it w ou ld  have been in c o n flic t w ith  the en tire  tone o f 
the program m e. V iewers were denied tiie  o p p o rtu n ity  o f hearing op in ions 
w h ich  co n flic te d  w ith  the image o f  ou r U n ion  w hich  the BBC was pre­
senting.
23 K e lv in  H ill,  Basingstoke, Hants.
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Appendix 35 
The Blackpool Agreement.
225,
THE CONFEDERATION OF SHIFBIJILDING AND ENGINEERING UNIONS 
CONFERENCE OF SHIPBUILDING DELEGATES 
(BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS )
ON
Tuesday, 4"th September, 1979 
Commencing 2,00 p.m.
at the
NORBRECK CASTLE HOTEL, BLACKPOOL
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REPORT
British Shipbuilders, in negotiations with union officials, 
advised of the measures it would take to mitigate the impact of •
its restructuring programme.
Details were given during negotiations between the Corporation 
and the National Officials of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions, Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee and local 
Shop Stewards at meetings held in Blackpool.
The Board Chairman, Admiral Sir Anthony Griffin, after a very 
full and detailed presentation on the state of the industry, said 
he believed merchant shipbuilding was at crisis point and thousands 
of jobs were under threat. There was a desperate need to show customers 
that the industry was united and that promised delivery dates would 
be honoured.
During the talks, British Shipbuilders officials repeated their 
previous statement that the 6,000 job losses throughout the industry 
could be met by natural wastage, inter-yard transfers, a sensible 
ban on recruitment and voluntary redundancy. The objective would 
be to maintain employment as far as possible and avoid adding to 
the social problems of the Shipbuilding Regions,
Following the negotiations with the trade union representatives, 
who had made it clear that capacity must be retained for the future, 
it was agreed as follows
1. Until all alternative avenues had been exhausted, there would 
be no compulsory redundancies declared and then not without 
further consultations with the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee,
2. Scotstoun yard, part of Govan, will be put on a care and maintenance 
basis and transferred at the end of the present programme to Yarrow 
Shipbuilders, who will possibly utilise the facilities for the 
purpose of warship-building. Should, however, the merchant ship­
building market recover to the point at which Scotstoun yard can
be utilised in the production of merchant ships, then any employees 
transferred from Scotstoun to Yarrow or elsewhere within British 
. Shipbuilders will have first refusal of jobs back at Scotstoun.
3. A number of vacancies at Yarrow and Barclay Curie will immediately 
be offered to redundant men and women from other yards,
4» Adult recruitment to all Clyde yards will cease. First refusal
of consequental vacancies will be offered to men and women affected
by restructuring proposals for the Clyde.
5, In consultation with the Shop Stewards in the various yards,
volunteers for redundancy will be called for at the yards on the 
Clyde affected by the proposals.
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6. At Scott's of Bowling, the labour force will be reduced as work 
runs out. The yard will then cease shipbuilding operations and 
will be put on a care and maintenance basis pending the outcome 
of a tender submitted for Ministry of Defence work,
7. At Cart8dyke, shipbuilding operations will also cease but berths 
will be retained against possible future workload,
8. Engineering work on the lower Clyde will be concentrated at 
Kincaid's. In the short term, however, some work will continue 
at Scott’s Engineering on refit contracts. For the longer term, 
should British Shipbuilders decide to stop all activity in 
engineering at Scott's further consultations will take place 
with the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee,
9. Although the Robb Caledon yard at Dundee will have no further 
shipbuilding workload at the end of its present programme, 
following representations from the Shipbuilding Negotiating 
Committee, British Shipbuilders retain the yard with the potential 
to re-open it for the construction of merchant ships in the event 
that the market place, availability of capital and adequate 
working agreement permit a successful operation. Meanwhile a 
drive to find alternative viable employment for the Dundee yard 
will be launched.
To this end, a joint working party, comprising British Shipbuilders 
Headquarters staff, representatives of the Shipbuilding Negotiating 
Committee and lay representatives, will ,e formed immediately.
It will have as its remit the responsibility of examining the 
possible introduction of shiprepair and offshore oil related work, 
before the end of the present programme of work.
10. The Corporation are decided that the future of Caramell Laird lies 
mainly in warshipbuilding and refitting. Additionally, the 
Corporation will maintain and intensify its efforts, in conjunction 
with the Company, to obtain additional offshore fabrication work.
In the short term, it is intended that other work may be generated 
from other sources, e.g.
@ An additional merchant shipbuilding order;
# Subcontracting from other sources, e.g. specialist warshipbuilders.
However, it is clear that numbers employed at Cammell Laird will 
have to be considerably reduced. British Shipbuilders propose that 
this be secured byi-
# An immediate embargo on all adult recruitment;
© By calling, in consultation with the Shop Stewards, for 
voluntary redundancies;
© By negotiating at once arrangements to encourage Cammell Laird 
employees to transfer (under the terms of the Transfer 
Agreement finally concluded between British Shipbuilders and 
the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee) to other specialist 
warshipbuilding yards - in particular, Vickers and Vosper 
Thornycroft, These employees shall have the first option to
return in the event of vacancies occurring at Cammell Lairds.
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• As a consequence of potential overload in certain departments, 
emerging by about late 1980, by investigating, together with 
trade union representatives, the need for retraining within 
Cammell Laird* s to meet their forecast needs and to retain 
the traditional skills within the industry. ■ ^
It is intended that the measures described above will yield the 
reduction ,in jobs required by British Shipbuilders restructuring 
programme.
11. Adult recruitment on the Tyne and Wear will cease forthwith.
First refusal of consequential vacancies will be offered to men 
and women affected by restructuring proposals at Sunderland 
Shipbuilders.
In consultation with Shop Stewards in Sunderland Shipbuilders, 
volunteers for redundancy will be called for.
Alongside the retention of the outfitting facilities at North 
Sands yard, the large building berth will be placed on a care 
and maintenance basis in order that it can be utilised in the 
event of an upturn in the appropriate market.
12. At Smith's Book South Bank yard, the planned reduction in jobs 
will be secured by placing an embargo on adult recruitment and 
allowing natural wastage to take place. If necessary, although 
it is thought unlikely, volunteers for redundancy may be called 
for. At Haverton Hill, further discussions will be held with 
the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee.
13* At Boxford's Engine Works, the local management and trade union 
representatives are in the process of resolving their problems 
through the acceptance of voluntary redundancies and work sharing.
14. Detailed consultations on the implemertation of the restructuring 
programme will begin immediately in each yard affected.
15. British Shipbuilders promised to join with the Shipbuilding 
Negotiating Committee in an approach to the Government, in an 
attempt to amend the shipbuilding redundancy payments scheme 
in such a way that the reduction in benefits incorporated in
■ the present scheme from the age of 62 onwards is deleted.
16. The Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee asked British Shipbuilders 
if they supported the 22 points incorporated in the resolution 
passed at their delegate conference. The Chairman of British 
Shipbuilders responded by saying that the majority of the points 
had the full support of British Shipbuilders - indeed it had been 
pursuing many of them for months - and a joint approach to the 
Government on certain of the agreed points would be sensible.
British Shipbuilders will give all of the 22 points their consideration 
and, as a matter of urgency, will reply in writing to the Shipbuilding 
Negotiating Committee.
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The Corporation were continuing to pursue urgently with the 
European Economic Community - as were the trade unions - what financial 
aid should be available to assist the restructuring programme.
British Shipbuilders tabled proposals setting out the terms of 
a transfer scheme to apply to men and women prepared to move to 
other yards beyond their daily travelling distance.
British Shipbuilders trust that the measures outlined above to 
deal with the proposed restructuring of the industry will lead to 
an immediate return to normal working which will create the conditions 
in which customer confidence will be restored on the basis of united 
action and a united sense of purpose between management and workforce.
RESOLUTION
This conference, having received a full and detailed report of 
the results of the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee's representation 
to British Shipbuilders, accepts that the spirit of the resolution 
passed at the delegate conference held on Thursday 23rd August at 
Newcastle has been vigorously pursued.
Further, this conference accepts that the main elements of the 
resolution regarding retention of capacity and the avoidance of the 
need for unwarranted compulsory redundancies has, to a great extent, 
been achieved.
The Conference, therefore, endorses the report of the Shipbuilding 
Negotiating Committee and, in consequence, agrees to the removal of 
the overtime ban and other sanctions applied arising from the British 
Shipbuilders statement on restructuring made on Thursday, I6th August,
The Conference now calls upon the Shipbuilding Negotiating 
Committee to vigorously pursue the 22 point plan on the future of 
the industry as detailed in the resolution passed on the 23rd August.
Finally, the conference congratulates those members who responded 
to the proposals of British Shipbuilders in such a way which assisted 
the Shipbuilding Negotiations Committee in achieving an acceptable 
and orderly transitional plan to deal with the immediate problems 
of the industry.
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Note on and index to Scottish Record Office and University of 
Glasgow Archives, UCS Transcripts, Vol. 1-3.
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Note on Scottish Record Office and University of Glasgow 
Archives, UCS transcripts. Vols. 1-3*
The set of tapes from which these transcripts were produced 
were made available to the writer from James Reid who is custodian 
of these on behalf of the UCS oo-ordinating committee.Copies of 
the original cassettes on which the recordings were made were taken 
independently by the Scottish Record Office and the writer who 
agreed to provide both the SRO and the University of Glasgow with 
a set of transcripts which are now available for public access.
The work of producing the transcripts was carried out over two and 
a half years. Latterly the writer was assisted by a grant over 
twelve months from the Manpower Services Commission which enabled 
Margaret Pitt-Watson to be employed on a full-time basis and
participate in the work of preparing the transcripts.
The tape recordings were originally made by the publicity committee 
of the co-ordinating committee and were intended to provide the basis 
for reports for the Chop Stewards Bulletins. It was realised by the 
UCS Shop Stew^ards, however, that the recordings would have a wider 
social historical interest. The material is comprised as follows:-
a) Mass meetings of UCS workers
b) Shop Stewards meetings
c) Press interviews, television and radio programmes on UCS.
Most of tho important mass meetings were recorded and many crucial 
shop stewards meetings. The radio end television programmes which
projected the spokesmen of UCS workers onto a national arena may be soon
as supplemented by transcripts a n d .sound recordings of documentaries
on UCS in the volume of BBC W  news rranscripts. Items a) and b)
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above which provide a record of the 'internal' discussions among- 
the TIGS workers amount to about 45 hours of recordings. Item c) 
together with the BBC TV news recordings discussed in the following 
appendix amounts to approximately 20 hours and provides a record of 
tho public statements by all the major participants in the ÏÏCS 
affair. The major absence ie comprehensive recordings from the daily 
meetings of the co-ordinating committee which was the inner core of 
the UCS shop E3towards organisation.
Nevertheless, despite this gap the whole body of recordings 
provides a unique source of primary data, from which it wa.s possible 
to attempt to reconstruct the complex day-to-day unfolding* of events 
as seen through the eyes of workers in struggle. Therefore it 
comprises an important documentary record the value of which is 
perhaps enhanced by the fact that it was the workers themselves who 
made the recordings rather than an outsider. The full and franîc 
nature of the discussions which are recorded and indeedj the urgency 
of the conditions with which such discussions took place gives the 
UCS tapes the character of a highly authentic reflection of the views 
of the active participants in the struggle.
Some comment on the problems encountered in transcribing the 
tapes is necessary as in parts there are gaps where the recording 
was inaudible for one reason or another. The actual recordings were 
made on a cassette recorder under far from ideal sound recording 
conditions. Often participants would be speaking from the back of 
a room or shouting from the body of a mass meeting. Sometimes the 
cassette recorder was incorrectly adjusted resulting in distorting 
levels of volume. For this reason t'/o tapes were not transcribable.
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As a result each hour of tape transcript took many hours to produce.
The editing process was one of preserving rather than excluding as 
much of the contents as possible. The transcripts were net rendered 
in standard English form except insofar as the speakers grammatical 
construction followed this. Some attempt to render the Clydeside 
accent in a recognisable manner was also made although this was 
perhaps loss than wholly satisfactory. However, a close familiarity 
with tho nuances of the Glaswegian accent was a help in transcription, 
a factor which defeated an earlier attempt to do the work of transcription 
by the SRO. More important in ensuring accuracy was an extensive 
background knowledge of the people, events and places which provided 
the context for Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.
So far as the individual speakers identities were concerned, 
often these had to be identified by their voice alone. V/hlle this 
did not present a problem so far as identifying the leading shop 
stewards was concerned, departmental stewards,who might or might 
not be continuing representatives of their section,were a problem. 
Individual workers except when they were either well-known or referred 
to and identified by either themselves or other speakers were impossible 
to identify. It was felt that accurate naming of speakers from the 
co-ordinating committee, that is about 4 0  persons in all, was 
important. A former member of the committee, Gerry Ross, assisted 
the writer over a period of two months in the final revision of the 
transcripts in order to tackle this problem. Ideally, however, it 
would have been desirable to be able to pinpoint each spealcer, his 
political background, industrial experience, departmental affiliation 
and so on.
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Finally many of the original cassettes, like the B3C TV 
material discussed, were undated. It was necessary to cross- ,
reference the content of the tapes with press reports throughout 
the period of the work-in in order to be s.ble to pinpoint precise 
dates. In a few instances there were real difficulties in ensuring 
accuracy. It is hoped, however, that the UCS transcripts have been 
rendered in a form which will be suitable for research in other 
areas in the future, in particular, a more extensive socio-linguistic 
investigation into language and class conflict. It was with this 
possibility in mind that effort was made to rerd er this unique body 
of material in a form which eventually would be useful beyond the 
immediate confines of the present study.
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Appendix 37
Note on and index to BBC TV News, UCS compilation.
241
Notes on BBC TV News, ÜCS compilation
The transcripts provided of BBC TV Mows items concerning UCS 
were prepared from recordings made by the writer, assisted by John 
Foster and Lee Brown at the headquarters of BBC Scotland in Glasgow.
The recording work was carried out over a two month period and 
transcription v;as conducted in the following twelve months» This 
material provides a record of the public events and pronouncements 
by major political and industrial spokesmen concerning UCS over the 
period of June 1971 to October 1972.
The material was located in the BBC archive and consists of the 
recordings made by outside broadcast crews for insertion in Scottish 
and nationwide news broadcasts. It therefore comprises mainly of 
short interview's and comments of 173 minutes duration. These are 
kept by the BBC for ‘flashback* purposes should another major news 
story break on a related theme. They are not therefore a comprehensive 
collection of all the material made by BBC outside broadcast units 
on UCS, nor are the longer unedited original recordings available 
with only one important fortuitous exception of the Rosevale shop 
stewards meeting in August 1971. Furthermore, transcripts of the 
news presenters ‘contextualising* statements are not available and 
nor is there any record of the placing of the UCS items in relation 
to other news items. Again, it is not always certain which material 
was sent out over national as against purely Scottish news networks 
although win re there is clear evidence that this occurred it is 
indicated in the index. Attempts were made to obtain similar 
material from Scottish Television Limited (STV) but the management 
proved unhelpful. It was subsequently discovered that all their 
current affairs material covering this period has been destroyed by
242.
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the company. Thuo the hope that a more extensive analysis of the 
role of the television media in the UCS crisis might be conducted 
proved not to be possible for the above reasons. Nevertheless, in 
terms of the present study the Volume of BBC transcripts which was 
produced is an important documentary supplement to the transcripts 
of the UCS tares.
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BBC TV NFWS INDEX, DCS
Reel No. Item Serial No. Date
Reel 1 Current Account UCS Special 18.6.71
Reel 2 Tuesday Documentary - ’The Fight
for Clydeside’ (BBC Transcript) 21.9.71
Reel 3
BBC Scotland. BBC National
N.1.1. Ken Douglas, Steward 14.6.71
N.1.2. Davies 14.6.71
Nol.3. Joe Black 14.6.71
N.1.4. McGarvey N.D.
N.1.5. Joe Black 21,6.71
N.1.10. N,1.6, Dickie, Airlie G71/104 S3 cw 17.6.71
N.1.7. Diddle G71/117 S5 cw 24.6.71
N.1.9. N.I.8. Diauidator G71/101 84 (c) 15.6.71
N.I.9. Liquidator, Steward 15.6.71
N,1.10. Reid, Airlie 29.7.71
N, 1.11. Reid 29.7.71
N.1.3&. N. 1.12 Dickie, Davies 3.8.71
N.1.37. N.I.13 Airlie G71/157-8 89 (o) 9.8.71
N.1.3 .^ N.1.14. Gilmore, Wilson G71/99 3/994 82 (o) 4.8.71
N,1.15 Kelly 9.8.71
N.1.16 Reid 15.6.71
N.1.17 Kelly 17.8.71
+18
N.I.42. N.1.19 Diauidator, Creditor, R. McOuattie
G7I/I9O/I 85 & 8 31.8.71
K.1.57. N.1.20. SdU'C Inquiry Opening 071/194(0) S5 1.9.71
N.1.21. Heath visit 10.9.71
N.I.58. N.1.22. Heath, Kitson 071/1162 10.9.71
- 2 -
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Reel 3 News Item Serial No. Date
BBC Scotland BBC National
N. 1.23. Greer, McGarvey (UC) 87 12.11.71
N.I.15 N.I. 24. UCS Demo. Reid, Benn, 071/114-5(0 ) 82 23.6.71
N.I.98. N.1. 25. Strathalmond G72/9 5.1.72
N.I.101. N.1. 26. Airlie, Strathalmond G72/I5 (5).1.72
Reel 4.
N.I. 27. Davies 3.3.72
N.I. 28. C-Smith 11.3.72
N.I. 29. Chataway 28.4.72
N. 1.30 Chataway 28.4.72
N.1. 51. Airlie, McGarvey 17.5.72
N.1. 32. Reid 28.4.72
N.I.91. N.I. 33. Reid, Marathon 072/534(0) 810 17.5.72
N.I. 34. Harbin, Reid Agreement 4.8.72
N.I.96. N.I. 35. Harbin on Boilermakers 072/040(0) 810 4.8.72
24 Hours Interview Reid, Michelmore KO37220 26.10,72
Reel 5.
N.I. 36. Davies NP. 82064 5.10.71
N.I. 37. McGarvey NR. 02069 5.10.71
N.I. 38. McGarvey NP. 82188 12.10.71
N.I. 39. Reid NP. 82189 12,10.71
N.I. 40. Reid NP. 82191 12.10.71
N.I.68. N.1. 41. Airlie NP. 82354
071/219(0) 87 28.9.71
N.I. 42. Reid, Airlie NP. 82464 11.10.71
N. 1. 43. Airlie NP. 82585 7.10.71
N.I. 44. Harbin D. 22072O8 M 7.8.72
N.I. 45. McGarvey D. 2487202 M 8.9.72
N.1. 46 Ha.rb in D. 2777209 M 3.10.72
245,
Reel 5 (contd) News Item Serial No,
BBC Scotland BBC National
N.1.47. Marathon 
N.1,48. Harbin, Reid 
N.1.86 N,1.49. Reid
Reel 6
BBC National BBC Scotland
N.1.1. Douglas
N.I.2. Hepper
N.1.3. Hepper, Douglas
N.1.4. Steward - Jarvis Bay
N.1.5. Hugh Birch - worker 
N.1.6. Douglas 
N.1.7. Demo and lobby
N.1.8. 
N.I.6.
Reel 7. 
N.I.24.
D. 2797212 
D. 2827208 M 
D. 3307172 M
071/1425
N.1.8. Commentary
N.I.9. Liquidator
N,1.10, Dickie, Airlie
N,1.10A Liquidator
N. 1,11, Ross, Benn
N.I.12, Reid
N.1.13. Airlie
N.1.14. Reid, Creditor, J.S, 
Thomson
N,1,15 UCS Demo,
N.'l. 16, Demo, Film - no sound
Date
5.10.72
8.10.72
26.11.72
G6923I4 A(c ) 84
0691145(0) 84
G70/430
G70/673 82 (UG) 
G71 99%
071/760(0) 84
G7i/97-99(uc) 82
G71/96-98
G71/101 (c) 84 
G7l/103-I04(c) S3
G7l/I08(c) 84 
G7l/I09(c) 82 
G71-109(2)
G7I/III’B ’(c) S3
1969
1969-70
19.6.69
10.4.70 
(1.6.70)
14.6.70
14.6.71
14.6.71 
(21.7.71)
14.6.71
15.6.71
17.6.71
18.6.71
18.6.71
10.8.71
21.6.71
G7l/l11-2(c) 85 21.6.71
071/114-5(0) 82 23.6.71
G7I/797 23.6.71
Reel 7 (contd)
i Reel 8.
i i
N.1.13.
246.
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I Nevrs Item Serial No. Date
BBC Scotland
N.1,17. Davies at Glasgow Airport -
■ no sound G7I/II8 23.6,71
N.1.18. Lidd3.e and Tory 
Councillors G7l/I20(c) 82 28.6.71
N.1.19. W. Ross - 16.7.71
N.1.20. Morran, Gilmore, G. Rose 
Lawson.
’ »
G71/137-8 29.7.71
N, 1.21. Stenhoxise, ’Reid in Yard -
no sound G7I/I244A 30.9.71
N.1.22. Reid on ’Takeover’. G71/977 30.7.71
N.1.23 Repeat of Gilmore G7I/977 30.7.71
N,1.24. James Jack G71/907 16.7.71
N.1.25 Repeat of Gerry Ross G?1/974 30.7.71
N.1.26. Included in 27. G7I/142 30.7.71
N.1,27 Steward at Yard G71/973 30.7.71
N.1.28 Men at Govan ™ no sound G71/977 30.7.71
N.1,29. Benn G7l/980(c) 84 30.7.71
N.1.30* Liquidator Repeat G71/139-142 30.7.71
N.1.31. Reid, Douglas, Ramsay G7l/I00~10l(c) 83 30.7.71
N.1.32. Dickie, Manager, Gilmore,
Reid. G7I/I43 2.8.71
N. 1,33. Airlie - Repeat N,1.75. G71/981 2.8.71
N.I.33A Demo as Davies arrives G71/988(c ) 82 3.8.71
N.1.34. Dickie, Jack, Campbell G7I/I49 3.8.71
N.1.35 Wilson G7l/993/4(c) 82 4.8.71
N.1.36 Reid, Gilmore G7l/995(o) 82 4.8.71
N.I.37. Airlie 071/157-8(0) 89 9.8.71
N.1.38» Reid, repeat N.I.12. G7l/I020(c) 89 10.8.71
N.I.39. Airlie 071/161(0) 89 10.8.71
- 5 -
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Reel 8 (contd) News Item Serial No. Date
BBC National BBC Scotland
N.I.40, Davies, Campbell G7l/988(c) 82 3.8.71
N, 1.41. James Jack STIJC Inquiry 071/1107(0) 85 31.8.71
N.1.19 N.1.42. Liquidator, Creditor G71/190/1 21.8.71
N. 1.43. 8'iUC Inquiry, Reid G7I/III5 51.8.71
N,1.44» Liquidator G7I/I9I 31.8,71
N,1,45» Repeat 42. Creditor G7I/IIO8 21.8.71
N.1.46. Harbin, repeat 95 G72/840(c) 810 4.8.72
Reel 9.
N.1.47» Feather G7I/IO48 16.8.71
N,1,48. Jack G7I/IO44A 16.8.71
N.1,49. Feather G7I/I64 . 16.8.71
N.I.50. Airlie G71/167 17.8.71
N.1.51* DCS March, Jack G7l/I057(c) 86 18.8.71
N.1.52, Eden on Kelly G71/IO67 19.8.71
N.1,109. N.1.53. Conn. O'Neill
N.1.54» Reid, Ramsay, Airlie 
at Rosevale
G71/187A(c ) 89 20.8.71
10.8.71
N.1.55» Ramsay, Gilmore G71/100/101 30.7.71
Reel 10.
N.1.56 Mahon G7I/II65 10.9.71
N. 1.57* STITC Inquiry Report 071/194 1.9.71
N.1.58. Heath G71/1162 10.9.71
N.I.59. Eden G71/II77 15.9.71
N.1.60. Stenhouse G71/1209(c ) 89 22.9.71
N.1.61. Airlie 071/1213(0) 89 22.9.71
N, 1.62. Stenliouse-out from 60 G71/212 22.9.71
N.1.63. Davies G71/1209 22.9,71
N.1.64 Gilchrist G71/1214 22.9.71
N.1,65 Airlie 071/122(7)3(0) 88 24.9.71
248.
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Reel 10 (contd) News Item Serial No. Bate
BBC National BBC Scotland
N.I.66. Reid G7l/2l6(c) 87 24.9.71
N.1,6y. Stenhouse G7I/I288(c) SB 24.9.71
N.1.41. N.1.68, Airlie - repeat 071/219(0) 87 28.9.71
N.1.69 Stenhouse, Airlie Reid 071/244(0) S7 50.9.71
N.1,70 Stenhouse 071/1244(0) 86 30.9.71
N.I.71. Stenhouse, Reid 071/244(0) 87 30.9.71
N.I.72. Stenhouse, McGarvey G71/22 29.9.71
N.1,73* McGarvey, Stenhouse 071/1239(0) 87 29.9.71
N.I.74. Reid 071/1239 29.9.71
Reel 11
N.1.49.
Reel 12
N.I.75. Airlie G71/981(c ) 82 2,8,71
N.I.76. Reid G71/23I 1.10.71
N.I.77. Airlie, Reid, Davies 071/23801(0) 85 6.10.71
N.I.78. Airlie, Dickie G7l/250cl(c) 85 8.10.71
N.I.79. Airlie G7l/249(c) 85 6.10.71
N.1.80. Stenhouse 071/25601(0) 85 9.10.71
N.I.81 Reid, Airlie 071/2560! 11.10.71
N.I.82. Barr 071/225(0) 86 1.10.71
N.I.83. Lithgow 070/275(0) 86 1.10.71
(13.10.70)
N, 1.84. Douglas 071/1276 18.10.71
N.I.85, Reid, 88 Conference G71/218 1.11.71
N.1.86. Reid 071/1425 26.11.71
N.I.87. Feather, Scanlon, UCS 
Demo. 071/169/172 18.8. 71
N.1.88. McGarvey 072/845 7.8.72
N.I.89 Reid, Harbin 072/466(0) 810 28.4.72
249.
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Reel 12 (contd) News Item
BBC National BBC Scotland
N.1.33.
N.I.47. 
N.1.35.
N.I.25.
N.I.26.
%eelJ3.
Reel 14®
N.1,90, Harbin, Reid
N,1,91. Reid, Harbin
N,1,92. Black, Airlie, 
Strathalmond
N.I. 95 Airlie
N.1.94 Harbin
Serial No, 
G72/840(c) 810
072/534(0) 810
G72/922A(c) 810
G72/618 
G72/100(c) 85
N.1.95 Harbin (Not Transcribed) Q72/1086(c) S6
N.1,96. Harbin 
N.1,97 Chataway 
N.I.98. Strathalmond
N.1.99. nos Ballad 
N.1.100 Reid
N,1.101 Airlie, Strathalmond 
N.1.102 Reid
N.1,105 Reid as Rector - no 
sound
N.1.104 Chataway
072/840(0) 810
G72/47I
G72/9
072/514(0) 810 
072/1093 
072/15 
072/1093
071/309
072/912
N, 1.105 R^eid, Black, Provost Davies, 
Campbell
N.1.106 Benn, Kilpatrick, 
Hepper
N.I. 107 McGarvey 
N. 1.108 Harbin
N,1,109 O'Neill, repeat N.i,53
N, 1.110 Reid, Davies
G69/2689A
Date
4.8.72
17.5.72
24.8.72
17.4.72
21.1.72
5.10.72
4.8.72 
(30.4.72)
5.1.72
11.5.72
(7.10.72)
(5).1.72
(7.10.72)
21.24.8.72
3.8.71 
27.8.69
10.10.71 
.72
20.8.71
14.10.71
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Note on GU Archive Collection of ÏÏCS Ephemera.
251.
This material is lodged alongside the collection of company records 
of the constituent UCS firms which comprised the consortium. The 
business records themselves^following the UCS liquidation^ passed to 
the Strathclyde Regional A?/cMve and are held in part at the central 
repository and Glasgow University providing an almost unparal.leled 
source of material concerning the industrial history of the West of 
Scotland,
The collection of ephemera is also one of the most extensive and 
comprehensive records of any industrial struggle in post-war Scotland,
It was originally established in 1973 by J.R. Hay and J, McLauchlan 
of the Department of Economic History of the University of Glasgow and 
an interim catalogue was published in the Journal of the Scottish 
Labour History Society, No. 8, June 1974? pp. 21-38» Since then the 
witei' has considerably augmented this collection with the material 
recovered in the course of his own research £md has reorganised the 
entire collection. Tiie main categories and som?ces of evidence from 
which this thesis has cited are as follows:
1. Material produced by the UCS Co-ordinating Committee comprising
bulletins, leaflets, pamphlets, cartoons, posters and records of 
discussion with vaxdous bodies concerning the future of the yards.
2. Press releases and statements of the major political parties,
3. Publications of various Marxist and socialist groups then active
on Clydeside.
4. Local authority minutes of Clydebank Town Council,
5. Publications of religious organisations concerned with UCS.
252.
6. Official government publications and reports relating to the 
UCS liquidation.
7. The STUC committee of inquiry, interim and final reports, 
together with the full transcripts of the inquiry proceedings 
and the STUC annual reports,
8. The transcripts of the Co-ordinating Committee tapes and 
BBC TV News recordings discussed in appendices 36 and 37.
9. Summaries of press reports from local and national newspapers,
10. Personal files on UCS of leading trade union figures,
11. The complete records of the Scotstoun yard shop stewards 
committee from the mid-1950*s to I98O recovered by the writer 
when the yard finally closed,
12. Taped interviews with participants in the UCS struggle listed 
in appendix 39 together with some earlier recordings made by 
Hay and McLauchlan,
253.
Appendix 39 
Note on and index to UCS taped interviews,
254,
The number qE* formal interviews conducted was relatively small.
In the main they were confined either to leading UCS shop stewards 
or members of the official trade union and labour movement. Numerous 
other discussions of a less formal nature were held with many trade 
unionists and political figures who were active in this period and 
involved in the events at UCS, However, as nearly ten years had 
elapsed since the work-in the main value of interviews lay in drawing 
a picture of the general political atmosphere of the period rather 
thah in pursuing specific points of detail, Hogwood's important 
transcript of the Open University interview with John Davies provides 
some insight into government ministerial reaction to UCS. Danny 
McGarvey who, like Davies is now deceased was regret ably never 
interviewed in depth during the UCS crisis.
It is unfortunate that apart from the small group interviewed 
by Pauline Hunt for her Edinburgh thesis no wider investigation, 
especially of ranlc and file attitudes was undertaken by locally- 
based social scientists. The nearest approach to an attempt to 
reflect the attitudes of the 'ordinary worker', is contained in some 
of the sequences of the documentary film of the UCS work-in produced 
by Cinema Action Ltd,, with financial assistance from the UCS 
Co-ordinating Committee.
In addition to the following list of interviews, Hay and 
McLauchlin conducted interviews in 1973-74 with Kit Carson, Ian Smith, 
Joe Moriorty, Benny Biggins and Gerry Ross, all of whom worked at 
UCS and these tapes are also lodged in the GU Archives.
255.
List of taped interviews
Jimmy Airlie, Govan, 15 July 1979.
Sammy Barr, Scotstoun, 11 July 1979°
Tony Benn, I4P, 6 September 1979.
Joe Black, Clyde Confederation, 12 February I98O,
Jimmy Blackwood, Clydebanlc, 27 October I98O,
Stuart Borthwlck, Clydebanlc Christian Action Group, 8 May 1979.
Willie Clydesdale, Clydebanlc, 15 May 1979*
Bobbie Dickie, Willie Robertson, Con O'Neill, Clydebank, 22 May 1979. 
Arnold Henderson, Clydebanlc Tovm Council, 15 August I98O.
Join Kerr, ex-Guardian correspondent, 5 February I98O.
Jimmy Kirkpatrick, Govan, 11 May 1979.
Willie McClafferty, Clydebank and District Trades Council, 27 January I98O, 
Roddy McKenzie, Clydebanlc, 5 May 1979*
Alan McKin!).ay, ex-Superintendent of police, Clydebank, 5 June 1979.
Alex Murray, Scottish Secretary CPGB, 2 August 1979, 6 November 1981,
Jimmy Reid, Olydebanlf,, 29 May 1979.
Jerry Ross, Clydebanlc, 2 May 1979» 6 June 1979» 15 June 1979.
Donald Tonner, Clydebanlc Confederation, 19 February I98O.
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Appendix 40 
UCS Jokes
257,
ÜCS Jokes
1, 'Do you Imov; what Airlie *s new kid is called?
No whaZk?
Govan I 
IVhy's that?
Because its a late delivery,*
2. 'Mrs. Reid, they've taken your man to hospital hut he's alright.
The ambulance men had a terrible job getting the straight-jacket on
him though. It took them about three hours to do it!' 'That's nothing,* 
says Reid's wife, 'its taken me three years to get a working jacket on 
him.' (Reference to Reid's legendary 'prowess* as a tradesman).
5. Policeman walking along South Street, just outside Connell's yard 
apprehends worker carrying a large colour TV set.
'Where did you get that?
In the yard!
Don't give us it, they don't sell TV's in there.
No, I won it in the shop stewards' draw.
Is that the first prize? Christ that's great'.
No, that was the second prize, the first prize wae a week with the 
Co-ordinating Committee.' (Reference to all the trips made by shop 
stewards around the country and abroad).
4. Reid and Airlie in a taxi in London, driver receives call sign 
over M s  radio, Airlie to Reid, 'Christ Jimmy that's the only thing 
you've never been on.''. (Reference to Reid's exposure on the mass 
media).
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Appendix 4I 
TICS Photographs
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THE WORKERS AT CLYDEBANK I 5 JTJNE I 97I
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I
»
MASS MEETING AT CLYDEBANK TO DECIDE ON WORK-IN 
15 JTJNE 1971
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0
GERRY ROSS, SUB-CONVENER AT CLYDEBANK TELLS THE GATEMAN THAT 
THE WORKERS ARE IN  CHARGE 3OTH JULY I 97I
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BENN CONES TO CLYDEBANK TO SUPPORT THE WORK-IN.
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THE WORKERS GREET EDWARD HEATH OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL HOTEL, 
GLASGOW 10TH SEPTEMBER I 97I
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PLESSEY WORKERS CARRY A COFFIN
278,
Appendix 42
Diagram of Consortium
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Appendix 43
281.
Cassette Contents
1. Jimmy Reid at Clydebank July 197*1 addressing workers. BBC TV 
News G71/100/101, 50 July 197*1; BBC TV documentary 'The fight for 
Clydeside' 21 September 1971» Reel 2.
2. Jimmy Airlie repudiates Davies's 'blackmail*, attempt, 8 October 
1971» Mass meeting at Linthouse, SRO, UCS Transcripts, Vol. 1,
Tape 7B.
3. Reid addresses Rosevale shop stewards meeting, 10 August 1971 
BBC TV News transcripts, n,1,54» Reel 9*
4. Conn Higgins and Reid on the 'Victoria Street' document, UCS 
shop stewards, report on National Confederation, I5 October 
1971» SRO, UCS Transcripts, Vol. 1, Tape 8A and B,
5. Sam Barr, Tommy Stewart, Willie Clydesdale, John O'Neill and 
Gerry Ross discuss withholding the vessels, UCS Shop Stewards, 
meeting Clydebsj.ik 24 January 1972, SRO, UCS Transcripts, Vol. 2,
Tape 11A.
6. Jimmy McCrindle, Airlie, Benny Biggins, John Donnelly and Reid 
on the Clydebank bonus controversy, UCS Shop Stewards, meeting 
Clydebank, 16 August 1972, SRO, UCS Transcript, Vol. 3» Tapes 
16b and I7A,
7. Airlie, Sam Barr, Reid, Willie Holt and McCrindle on the boilermakers' 
rejection of the Govan Agreement, UCS Shop Stewards, meeting, 
Linthouse, 3I August 1972, SRO, UCS Transcripts, Vol. 3» Tape 18A,
8. Joe Black, Williams, John Connolly, Airlie and Joe Brown,
Lyceum finishing trades meeting on re-imposing 5Op levy, UCS Shop
Stewards finishing trades meeting, Lyceum, 2 October 1972, SRO, UCS
Transcripts, Vol. 3» Tapes I9A and B. j GLA2GO".v |
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